Freedom tale

HAMAS: Friend or Foe in the Fight Against Islamist Terrorism

2010-03-01T11:12:00.000-08:00

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. with the support of the international community launched the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), positioning Islamist terrorists in the center of this war (Raghavan, pp. 149-150). However, the GWOT did not make a strategic distinction between Salafi-jihadist groups waging global jihad, such as al Qaeda (AQ), and other Islamist movements regarded by the majority within the Muslim world as resistance movements fighting Israeli occupation and enjoy considerable popular support, such as HAMAS and Hezbollah. Instead, the U.S. has sought to weaken HAMAS and undermine its control of Gaza, arguing that weak HAMAS is well positioned within the overall war against Islamist terrorism.

Therefore, the international community boycotted HAMAS and enforced complete blockade against the 1.5 million Palestinians living in Gaza Strip under HAMAS control, following its violent takeover of the Strip in 2008, at the heal of domestic dispute with its rival Fattah. The Gaza blockade and the human suffering, combined with the worldwide financial crackdown against HAMAS financing, have angered the Muslim public opinion, which considered the GWOT a war against Islam.

Due to the significance that Palestine has assumed in Islamic discourse for more than half a century, AQ has used Palestine to be at the heart of its propaganda campaign against the West. The genuine evolution of HAMAS from a terrorist group to an insurgency abiding by the Laws of Armed Conflict in its fight against Israel deserves a review of US strategy towards the group. Removing HAMAS from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) will better serve the GWOT by improving the relations with the Muslim world, isolate AQ and deprive it from one of its major weapons to gain sympathy and support for its terrorism

1- Understanding HAMAS

It is essential for US policy makers to recognize the ideological roots of the HAMAS movement, and the Islamic framework of its identity in order to formulate an effective strategy that further pushes the movement into the path of moderation, away from terrorist tactics. Without some knowledge of Islamic reasoning and discourse, actions and statements by HAMAS and other Islamist organizations will remain opaque and meaningless, and the West will remain oblivious to significant developments on the part of its adversaries. This is not arguing that everything HAMAS or one of its officials says should be taken at face, instead, pointing out that HAMAS, within its own frame of reference, is signaling real shifts that are understood in the Arab and Islamic world. If Israel and the West wish to attempt to coexist peacefully with HAMAS, which is itself not at all a given, they must develop the capability to understand its language (Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, 2009, p. 15)

HAMAS, known in Arabic as Harakat al Muqawama al Islamiyya (the Islamic Resistance Movement), was first established by a group of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leaders in the Gaza Strip led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, as the first Palestinian intifada (uprising) erupted in mid-December 1987 (Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, 2009, p. 4).

Therefore, it’s critical to recognize the fact that HAMAS since its inception has been embedded in the culture and jurisprudence of the Muslim Brotherhood (p. 17). HAMAS's traditional projection of itself as an uncompromising resistance movement, and its popularity is derived from its resistance to the Israeli occupation (Hroub, 2006, p.10). Although many Palestinians do not necessarily identify with HAMAS’s Islamist ideology, they are nonetheless sympathetic to the movement and its role within their society, particularly because HAMAS is not perceived to be tainted by corruption (Malka, 2005, p.43)

Less than a year after its formation, HAMAS issued its Charter (or covenant), which has continued to define the organization in Western eyes. Scham and Ibn-Irshaid in their critique of HAMAS’s Charter argued that the Charter, drawn up in direct response to the outbreak of the first intifada and when its raison d’être was armed resistance to the occupation (Hroub, 2006, p. 7), is an unapologetically hard-line document that vividly promises destruction to Israel.

Article 1 of the Charter characterizes HAMAS as an Islamic movement, with “Islam as its doctrine and source of notions, concepts, and perceptions regarding the universe, life, and man; and by which HAMAS’s conduct is governed, inspired, and guided righteously.”

Article 2 defines HAMAS’s ideological identity and orientation as an extension of the intellectual school of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is referred to as “a global organization, the largest Islamic movement in the modern era, [which] features deep understanding, precise perception, and a comprehensive approach to all Islamic concepts in various spheres of life.”(Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, p. 5)

Thus, HAMAS’s conceptual framework, including its approach to Palestinian nationalism, is unequivocally rooted in Islam. For example, Article 11 of the charter affirms “that the land of Palestine is an Islamic waqf (trust) endowed for Muslim generations until the Day of Resurrection, and should not be compromised entirely or partially, or relinquished entirely or partially.”

Article 13 states that “various initiatives of [settlement], and the so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences to resolve the Palestinian issue contradict the tenets of the Islamic Resistance Movement, as compromising any part of Palestine is equivalent to the omission of a part of our religion.” Hence, according to the same article: “[There is] no solution to the Palestinian cause save jihad (religious struggle); for initiatives, proposals, and international conferences are nothing but a waste of time and absurd nonsense; and the Palestinian people are too dignified and righteous to allow tampering with its future, rights and self-determination.”. In HAMAS’s communiqué of December 7, 1993, issued to commemorate the sixth anniversary of the intifada, the movement reiterated that “jihad is the only way to liberate Palestine, and that force is the only language of understanding with the enemy.”

HAMAS was organized on the basis of rejecting Israel and its existence. Article 9 defines the objectives of HAMAS—“fighting, humiliating, and defeating untruth in order for truth to prevail; wresting the homeland.” It states further that “from its mosques, the call for prayer [adhan] shall start over announcing the establishment of the state of Islam.” This is reasserted in HAMAS’s twenty-eighth communiqué, issued on August 18, 1988, which states that “Palestine is Islamic from the [Mediterranean] sea to the [Jordan] river” and that HAMAS’s purpose is the liberation of “Palestine, all of Palestine.”

A simple reading certainly suggests that declared ideology of rejecting Israel and denying its right to exist necessarily mean, in practice, that it is impossible to deal with HAMAS or come to terms with its ideological and political discourse that is the case. Nevertheless, as Scham and Ibn-Irshaid continued to argue, these hard-line, unequivocal assertions do not necessarily reflect the movement’s current positions, which have evolved over time. They further argued that there is a wide disparity between the movement’s early ideological assertions, which were composed at its inception, and much of its everyday political conduct and discourse. Indeed, the movement’s actions and direction cannot be understood without recognizing this distinction (p. 5)

Furthermore, Scham and Ibn-Irshaid argued that HAMAS’s literature and statements during the movement’s early years reflect a genuine confusion over how to deal with Jews, a confusion which has been resolved by the eventual adoption of a much clearer position that reflects hostility to actions by Jews against Palestinians and not hostility to Jews simply on the basis of belief or because they are Jewish (p. 6)

2- HAMAS and the recognition of Israel

Scham & Ibn-Irshaid in 2009, explained that the issue or recognizing Israel is much bigger than HAMAS, and one of the most sensitive and dangerous issues for the entire Muslim world. According to the tenets of Shari‘a, it is unlawful to recognize Israel since it is founded on aggression, injustice, and the usurpation of Muslim land—that is, Palestine. This view is supported by dozens of fatwas (Islamic edicts) by Muslim scholars who have prohibited the recognition of Israel under any circumstance. Palestine’s land, according to these scholars, constitutes a waqf, and no portion of it may be surrendered, of whatever size and thus cannot be ruled by non-Muslims (p. 9). Moreover, it is particularly sacred because it contains the third most important city for Muslims, after Mecca and Medina.

Therefore, according to Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, for HAMAS, “recognition” of Israel would represent a negation of the rightness of its own cause and would be indefensible under Islam. Furthermore, HAMAS’s incessant declarations that it will never recognize Israel are based on the overwhelming preponderance of Islamic jurisprudence on the subject. Recognition would be a matter of grave theological and political import that affects the whole Islamic world (p. 16)

Although HAMAS, as an Islamic organization, will not transgress Shari‘a, which it understands as forbidding recognition, it has formulated mechanisms that allow it to deal with the reality of Israel as a fait accompli. These mechanisms include the religious concepts of tahadiya and hudna and HAMAS’s own concept of “Palestinian legitimacy.” A tahadiya stopped most violence between HAMAS and Israel from June to December 2008.

Hudna is a truce for a specific period, which is based on the practice of the Prophet Mohammad and on subsequent events in Muslim history. HAMAS has indicated on a number of occasions its willingness to accede to a hudna with Israel, assuming basic Palestinian rights as set forth in the Arab Peace Initiative (API) are agreed to first. However, since there is a consensus among Muslim jurists that an open-ended or, more specifically, a permanent hudna is prohibited, because in their reasoning is that a hudna without a time certain will lead to the nullification of jihad, therefore according to HAMAS, hudna with Israel expresses the continuity of conflict, but does not convey an end to the conflict (p.11)

Moreover, though HAMAS would not directly participate in peace negotiations with Israel, HAMAS has indicated that it would be willing to be part of a Palestinian coalition government with Fatah under which Fatah would negotiate the actual treaty.

Understanding the Islamic bases of HAMAS’s policies and worldview will be essential for the success of any process in which it is engaged (Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, p. 3)

3- Current Western strategy towards HAMAS

HAMAS was listed by the US as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), the US government refused to deal with Palestinian government formed by democratically elected HAMAS following its landslide victory in free and transparent legislative elections in 2006. At a White House press conference with Abbas held on May 26, 2005, President George W. Bush reiterated the U.S. stance that HAMAS is a terrorist organization that must be dismantled, stating that “[o]ur position on Hamas is very clear, it’s a well-known position and it hasn’t changed. …HAMAS is a terrorist group, it’s on a terrorist list for a reason.” This has been the U.S. position since the organization was designated a “Terrorist Organization Which Threatens To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process” by Executive Order 12947 on January 23, 1995, and by the U.S. Department of State as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” since 1997 (Malka, 2005, p. 50)

However, the EU and U.S. diverge on policies toward militant Islamist groups like Hezbollah and HAMAS (p. 10). Officially, the EU does not communicate with HAMAS, although over the past year, there has been a softening in the European position, with France admitting to having had contacts with the group. British, Italian, and Greek members of parliament have met with HAMAS officials in early 2009. Despite increasing international pressure to alter its position, the United States, under both the Bush and Obama administrations, has so far refused to talk to HAMAS until it renounces violence and recognizes Israel (Hamid & Kadlek, 2010, p. 11)

Furthermore, Scham & Ibn-Irshaid in 2009 contended that the strategy of both the United States and Israel was and still is based on the following assumptions:

- HAMAS is irrevocably opposed to recognizing or coming to terms with Israel’s existence
- Economic, political, and military pressure will affect the Hamas regime either by prying away its popular base, forcing it to modify its behavior significantly, destroying it as an organization.
- Direct talks with HAMAS are pointless and likely to be counterproductive, because
there is nothing to talk about. This assumption is reinforced by HAMAS’s virtually
identical stance with regard to its talking with Israel, though HAMAS is eager to talk
with the United States (pp. 3-4)

Moreover, the “Quartet” (consisting of the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations), which had a role in overseeing Palestinian-Israeli negotiations,
enunciated three conditions that had to be accepted by HAMAS in order for sanctions
to be lifted and for it to be accepted as a player in the Palestinian-Israeli political
process. Hamas had to:

(1) recognize the right of Israel to exist
(2) repudiate violence and “terrorism” (which HAMAS considers legitimate resistance)
(3) recognize previously signed agreements between the PLO and Israel—agreements that HAMAS had consistently rejected (Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, p. 13).

This represents a common dynamic in Western responses to Muslim and Arab approaches—that is, demanding clear, explicit, and unambiguous language. Such language is the norm in the West but not in the Middle East, where indirection and nuance are often used to indicate change, largely in order to spare the party making the change from public humiliation (p. 13)

Therefore, the West’s strategy towards HAMAS is based on isolation, even though HAMAS has been elected to government. In doing so, the West has imposed policy of collective retribution against the Palestinian people for their democratic choice, especially those living in Gaza. However, the costs of collective retribution outweigh the benefits, and therefore can’t be an effective deterrent. As Colby in 2008 explained, such policy “has the potential to radicalize fence-sitting populations, alienate public opinion, ease al Qaeda efforts to establish common cause with other groups, generate anti-Americanism, weaken friendly states” (p. 52).

Furthermore, what weakens the US war on terrorism when it includes Palestinian terrorism is lack of clear definition of terrorism itself by the international community. Following the attacks of September 11, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Arab League (AL) stressed their empathy for the Palestinians and reiterated their positions rejecting “any linkage between terrorism and Islamic and Arab peoples, including the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples, right to self-determination, self-defense, sovereignty, resistance against Israeli and foreign occupation, all of which are legitimate rights enshrined in the UN Charter and
international law” (Miskel, 2004)

4- HAMAS’s Evolution

The evolution of HAMAS from predominately terrorist organization—based on Western definition—into an insurgency fighting an illegal occupation, began in the fall of 2004, and took shape in two major aspects: Political strategies and military tactics.

A- Political strategies:

In 2004, HAMAS decided to participate in the Palestinian municipal elections, which
were held in four stages in 2005. HAMAS’s candidates met with considerable electoral
success, despite strong opposition by Fatah. Running municipalities fit nicely within HAMAS’s ideology of providing daily services to the needy Palestinians and shoring up its grassroots support. However, from its establishment, HAMAS had steadfastly refused to run in any national elections, either for PC or for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA), as both these structures grew out of the Oslo accords, which HAMAS opposed and considered illegitimate, it had never recognized the legitimacy of either (Hroub, 2006, p. 6).

Therefore, when HAMAS announced in 2005, its intention to participate in the Palestinian legislative elections, it was a surprise for both its friends and foes. HAMAS’s participation in legislative elections represented a de facto acceptance of the Oslo Accords. Furthermore, HAMAS’s participation would necessarily require Hamas to deal with Israel and the international community and engage in political compromises, which are a major shift in HAMAS’s attitude (Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, 2009, p.12).

However, for HAMAS, participation in the legislative elections falls within its comprehensive program for the liberation of Palestine, the return of the Palestinian people to their homeland, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Furthermore, this participation [in the elections] was a means of supporting the resistance and the intifada program, which the Palestinian people have approved as its strategic option to end the occupation (Hroub, 2006, p. 8).

HAMAS’s landslide victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections of January 2006 came as an unwelcome and unexpected shock to both Middle Eastern and international regimes, with the organization winning nearly 58 percent of the Palestinian Legislative Council seats (p. 3). Nonetheless, HAMAS attempts to form a National Unity Government along with Fattah movement and other factions, failed due to domestic and international pressure (Hroub, 2006, p. 16), which led HAMAS to form its own government, but was quickly boycotted by the West and Israel.

However, during the run off for legislative elections in the fall of 2005, and in the course of negotiating National Unity Government in March of 2006, to forming its own government, HAMAS has produced three important documents: the 2005 electoral program; the 2006’s draft National Unity Government program, and government platform after the collapse of coalition talks, as presented by Prime Minister-elect Ismail Haniyeh in his inaugural address to the Palestinian Council (PC) on 27 March.

The three documents reveal beyond question that the demands of the national arena have driven HAMAS in dramatically new directions, and represent in themselves an evolution in HAMAS's political thinking toward pragmatism and the Palestinian "mainstream”, compared to its radical Charter (Hroub, 2006, p. 7 & 25). HAMAS’s electoral platform , which chose “Change and Reform” as its slogan, focused primarily on domestic issues, with particular emphasis on governance and reform and was designed to carry out exactly the kinds of reform that had been demanded by Western governments and financial institutions (Hroub, 2006, p. 11).

Furthermore, though the language of the electoral platform overall is secular and bureaucratic, with the virtual absence of military resistance from the platform, the religious references that it does contain fuelled suspicions (arising from HAMAS's origins and history) that the movement was quietly working toward its true agenda, the Islamization of society. For its part, HAMAS justifies its Islamic language and positions on the grounds that they reflect the true nature and aspirations of society (Hroub, 2006, p. 15 & 19).

Moreover, HAMAS’s problematic previous rejection of international agreements on Palestine signed by PLO, was transformed into a more moderate approach expressed by HAMAS’s government Prime Minister Ismail Hanieyh who stated that “The government [HAMAS] will deal with the international resolutions [on the Palestine issue] with national responsibility and in accordance with protecting the immutable rights of our people.", which represent a major shift on HAMAS's part, showing an obvious attempt to maintain a delicate balance between appeasing international observers and HAMAS's own constituency (Hroub, 2006, p. 17)

Most importantly, the entire HAMAS’ government platform, is based on the concept of the two-state solution according to the 1967 borders, without a hint of the "liberation of the entire land of Palestine" or "the destruction of Israel" or even “armed struggle” found in the Charter (Hroub, 2006, p.17 & 22). HAMAS’s government went further and declared for the first time its intention to deal with Israeli officials, assuring Israel of non-belligerence and smooth interaction, when Prime Minister Haniyeh announced in a major departure from its 1988 Charter "The government and relevant ministries will take into consideration the interests and needs of our people and the mechanisms of daily life, thus dictating necessary contacts with the occupation in all mundane affairs: business, trade, health, and labor.".

Thus, evidence that HAMAS had implicitly responded positively to some of the demands to comply with international order, was by no means sufficient for the West and Israel to recognize or acknowledge any progress. Presumably they understood that HAMAS could never accede to their demands directly and publicly; that would be understood by HAMAS’s friends and enemies alike as surrender of its ideological identity and virtually an end to its raison d’être (Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, 2009). Thus, although HAMAS had, in its own frame of reference, moved its position significantly closer to what the Quartet demanded, this was not understood, accepted, or valued because, in Western terms, it clearly did not represent an unambiguous acceptance of the Quartet’s demands.

B. Military tactics

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks by Islamist terrorists, HAMAS suspended its attacks against Israel, especially its suicide attacks, and sought to maintain a low profile and avoid being targeted by the war on terrorism (Malka, 2005, p. 41). However, for HAMAS, there is no contradiction between political activity and military activity; both, they claim, go hand in hand as dual parts of the resistance. In fact, HAMAS believes that military action and resistance will strengthen the Palestinian political and negotiating position. As Masha’al has stated, “[N]egotiating without resistance leads to surrender but negotiating with resistance leads to real peace. Therefore, HAMAS will never give up its military struggle against Israel, as long as Israel existed.

However, what has evolved in HAMAS’s military strategy is refraining from using terrorist tactics, specifically suicide attacks targeting Israeli civilians, and restricting its military operations against Israeli military targets, and within the parameters of armed struggle. This evolution in HAMAS’s military tactics was caused by the following factors:

1) HAMAS’s desire to gain international legitimacy, recognition and support for its cause.

HAMAS’s new strategy to win international recognition was fueled by its ascent to power after its victory in legislative elections, and its desire to present itself to the world as moderate governing political party, which might result to an end of its economic and diplomatic blockade by the international community. Furthermore, gaining popular support is one of the insurgents’ most important strategies to ensure the success of their operations (O’Neill, p. 49), and a key to overcome the deficiencies of their military power in face of government’s resources superiority (p. 93).

Gaining popular support can be decisive factor in achieving final victory for an insurgency even when the government forces win on the battlefield, as in the case of Algerian insurgents against French forces (p. 54). Civilian support is the essential element of successful guerrilla operations employed by insurgents, and renders them hard to subdue and control (p. 94). As Ignatieff in 2002 argued that targeting civilians would alienate valuable support. Furthermore, according to Bard O’Neill popular support to insurgents could take the form of passive or active support, with the latter being the most important kind (p. 95).. What counts as valuable support depends critically on whether the struggle needs international approval to succeed. Struggles that need such support may be more willing to subject themselves to ethical restraint than those that believe they can win on their own terms.

2) Distancing itself from Salfi-Jihadi Islamist groups, such as AQ, and other groups operating in Palestinian territories.

In order for HAMAS to evade being an immediate target in the GWOT, and portray itself as a liberation movement resisting occupation, HAMAS had to practice a different form of violence than that often used by AQ, including suicide attacks and targeting civilians. Instead HAMAS ameliorated Hezbollah’s successful model of guerrilla warfare against Israel, while running for elections and participating in governments (Malka, 2005, p. 43).

According to Hoffman, guerilla warfare although share the same tactics as terrorism, it “refers to numerically larger group of armed individuals, who operates a military unity, attack enemy military forces [hit -and -run style], and seize and hold territory, while exercising some form of sovereignty or control over a defined geographical area and its population” (p. 35). Hoffman argued that the distinction between guerilla warfare and modern terrorism is important because while the latter is condemned the former can be considered legitimate in certain cases such as fighting a foreign occupation or to attain independence. However, an overlap does exist between the two (p. 36).

Within the context of seeking international recognition as legitimate liberation movement fighting occupation, HAMAS seemed to have abandoned its reliance on terrorism to achieve political gain. Furthermore, HAMAS’s violent takeover of the Gaza Strip, provided the movement with a territory to defend, and needed to be branded an insurgency waging guerrilla warfare against Israel.

3) Qaradawi’s revisions concerning jihad

In order to maintain legitimacy and credibility among its supporters, HAMAS, as nationalist movement embedded in Islamic ideology, always sought to justify its actions or ideological shifts within Islamic jurisprudence. The Islamic justification of HAMAS’s tactical shift leading to its military evolution away from terrorism and more towards guerrilla warfare against occupation, was provided by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, probably the single most influential living Sunni Islamist figure and closely associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, in his 2009 book entitled Fiqh al-Jihad (The Jurisprudence of Jihad) which decisively repudiates al Qaeda's conception of jihad as a "mad declaration of war upon the world." (Lynch, 2009).

Qaradawi also offers an intriguing broadening of the concept of jihad, away from violence to the realm of ideas, media, and communication -- which he calls the "jihad of the age." The weapons of this jihad should be TV, the internet, email and the like rather than guns. Persuading Muslims of the message of Islam and the importance of this jihad in the path of God should be the first priority, he argues: "the jihad of the age, a great jihad, and a long jihad." He also goes into great detail about the different forms of jihad, the need for pragmatism, and the diverse nature of possible relations between Muslims and non-Muslims (Lynch, 2009).

Therefore, it’s fair to argue that HAMAS’s vision of waging jihad has broadened to include the greater jihad, which is the building an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, after succumbing to the reality that it will not be able to defeat Israel militarily—the lesser jihad.

5- Conclusion

While the 9/11 attacks occurred in the U.S., the casualties came from approximately 80 countries and any reprisals have the potential to impact the people of many nations (Gray & Wilson, 2006, p. 33). Despite the psychological barriers erected as a result of the war on terrorism, U.S. policymakers must adjust to the new realities taking shape in the Palestinian political arena (Malka, 2005, p. 51).

The genuine evolution of HAMAS, which began in 2005 following its landslide victory in legislative elections, from resistance movement using terrorist tactics to an insurgency using guerrilla warfare, and abiding by Laws of Armed Conflict, deserves a reassessment by the U.S. of its strategy towards the movement. Engaging HAMAS and removing it from the list of FTO, which many observers challenge its fairness (Best, 2001, p. 8), will result in an end to the blockade of Palestinian civilians in Gaza, deprive AQ and other Islamist terrorists from their main weapon in their anti-American rhetoric, and remove a major hurdle in reaching an international agreement on the definition of terrorism.

Furthermore, Western governments can improve their image in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims by demonstrating a willingness to engage popular Islamist movements, and that they are serious about democracy promotion. A “strategic dialogue with HAMAS allows Western governments to influence Islamist groups to respect regional security interests, including Israeli security, Iraqi stability, and combating terrorist groups” (Hamid & Kadlek, 2010, p. 12)

Without doubt, there are many who remain highly skeptical of HAMAS's new face, suspecting a ploy to gain power by concealing true agendas. But it is equally true that the "new" discourse of diluted religious content-to say nothing of the movement's increasing pragmatism and flexibility in the political domain-reflects genuine and cumulative changes within HAMAS. Whether HAMAS would destroy the system given the opportunity remains subject to speculation.

However, with the ever mounting external pressures on HAMAS, in the form both of ceaseless Israeli attacks on the Palestinians to embarrass the government and of United States-led Western cutting of aid to the Palestinian people and efforts to isolate the government, the chances of aborting the natural development of a "new HAMAS" appear great.

Historically, the U.S. has dealt with persons and groups that have engaged in terrorist activities, when they have been accepted as leaders of sovereign states that the U.S. might find it necessary to cooperate with to accomplish important national goals. Dealing with such leaders is distasteful, even abhorrent, but some observers will see it necessary (Best, 2001, p. 8).

In recent history, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. has made a distinction between the secular Ba’athist Party insurgents who stage guerrilla-like hit-and –run operations or carrying out attacks using IEDs, and the foreign terrorists belonging to al Qaeda who are responsible for suicide attacks and beheadings (Hoffman, p. 36). Because of that distinction, it became part of the US policy in Iraq to negotiate with Sunni insurgents, for example members of al Sahwa (awakening) councils, and invited them to participate in the political process and armed them to fight al Qaeda, a strategy that has been proven very effective in weakening al Qaeda in Iraq and saving US lives according to General David Petraeus.

Much as President Ronald Reagan did with the PLO during his administration’s final days in office, the US should set out clear and unambiguous guidelines for a political dialogue with HAMAS. If HAMAS agrees to suspend its terrorist attacks and is able to impose discipline on its military cadres, enforce rule of law, and accept the parameters of a negotiated agreement with Israel leading to the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, the United States should reconsider its position of banning contacts with HAMAS’s political leadership, tone down rhetoric calling for its elimination, consequently removing it from list of FTO, and resolve HAMAS’s future as a military organization another day.

Such strategic engagement should be viewed as part of the global war on terrorism and not a softening of U.S. resolve (Malka, 2005, p.51). Weakening HAMAS within the Palestinian territory will create a vacuum were Salfi-Jihadi groups are striving for decades to have a foot and export Islamist terrorism within Israel’s borders. HAMAS not only can constitute a safeguard against AQ attempts to gain access to Israel, but also an ideological barrier against the infiltration of AQ ideology within Palestinian society (Levitt & Cohen, 2010)

Finally, one way to reduce terrorism is to create incentives for liberation movements to comply with the Geneva Conventions during armed struggle and to penalize them, with international ostracism, when they do not (Ignatieff, 2002, p. 1154)

6- References

Best, R.A. Jr. (2001, December). Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. , Congressional Research Service, pdf document

Colby, E. (2008, June). Expanded Deterrence. Policy Review

Gray, J. M. & Wilson, M.A. (2006, January). Understanding the “War on Terrorism”:
Responses to 11 September 2001.

Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. (2nd ed). New York: Columbia University Press

Hroub, K. (2006, Summer). A “New Hamas” through its documents. Journal of Palestinian
Studies, 35 (4), pp. 6-27.

Ignatieff, M. (2002). Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Terrorism. Social Research, 69(4), 1137-1158.

Levitt, M. & Cohen, Y. (2010, January). Deterred but determined: Salfi-Jihadi groups in the
Palestinian arena. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, pp. 1-47, public
website

Lynch, M. (2009, July). Qaradwai’s Revisions. Foreign Policy Blog, public website,
retrieved from http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/09/qaradawis_revisions

Malka, H. (2005). Forcing Choices: Testing the Transformation of Hamas. Washington
Quarterly, 28(4), 37-53

Miskel, J. (2005, June). Arab and Muslim Approaches to the Definition of Terrorism.
Norwich faculty paper, pp. 1-5

O’Neil, B. (2005). From Revolution to Apocalypse: Insurgency & Terrorism (2nd ed).
Potomac Books, Inc. : Washington DC

Raghavan, V. (2004). The Double-Edged Effect in South Asia. Washington Quarterly,
27(4), 147-155. http://search.ebscohost.com.library.norwich.edu/

Overcoming impediments to international cooperation against terrorism

2010-01-31T07:19:00.000-08:00

Transnational terrorism waged by Islamist terrorists represents a major challenge to international security, which necessitates an unwitting cooperation by all countries in order to effectively confront this asymmetric and unpredictable form of threat (Gray, 2002, pp. 8-11). The Global war on terrorists is not only a battle of arms and ideas (Posen, 2002, p.1), but also a battle for the hearts and minds, where all elements of international power including intelligence; law enforcement; military; financial, diplomatic and intellectual to defeat the terrorists and isolate their radical ideology that inspired others to join or support them (Probst, 2001, pp. 4-5: Posen, 2002, p.1))

Effective international cooperation in the war against terrorists cannot be achieved without addressing the impediments to such cooperation; among them are the lack of international agreement on the definition of terrorism itself, and placing domestic politics and national interests ahead of those of the international community as a whole. Using examples from ongoing policy efforts describe impediments to international cooperation against terrorism and assess ways in which these impediments can be overcome

Barry Posen in 2001 argued that the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States today is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends (p. 5). Al Qaeda (AQ), formed by Salafi Jihadists and led by Osama Ben Laden (OBL), perpetuated the most horrific terrorist attack in history on September the 11th, in New York and Washington, and is the main transnational Islamist terrorist group that exists today. AQ is seeking to establish pan-Islamic regime, create and exploit a division between the Muslim and non-Muslim world and within the Muslim world itself, and ignite a clash of civilizations, which OBL himself firmly believes

Therefore, the war on Islamist terrorism cannot be won without winning the war of ideas, which require the cooperation between the Muslim world and the West in particular, and among the entire nations in general. Such cooperation will not be achieved without reaching a common ground based on the shared human values and address the impediments that undermine international cooperation in the war on terrorism. Among these impediments are:

1- Absence of international agreement on the definition of terrorism

Islamist terrorism is not monolithic (Posen, 2001, p.5). Most of the ME and the Muslim world doesn't see eye for eye with the West in their classification of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), and in this regard, unlike AQ, HAMAS and Hezbollah are not considered terrorist organizations, but rather resistance movements against Israeli occupation (Bahgat, p. 58). John Waszark in 2004 argued that “the major weapon in the arsenal of the counterterrorist financing regime is the criminalization of material support for terrorist Organizations” (p. 683). Therefore, support to these organizations lie at the heart of disagreement between the West and Muslim world and is a major impediment to the war on Islamist terrorism, where the vast majority of the public, according to opinion polls in the Muslim world, are not willing to alter their financial practices to comply with anti-terrorism written laws (p. 692)

Furthermore, Gawdat Bahgat in 2004 explained how the opposition to US policies in the ME, Israel’s support, “America’s failure to be even-handed” in the Arab-Israeli conflict, invasion of Iraq, and labeling the GWOT as war against Islam, have contributed to rising anti-Americanism in the Muslim world in which terrorists and terrorism breed (p. 58).

Palestinian suffering is a very sensational issue across the Muslim world, and is a weapon that has been used very effectively by terrorists, especially AQ, to rally support and win sympathy for their action and also to feed into anti-Americanism. Therefore, dealing with Palestinian terrorism with its complexities through a separate strategy and within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and not through narrow definitions that no one can agree on, will isolate AQ and give more momentum to the war on terrorism, which will be then defined as the brand of AQ terrorism. Consequently, the parameters for designating FTO need to be revisited, in which a distinction must be made between Islamist terrorist organizations with global agenda that use terrorist as a strategy, such as AQ, and other insurgencies that might of have used terrorism as a tactic during an armed conflict, but no longer do so, such as HAMAS and Hezbollah. Therefore, making such distinction, and engaging HAMAS and Hezbollah, provided that they end their terrorism against Israeli civilians, will pave the way to ending the blockade against Palestinians in Gaza which is galvanizing anti-American and sentiments in the region and aiding terrorists

2- Lack of clear understanding of foreign culture, especially Muslim culture

There is an inherent need by people in any country, religion or culture for prosperity, freedom and justice and aspiring to these values is not exclusive of particular countries or group of countries. In the Muslim world, tradition plays an important role, and most of these traditions stem from religion. Therefore, Anatol Lieven argued in 2001 that the USG should have basic knowledge of the Arab and Muslim world culture, traditions, value systems, and religious sects, as it conduct its GWOT. Such understanding of Muslim culture will help the GWOT on two fronts:

A) Build “culturally sophisticated profiles of asymmetric foes, so that we may stand some chance of understanding what might best discourage them [Islamist terrorists] from proceeding”, as Colin Gray argued in 2002 (p.11). Peter Probst in 2001 argued the greatest threat to national security that the US fails to appreciate remains problems of mindset and perception, which impacts terrorists thinking, operations, strategy, tactics, and planning (p. 4). Probst added that terrorists’ perception is their reality, and we must understand this reality through their lenses not through ours, which is colored by culture, history, personal experience and bureaucracy (p. 4)

B) Such knowledge and familiarity, according to Lieven, will enable the US to rightfully characterize the “enemy” and avoid alienating the majority of those in the Muslim world who perceive the GWOT as a war on Islam (p. 2). Furthermore, as George Perkovich in his fascinating 2005’s article “ Giving justice its due” argued it will enable us to realize how the ME today, contrary to Western thinking, is striving for justice more than freedom, and that should be the emphasis of US policies towards the Muslim world.

3- Respect of International Law, human rights and civil liberties

Several analysts criticize the GWOT, especially the US Patriot Act, and the war on Iraq for their encroachment on civil liberties, violating acceptable procedures of International Law, and creating the impression that US relies on brute force and undermines legal norms, which consequently compromise the international cooperation in the war on terrorists (Best, p. 26). Some argued that waging wars of choice on other countries in absence of credible and reliable evidence that they represented an imminent threat US (Record, 2003, p. 43 & p. 18)

The US cannot afford to lose the support of friendly nations in the war on terrorists, where security services of these nations can be important sources of information for US intelligence; they know their neighborhoods and have access that US agencies do not (Deutch & Smith, 2002, p. 65). Therefore, the US must work with the international organizations and avoid unilateral actions that threaten international unity.

However, as the nature of the enemy we face today has changed, and as governments are obliged to respect international law and make an effort to preserve civil liberties, people themselves, particularly in the US, might need to change their perception on what constitute violation of civil liberties and what does not.

Chalk and Rosenau explained how the European public opinion generally accepts government intrusion into citizens' personal life as "necessary evil" (p. 51). However, in the US, the single largest obstacle to domestic intelligence remains cultural, given the history and structure of the US, where "most Americans don’t like to feel that they are being spied upon by their government or neighbors (Burch, 2007, p. 19). Where to draw a line between security needs and civil liberties, is a question that Americans themselves are ought to reconcile and without infusing partisan politics in order to provide our intelligence agencies with the necessary tools to fight this asymmetric form of threat to our national security

4- Conflict with domestic politics

Since domestic politics often shape a country’s foreign policy decisions, governments tend to appease their domestic audience sometimes at the expense of its international standing and credibility. Barry Posen, in 2002, argued how the US has often failed to act out of fear of incurring modest costs; it has applied insufficient pressure on Israel to suppress its settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza. He added that short-term domestic political gains or losses has often dominated decision-making (p 6), which has significantly hurt the US foreign policies, especially in the Middle East, and hence undermine the international cooperation in the fight against terrorists.

Furthermore, domestic partisan politics can also undermine our intelligence and law enforcement capabilities and distract reform efforts. For example, although the US has a solid legal oversight structure, however, the lack of bipartisan approach and the politicization of intelligence reforms represent an obstacle to effectively implement these reform initiatives. Burch in 2007, argued how the CIA was insulated from partisan politics from 1947-1967 because secrecy normally expected by intelligence agency was maintained and congressional knowledge and monitoring of intelligence operations was very limited (p. 3). Therefore, having less legislative and more judicial and/or independent internal oversight might be the best approach to shield national security agencies from partisan politics, as it is happening in Italy, France and other European countries

Moreover, as the 2004’s National Commission Report on terrorists financings have indicated, domestic politics has also played a role in countries like Saudi Arabia, where the balance that the government has tried to strike between the Wahhabi clergy and the more liberal ruling elite, have rendered the Saudis skeptical of US new strategies in the war on terrorism, until the country itself became a victim of a series of terrorist attacks from May of 2003 and November of 2004. Since then, Saudi Arabia viewed AQ as a domestic threat (p. 123) and has dramatically increased its cooperation with the US in the fight against terrorism to an unprecedented level (p. 126), stepped up their crackdown on terrorist financiers, captured or killed many AQ suspects and disrupted several terrorist cells (pp. 124-128)

5- Differences in Intelligence and law enforcement agencies’ structures and philosophy from one country to the other

According to Chalk and Rosenau, 2004’s comparative study of four European countries—UK, France, Canada and Australia—differences exist in the culture and modes of operations between these countries and their counterparts in the US, despite of shared strengths and weaknesses in their operational and organizational structure. These differences might stall cooperation and adds to layers of bureaucracy and create some difficulties coordinating policies and strategies. Furthermore, foreign counterterrorism agencies, which include intelligence and law enforcement, might not have the same guidelines that regulate the balance between national security and civil liberties. Therefore, the quality of information gathered by intelligence, as well as its credibility might be undermined, especially if a country has history of human rights abuses, torture or racial discrimination, or if some countries perceive certain intelligence information politically motivated, which can prevent some countries from acting upon intelligence information gathered by that country

Among the various reasons cited in 2004’s National Commission’s report on terrorist financing for Saudis’ lack of cooperation with the US their inaction against Islamic charities, such as HIF, suspected of financing terrorists, was the lack of specific and credible intelligence available for the Saudis to move against these organizations

6- Deconflating the threat

Jeffrey Record in 2003 argued that in declaring the “we [US] make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them” (p. 10), the US broadened the scope of its enemies, risked international and popular support, and undermined the resources to fight wars of necessity by lumping in the same basket all terrorist organizations, in addition to rouge states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and failed states, such as Afghanistan, instead of focusing on AQ and Islamist terrorists as the main threat to US (p. 13 & p. 18). Therefore Record argued that while transnational terrorist organizations’ most potent protection is statelessness (p. 16) therefore they are undeterrable, there is no evidence that rouge states, such as North Korea and Iran, are not subject to effective deterrence (p. 17).

7- lack of written anti-terrorism laws in some countries and lack of enforcement

Among the major hurdles in waging an effective global financial war on terrorism is the lack of written anti-terrorism laws in some countries to disrupt the financial networks funneling monies to terrorists, or the lack of enforcement of such laws when they exist.

John Waszak in 2005 argued that “the problem of suppressing terrorist financing is not necessarily one of the laws or law enforcement. Rather, the suppression of terrorist financing is made difficult for [various] non-legal reasons” (p. 707), which include:

1- Sensitivity and restraint: since terrorists rely, among other sources, on money collected from Islamic charities and mandatory zakat paid by Muslim individuals and businesses, it will is logistically difficult to sort out and clamp down on terrorist finances without running into the risk of restricting one of the main pillars Islam—zakat—and offending majority of mainstream Muslims. Therefore, counterterrorist strategists must communicate effectively with Muslim leaders and communities in the US and “be sensitive to peaceful followers of Islam not materially supportive of terrorism or terrorist organizations” (pp. 707-708)

2- Lack of financial intelligence network with the essential resources and tools for law enforcement: The building of such global network requires strong political and economic will by countries which are major international players in the fight against terrorism, such as US, Saudi Arabia and UAE. This will might be lacking in some countries because of several complex political, economic, and cultural reasons that must be addressed by policy makers (pp. 708-709).

Therefore, micromanaging an unfocused financial war on terrorism by going after every individual, charity, business or organization with suspected ties or links to terrorists, can be exhaustive, and will create an atmosphere of phobia that is counterproductive. It will be more effective to focus on identifying and detecting patterns of financial transactions that can predict early phases of terrorists’ operations. This can be achieved by combining financial information with counterterrorist intelligence, coordination between financial institutions, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, outreach to the private sector, and rely on diplomacy to achieve international engagement and ending state sponsorship of terrorism (FATF, pp. 29-35)

Conclusion

The Global war on Islamist terrorists is not only a battle of arms and ideas, but also a battle for the hearts and minds, where all elements of international power including intelligence; law enforcement; military; financial, diplomatic and intellectual to defeat the terrorists and isolate their radical ideology that inspired others to join or support them. Therefore, the war on terrorism cannot be won without winning the war of ideas, which require the cooperation between the Muslim world and the West in particular, and the entire world in general. Such cooperation will not be achieved without reaching a common ground based on the shared human values and addressing the impediments that undermine international cooperation in the war on terrorism.

International cooperation can be achieved by formulating new strategy in the GWOT that does not deal with Islamist terrorism as a monolithic threat. A distinction must be made between Islamist terrorist organizations with global agenda that use terrorist as a strategy, such as AQ, and other insurgencies that used terrorism as a tactic during an armed conflict, but no longer do so, such as HAMAS and Hezbollah. Dealing with Palestinian terrorism with its complexities through a separate strategy and within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and not through narrow definitions that no one can agree on, will isolate AQ and give more momentum to the war on terrorism.

Better understanding and appreciation of the Arab and Muslim world culture, traditions, value systems, and religious sects, will avoid alienating the majority of those in the Muslim world who perceive the GWOT as a war on Islam, and will help shape counterterrorism based on terrorists’ perception, and therefore reduce intelligence gaps and vulnerabilities

Furthermore, broadening the scope of enemies by lumping deterrable rouge states and undeterrable transnational terrorist groups will risk international agreement and unity and compromise cooperation.

As governments are obliged to uphold International Law, respect human rights, and work within international norms, peoples also need to redraw the line between national security and civil liberties, where sacrifice of some the personal freedoms might be necessary in order to meet the challenges of the new transnational terrorist threat posed by non state actors.

Effective international cooperation can also be achieved by improving quality of intelligence and seeking better coordination between law enforcement and intelligence services in different countries. Identifying and detecting patterns of financial transactions that can predict early phases of terrorists’ operations. This can be achieved by combining financial information with counterterrorist intelligence, coordination between financial institutions, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, outreach to the private sector, and rely on diplomacy to achieve international engagement and ending state sponsorship of terrorism

References

Bahgat, G. (2004, Winter). Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism. Arabic Studies
Quarterly, 26 (1), pp. 51-63. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier
Best, R. A. (2001, December). Intelligence and law enforcement: Countering transnational
threats to the U.S. , Congressional Research Service, pdf document
Chalk, P. & Rosenau, W. (2004). Confronting the "Enemy Within": Security intelligence,
the police, and counterterrorism in four democracies, RAND, Available at:
http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG100/
Deutch, J., & Smith, J. (2002). Smarter Intelligence. Foreign Policy, (128), 64. Retrieved

from Academic Search Premier .

FATF Report (2008, February). Terrorist Financing. Public website

Gray, C. (2002). Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror. Parameters: US Army War
College, 32(1), 5. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier
Perkovich, G. (2005). Giving Justice Its Due. Foreign Affairs, 84(4), pp. 79-93. Retrieved
from Academic Search Premier.
Posen, B. (2001, December). The struggle against terrorism: Grand strategy, strategy, and
tactics, International Security, 26 (3 )
Probst, P. (2001, March). Intelligence and Force Protection vs. Terrorism", in James M.
Smith and William C. Thomas, eds., The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government
Response: Operational and Organizational Factors, Colorado Springs, CO: USAF
Institute for National Security Studies, March 2001, pdf file Available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA409533&Location=U2&doc=GetTR
Lieven, A. (2001, October). Fighting Terrorism: Lessons from the Cold War. Policy Brief,

Carnegie Endowment

Record, J. (2003, December). Bounding the Global War on Terrorism. US Army War College

Strategic Studies Institute. Available at

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=207

Waszak, J. D.G. (2004). The obstacles to suppressing radical Islamic terrorist financing.

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 36(2/3), pp. 673-710. Retrieved

from Academic Search Premier

Key elements in counterterrorism strategies

2010-01-10T07:11:00.000-08:00

Paul Pillar in 2001 argued that terrorism deserves to be condemned and actively opposed by all the world’s nations because it involves conduct that offend universal values involving human life and the suffering of innocents. In this regard, counterterrorism is of a piece with international humanitarian law as it has evolved for more than a century and been codified in The Hague and Geneva conventions on the conduct of warfare and is a similarly apt subject for multilateral diplomacy (Pillar, p. 78)

Following the attacks of 9/11, the US National Security Strategy became multifaceted, and more focused as far as its threat assessment and its articulation of the nature of the “new terrorism” the country faces, compared to pre 9/11. The presence of a comprehensive, integrated and more coordinated national strategy that includes several intelligence, law enforcement and security agencies highlights the main characteristics of counterterrorism (CT) today (Hoffman, 2001; Lieven, 2001, p. 1)

Furthermore, as Pillar explained, there are several elements upon which this new post 9/11 counterterrorism strategy should address, which includes: Roots, capabilities, intentions and defenses (pp. 29-40). According to Pillar, no single approach makes an effective counterterrorism policy, which must have several elements these elements.

1- Roots

Terrorism does not arise randomly (Pillar, 2001, p. 30). Nonetheless, the National Security Strategy for the US lacks a clear understanding of the roots of terrorism’s asymmetric threats (Gray, 2002, p. 5), and consequently, a clear strategy to deal with and address these threats, without which CT today remains ineffective in its ability to prevent future terrorist attack.

A major flaw in the US national counterterrorism strategy is its downplaying of the role of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the perceived US bias towards Israel among Arabs/Muslims public opinion, as well as the US policies in Iraq during the period of economic sanctions ending with the Iraq war as some of the causes of Islamist terrorism (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006, p. 8)

Another flaw in the US national counterterrorism strategy is its mischaracterization of the Al Qaeda (AQ)’s reasons of waging jihad against the “US and the crusaders” as their hatred towards Western civilization, freedom and democracy, which is not what AQ’s literature clearly indicated.

Barry Posen, in 2001/2002, argued that AQ targeted the US mainly for its policies in the Middle East responsible for the killing and suffering of millions of Muslims in countries such as Iraq, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and imposing upon Muslims a Western culture deeply offensive to traditional Islam (p. 1). Furthermore, the US military presence in Saudi Arabia is considered by bin Laden as a desecration of the Islamic holy land. Posen’s argument seem to correlate more accurately with AQ’s statements and videotapes released in Arabic

Furthermore, the US national counterterrorism strategy emphasized the role of democracy in combating terrorism through the”advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy.” (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,2006, p.8). However, democracy promotion does not seem to be a priority for the current US administration, which eased up pressure exerted by the Bush administration on autocratic regimes to in the Middle East to democratize, in favor of their cooperation the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, Iran, and other areas that serves the interests of the US. Therefore, the lack of consistency in US foreign policies in the Middle East represents a gap in the US counterterrorist strategy

Anatol Lieven in 2001 argued that the US Global War On Terror (GWOT) should be waged in a fashion similar to the Cold War and drawing from its lessons (p. 1). He makes a valid argument that the USG should have basic knowledge of the Arab and Muslim world culture, traditions, value systems, and religious sects, as it conduct its WOT, by incorporating experts in these areas (p. 2). A need to build “culturally sophisticated profiles of asymmetric foes, so that we may stand some chance of understanding what might best discourage them from proceeding”, as Colin Gray argued in 2002 (p.11). Such knowledge and familiarity, according to Lieven, will enable the US to rightfully characterize the “enemy” and avoid alienating the majority of those in the Muslim world who perceive the WOT as a war on Islam (P. 2)

However, as Paul Pillar argued, doing something about the roots involves the management of numerous foreign policy matters that are not primarily the responsibility of people in counterterrorism (p. 30), which remains a challenge in itself. Some of these grievances are expressed directly by terrorists such as political repression, lack of self-determination, the depravity of other rulers (p. 30). Therefore, policy initiatives, peace progress, political reforms and economic reforms should be made part of measures aimed at addressing the roots of terrorism (p. 31). Furthermore, counterterrorism is not the only consideration in determining US policies. Some things that are potentially terrorist-breeding and considered unjust, may be viewed by the US for politically and ethically sound reasons, as not unjust and in no need for major change (p. 32)

Moreover, there will always remain a core of incorrigibles’ roots of terrorism, and these will include terrorists about whom the US must worry the most. Their viewpoints are simply too extreme to be accommodated (Pillar, 2001, p. 32)

2- Capabilities

Reducing the capabilities of terrorist groups to conduct attacks is at the heart of US counterterrorism programs. However, terrorists can still inflict mass casualties, which might not require much capability.

3- Intentions

Why do terrorists do what they do, matters. Nonetheless, no matter what the terrorists’ intentions are, the US has made its policy that it will make no concessions to terrorists, because not rewarding terrorism will give terrorists less incentive to try using it again (Pillar, 2001, p. 35). Although the US at times made concessions to terrorism, e.g. Iran-Contra affair, the incorrigibility of some hardcore terrorists’ demands is the main limitation of this element of counterterrorism, and therefore, there is no way to influence their intentions over long term (p. 37)

4- Defenses

Defenses against terrorism include security measures, anti-terrorist defenses, and physical defenses. The anti-terrorist defenses constitute a very large proportion f the US fight against terrorism (Pillar, 2001, p. 37). Furthermore, research and development of new antiterrorist technologies continues through the Technical Support Working Group created by the federal government (p. 38)

However, as Pillar argued, the comprehensive protection for everything in the terrorists’ sights would be prohibitively expensive (Pillar, 2001, p. 39). As the Crowe panel acknowledged, “We understand that there will never be enough money to do all that should be done, we will have to live with partial solutions, and in turn, a high level of threat and vulnerability for quite sometimes. Furthermore, terrorists themselves shift their targets depending on the limitations due to security countermeasures (p. 39)
Counterterrorist instruments

In order to ensure that a counterterrorism strategy contains some or all main four elements mentioned above, Paul Pillar in 2001, suggested five various instruments to be implemented. He argued that all instruments needs to be employed and that each element can be pursued with more than one instrument (p. 73)
These instruments of counterterrorism strategy include:

1- Diplomacy

Diplomacy influences all elements of counterterrorism, including roots, intentions, capabilities and defenses. Through diplomacy, the US can seek peace, improve its image, and persuade allies to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and combat anti-Americanism.

Therefore, effective counterterrorist diplomacy must be practiced not only by Foreign Service Officers, but also by immigration officers, FBI agents, CIA officers, and all other branches of government (Pillar, 2001, p. 74)

Counterterrorism diplomacy supports other instruments, including the application of criminal law by negotiating treaties and extraditing terrorist fugitives among states. By encouraging states not to allow terrorist groups to operate within their borders, the time and effort spent by intelligence services can then be limited and directed into other avenues (Pillar, 2001, p. 75). In order for counterterrorist diplomacy to be effective, cooperation from other states is necessary, which can be achieved through bilateral or multilateral negotiations leading to more powerful resolutions. Multilateral resolutions, e.g. UN, G8, or NATO, can provide more latitude to obtain cooperation by countries that are reluctant to bear its responsibilities in the GWOT. The case of Pan Am 103 and the implementation of UN Resolutions forcing Libya through multilateral diplomacy to cooperate in the investigations that led to successfully prosecuting those responsible for the crime (p. 76). Moreover, collective interventions through multilateral diplomacy reinforce international norms against use of terrorism (p. 77)

Among the major achievements of multilateral counterterrorist diplomacy is the rejection by the international community and UN General Assembly of terrorism as tactic against occupation, which was used predominately and condoned during the 1970. The Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, which met from 1974 to 1977, adopted a protocol that diluted the legal distinction between armed conflict and terrorist acts when it defined a combatant as someone who belongs to the “armed forces of a party to the conflict” needs to distinguish himself from the civilian population only “while….engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack (Pillar, 2001, p. 79)
Criminal law

Despite its shortcomings, applying the rule of law in terrorist cases remains a fundamental part in counterterrorism. The US national security will be served better when terrorists get punished for what they have done, which in turn, not only prevent them from conducting further attacks, but also might deter others from committing more acts of terrorism (Pillar, 2001,p. 81) Moreover, applying the rule of law reinforces democratic principles of the US, with freedom and justice their basic tenets.

However, bringing justice to terrorists through imprisonment or even capital punishment might not be effective deterrence with terrorists who are driven by religious ideology, and whose ultimate goal is to seek death to become martyrs. Furthermore, terrorists might exploit the legal system and use trials in open courts to disseminate propaganda for their cause, seek to justify their violence, and alter public perception regarding the nature of their heinous crimes. Often, the targeted audience in such propaganda would be the sympathizers and potential recruits, who the terrorists are keen on not losing their support.

Pillar, in 2001, warned of potential complacency when applying criminal justice in counterterrorism, which can be manifested through:

1- Confusing criminal justice as an instrument of counterterrorism with counterterrorism itself (p. 81). In other words, because criminal justice is focused on the punishment of terrorists after they commit their crimes, the main goal of counterterrorism should always remain the prevention of terrorists from conducting future operations

2- Prosecuting and successfully convicting terrorists might give a misleading sense of closure on terrorist crimes, that are still open, and terrorists will continue to plan and conduct their operations (Pillar, 2001, p. 82)

Although criminal justice has been playing an increasingly essential role in international counterterrorism efforts, applying criminal justice in terrorism cases remains a national issue, which Pillar argued could be because of various reasons, among them,

1- Difficulty to prosecute foreign terrorists and gather evidence that would stand in court, since most of the investigations require unfettered cooperation by foreign governments and may compromise intelligence sources. The federal government enacted the Classified Information Procedure Act (CIPA) in order to protect sensitive information during trials (Pillar, 2001, p. 85)

2- Lack of cooperation by some foreign governments despite of their commitments to the fight against terrorism. This ambivalence might be stemming from notions of sovereignty and national laws that might prohibit extradition or oppose capital punishment, in addition to political or public pressure on the governments not be perceived as collaborating with the USG, especially in some of the Middle East countries where anti-Americanism is influencing public sentiment. For example, the Khubar Towers and African embassy bombings cases (Pillar, 2001, p. 87)

3- Legal challenges in the application of international law governing extraterritorial prosecution of terrorists. The extraterritorial application for the US criminal law to terrorism relies heavily on cooperation of other states (Pillar, 2001, p. 86)

Therefore, due to the global nature of terrorism, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was proposed as a viable forum to prosecute terrorists, withstanding the various logistical hurdles and objections by major states including the US. Concerns were voiced regarding the mechanisms of handling of sensitive material and possible exploitation of intelligence sources (Pillar, 2001, p. 89).

Transferring suspected terrorists to other countries, such as Israel and several “moderate” Muslim states, for interrogation and possible prosecution, appeared to be an attractive option for USG in order to avoid possible retaliation by terrorist groups, or offending Muslim population (Pillar, 2001, pp. 91-92). However, when news about rendition operations becomes public, as in the case of CIA secret transfer of terrorist suspects to countries accused of poor human rights records and torture, the harm to US interests can be more.
Financial Controls

Contrary to common belief, controlling finances of terrorist groups and individuals plays a modest and secondary role in counterterrorism (pp. 93-94). Freezing terrorists’ monies and financial assets can undermine their ability to operate, that’s why the US has pursued their financial livelihood. Among other challenges facing financial war on terrorism is the fact the most of the financial operations take place outside the US, where, similar to criminal justice, foreign countries’ cooperation in clamping down on terrorists finances have not been limited (p. 95).

Furthermore, terrorist networks have developed multiple channels to move money around the globe outside the formal banking systems, therefore it is difficult to track. Moreover, terrorism is cheap, which makes impossible to eradicate (p. 94). It does not require significant sums of monies to blow up a truck or destroy a building in order to spread fear and make political statement.

Therefore, as Pillar argued, the value of the financial control instrument in counterterrorism will always be more symbolic demonstrating the US seriousness in countering terrorism than the material one of impoverishing terrorist groups (p. 96)
Military Force

Pillar argued that the use of military force in counterterrorism must always be an instrument available for the US to undermine terrorists’ capabilities, although it should be limited to punitive retaliatory situations (p. 99) where a high standard of proof in establishing responsibility for terrorist incident can be maintained (p. 107). He added that the cost of using military force unwisely can be staggering, especially on the diplomatic and international relations fronts, where the US is often perceived as superpower using its military muscle offensively (p. 106).

Despite of public domestic support to retaliatory military strikes against terrorist targets, foreign reactions have been mixture of cynicism and criticism of the real US intentions (p. 107). Furthermore, opponents of use of military force argue there has been no concrete evidence to conclude that military strikes have been successful in weakening terrorists’ capabilities and prevent them from conducting future attacks (pp. 102-103)

Furthermore, the use of destructive and indiscriminatory military force in retaliation to terrorist attacks have inflamed public opinion especially in the Muslim world, and have contributed to rising anti-Americanism. Since the US has began utilizing its military forces to in counterterrorism, all countries that have been attacks were Muslim, including Libya in 1986, Iraq in 1993, Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, ending with the invasion of Iraq in 2002 following the attacks of 9/11 (p. 100). Therefore, the US was portrayed by radical Islamists as the new “crusader” seeking to kill Muslims and strike poor Muslim nations (p. 107).

The use of military force as a counterterrorist instrument should be lethal, precise, and based on sound, credible and reliable intelligence in order to destroy terrorists’ capabilities and prevent future attacks with the least amount of collateral damage. This task can be best achieved by the Special Forces, which is the center of the US military’s capabilities to apply armed force to terrorists (p. 98)
Intelligence and Covert Action

Intelligence supports all the other counterterrorist instruments, with specific information as well as strategic assessments (p. 116). Therefore, it’s the most substantial instrument of counterterrorism (p.110). Human and tactical intelligence are the two main arms for information collection about terrorists, followed by meticulous process of information analysis, that should involve and coordinate with all other branches of security (pp. 110-112)

However, inherent problems and limitations with both collection and analysis of intelligence on terrorism undermine the feasibility of tactical warnings of potential terrorist attacks (p. 115). Similar to some of the European countries, some argue that the creation of a stand-alone domestic intelligence services entity is in the US is a necessary tool for CT, in order to address the limitations in intelligence information collection and analysis.

Rosenau and Chalk in 2004 argued that although significant cultural, historical, and political differences exist between the US and other countries examined in their study, and that intelligence institutions cannot and be replicated from one country to the other, there are in these countries measures that can be adopted by the US (p. XV), among them are:

1- Creating a domestic intelligence agency that focuses solely on information gathering, penetrating terrorist cells, but has no law enforcement capabilities (p. 43). However, there is no evidence to suggest that the presence of domestic intelligence agencies have actually been effective in preventing terrorist attacks in these countries, compared to what we have today in the US. The Bombings in London, Bali and Mumbai serve as example of the shortfalls in some of strategies implement by these domestic intelligence agencies in their respective countries

2- Extensive use of intelligence services in local community and reliance on information derived from HUMINT information (p. 35). Australia in particular posses a public outreach programs that emphasizes on increasing public understanding and awareness of its role, and building public trust, that can be helpful for the US (p. 37). In the countries examined in the RAND study, the emphasis on HUMINT and community intelligence/outreach was done through their domestic intelligence agencies, however, in the US in absence of such agency, this strategy can be pursued by FBI Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) spread throughout the country, but under the direct control of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and/or the NCTC not the FBI itself, which is one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission (Burch, 2007, p. 15)

Therefore, creating a domestic intelligence agency seem to be natural, especially that a series of reform initiatives from 1998 to 2001have not been able to reshape the culture within the existing intelligence agencies, especially the FBI, which seem to be resistant to change. A domestic intelligence agency that has the organizational strategic structure to effectively and precisely perform its mission of information gathering relying mainly on HUMINT and local community intelligence; effectively coordinate and share information with law enforcement and other foreign intelligence; governed by the constitutional safeguards to prevent the abuse of its power in surveillance and monitoring of private citizens for political gain, and is subject to independent internal and external oversight, can be the most valuable tool in the fight against terrorism

References

Chalk, P. & Rosenau, W. (2004). Confronting the "Enemy Within”: Security intelligence,
the police, and counterterrorism in four Democracies , RAND, retrieved from
http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG100/*Public Site
Gray, C. (2002). Thinking asymmetrically in times of terror. Parameters: US Army War

College, 32(1), 5. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier Database

Hoffman, B. (2001, March). Combating terrorism: In search of a national Strategy,

RAND. Retrieved from: http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT175/index.html

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Pillar, P. (2001). Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1st ed. Washington Dc: Brooking

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Assessing factors behind strength and resiliency of major terrorist groups

2009-10-04T09:28:00.000-07:00

Global terrorism is one of the major threats facing the world in the 21st century, and that threat is only going to get more serious (Colby, 2008, p. 43). Deterring stateless terrorists in globalized world posses even further significant challenges for the international community (Whiteneck, 2005, p. 193). The progress of technology, the increasing interconnectedness of global systems, and the accelerating advances in science and technology have increased both the productive and destructive powers (Colby, p. 43). Terrorist groups that share the same ideology can now easily operate from different parts of the world in the form of networks, exchanging resources and planning synchronized powerful attacks. Since hysterical overreaction about terrorism can be costly and counterproductive (Mueller, 2005, p. 229; Krepon 2009, p. 3); only through understanding of these new terror networks and their social movement will enable the world to mount an effective defense (Segeman, 2004, p.VII)

According to Brian Hoffman in 2005, religion provided the only justification of terrorism until the 19th century (p. 84). Then the emergence of the notions of nationalism and self-determination at the beginning of 19th century, and the growing popularity of radical political thought embracing Marxist ideology completed the transformation of terrorism from a mostly religious to predominately secular phenomenon. Hoffman added that while terrorism and religion share a long history, this manifestation was overshadowed by ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideologically motivated terrorism. This process of “secularization” was given fresh impetus by the anti-colonial/national liberation movements that arose after the Second World War to challenge continued Western rule in Asia, the ME, and Africa and subsequently exerted so profound an influence on ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideological terrorist organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s (p. 84)

Moreover, Hoffman argued that it was not until 1980—as a result of the repercussions of the revolution in Iran the previous year—did the first “modern” religious terrorist groups appear. Daniel Byman in 2007 stated that after the Islamic Revolution, Iran has been one of the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism (p. 169). Before the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1980 there were only two out of 64 terrorist groups active could be classified as predominately religious in character and motivation: the Iranian-backed Shi’a organization al-Dawa and the Committee for Safeguarding the Islamic Revolution (Hoffman, p. 84). However, in 1992, the number of religious terrorist groups had increased from 2 to 11 and expanded to embrace major world religions other than Islam, as well as various obscure religious sects and cults. Moreover, as the number of religious terrorist groups was increasing, the number of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups declined (p. 84). Throughout the1990s the growth in the number of religious terrorist groups continued to increase (p.86).

The end of Soviet war on Afghanistan in 1988 marked the birth of global Salafi jihad and its present vanguard, al Qaeda religious social movement (Sageman, pp.37-38) ,which now directed its jihad efforts to other areas where infidels had conquered or threatened former Muslim lands (p. 36), as well as Muslim governments which oppose and oppress jihadists. The evolution of Salafi jihadists throughout the course of their struggle which began during the Afghan war, meant that jihad is to be redefined to fight far enemy first (the infidels), or the “greater master” (p. 22 & p. 44) before directing their fight against the near enemy (oppressive Muslim regimes). Hence the contemporary global jihad or the new jihad (p. 20) was born in 1991 in Sudan, which witnessed an important milestone in the history of Salafi Jihad (p. 55)

Furthermore, the Saudi reliance on US and Western troops during the 1990-1992 Gulf War fueled al Qaeda’s fear that the presence of foreign troops in the holy land was part of a strategy to conquer Muslim lands, hence, the war against the West and the “crusaders” was declared by Al Qaeda on August 23, 1996, which then marked the emergence of the true global Salafi jihad (Sageman, p. 40 & p. 45). Paranoia about Western influence has become a prime motivator for Islamist groups in the ME (Abuza, 2007, p. 22). Defense against “Cultural NATO” is a theme that Iranian hardliners have also recently adapted (p. 22)

Sageman argued that the contentious concept of jihad in Islam remains one of the most useful tools for global Salafi Jihadi terrorist groups (Sageman, 2004, p.1), and one of its main factors that provide Islamist terrorists with strength and resiliency. The distinction between the greater and lesser jihad, or between defensive and offensive jihad is rejected by Salafi jihadists, who believe that da’wa and peaceful political activism are not viable strategies for the establishment of a strict and true Islamic state they saw a solution to the decadence afflicted Muslim communities (pp. 4-7). Their ideology is based on the literal interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna, or hadith, rejecting as innovation (bi’dah) any other religious and legal interpretations by scholars especially in dealing with situations no encountered in the Qur’an or Sunna (p. 4)

Furthermore, unlike the notion of separation between church and state widely accepted in the West, Salafi jihadists believe that Islam teaches its followers that religion is not simply a theory but a way of life, translating their beliefs into a living reality (p. 11) in the form of a state, system of laws and regulations (p. 10).

The freedom of Muslims to practice their religion is inherited in Islam, which implied the abolition of oppressive political systems which prevented people from freely choosing Islam (pp. 11-12). The message of Islam is also a universal that cannot be restricted by geographical, racial or social boundaries (p. 12). As Qutb explained “it is the duty of Islam to annihilate all such systems, as they are obstacles in the way of universal freedom” (p. 13). Salafi jihadists believe that only through jihad al-sayf, or violent revolt, against Jahiliyya can Muslims re-establish their once dominant Islamic state and allow Islam to lead mankind.

Radical interpretation of Islam by Salafi jihadists represents an important factor in the strength of their ideology. Islam is one of the most communal of all religions with many orchestrated shared rituals (Sageman, p. 116). Muslims are required to pray in groups five times a day at the mosques, and gather every Friday for mandatory Jumm’a (Friday)’s Prayer. Muslims also are required to perform Hajj (visit to Mecca and perform religious rituals) once in a life-time where millions of other Muslims from around the globe gather. Salafi jihadists use mosques, mostly private mosques unregulated by the state (Sageman, p. 143), to form friendship groups and begin the intensification of religious sentiment. Those social bonds seem to be the critical element in the process of radicalization, and usually precede the ideological commitment (p.135). As Victor Comras in 2005 argued, the line between being radical Islamist and Jihadist is a very thin one, and easily crossed religiously and intellectually (p. 4), therefore, Salafi jihadists can easily exploit those new potential mujahedeen into fanaticism and violence (pp. 114-115).

The technological advances in communications as a result of globalization and heightened interconnectedness (Sageman, p. 158) have enabled terrorist groups to work in robust small-networks pattern that resist fragmentation (p. 140), and enjoy flexibility (p. 164). Eliminating individuals, or hubs, through counter terrorism will not threaten the integrity of the network as whole, and a new network on the site of an incompletely destroyed one (p. 141). Furthermore, the new communication revolution in the form of satellite phones; internet; laptops; email; fax and web sites, coinciding with the rise of the global Salafi jihad in 1990s, have enabled terrorists to turn their geographical isolation into source of strength, for it provided a sanctuary and protected them from detection and retaliation (pp. 158-159). Moreover, the internet has offered terrorist a tremendous opportunity to propagate their ideology to the public and gain moral and or financial support for their operations (p. 160)

Resiliency in the tactics of global Salafi jihad was evident after the Afghan war and operation “Enduring Freedom”, which eliminated the safe-haven once used by al Qaeda and has degraded the operational capabilities of the global Salafi jihad and its ability to strike official targets in the West. Instead, the terrorist group was forced it to shift to operations on “soft targets” in their own sanctuaries (Sageman, p. 56)

Islamist terrorism may have its roots in the Middle East, but it has long since then expanded globally (Abuza, 2009, p. 15). Islamist terrorists exploited Muslims’ devotion to help the poor and the needy as ordered by Islam, in order to ensure their flow of money runs uninterrupted. The diverse sources of financing terrorist groups utilize under the umbrella of Islamic charities represent another major factor in their strength and resiliency. Middle Eastern Islamist groups embrace the inverse triangle in which a broad range of charities and nongovernmental agencies serve as cover for narrower terrorist mission (p. 17), and therefore show no intention of abandoning its core ideology. After beaten back by counter terror strategies, they regroup using both the democratic process they simultaneously fight (p. 17).

As Abuza in 2009 contended that Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestinian Territories, and Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia use a similar model of social organization and a network of schools, orphanages, clinics, and social welfare to bestow legitimacy on their activities and gain international support (p, 18). The existence of charities and social service networks has not made Hamas or Hezbollah any less violent although they have contributed to de-legitimization of governments (p. 23). Tactics may shift but strategy does not. Its assumption of political control in Gaza has not tempered its commitment to terrorism; indeed, Hamas has become even more aggressive since the January 2006 Palestinian elections (p. 23)

Furthermore, according to Zachary Abuza, 2003, the hawala system represents the primacy source of financial transfers used by terrorist groups, especially in Southeast Asia and the Middle East (p. 183). Hawala shops are spread throughout the Middle East, Asia, Latin American as well as Europe and North America (Comras, 2005, p.8). These heavily unregulated and relatively cheap transactions are also called “trust” system, works as an informal banking system (Comras, p. 8) in which the names of the individuals sending and receiving the monies are anonymous or unverified, and no records can be traced (Abuza, p. 183). Therefore, it remains the preferred and the most effective method of financing terrorist operations in different parts of the globe (Abuza, p. 183)

In countries that impose currency control measures, the hawala becomes more important. Therefore, it seems that abolishing exchange controls will encourage transactions through the regulated banking methods, but only for legitimate money transfers (Abuza, 2003, p. 185). Regulating the hawala system would also mean that names of senders and receivers and their identity is to be documented and verified, which can subsequently be invaluable tool for intelligence agencies to follow the money trails and help solve the puzzles and uncover secrets of terrorist finances (William, p.11)

Since small amount of money can be sufficient to execute even the most lethal terrorist operations (Williams, 2005, p. 1), imposing measures that would regulate the hawala system might play an important part in an overall strategy to prevent future terrorist operations. However, as Phil Williams in 2005 argued, knowing the inadequacy of the global regimes designed to combat terrorist financing and the capacity of terrorist organizations to quickly adapt to new regulations (William, p. 2) attacking terrorist finances in general can be self-defeating strategy in the intelligence process.

Victor Comras mentioned “an interesting nexus” between businesses and the charities they have used to mask their terrorism related funding (p. 6). He argued how these charities provided AQ donors with deniability of directly financing terrorism, while ensuring that the flow of funds to terrorist groups maintain its mask and escape detection. However, Comras also admitted that “much of this [business-charities nexus] is still speculation and little information has yet been gathered concerning this business-charities nexus” (ibid, p. 6)

Moreover, Comras explained how charity forms a very important part of Muslim law and tradition (p. 3). Donations in the form of the mandatory Zakat, or the optional Sadaqah, are highly encouraged and emphasized in Islam. In most part, these Islamic charities were legitimate and played an admirable role in alleviating suffering of millions of Muslims around the globe, most notably in Afghanistan, Sub-Saharan Africa, Palestine and Iraq. Therefore, cracking down on Islamic charities on the premise that they are guilty of supporting terrorism until proven otherwise, will play in the hands of terrorists who are aiming at further.

Stopping the flow of funds to terrorist organizations is impossible (William, p. 6). However, it’s essential as we search for measures to reduce prospect of using hawala system or other financial tools by terrorists to finance their operations, to realize that it’s the motivation and the ideology that has generated the dedication by many individuals, groups or organizations to provide financial aid to terrorist groups (Comras, p. 2). Winning the war of ideas against al Qaeda by empowering moderate Islamists, and addressing the growing resentment among Muslims caused by the Israeli-Palestinian situation and the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, will ensure that ordinary mainstream Muslims are engaged in the fight against terrorism, and deprive terrorists of their financial tools whether in the form of Hawala, Zakat, Saddaka monies.

Proper intelligence is essential to sort out any alleged link between an Islamic charity and terrorist activities. As Phil Williams contended, the difficulty facing intelligence today is “less about finding a needle in a haystack than finding a particular needle in a stack of needles” (p. 1). Almost all of the mosques, Islamic schools, educational centers, and major relief projects organized here in the US were all built through donations and charities. Clamping down on these charities might further alienate Muslim communities and aid radicals.

Bard O’Neill in 2004 explained that governments should try to cultivate support from the moderate religious leaders to make the case that those fanatics are disingenuous and violate the most sacred norms of the faith (p. 171). He added that popular support for Islamist terrorists could be “contained and reduced only by a focused, aggressive, and compelling battle of ideas led by respected clerics and intellectuals who could draw on Islamic theology and sacred sources to make compelling case that militant ideas and behavior, especially terrorist attacks against innocent civilians, are both un-Islamic and anti-Islamic” (p. 170)

Clamping down on Islamic charities will heighten anti-Americanism or anti-Western feelings, because it will certainly undermine numerous legitimate charities that benefit million of Muslims around the world. Moreover, since the world cannot agree on a single definition of terrorism, it will be impossible to agree on which charities or financial transactions constitute an aid to a terrorist group. Regulating, monitoring, and analyzing financial transactions is important for Western intelligence in pattern establishment and anomaly detection, but the actual battle ground against terrorists’ financial networks lies within the Muslim world

References

Abuza, Z. (2003, August). Funding terrorism in Southeast Asia: The financial network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya. Contemporary Southeast Asia, (2) 25, pp. 169-199.

Abuza, Z. (2009, Winter). Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model. Middle East
Quarterly, 16(1), 15-26.

Iran, terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (31), pp. 169-181.

Colby, E. (2008, June). Expanded Deterrence. Policy Review

Comras, V. (2005, January). Al Qaeda finances and funding to affiliated groups. Strategic Insights, (1) IV, pp. 1-16.

Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. (2nd ed). New York: Columbia University Press

Krepon, M. (2009, May). The Mushroom Cloud That Wasn't. Foreign Affairs, 88(3), 2-6.

The role of Moderate Islamists in the fight against terrorism, case study of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

2009-08-29T11:37:00.000-07:00

The attacks of September 11, 2001, the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, and the war on terror, mainly Islamist terrorism, have strained the relations with the Muslim world, which considered the US and the West at war with Islam. Part of the failure of the US strategy to engage the Muslim world in the war on terror is the lack of a clear strategy that distinguishes between moderate and radical Islamists. By lumping both radicals and moderates in one basket, the US policy makers and the West have alienated a large number of the Muslims who supported moderate Islamists in general elections, and considered them the hope to change the status quo in the Middle East and end corruption and oppression.

Moderate Islamists can be an effective partner in the fight against terrorism, for their enmity to radical Islamists and the stark differences in their ideologies. Most Mideast analysts would agree that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, is the most popular and the most formidable grassroots organization in the Islamic world (Walsh, p. 84), and is also a safety valve for moderate Islam (Leiken, p. 6), seeking to translate the abstract theoretical principles of Islamic governance into a practical political platform (Rutherford, p. 707). Moderate Islamists with their effective strategies to combat radicalism, while wining the hearts and minds in their constituencies, can serve well the goals of the fight against international Islamist terrorism. Furthermore cooperation [between MB and US] in specific areas of mutual interest—such as opposition to al Qaeda, the encouragement of democracy, and resistance to expanding Iranian influence—could well be feasible (Leiken, p.14)

Terrorism remains the primary national security challenge confronting the United States and will be for many years (Hamilton, 2005, p. 379). Until the 19th century, religion provided the only justification of terrorism. Then the emergence of the notions of nationalism and self-determination at the beginning of the 19th century, and the growing popularity of radical political thought, embracing Marxist ideology completed the transformation of terrorism from a mostly religious to a predominately secular phenomenon (Hoffman, p. 84). This process of “secularization” was given fresh impetus by the anticolonical/national liberation movements that arose after the Second World War to challenge continued Western rule in Asia, the ME, and Africa and subsequently exerted so profound an influence on ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideological terrorist organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s (p. 84). While terrorism and religion share a long history, this manifestation was overshadowed by ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideologically motivated terrorism. At the height of the cold war, when the majority of terrorist groups (eight) were left-wing, revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideological organizations, the remaining three-including the various constituent groups of the PLO—reflected the emergence of the first postcolonial ethno-nationalist/separatist organizations (p. 85). It was not until 1980—as a result of the repercussions of the revolution in Iran the previous year—did the first “modern” religious terrorist groups appear

The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the resurgence of religious terrorism by radical Islamic movements, made it important for policy makers to realize the difference in ideology these groups have with moderate and mainstream Islamic movements (Walsh, 2003, p.82). Mideast experts, following 911, argued that force alone has not resulted in the defeat of terrorism and that diplomatic initiatives directed at coaxing local leaders to encourage or implement change have not yielded the expected effects. As a consequence, these experts favor a “new” idea—namely, bringing the Islamist movements into the political processes of the individual countries of the region. The United States and its allies should therefore encourage Islamists to participate in democratic reforms (Hoveyda, 2005, p. 119)

The dramatic events that followed the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran brought concept of contemporary political Islam to the forefront of the world’s attention. Journalists, scholars, and other specialists have developed and are continuing to create concepts and a vocabulary to describe the Muslim world and its relationship to the West. The use of the adjective moderate to describe some Muslim leaders and movements is one example of this phenomenon (Hoveyda, 2001, p. 53).

The phrase “moderate Islamists” as opposed to “hard-line Islamists” was first introduced by American journalist of Middle East origin, Geneive Abdo. Until then “Islamist” used as both a noun and an adjective designated Muslims who adhered to the more fundamentalist and extremist views than those of mainstream. Therefore, from that perspective, an Islamist, by definition, is an extremist and cannot be labeled a moderate (Hoveyda, 2001, p. 53)

Especially after 9/11, the phrase “moderate Islamist” is often used in the literature and media to refer to movements of political Islam which reject global jihad while embracing elections and other features of democracy (Leiken, 2007, p. 2), and an extension to the 19th century’s reform ideologies of prominent scholars such as Muhammad Abdoh and Jamal-ed-Din Afghani, who had traveled to Europe, became convinced of the necessity of reforming certain parts of the theological interpretations in light of modern scientific knowledge (Hoveyda, 2001, p. 55)

Most Mideast analysts would agree that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, is the most popular and the most formidable grassroots organization in the Islamic world (Walsh, p. 84), and has also became a safety valve for moderate Islam (Leiken, p. 6), seeking to translate the abstract theoretical principles of Islamic governance into a practical political platform (Rutherford, p. 707). The Brotherhood differs from earlier reformers by combining a profoundly Islamic ideology with modern grass-roots political activism (Leiken, p.2)

In contrast, radical Islamists, or Jihadists, movements, which developed in an unchanged environment steeped in fundamentalism since the twelfth century, and influenced by scholars such as ibn Taymiyya (fourteenth century, Syria); and Abdal Wahhab (eighteenth century, Arabia) (Hoveyda, 2005, p. 506). These ‘‘extremists’’ are often called Salafis, whose central ideas were crystallized in the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya. Its adherents seek to transform the Muslim community and ensure that Islam as a system of belief and governance will eventually dominate the globe (p. 509)

Shamuel Bar in 2004, argued that radical interpretation of Islamic teachings has become a source of terrorism committed by militant Islamists, which constitute the lion share of terrorists acts and the most devastating of them (p. 27). According to Bar, “radical leaders of Islamist Jihadist-type movements used deeply ingrained religious beliefs to motivate Islamist terrorists and provide them with religious and moral justification to sanction their actions” (p. 28)

Therefore, Bar contended, it’s important to recognize these cultural and religious sources of radical Islamic ideology and address them in order to develop an effective counterterrorism strategy, and without such recognition the war on terror will doom to failure (p. 28 & p .36)

The Islamic Awakening of the early twentieth century, which emerged in response to Western imperialism and colonization, led to the revival of the more “traditional” or “fundamental” form of Islam as a religion and governing system (din wa dawla), where no area of human activity is outside its remit (pp. 28-29). Fundamentalists saw that the decay of the Muslim nations caused by their deviation from the original mores of Islam (p. 28). “Perfection lies in the ways of the Prophet and the events of his time” (p.29) without taking into consideration historical circumstances and developments.

Therefore, in this radical Islamist worldview, the world was dichotomized into two opposing worlds, the House of Islam (Dar al-Islam—i.e. the Muslim countries) and the House of War (Dar al-Harb—non Muslim countries) as it was the case when Islam first appeared (p. 29). The military form of global Jihad was then declared when the Soviets (infidels) invaded Afghanistan in 1980s, which ended with spectacular victory over a superpower. The triumph of Jihadists in Afghanistan and the collapse of the USSR galvanized militant Islamists who argued that the renewal of Jihad against infidels “will result in the rule of Islam in the world” (p. 30)

Fatwas (religious decrees) by religious scholars stipulating that Jihad is a “personal duty” played pivotal role encouraging radicalism and building support for radicals within the traditional Islamic community (p. 32). The controversial concept of irreversibility of Islamic identity –individual or territory—was also instigated by radicals to support their ideology of militant Jihad and to open more fronts not only with non Muslim states but also with apostate Muslims (p. 29)

The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic radicals share the same long-term goals of implementing Shari’a laws as the basis of national law (Walsh, p. 82). However, Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy (Leiken, p. 2). Even among pro-terrorist tendencies within Islamist politics one must be careful not to create artificial uniformity (Schwartz, p. 283). The MB has committed itself to working within the current Egyptian system to achieve this objective and renounces—at least in its official statements—the violent tactics of militant splinter groups such as al-Gama’at al –Islamiyyah and al-Jihad (Walsh, p. 82). It offered the important message that Egyptians can return to “true” Islam and still be materially comfortable (p. 84)

It is important as we are trying to identify the enemy we are fighting (Hamilton, p. 380), to make the distinction between moderate and radical Islamists in order to win the fight against terrorism, but without losing the public support in the Muslim world, which is increasingly rallying behind the moderates in their respective countries for various domestic reasons. Distinction between “Islamist” and “radical Islamist” is as significant as the distinction between “reformer” and “revolutionary” in the contemporary United States (Walsh, p. 36). Islamists are not monolith and lumping them all together in the basket of “radicals” and “terrorists” will hamper the efforts to combat the real roots of terrorism and complicate the efforts to seek common ground with the Muslim world. Leiken and Brook argued in 2007 how the “nuance is lost in much of current Western discourse. Herding these different “beasts” into a single conceptual corral labeled “Salafi” or “Wahhabi” ignores the differences and fault lines between them—and has thwarted strategic thinking as a result” (p. 6)

In their 2007’s study of the “moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, Leiken and Brook elaborated further on the use of various nomenclatures and its different interpretation in Western and Middle Eastern literature. For example they explained that “When we asked Muslim Brothers in the Middle East and Europe whether they considered themselves Salafists (as they are frequently identified), they usually met our question with a Clintonian response: “That depends on what your definition of Salafist is.” If by Salafism we meant the modernist, renaissance Islam of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh (turn-of-the-twentieth-century reformers who influenced Banna), then yes, they were Salafists. Yet the ubiquitous Web site www.salafipublications.com, which is run by Salafists who believe that religion should never mix with politics and that existing rulers should be supported almost unconditionally, attacks Afghani and Abduh for being “far away from the Salafi aqidah [creed].” (This is the view, for obvious reasons, of the Saudi religious establishment.) Such “pietists,” most of whom were trained in official Saudi institutions, argue that the Brotherhood’s participation in politics has converted them into the “Bankrupt Brotherhood.”According to one, “The Muslim Brothers have political goals and strategies, which induce them to make concessions to the West. For us, the Salafists, the goal is purely religious.” (p. 6)

Hamilton in 2005, identified five essential elements in order to win the fight against terrorism; these five elements or five I’s” include: identification, integration, international, intelligence, and implementation. He argued the identifying the threat and knowing who the enemy is and therefore designing a strategy to confront it remains one of the most important of these elements (p. 379)

Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission listed al Qaeda, and other Jihadist groups inspired by its radical ideology, as the main terrorist threat to national security. Beyond these groups there are 1.3 billion Muslims around the world, many of whom may be empathetic to the jihadist agenda, even if they disagree with their violent methods. Therefore, it is the ideology of radical Islam that poses a grave and gathering threat, not simply individuals or groups who can be hunted and destroyed. This ideology joins anti-American political grievances with a radical strain of Islam. Sadly, this ideology reaches many Muslims: those who are hopeless or unsettled by modernity; people who hate America and their own repressive governments, and that is why the threat is bigger than just al Qaeda (Hamilton, p. 381)

Therefore, in order to prevail over the ideology of radical Islamists that breeds terrorism, we cannot rely solely on massive military force (Schwartz, p. 291) instead we must implement a comprehensive strategy that uses all elements of America power (Hamilton, p. 382). Failure to address the political and sociological causes of terrorist recruitment will only lengthen the life of and increase the effectiveness of terrorist groups (Schwartz, p. 291)

Moreover, fighting wars against states with significant Islamic populations will curtail security cooperation with states in the Islamic world (Schwartz, p. 285) and enrage its people. However, lethal military force remains crucial to win the struggle against active terrorists by relying on target killing or apprehending them through Special Forces operations. The large number of civilian casualties caused by conventional wars between states is likely to be self-defeating, as they potentially enlarge the recruitment pool for terrorist groups. And such ‘‘collateral damage’’ can be ethically justified only if such attacks were absolutely necessary to curtail terrorism and if the casualties were unintended, as well as unavoidable in achieving a particular military objective (that is, in accord with the just-war doctrine of ‘‘double effects’’). The civilian casualties from high-altitude bombing in Afghanistan were not absolutely necessary to uproot Al Qaeda and its Taliban government hosts (the use of more ground troops would have been ethically preferable (Schwarz, p. 286)

The 9/11 Commission recommended that combating terrorism must rest on an effective strategy to isolate radical Islamists by engaging the people across Muslim world in the battle for ideas, and show them that we are on their side. Right now, millions of Muslims grow up lacking political freedom, economic opportunity, and hope, and suffering at hand of governments, including U.S. allies, which repress their populations and deny them political participation (Hamilton, p. 384)

Isolating radical Islamist ideology without alienating public Muslim opinion can be best achieved by empowering moderate Islamists and pragmatics who are, because of their knowledge of Islamic thinking and ideologies and their increasing public support are better suited to debate radical elements within their societies. The exact same meaning was uttered by the leader of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party in Jordan, said that his group outdoes the government in discouraging jihad: “We’re better able to conduct an intellectual confrontation, and not a security confrontation, with the forces of extremism and fanaticism.” (Leiken, p. 7). Especially when repressive and undemocratic governments can be a major source of radicalization of the young people which ultimately breeds terrorism.

Historically, oppression of moderate Islamists by their governments has resulted in waves of radicalization. According to Schwartz, 2004, the origins of pan-Islamic global terror partly derived from U.S.-backed regimes suppressing their moderate Islamist political opposition. Then in the late 1970s, Sadat’s brutal suppression of a fairly moderate Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi hostility to any religiously inspired dissent, and Algerian suppression of the Islamic Salvation Front engendered a pan-Islamic political sensibility, as nationally based Islamist parties were no longer viable (p. 282).

Walsh, in 2003, added that because the United States has long condoned the anti-terror campaigns in several Middle East countries; an unfortunate consequence is that though the threat to the regimes from the radicals has been successfully contained, these government continue to receive an international mandate for repression of all dissident Islamic groups, not only the violent ones (p. 82). These governments’ main goal is not to combat terrorism, but rather oppress their political rivals who happened to be moderate Islamists to ensure their continuous grip on power

Furthermore, the suppression of Islamist politics by secularist, often pro-Western regimes and the failure of both Arab socialist and Arab nationalist projects helped introduce global and anti-American elements into the strategy of ‘‘lesser jihad” (p. 282). Therefore, as Schwartz argued, the United States would be more likely to enhance its security through diplomatic and economic pressures in favor of liberalizing Middle Eastern and South Asian regimes, pressuring not just for more liberal treatment of secular dissidents but also for the expansion of political space for nonviolent Islamist movements (p. 284). Leaders who are cooperating with the West in general and with the United States in particular are doing so out of fear of their own people or their rivals at the helm of government in other Muslim countries. By supporting such rulers unconditionally, the United States is ensuring that it will be harmed when the people in the area turn against them and drive them from power (Hoveyda, 2001, p. 51)

Hoveyda in 2005 argued that in addition to the military force we are using in our own defense, we must find appropriate ways to isolate radicals inside the Arab world and to expose the dangers of their ideology for the Arabs themselves (p. 122). Rutherford in 2006 explained how moderate Islamist scholars, mainly in Egypt, with their contemporary interpretations of Islam can help bridge the gaps that divide the Muslim world and Western civilization and remove some of the roots of radicalization and terrorism. These moderate, reconciliatory, and most importantly “authentic” interpretations of Islam are the West’s best hope to end hostilities with the Muslim world and isolate radicals. Once isolated, these radicals can be apprehended or even killed with little sympathy from the public.

For well over a century, Egypt has been an important center for legal thinkers seeking to adapt Islam to the challenges of contemporary governance. This effort began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the works of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, and Rashid Rida. It continues today with a new generation of Islamic thinkers. The most important figures in this effort are Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Tariq al-Bishri, Kamal Abu al-Majd, and Muhammad Salim al-'Awwa (Rutherford, p. 708). They are influential among the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly the "new guard" of younger leaders who have grown more powerful within the organization in recent years. Raymond Baker argues that they constitute a coherent school of Islamic reformist thought that he calls the "New Islamists”

These moderate Islamists argue that the Qur'an and Sunna (teachings of the Prophet Mohamed) are silent on many specifics of running a state and, thus, man-made law is needed to manage the details of day-to-day governance. Therefore, unlike radical Islamists, they favor the creation of man-made laws as long as they are compatible with Shari'a. (Rutherford, p. 711). Abu al-Majd argues that Shari'a plays the same role in Islamic legal thought that natural law plays in the American constitutional tradition. It defines the purposes of state power and delineates its boundaries. Within these boundaries, rulers and citizens are free to develop specific laws that respond to the needs of their community (p. 712)

Moderate Islamists believe that state power must be restrained, the government must be held accountable (Rutherford, p. 713), the political authority lies with the people and they are entitled to select their ruler and should participate in day-to-day governance (p. 714). They also believe that these ideas are best realized in contemporary political life through democratic institutions. These institutions include:

Elections: support for selecting public officials through free elections. Each citizen has a religious obligation to vote, since he has a religious duty to convey his knowledge of the candidate for office.

Political Parties: the theorists also endorse the creation of multiple political parties. Al-'Awwa adds that the presence of multiple parties reflects the principle of tolerance of dissent, which he considers fundamental to the faith. He concludes that, "The existence of political parties ... is necessary for the advancement [of Islamic societies] and for freedom of opinion within them, and to ensure the absence of oppression” (p. 715)

Parliament: The Islamic constitutionalists argue that a parliament is the most effective institution for enabling the public to participate in the drafting of laws in those areas where the Shari'a is silent (p. 716)

Rutherford added that moderate Islamist thinkers note that they borrow these institutions from Western democracies. However, each stresses that this borrowing is done in a highly selective manner. Al-Qaradawi's view is typical when he writes that the Islamic world must "take the best elements of democracy without seeking to duplicate it". The central goals of an Islamic state are to enhance justice and oppose tyranny. At this moment in history, democratic institutions are the best means for achieving these goals and, thus, democracy "is the form of government that is closest to Islam.'" However, democracy in an Islamic context must operate within the ethical framework defined by Shari'a. It must not lead to laws that allow what is forbidden in Islam (such as adultery or alcohol consumption) or prohibit what is required (p. 716)

Furthermore, moderate Islamists stress the importance of justice and freedom of choice in Islam, however, al-'Awwa adds an important caveat: the freedom to leave the Islamic faith is restricted. The Qur'an clearly declares that apostasy is a sin, although it does not specify a penalty. Freedom of thought, inquiry, and speech are essential to the full expression of each Muslim's faith." In addition, al-'Awwa proposes that each Muslim bears an obligation to "enjoin good and forbid evil" within the community. In order to fulfill this obligation, each Muslim must be free to speak out against evil and corruption. Speaking out in this manner is a religious duty and, thus, freedom of speech is divinely sanctioned and mandated (Rutherford, p. 716)

Al-Qaradawi offers the most detailed discussion of women’s rights. He stresses that women have the same duties as men, and that they play an important role in the life of the community. Trying to exclude them from public life "is like trying to breathe with one lung or fly with one wing (Rutherford, p. 716). In his view, women should be allowed to vote and to hold public office (p. 717), and be permitted to hold positions of authority, including the posts of judge and head of state (p. 718). They also advocate protecting the rights of non-Muslims. "No compulsion in religion." (Quran, 2:256). Al-'Awwa makes essentially the same argument, and proposes that sectarian strife has risen in recent years because of political opportunism by trouble makers on both sides (p. 718)

Moderate Islamists, therefore, share core beliefs of liberal democracy. They support freedom of choice and expression, rule of law, political participation and protect the rights of women and non-Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood has frequently dismissed the notion of an incompatibility between Islam and democracy (Walsh, p. 85). Brotherhood seeks to create a "republican system of government that is democratic, constitutional, and parliamentary and that conforms to Islamic principles." (Rutherford, p. 721)

The Brotherhood’s evolving social network is probably more responsible than anything else for the enormous power the organization could now wield in an open election. These services are compatible with the organization’s Islamist message and thus can serve as an important counterbalance to the supposedly divinely-sanctioned violence of al Gama’ at and al-Jihad (Walsh, p. 84). The MB followed the path of toleration and eventually came to find democracy compatible with its notion of slow Islamization. An Islamic society, the idea goes, will naturally desire Islamic leaders and support them at the ballot box. The MB also repeatedly justified democracy on Islamic grounds by certifying that “the umma [the Muslim community] is the source of sulta [political authority].” In pursuit of popular authority, the Brotherhood has formed electoral alliances with secularists, nationalists, and liberals. Therefore, jihadists view the Brotherhood’s embrace of democracy as blasphemy (Leiken, p. 4)

Instead of the Madrasahs models, run by radicals and Jihadists, which teach students intolerance and radicalism, and even deny girls education, the Egyptian MB created modern schools, where boys and girls are offered equal opportunities for education, learned foreign languages and taught to be effective members in societies. The MB works to dissuade Muslims from violence, instead channeling them into politics and charitable activities (Leiken, p. 6)

Moderate Islamists reject terrorism, violence and killing of innocent civilians who are not involved in combat. As Robert Leiken and Steven Brook argued in 2007, the MB itself played a role in resisting radicalization within its own ranks, when “Sayyid Qutb, then the MB’s most profound thinker, and in response to extreme oppression by Nasser’s regime, produced an answer that would echo into the twenty-first century: these were the acts of apostates, kafireen. Accordingly, the torturers and their regime were legitimate targets of jihad. But from his own cell, Hudaybi (MB General Guide) disputed Qutb’s conclusion. Only God, he believed, could judge faith. He rejected takfir (the act of declaring another Muslim an apostate), arguing that “whoever judges that someone is no longer a Muslim ... deviates from Islam and transgresses God’s will by judging another person’s faith.”Within the Brotherhood, Hudaybi’s tolerant view—in line with Banna’s founding vision—prevailed, cementing the group’s moderate vocation. But it appalled the takfiris, who streamed out of the Brotherhood. Qutb, who breathed his last on Nasser’s gallows in 1966, went on to become the prophet and martyr of jihad. “Qutb has influenced all those interested in jihad throughout the Islamic world,” said a founding member of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, an erstwhile jihadist group known for its vicious campaign against foreign tourists in Egypt during the 1980s. “The Brothers,” he continued sadly, “have abandoned the ideas of Sayyid Qutb.” (Leiken, p. 4)

Leiken and Brook further reputed a common myth accusing the MB, and movements of moderate Islam of spawning other terrorist groups. They argued that “having lost the internal struggle for the Brotherhood, the radicals regrouped outside it, in sects that sought to topple regimes throughout the Muslim world. (Groups such as al Jihad would furnish the Egyptian core of al Qaeda.) These jihadists view the Brotherhood’s embrace of democracy as blasphemy. Channeling Qutb, they argue that any government not ruling solely by sharia is apostate; democracy is not just a mistaken tactic but also an unforgivable sin, because it gives humans sovereignty over Allah. Osama bin Laden’s lieutenant, Zawahiri, calls it “the deification of the people.”Abu Hamza al-Masri, the one-eyed radical cleric who presided over London’s notorious Finsbury Park mosque, considers democracy “the call of self-divinity loud and clear, in which the rights of one group of people, who have put their idea to vote, have put their ideas and their decisions over the decisions of Allah.” Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (whom a recent West Point study found to be the most influential living jihadist thinker) inveighs, “Democracy is obvious polytheism and thus just the kind of infidelity that Allah warns against, in His Book.” (Leiken, p. 5). In London, Brotherhood leaders contrasted their approach to that of radical groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (ht), that “seek to bring society to a boiling point.” (Leiken, p. 7)

On the other hand, the MB’s success in elections, professional syndicates and social support institutions led to harsh response from the Egyptian government from the mid-1980s, onward. Initially, in 1981, Mubarak offered the MB olive branch, legitimizing it as the primary representative of centrist Islamism, which place militants outside the mainstream. Once they are isolated, he can take forceful measures against them with little protest from Egyptian sympathetic to centrist Islamists (Walsh, p. 82)

However, the MB gained popularity and penetrated professional and student association. In 1990s, the brotherhood had taken over nearly all of the prominent associations. The Brotherhood exploited the longstanding alienation of young, educated Egyptian professionals who had been guaranteed government jobs upon graduation since the days of Nasser but had become heavy burden on the state. The social support network that the Brotherhood had cultivated as the third wing of their campaign during this period was an enormous draw for these professionals; the Brotherhood offered full health insurance and other considerable welfare benefits that no other organization could provide (Walsh, p. 83). The MB experience in the past 20 years have suggested that it may be more capable of providing social services to the Egyptian population, more reliable in keeping the promises it has made, and even more democratic than the secular regime that has enjoyed consistent US support (Walsh, p. 82)

Therefore, and in order to undercut the MB’s chances of presenting itself as viable alternative to the dysfunctional government, Mubarak took measures to crackdown on MB activities that would show a lack of rigid discrimination between radicals and moderates, and very possibly Mubarak’s recognition of the moderates as the greater political threat. In the remainder of the 1990s, there were violent outbreaks that erased the distinction between radicals and moderate Islamists in Egyptian government policy. Warfare erupted between the government and Islamic radicals from al-Gama’at al-Islamiyyah and al-Jihad, launching series of terrorist attacks between 1995-1997, after the Gulf War. The government’s campaign against Islamic radicals succeeded in isolating the violence, but also struck the MB. The regime arrested a number of civic officials, academics, former parliamentarians, and members of professional syndicates

In 2001 and 2002, when several younger MB leaders who were imprisoned in 1995, were released and resumed their positions in the organization. Another turning point occurred in 2004, when the 84-year-old General Guide Ma'mun al-Hudaybi passed away. Al-Hudaybi had been one of the most eminent members of the old guard. His death marked the beginning of a transition toward a new generation of leadership. While the younger generation was not permitted to take the top spot, two of its most respected leaders — Muhammad Habib and Khayrat al-Shatir — were promoted to the post of Deputy General Guide. The new General Guide, Muhammad 'Akif, publicly endorsed the moderate political views articulated by the younger generation (Rutherford, p. 721)

Despite of the MB tolerance and moderation facing increasing repression by the Egyptian government; Egypt’s interior minister said to The Economist,” The Brotherhood is a greater threat to the safety of the state than the terrorists and the militant groups. We are determined not to go Algeria’s way”. In 1994, Mubarak told The New Yorker “The Middle East terrorism is a by-product of our own illegal Muslim Brotherhood” (Walsh, p. 84), despite of lack of evidence that supports the MB violent tendencies (p. 85). MB leader Ahmed Hassanein insists that the Brotherhood has never ordered an act of terrorism, even during the organization’s truly underground days in the peak of the Nasser revolutions. Even today, there have been no concrete links made between acts of terrorism and anyone who might be construed an official of the MB. The Brotherhood does not deny, however, that members of the organization have committed radical acts. Just because the Brotherhood shares the same long-term goal as radical group does not necessarily mean there is an overlap in their short-term methods, and at this point there is no evidence to undermine the Brotherhood’s peaceful rhetoric (p. 86).

According to Leiken & Brook “The Brotherhood claims success at sifting radicalism out of its ranks through organizational discipline and a painstaking educational program. (One Muslim Brother noted that the organization’s motto could be “Listen and Obey.”) If a Muslim Brother wishes to commit violence, he generally leaves the organization to do so. That said, a number of militants have passed through the Brotherhood since its inception, and the path from the Brotherhood to jihad is not buried in sand. Defections have historically occurred when the organization has faced a conjunction of internal and external pressures, as when the takfiri element emerged under repression to produce the Egyptian jihadist movement. Today, however, Brothers who leave the organization are more likely to join the moderate center rather than to take up jihad” (p. 7)

Few of the vices the Western world seeks to combat in the Middle East apply to the Brotherhood, but many of them do apply to the Egyptian regime, which has unquestionably failed to deliver meaningful economic relief to an extremely poor population, remains undemocratic, and uses violence in an arbitrary fashion. In this light, the gap between Western and centrist Islamist interest seems significantly less difficult to close (Walsh, p. 86). Furthermore cooperation [between MB and US] in specific areas of mutual interest—such as opposition to al Qaeda, the encouragement of democracy, and resistance to expanding Iranian influence—could well be feasible (Leiken, p.14)

References

Bar, S. (2004, June). The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism. Policy Review

Campagna, J. (1996, summer). From accommodation to confrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak years. Journal of International Affairs, 50(1), 278.

Hamilton, L. (2005, Summer). Fighting terrorism. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies,
12(2), pp. 379-390.

Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. (2nd ed). New York: Columbia University Press

Hoveyda, F. (2001). Moderate Islamists? American Foreign Policy Interests, (23), pp. 53-59.

Hoveyda, F. (2005). A new strategy against Islamist terrorism? American Foreign Policy
Interests, (27), pp. 119-123.

Hoveyda, f. (2005). Understanding and fighting Islamist terrorism. American Foreign Policy Interests, (27), pp. 503-512.

Huntington, S. (1993, summer). The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22-49.

Leiken, R., & Brooke, S. (2007, March). The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood. Foreign Affairs, 86(2), pp. 107-121.

Rutherford, B. K. (2006, Autumn). What do Egypt Islamists want? Moderate Islam and the rise of Islamic constitutionalism. Middle East Journal, 60 (4), pp. 707-731.

Schwartz, J. (2004, April). Misreading Islamist terrorism: The “War Against Terrorism” and
Just-War theory. Metaphilosophy, 35(3), pp. 26-68.

Walsh, J. (2003, Winter). Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. Harvard International Review, 24(4), 32.

Anti-terrorism lessons from the Libya case

2009-08-02T11:51:00.000-07:00

Gawdat Bahgat in 2004, argued that the ongoing transformation of Libya, from a “pariah state” (p. 374, & p. 386) refusing to abide by international norms and laws (p. 390), and a state-sponsoring terrorism, into a partner in the fight against terrorism, engaging fully in multilateral economic and political relations with the rest of the world, represents the first time in the history of the international struggle against modern terrorism that the international community has succeeded in imposing and enforcing effective sanctions against a terrorism-sponsoring state under the auspices of the UNSC (p. 384). Furthermore, Ray Takeyh in 2004 contended “the Libya case can provide a model for how to deal with a revolutionary regime that has grown weary of its isolation and ostracism” (p. 72)

Libya’s strained relations with the West began shortly after September of 1969, when the 27 years old Mu’ammar el-Qaddafi, seized power toppling the conservative monarchy of King Idris. As young revolutionary, el-Qaddafi had ambitions to assume the leadership position in the Arab world once held by late Egyptian President and Arab nationalist Gamal abdel Nassar (1954-1970), which led him to direct his anger at what he perceived as “Western injustice” (Bahgat, p. 390), and blaming the West for the Arab world’s problems. Libya also provided terrorist groups throughout the world with money and arms; on top of them was the PLO, which was regarded by all Arab countries as liberation movement (p. 383). Libya’s policies as revolutionary state was similar to other revolutionary regimes in the Middle East like Egypt’s Nasser, Iran, and Iraq, which traditionally antagonized Western interests in the region and allied themselves with terrorist groups they considered liberation movements (p. 374 & 383).

John Cooley argued in 1981 explained how the US oil companies have helped create the conditions that led to Qaddafi’s seize of power in 1969 by supporting and allying themselves in the public eye with the corrupt Libyan elite (p. 74 & 78). Therefore, the US administration initially accepted Qaddafi’s regime, praising his anticommunist ideology and anti-Soviet rhetoric, and showed no sympathy to the ousted king (p. 81). The Nixon administration was also pleased when Qaddafi denounced the Soviet role in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war in the area, and his approval of the Egyptian President Sadat’s expulsion of the Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July 1972 (p. 75)

However, in mid 1970s, Qaddafi’s support for global revolution and terrorism became more apparent (Cooley, p.84), further straining its relations with the West, in particular the United States. On April 15, 1973, at the peak of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Qaddafi attempted to sink the ship Queen Elizabeth II, which had many Jewish Americans on board (Cooley, p. 86). Furthermore, the US and its European allies were greatly concerned by Qaddafi’s apparent reversal of attitudes toward the Soviet Union since 1974 (p.77). Qaddafi also took a series of decisions that would increase Libyan control over the foreign oil companies (p. 82), and by mid-1974 Libya controlled about 2/3 of its production (p. 83)

Consequently, on May 2, 1980, the US closed its embassy in Tripoli, at times when the Soviets were trying to repair their relations with Qaddafi (Cooley, pp.84-85). Moreover, Qaddafi’s regime opposed Camp David’s peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and joined the camp of Arab states that threatened to wipe Israel off the map (Cooley, p. 75). He elevated his anti-American rhetoric when he accused the Saudi Royal family of desecrating Islamic holy places by allowing a US military presence in their country following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 (Cooley, p. 89)

In the 1980s, Libya’s support of international terrorism widened, and in 1986 the US attacked Libya for its involvement in the bombing of Berlin disco killing two US servicemen (Bahgat, p. 383). Libya responded by the 1988 and 1989 terrorist attacks against Pan Am and French UTA respectively, killing hundreds of civilians from different countries (Bahgat, p. 383). Furthermore, Qaddafi has made it known that his next ambition is to make Libya the first Arab nuclear power. Libya sought but failed to buy nuclear bomb from China, and arranged to share in the efforts and proceeds of the Pakistani nuclear program by financing the Pakistani nuclear program (Cooley, p. 87). Furthermore, in pursuing his nuclear ambitions, Qaddafi attempted to obtain uranium from northern Chad occupied by Libyan troops since 1975 (Cooley. P. 88).

However, Libya’s international hostile policies did not come without a price. The UN in 1992 and 1993 imposed comprehensive sanctions against Libya, which had greatest impact weakening Libyan economy especially the hydrocarbon industry, costing Libya an estimated $26.5 billion (Bahgat, p. 384). The country’s growing oil production declined to less than half by 2003, losing its booming edge of 1960s due bilateral and multilateral devastating sanctions against Libya’s oil and gas industry. The deteriorating economic conditions in Libya-30% unemployment and 50% inflation rates (Takeyh, p. 65)- compounded by the collapse of the oil prices in 1998/1999, which revenues constitute 75% of the government expenditure and the main source of its foreign currency (p. 377-378), led to mounting popular unrest in Libya fueled by Islamist insurgency, and competing politics between pragmatics and hardliners within the Libyan elites, sending the country into chaos by mid-1990s (Takeyh, p. 65).

Takeyh argued that the UN sanctions following Lockerbie—particularly oil and technology embargo—and their devastating effect on Libya’s economy shattered Qaddafi’s long beliefs that Libya’s oil resources and wealth will undermine international unity and render the country immune to sanctions and that the world powers will not have the guts to interrupt the flow of oil from Libya for long (p. 64). Furthermore, according to Takeyh, the collapse of the Soviet Union left Qaddafi Isolated and exposed facing international pressure, especially at times when the Arab world began to negotiate peace with Israel, and seek better relations with the US (p. 64).

Faced with futile revolutionary ideology, deteriorating economy, mounting popular unrest, two military coups, and Islamic insurgency, Qaddafi realized in 1998 that that he had to accept the “passing of the age of revolutions and the arrival of globalization” and economic interdependence (pp. 64-65). As a result, Libya showed interests in multilateral institutions, and the desire to work within the international organizations to reconcile grievances, instead of resorting to terrorism (p. 72)

Qaddafi’s actions were indicative that he would steer Libya in favoring pragmatics within his regime, and shifted his international focus toward Africa & away from the Arab-Israeli conflict thus mediating crises as well as settling conflicts precipitated in working, multilateral institutions (Takeyh, p. 67). Qaddafi also began to implement a series of political and economic reforms aimed at ending Libya’s international isolation, seeking better relations with the West, and encourage foreign investment crucial for Libya’s economic recovery (Bahgat, p. 37 & p. 378; Takeyh, p. 68).

In 1999 and a result of Libya’s transformation, sanctions against Libya began to be lifted (Bahgat, p. 382). By September of 2000, Qaddafi declared the end of his anti-imperialist struggle and declared he will have to “follow the moment” and becomes a part of interdependent world shaped by globalization (Takeyh, p. 66). In 2002, Libya became a party to the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, thus Tripoli became a party to all the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (Bahgat, p. 386). By 2003 Libya became no longer isolated (Bahgat, p. 382). This allowed European and American oil and gas companies to resume working in Libya in full force to utilize Libya’s vast natural energy resources, which is anticipated to enhance global energy security and reduce prices (p. 382). By 2006, Libya’s oil production reached its 1970s level, and Libya became the 15th oil imports to the United States (Power Point presentation, Week 8)

Similar to Bahgat, Ray Takeyh (2004) contended that the successful shift in Libya’s policies was likely due to a combination of the above international, regional, and domestic developments. They both underscored the effect of economic sanctions on Libyan leader Mu’ammar el-Qaddafi’s “philosophical evolution” leading him to abandon his anti-imperialist struggle in September of 2000, and announcing “the world has changed radically and drastically. The methods and ideas should change, and being a revolutionary and a progressive man, I have to follow this moment” (p. 66).

Moreover, they both concluded adding that “the very fact that Qaddafi surrendered the suspects [in the Pan Am bombing] suggests that international pressure has prompted subtle yet significant changes in his foreign policy.” (p. 63). Furthermore, Bahgat argued that "rising political challenges from fundamentalist Islamist groups capitalizing on poor economy, and the desire by el-Qaddafi to groom his son to succeed him, "have convinced the Libyan leadership that economic reform and acceptance by the international community was a necessary". Therefore, "Libya decided to trade its involvement in international terrorism and its poorly developed WMD for lifting sanctions and the normalization of diplomatic and political relations with the West" (pp. 392-393).

As Qaddafi implemented his new policies towards the West and ended his support to international terrorism, Libya also began in 190s to shift its attitude towards another contentious issue in its relations with the West: the proliferation of WMDs, which the government decided was not in its best interests (Bahgat, p. 390). In December 0f 2003, Libya finally declared it is abandoning its ambitions to seek WMDs and would fully cooperate with the international community and IAEA to destroy tons of chemical weapons, and surrender documents related to its WMDs activities (pp. 386-390), a step praised by major powers including the US and UK (Bahgat, 2004, p. 373). Moreover, Libya took responsibility for several terrorist attacks committed by its intelligence services, agreed to pay compensations to victims’ families (pp. 384-385), and cooperated in the war against international terrorism (p. 386) dissociating itself from terrorist groups (p. 375 & 382). Furthermore, in 2002, Libya became a party to the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, thus Tripoli became a party to all the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (p. 386).

The dramatic change in Libya’s policies and behavior was regarded by various European countries, as well as China, Russia, Iran and Arab leaders who have been strongly critical of the war in Iraq as indication of how effective economic and diplomatic pressure could be, without the need to use military power (p. 387)

Libyan involvement in international terrorism has been different from that of other countries. Bahgat cited at least five distinctive characteristics of the Libyan case can be identified. The combination of these characteristics makes Libya an almost unique case in the war on terrorism and the states that sponsor it. First, Tripoli’s backed-terrorist operations targeted citizens of several countries (p.383). Second, most states that are accused of sponsoring international terrorism strongly deny these accusations. Tripoli, however, under pressure has accepted legal responsibility for several terrorist operations and paid financial compensations to the victims’ families. Third, the international community was united in condemning Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and took specific measures to compel Tripoli to change its policy and abide by international norms (p. 384). Forth, international sanctions seem to have contributed to shaping a new Libyan attitude on terrorism in particular and on foreign policy in general. Al-Qaddafi has sought to position himself and his country as a power broker in Africa and as an economic intermediary between Europe and Africa (p. 385). Finally, Libya stated in 2004 that its intelligence had been sharing information on al-Qa’eda and other Islamic extremists with Western intelligence services and characterized such cooperation as “irrevocable” (p. 386)

As Bahgat elaborated, the Libyan case was unique compared with other states remaining on the list of sponsoring terrorism today, not only because Libya’s support of terrorism had distinctive characteristics, but also because the anti-terrorism strategies employed successfully by the international community will be difficult to achieve the same success today, for several reasons, among them is that the nature of terrorism itself has changed, in addition to the changing dynamic between the state and the sponsored terrorist group. Furthermore, despite of Qaddafi’s regime ‘s support and practice of terrorism and his anti-Western rhetoric, has never actually destabilized US interests, compared with leader like Saddam Hussien, who twice invaded his neighbors and continued to seek hegemony over the Persian Gulf (Takeyh, p. 68). Qaddafi also has shown himself to be more susceptible to international pressure compared with Saddam Hussien (p. 68), and Ahmadinejad.

While most of the 19th century terrorism that Libya supported was “secular” , driven by the notions of nationalism and self-determination and the growing popularity of radical political thought embracing Marxist ideology (Hoffman, 2006, p. 84), terrorism in last three decades and as a result of the repercussions of the revolution in Iran has began to take religious meaning (p. 85). States –sponsoring religious terrorism are usually less likely to bow to international pressure, since their relation with the sponsored group is based on firm ideology derived from religious belief. Example is the support that Iran provides to terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Unlike Iran, which refuses official contact with the US, Libya is eager to open a diplomatic dialogue (Takeyh, p. 70)
Cooley argued how the US dependence on Libyan oil has been a constant factor deterring US action against Qaddafi, even greater West European dependence on Libyan oil and gas (p. 90). Therefore, in order for the international community to an effective strategy against Libya, the US and European governments had to create contingency plans to cope with an embargo on Libyan oil. Hence, was the strategy to explore possible alternative sources for oil, such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia (p. 91)
Moreover, the US and allies strategy with Libya for two decades was based on the rejection of any direct military action against Libya, and on the constant consultation and coordination with European allies (Cooley, p. 91). Takeyh argued that such unified international pressure was crucial for the success of the anti-terrorism strategy against Libya (p. 63), something that is not possible today, especially with China and Russia’s deep economic relations with countries sponsoring terrorism such as Iran, Syria and Sudan. Therefore, diplomacy should not be mounted against states-sponsoring terrorism only, but also should involve countries that maintain economic relations with them, in order for UN sanctions achieve their desired effects. The US implemented this strategy against Libya, when its European allies fulfilled their part in enforcing the UN sanctions, blocking all life lines to the Libyan regime (Takeyh, p. 71). However, such cohesive and collective international action was threatened by the US unilateral action in waging war against Iraq without UN mandate, which consequently undermined international unity facing regimes such as Iran, Syria and Sudan.
In order for the international community to neutralize and weaken the Libyan regime, it was necessary to strengthen regimes threatened inside their own countries by overt Libyan action, and constantly monitor the Soviet arsenal in Libya (Cooley, p. 92). The international community is utilizing this strategy currently in Lebanon by aiding its government against attempts by Syria and Iran to destabilize the country to serve their own domestic and international interests.
Furthermore, Takeyh contended that the policy of incremental normalization was important in dealing with Libya in order to enhance constructive Libyan conduct and further pushes its regime towards moderation. This strategy is essential in encouraging more rouge states to seek rehabilitation and integration within the international community (p. 72)
References
Byman, D. (2005) Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (1st ed). New York:
Cambridge University Press
Bahgat, G. (Winter, 2004). Oil, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Libyan
Diplomatic Coup. Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies, 29 (4), pp. 373-394.
Retrieved July 27, 2009, from Academic Search Premier
Cooley, J.K. (Spring, 1981). The Libyan menace. Foreign Policy, (42), pp. 74-93. Retrieved July 28,
from Academic Search Premier
Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. (2nd ed). New York: Columbia University Press
Murphy, S.D. (2001). Verdict in the trial of the Lockerbie bombing suspects. The American Journal
of International Law, 95(2), pp.405-407. Retrieved July 28, 2009, from ProQuest Social
Science Journals
Takeyh, R. (2001, May). The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold. Foreign Affairs, 80(3), 62-72.
Retrieved July 28, 2009, from Academic Search Premier

Why is terrorism hard to define?

2009-06-28T09:47:00.000-07:00

Bruce Hoffman in 2006 argued that terrorism is so difficult to define mainly because “the meaning of the term has changed so frequently over the past two decades” (p. 3). Furthermore, Jenkins contended that terrorism should be defined “by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause” (p. 25).

In his summary of the changing nature of terrorism, Bruce Hoffman explained that until the 19th century, religion provided the only justification of terrorism (p. 84). He added that the emergence of the notions of nationalism and self-determination at the beginning of 19th century, and the growing popularity of radical political thought embracing Marxist ideology completed the transformation of terrorism from a mostly religious to predominately secular phenomenon. According to Hoffman, this process of “secularization” was given fresh impetus by the anticolonical/national liberation movements that arose after the Second World War to challenge continued Western rule in Asia, the ME, and Africa and subsequently exerted so profound an influence on ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideological terrorist organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s (p. 84)

Going back to the French Revolution, Hoffman explained that “terrorism”-or régime de la terreur- was first used to refer to “revolutionary or antigovernmental activity undertaken by nonstate or subnational entities, and an instrument of governance wielded by the recently established revolutionary state” (p. 3). Then the meaning of terrorism changed at the end of the French Revolution to be associated with “the abuse of office and power—with overt criminal implications”, when the French executed those who abused their power and resorted to régime de la terreur to eliminate political opponents (p. 4)

According to Hoffman, the French Revolution led to the spread of antimonarchical sentiment elsewhere in Europe during a period of time when nationalism and Industrial Revolution have generated massive socioeconomic changes, and hence a new era of terrorism emerged; terrorism based on ideology (p. 5). Pisacane’s dictum of “propaganda by deed” became the inspiration for new form of revolutionary antimonarchical terrorist movements, which dominated the nineteenth’s century, based on new “universalist” ideologies such as communism/Marxism (p. 5). Pisacane wrote “ideas result from deeds, not the latter from the former, and the people will not be free when they’re educated, but educated when they’re free” (p. 5). He argued that violence was necessary not only to draw attention to, or generate publicity for, a cause, but also to inform, educate, and ultimately rally the masses behind the evolution (p. 5). The Russian Narodnaya Volya, or People’s Will in 1878; the Anarchist International, or Black International in London; the Fenian Brotherhood in 1858; the Irish Clan na Gael in 1873; and the Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in 1880s, all have had revolutionary connotations and have been influenced by the Pisacane dictum (p. 11)

By the 1930s, the meaning of terrorism changed again to become more internal, where it became “used less to refer to revolutionary movements and violence directed governments and their leaders and more to describe the practices of mass repression employed by totalitarian states and their dictatorial leaders against their own citizens”( p. 14), a term Hoffman identified as “terror” (p. 16). Hoffman suggested that terror and terrorism are two distinctive terms—terror is described as “ state-sanctioned or ordered acts of internal political violence directed mostly against domestic populations—that is, rule by violence and intimidation by those already in power against their own citizenry”, whereas terrorism is committed by nonstate actors, (Hoffman, pp. 15-16). Examples of terror committed by states are the Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Stalinist Russia (p. 14)

Hoffman’s distinction between terror and terrorism would mean that policy-makers should approach and handle them differently. While terrorism committed by nonstate actors-groups or individuals- is dealt with through countermeasures that may involve military operations across state borders, terror committed by states against its own citizenry is considered a domestic or internal issue that might not invite the same international collective response. For example, several autocratic and authoritarian regimes in the Third World continue to use terror against political opponents and engage in systematic campaign of intimidation, but yet are not dealt with the same way as those groups or entities that practice terrorism. Therefore, in that regards, policy-makers do make distinction between terror and terrorism and that difference is reflected in their policies

Following WWII, Hoffman argued that terrorism regained its revolutionary connotations with which it is most commonly associated today with contemporary terrorism (p. 16). He added that terrorism was used to refer to the violent revolts by “the various indigenous nationalist/anticolonialist groups that emerged in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East during the late 1940s and 1950s to oppose continued European rule” and waging “wars of liberation” (p. 16). Although such movements in Israel, Kenya, Cyprus and Algeria were labeled as “terrorist” groups, many newly independent Third World countries, supported by communist-bloc states, argued that any movement that fought against “colonial” oppression and/or Western domination should not be described as “terrorist” but instead deemed to be “freedom fighters”, according to Hoffman (p.16).

In the 1960s and 1970s, the term terrorism continued to be viewed within its revolutionary contexts but expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist groups outside the colonial framework, for example the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), (p. 16)

The PLO, established in 1946, has significantly contributed to transform terrorism into a new era of internationalization by being the first terrorist group to send its members across international borders to attack symbolic targets of its enemy state, Israel (Hoffman, pp. 63-64). The 1968, hijacking of an Israeli El Al flight en route from Rome to Tel Aviv by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre of Israeli athletes by the PLO’s Black September Organization (BSO), have achieved significant successes for the Palestinian cause, by PLO accounts, which exceeded what diplomats, lobbyists and humanitarian workers have tried to do to (Hoffman, p. 70). Consequently, Israel was forced to negotiate with PLO terrorists, creating a de facto recognition and major media events (p. 64). The incidents also represented a precedent where civilians were targeted to in order to attract worldwide attention to their cause (p. 64). Moreover, PLO ability to accumulate capital wealth (around $600 million of annual income flow) was unprecedented, mainly because the unlimited support it enjoyed from petrodollar rich Arab states and masses in the Muslim world in general.

The internationalization of Palestinian cause through acts of terror and the success it achieved, has served a model for other ethno-nationalist movements to follow. Groups such as the Armenian ASALA, the Indonesian Free South Moluccan Organization, and the Kurdish PKK attempted to follow the PLO model of international terrorism but with limited success (p. 78).

In the 1980s, and as repercussion of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, terrorism restored its religious face and became “a calculated means to destabilize the West as part of a vast global conspiracy” (Hoffman, p.17). According to Hoffman, in the1980, the first “modern” religious terrorist groups appeared, but there were only 2 out of 64 terrorist groups active in 1980 that could be classified as predominately religious in character and motivation: the Iranian-backed Shi’a organization al-Dawa and the Committee for Safeguarding the Islamic Revolution (p. 85). In 1992, the number of religious terrorist groups had increased from 2 to 11 and expanded to embrace major world religions other than Islam, as well as various obscure religious sects and cults (p. 85). As the number of religious terrorist groups was increasing, the number of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups declined. Moreover, the post Iranian Revolution era witnessed the emergence of state-sponsored terrorism, whereby weaker regimes in Iran, Libya, Iraq, and Syria became actively involved in sponsoring terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as way to inflict harm on strong rival countries without running the risk of seeking direct confrontation (p. 85)

Therefore, as Hoffman has shown the changing nature of terrorism through his historical analysis, he then admitted that “if we cannot define terrorism, then we can at least usefully distinguish it from other types of violence and identify the characteristic that make terrorism the distinct phenomenon of political violence that it is” (p. 34). He concluded it is that distinction between terrorism and other forms of “crime and irregular warfare”, which can help us understand the meaning of terrorism, and consequently attempt to define it (p. 40) . One significant distinction that Hoffman was keen to make is between terrorists, guerrilla fighters, and criminals. According to Hoffman, guerilla warfare, although share the same tactics as terrorism, “refers to numerically larger group of armed individuals, who operates a military unity, attack enemy military forces [hit -and -run style], and seize and hold territory, while exercising some form of sovereignty or control over a defined geographical area and its population” (p. 35). As implied by Hoffman, it seems that the distinction between guerilla warfare and modern terrorism is important because while the latter is condemned the former can be considered legitimate in certain cases such as fighting a foreign occupation or to attain independence. However, an overlap does exist between the two (p. 36)

Moreover, the distinction between terrorism and guerilla warfare can have far reached implications on foreign policies. For example, while a country might efuse to negotiate or deal with terrorists, it might find it strategically acceptable to negotiate with insurgents who stage guerrilla-like hit-and –run operations against its soldiers in attempt to dissuade them from violence

Another area where the distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare can have implications of policies is the decision by governments whether or not to engage these groups either in dialogue or to have diplomatic relations with them if they reach power in their countries. For example, the U.S. categorized Hamas’ militants as terrorists—not freedom fighters, guerilla fighters or insurgents—and therefore, the US refuses to recognize or deal with Palestinian government that include members of Hamas, imposed economic blockade on Gaza and prosecuted US citizens who contributed money to any Hamas entity , as was in the case of the Holy Land Foundation trial.

Moreover, Hoffman found that a distinction between terrorists and criminals can be helpful to further demarcate the boundaries of terrorism. While terrorists, especially religious terrorism, tend to rationalize their violence based on premeditated ideology, criminals, Hoffman argued, use violence to achieve personal gains and based on personal motivations. Therefore, violence in crimes is not designed or intended to have consequences or create psychological impact beyond the act itself (Hoffman, p.36). Similarly, Kornard Kellen argued that a “terrorist without a cause is not a terrorist” (p.37).

However, Walter Laqueur in 1996 argued that “the decision [by terrorists] to use terrorist violence is not always rational one; seldom achieves its aims” (Laqueur, p. 31). He drew examples of futile terrorism in several parts of the world where terrorism failed to bring about any change, including India, Israel, Sri Lanka, Spain and Algeria (p. 27). He added that even in cases where terrorism was effective to the extent of terrorist leaders becoming heads of governments; it only happened after terrorists abandoning violence and adjusted to political success (p. 28).

Moreover, Laqueur argued that terrorists are irrational for the fact that since violence does not yield wanted results, therefore it must be abandoned. However, he did not discuss the rationality of the methods used by terrorists. In other word, he judged the rationality of the aim not the methods of terrorism. Therefore, for Laqueur, violence to achieve political aims—regardless of the nature of that violence—must cease in favor of political participation

Hoffman, on the other hand argued that contrary to the claims that terrorism “more than often has little political impact” as Laqueur argued (p. 27); the examples of anticolonial terrorists groups, most notably the Israel’s Irgun, Cyprus’ EOKA, and Algeria’s FLN, and ANC in South Africa, provide convincing evidence to the contrary (p. 61). These groups led terrorist campaign against an occupier and eventually succeeded in attaining independence for their people. Begin, Ahmed Ben Bella, Makarios, and Nelson Mandela, all leaders of terrorist groups who later became head of governments and states (Hoffman, p.61). Although Hoffman does not deny that in some cases change was also product of a distinct period of time and due to powerful forces other than terrorism (p. 61).

Hoffman also added that successful ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist organizations carefully choose their level of violence rationally, to be “effective, tolerable, tactically acceptable to the international opinion and sufficiently modulated not to provoke massive governmental crackdown and reaction” (p. 233). While, for example, Hamas’s use of suicidal bombers to indiscriminately and deliberately target Israeli civilians, including women and children, received worldwide condemnation regardless of their reasoning and motivations, and earned the group a spot in the list of terrorist groups. The fallout of these suicide operations is huge and the political consequences make Hamas’ choice of such tactic “irrational”

In summary, although the definition of terrorism remains elusive because it’s changing over time, in general terrorism has two essential characteristics; first, it’s a calculated, planned and systematic act, and second it’s inherently political (pp. 2-3).Therefore, according Hoffman, we can then argue that terrorism is basically is where politics and violence intersect.

However, Hoffman’s approach to understand terrorism by distinguishing it from other forms of political violence and based on historical based evidence did not fully succeed to persuade many countries to agree on the definition of terrorism. In this regards, Jenkins’ argument that terrorism should be defined by “the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators on the nature of their cause”, more compelling and resonates with many around the world, especially Muslims in dealing with Israel’s disproportionate response to Palestinian suicidal terrorists targeting Israeli civilians. In the 1999 Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 35 states have refrained from signing, which indicates that there are numerous geographic “holes” in the Int’l law regime as it relates to terrorism (Week 4 lecture, p. 2). These countries were not convinced by Hoffman’s differentiation between terrorism and guerilla warfare.

Because of the apparent lack of consensus among states on the definition of terrorism, there has been no single definition of terrorism in International Law, which remains elusive. One of the main sources of international law, as set forth by Article 38 (1) of the International Court of Justice, is treaty law based on international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the consenting states (D’Amato & Abassi, 2004, p. 13 & p. 26, Janis & Noyes, 2004, p. 138), therefore, a state consent is required for a treaty law to be binding.

The international community has attempted to set legal framework dealing with terrorism through the Laws Of Armed Conflict (LOAC), also known as the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which is the body of International Law applicable when armed violence reaches the level of armed conflict, whether international or non-international (ICRC, 2004, p. 1). Geneva Conventions treaties remain the main source of IHL dealing with terrorism, however, it does not provide a definition of terrorism. The fundamental purpose of the Geneva conventions is to protect and assist victims of armed conflict and therefore deal with acts of terrorism only as they occur in the context of an armed conflict or war (ICRC website). However, critics of the Geneva conventions argued of their irrelevance in the war on terrorism since al Qa’eda is a nontate actor and therefore cannot be party to an international agreement (de Nevers, 2006, p. 105) and that they [Geneva conventions] impose overly stringent limitations on interrogation of detainees (pp. 105-107)

On the other hand, supporters of the Geneva conventions argued that following the September 11 attacks, although the Security Council Resolution 1373 added another dimension to the concept of “armed attack” to include attacks by non-state actors such as terrorist groups, it focused primarily on improving states’ cooperation to fight terrorism, (UNSCR 1373, pp. 1-4) and it did not include any new laws or modifications in the 1949 Geneva conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols. This move by the UN suggests that the international community feels confident that the current IHL have the ability to combat terrorism by criminalizing, apprehending and successfully prosecuting terrorists issues related to terrorism.

Furthermore, as de Nevers argued, complying with the Geneva conventions laws in detaining and interrogating terrorists, will enhance the efforts to fight terrorism, and “reinforces the stark differences between the US and al Qa’eda” and serves US security (p. 107). He added that if populations see the US and its allies working to ensure stability and the rule of law, they are more likely to cooperate against terrorists (p. 109).

References

D’Amato, A. & Abbassi, J. (2006). International Law Today (1st ed). St. Paul, MN: West
Publishing

De Nevers, R. (2006, Spring). Modernizing the Geneva Conventions. The Washington Quarterly, 29 (2), pp. 99-113

Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. (2nd ed). New York: Columbia University Press
International Committee of the Red Cross, "International humanitarian law and terrorism: questions and answers", May 2004.
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/terrorism-faq-%20050504?opendocument
Laqueur, W. (1996, September). Postmodern Terrorism. Foreign Affairs, 75(5), 24-36. Retrieved

UNSCR 1373, p. 1-4.
https://norwich.angellearning.com/AngelUploads/Content/MDY_LOR_2008_12/

Week 4 Lecture,
https://norwich.angellearning.com/section/default.asp?id=20091212069%5FGR%5FGD542A

Is Egypt Violating International Law by Closing Rafah Crossing?

2009-05-16T09:33:00.000-07:00

Since Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in June of 2007, and even in light of the severe humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip in December 2008-January 2009 as the result of Israel’s military offensive against the Gaza Strip, under harsh criticism from the Arab world and Egyptian public opinion, Egypt refused to open Rafah Crossing to regular traffic opposite the Hamas regime (Kadman, p. 132), and supported the reopening according to a renewed agreement of all parties who consented to the AMA—Israel, the PA, the US, and the EU—regarding opening the Palestinian side of the border (p. 126). However, Egypt agreed to open the border, ad hoc, in response to humanitarian needs of the Gaza Strip (p. 125). Furthermore, Egypt viewed Hamas as devoid of international legitimacy and recognizes the PA as the sole legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people (Kadman, p.126), and argued that opening the Crossing opposite Hamas it automatically translates into a new political reality, a de facto recognition of Hamas's legitimacy (Howeidy, 2009. P.1).

However, the Israeli closure of the Gaza Strip created an obligation for Egypt to open Rafah by virtue of its obligation to respect the right of transfer of the residents of the blocked Gaza Strip, and by virtue of its obligation to act against the violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention by Israel (Kadman, p. 160). Moreover, since Egypt was not a party in the 2005 AMA between Israel and PA, therefore, Egypt has no obligation under treaty law to close the Rafah Crossing even when the agreement expired after 12 months of its implantation and was not renewed (Janis & Noyes, 2006, p. 92). Therefore, Egypt seemed to be in violation of the laws of jus cognes, the law of compelling norms, which are human rights violations and humanitarian crisis in Gaza caused by the blockade and the war.

On November 15, 2005, negotiators from Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) signed the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) facilitating the movement of people and goods within the Palestinian Territories and on opening an international crossing on the Gaza-Egypt border, also known as Rafah Crossing that will put the Palestinians in control of the entry and exit of people. The negotiations were facilitated by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana. The agreement also aimed at promoting peaceful economic development and improving the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian Territories and was heralded as a relative breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate: an agreement on border crossings in and out of the Gaza Strip (Prusher & Murphy, 2006, p. 1). A mix of Egyptian soldiers and European observers would monitor and control transit of goods and people in coordination with the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces. In theory, it was ideal. Israelis would meet security needs by tracking cross-border travel - but only from a distance. Gazans would enjoy longed-for freedom from loathed Israeli checkpoints.

According to the terms of the AMA which is published on the United Nations Website, the parties have agreed that:
-The PA will ensure that the passages will be protected on the Palestinian side of the border and will train and upgrade the management of all crossings to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.
-The PA will establish, without delay, a unified system of border management.
-It is understood that security is a prime and continuing concern for Israel and that appropriate arrangements to ensure security will be adopted.
-Rafah will be operated by the Palestinian Authority on its side, and Egypt on its side, according to international standards, in accordance with Palestinian law and subject to the terms of this agreement. --Rafah will be opened as soon as it is ready to operate at an international standard in accordance with the specifications of this agreement and as soon as the 3rd party is on site, with a target date of November 25.
-Use of the Rafah crossing will be restricted to Palestinian ID card holders and others by exception in agreed categories with prior notification to the GoI (Government of Israel) and approval of senior PA leadership.
-The 3rd party will ensure the proper procedures are followed and will advise both sides of any information in its possession pertaining to the people applying to cross under these exceptions.
-These procedures will remain in place for a period of 12 months, unless the 3rd party delivers a negative evaluation of the PA running the Rafah crossing. This evaluation will be done in close coordination with both sides and will give due consideration to the opinion of both sides.
-Rafah will also be used for export of goods to Egypt.
-Rafah will be the only crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (with the exception of Kerem Shalom for the agreed period).
-The PA will act to prevent the movement of weapons and explosives at the Rafah crossing. The 3rd party will have the authority to ensure that the PA complies with all applicable rules and regulations concerning the Rafah crossing point and the terms of this agreement. In case of non-compliance the 3rd party has the authority to order the re-examination and reassessment of any passenger, luggage, vehicle or goods. The 3rd party will be the European Union.

According to Gutman, 2009, the Palestinians took control of the border as soon as Nov. 25, according to the agreement. The Palestinian Authority pledged to prevent smuggling of weapons or militants across the border. European Union representatives on the ground will monitor compliance, as will a joint Israeli-Palestinian-European control room, according to the agreement. Goods coming into Gaza from its revamped border terminal at Rafah will be monitored by sophisticated X-ray equipment. Israel also agreed to ease restrictions it applied to West Bank travel after Palestinian attacks on Israelis

However, in June of 2007, the militant Islamic group Hamas, took control of the internal government in Gaza Strip, ousting the Palestinian Authority and its security forces which belonged to the Fattah movement, Hamas’s rival. In the year between the capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June of 2006 and the Hamas takeover in June of 2007, Israel kept Rafah Crossing closed 85% of the time, since June 2007, Rafah Crossing has been closed permanently, except for random and limited openings by Egypt, which meet only 3% of the needs of the residents of the Gaza Strip to enter and leave (Kadman, 2009, p. 7).

Following Hamas’s took control of the Gaza Strip, Israel as well as the EU were no longer involved in the monitoring of the Rafah crossing. Israel imposed a blockade on Gaza borders to force Hamas to concede power, and hence the Rafah Crossing was closed. It was exacerbated when Israel imposed a strict economic siege on Gaza both as a punishment for Gazans having elected Hamas in free and fair elections, and as a tactic to remove it from power. The Rafah border crossing, the Gazans' only gateway to the world that isn't controlled by their occupier, inevitably emerged as a symbol for the latest stage of the 60-year-old conflict, serving as a litmus test of Egypt's relations with the three parties on the other side of the border, Hamas, the PA and Israel (Howeidy, 2009, p.1)

Several Israeli politicians called for a unilateral reoccupation of the "Philadelphi" route, the name for the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt. On December 27, 2008, Israel launched massive air and ground campaign into Gaza in response to rocket attacks by Hamas in the Gaza Strip into northern Israel, in order to destroy Hamas rockets launching capabilities and bombarded the Gaza-Egypt border in what officials say are antismuggling operations (Prusher & Murphy, pp. 1-2).

According to the 2009 report by the Israeli Physicians for Human Rights (Gisha) organization, the closure of Rafah had severe implications for the residents of Gaza Strip, including preventing access to health care services that are not available in Gaza, preventing access to students and employees, forcing long separations of family members on either side of the border. Therefore, the closure of the Crossing was considered a severe violation of the rights of residents of the Gaza Strip (p. 7)

One of the most pivotal points in the Rafah Crossing agreement was that the role of the Egyptian Army in guarding the border to prevent arms and cash (p.3) smuggling or easy access for militants across the border (p. 2). Instead, Israeli officials say, the Gaza-Egyptian border is being used as a route for arming Hamas and other militant groups in anticipation of widely expected battles with the Israel Defense Forces (p. 2)

The 14km Rafah Crossing is one of five ways in and out of Gaza - It's the only crossing not guarded by Israeli forces. The Rafah border crossing has come to epitomize the geopolitical realities between Egypt and the occupied Palestinian territories -- with all their security and legal complexities -- as never before (Howeidy, 2009, p. 1). Since Hamas took control of Gaza in June 2007 the Egyptian-Gaza borders have been free of any Israeli presence for the first time since 1967. This immediately posed a complex problem for the Egyptian regime (p. 1)

Caroll J, 2007, elaborated on Egypt’s dilemma in policing the Rafah Crossing. There is "genuine concern" that Palestinian violence in Gaza could spill over into the Sinai, says Walid Kazziha, chair of the political science department at the American University in Cairo. "It is in Egypt's national interest that they have to look after" the smuggling issue. But he also notes that the Egyptian government faces domestic pressure to support Palestinians. "One thing that embarrasses the Egyptians is the Israelis asking Egypt to take [what would amount to] violence against the Palestinians," he says. "So it's a very tight rope." (p.1). Egypt itself is not a natural ally for Islamist Hamas, which is an offshoot of the country's banned Muslim Brotherhood, the country's powerful opposition movement. Terror attacks in the Sinai over the years have been blamed by the Egyptian government on local Bedouins who have been radicalized by contact with Palestinian militants (Prusher & Murphy, p. 2).

Furthermore, Egypt viewed Hamas as devoid of international legitimacy and recognizes the PA as the sole legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people (Kadman, p.126). Therefore, Egypt increased border patrols in response to Israel's complaints to quell weapon smuggling across the border, and a result Israel's critique has focused more on the smuggling and less on the Egyptian role, perhaps in part due to the sensitive point in negotiations over a possible prisoner exchange (Prusher & Murphy, p.2)

In the course of a week President Hosni Mubarak addressed the issue twice. He said that Egypt will not open the border because Gaza is an occupied territory and remains, therefore, the responsibility of Israel, the occupying force (Howeidy, 2009, p. 1). A few days later he said that Egypt would not open the border "in the absence of the Palestinian Authority and European monitors", a reference to the 2005 border agreement formulated between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel a year before the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections brought Hamas to power. The agreement expired a year after it went into effect and has not been renewed since (p. 1)

At the heel of the Israeli offensive in Gaza in December of 2008, various statements by the UN Secretary-General described the level of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza Strip. On December 27, 2008, the Secretary-General expressed deep concern about the heavy bloodshed in Gaza, which he described as “unacceptable”, as well as the continuation of violence in southern Israel. The Secretary-General also “reiterated Israel’s obligation to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law and condemns excessive use of force leading to the killing and injuring of civilians”, and “large scale destruction” in Gaza. Moreover, the Secretary-General reiterated his previous calls for humanitarian supplies to be allowed into Gaza to aid the distressed civilian population. In another statement on December 29, 2009, the Secretary-General “stressed the need for the strict observance of international humanitarian law”, and reiterated his call that “unhindered access should be ensured for the delivery of humanitarian assistance” “much needed assistance and alleviate civilian suffering”. He also stated that “Israel must keep opening all border crossings necessary for the continued provision of humanitarian supplies”

Moreover, the World Bank warned of a growing public health risk because of the lack of drinking water and a collapse of Gaza's wastewater systems that has sent sewage into the streets (Mitnick, 2009, p. 1). The US Congress expressed the signers' "deep concern for the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip" and requested "immediate action by the U.S. to address this crisis.” It described in detail the "dire" situation on the ground in Gaza and stated "it is imperative that we work with Israel to open the borders so that the wounded can be treated, basic aid can reach those in need, and rebuilding can begin." Adding that "the failure to address this humanitarian emergency has the potential to produce a crisis of even more unspeakable proportions." (McArther, 2009, p. 23). Congressman Brian Baird (D-WA) after his visit to the Gaza Strip on February 20, 2009 stated that “The amount of physical destruction and the depth of human suffering here is staggering," said Baird. "Entire neighborhoods have been destroyed, schools completely leveled, fundamental water, sewer, and electricity facilities hit and relief agencies heavily damaged. The personal stories of children being killed in their homes or schools, entire families wiped out, and relief workers prevented from evacuating the wounded are heart wrenching--what went on here, and what is continuing to go on, is shocking and troubling beyond words." (Baird, 2009, p.21)

However, since Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in June of 2007, and even in light of the severe humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip in December 2008-January 2009 as the result of Israel’s military offensive against the Gaza Strip, under harsh criticism from the Arab world and Egyptian public opinion, Egypt refused to open Rafah Crossing to regular traffic opposite the Hamas regime (Kadman, p. 132), and supported the reopening according to a renewed agreement of all parties who consented to the AMA—Israel, the PA, the US, and the EU—regarding opening the Palestinian side of the border (p. 126). However, Egypt agreed to open the border, ad hoc, in response to humanitarian needs of the Gaza Strip (p. 125). Egypt stated that it is committed to the AMA agreement although Egypt itself was not a party to the agreement. Therefore, Egypt says it has not been able to open Rafah to regular traffic since Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, and by opening the Crossing Egypt would violate the AMA, which requires the presence of the PA and the European force on the Palestinian side of the border, and Israel’s presence at Kerem Shalom—conditions which have not been fulfilled since that date (p. 126)

Egypt further argued that Israel consent to the open the Crossing was necessary since Israel continues controlling the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and that the peace process, which Egypt supports, includes the gradual transfer of power from Israel to the PA, the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, according to Egypt (p. 126). Furthermore, in order to reach a new or renewed international arrangement on opening Rafah, Egypt is negotiating with various parties including Israel, Hamas, and the PA to open the border, including the EU and the US (p. 130). However, the Palestinian parties’ refusal to compromise on dividing control of the crossing constitutes the largest obstacle to opening Rafah (p. 131). For its part, the Palestinian Authority objected to opening the Crossing on a regular basis by Egypt opposite Hamas, so as not to legitimize the latter’s rule (Kadman, p. 136)

Janis & Noyes, 2006, stated that there are three principal formal sources of IL set forth in Article 38(1) of the ICJ; these are the rules that the Court “shall apply” as it decided “in accordance with IL such disputes as submitted to it”:”(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the consenting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Although the first two sources—treaty and custom—may be said by positivists to be more or less consensual among states, the third source—general principles of law—clearly involves some judicial or doctrinal initiative beyond a search for inter-state agreement on rules (p. 138). Historically, one of the most important sources of the law of nations was natural law, referred to as jus cognes or compelling norms (p. 138)

Compelling norms or jus cognes a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even ordinary customary rules, principle at most issue cannot be derogated from by States through int’l treaties or local or special customs or even general customary rules not endowed with the same normative force (Janis & Noyes, p. 147)

Vienna’s Professor Alfred von Verdross wrote in 1937, that jus cognes consists of the general principle prohibiting states from concluding treaties contra bonos mores, which means that no judicial order can, therefore, admit treaties between juridical subjects, which are obviously in contradiction to the ethics of a certain community. Furthermore, treaties are regarded as being contra bonos mores if it restricts the liberty of one contracting party in an excessive or unworthy manner or which endanger its most important rights. Those norms of treaties which are incompatible with this goal of all positive law must be regarded as void (Janis & Noyes, p. 144). In other words, Professor Verdross argued, a treaty norm is void if it is either in violation of a compulsory norm of general international law or contra bonos mores. A treaty norm is contra bonos mores if a state is prevented by an international treaty from fulfilling the universally recognized tasks of a civilized state (p. 145). Contra bonos mores is a category Verdross justified as stemming from the general principle of law recognized by civilized nations (p. 146)

The 1937 article above by Vienna’s Professor Alfred von Verdross has been singled out as an important step in the development of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the law of the Treaties concerning peremptory norms of international law (Janis & Noyes, p. 146), which stipulates that “A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. Therefore, Egypt’s claims that it’s obligated by the expired Agreement on Movement and Access, which Egypt was not even a party, not to open the Rafah Crossing unless a new or renewed agreement is reached is considered a violation of the peremptory norm of general international law, which in this case the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the human rights violations.

Article 43 of the Hague Regulation, which are part of international customary law, binding upon all countries imposes upon an occupying power the obligation to maintain public order and guarantee the existence of normal public life for the civilian population. Freedom of movement is necessary to guarantee normal life (Kadman, p. 150). Moreover, Articles 27 & 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, to which both Israel and Egypt are parties stated that “protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honor, their family rights, their religious convictions and practice, and their manners and customs” “No protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed” and adds that collective punishments are prohibited (Kadman, p. 151)

Egypt has an obligation under international humanitarian law to open the Rafah Crossing to allow the passage of humanitarian aid, which is derived from Israel’s actions by closing other crossings to and from Gaza and uses Rafah Crossing to implement a policy of collective punishment. Therefore, the Israeli closure of the Gaza Strip creates an obligation for Egypt to open Rafah by virtue of its obligation to respect the right of transfer of the residents of the blocked Gaza Strip, and by virtue of its obligation to act against the violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention by Israel (Kadman, p. 160). Moreover, since Egypt was not a party in the 2005 AMA between Israel and PA, therefore, Egypt has no obligation under treaty law to close the Rafah Crossing even when the agreement expired after 12 months of its implantation (Janis & Noyes, 2006, p. 92)

Positivists would argue that Egypt as a sovereign has the power to decide who and what shall enter its territory, and it has no obligation to allow passage through its border, except for its obligation to allow the passage of humanitarian aid, which Egypt continued to do only on ad hoc bases. In fact the judgment of PCIJ in 1927 (Permanent Court of International Justice) in the Lotus case has become of the most usually cited positivist opinions about the nature of IL, because it argued in part III that the “rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law”. The ruling of an evenly divided Court in Lotus maintained that all international legal rules are based on state consent: “restrictions upon independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.” No room was given to general principles of IL: fundamental norms, natural law, or equity as sources of IL; state sovereignty was seen as the fundamental principle of IL from which all other international legal principles and rules are derived (Janis & Noyes, p. 116)

Furthermore, in the 1966 Southwest Africa Cases, the ICJ ruled that humanitarian considerations are not sufficient in themselves to generate legal rights and obligations. The Court can take account of moral principles only in so far as these are given sufficient expression in legal forms. The secret trust itself must be or becoming something more than a moral or humanitarian ideal. It must be given judicial expression and be clothed in legal form. However, the Court in 1970 moved closer to Verdross position when it recognized in the Barcelona Traction Case, the concept of “obligations erga omnes”—the obligations of a state towards the international community as a whole. The Court cited as examples, the international legal proscriptions against interstate aggression, genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination (Janis & Noyes, p. 147)

Therefore, Egypt under obligations erg omnes, has an obligation towards the international community as a whole to intervene using its sovereign power and ease suffering of 1.5 million Palestinians and open the Rafah Crossing to allow the flow of humanitarian aid, and allow Palestinians their basic human right of movement and access. Furthermore, Egypt should invoke Articles 27 & 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts by allowing civilians in Gaza passage to seek refuge and humanitarian assistance. By not doing so, Egypt is in violation of the law of compelling norms, jus cognes, created by the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and expressed in the UN Secretary-General statements and members of the US Congress.

References

Anthony D’Amato & Jennifer Abbassi (2006). International Law Today (1st ed). St. Paul, MN: West Publishing

Baird, B. (April, 2009). U.S. Congressmen visit Gaza, call for immediate relief, changes in U.S.
policy. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 28 (3), pp. 21-31.

Carroll, J. (May, 2007). Egypt's Gaza gateway: crossroad of frustration. Christian Science
Monitor, 99 (109), pp.1-4.

Gutman M. (November, 2005) Mideast deal gives Palestinians control of Gaza-Egypt
border. USA Today (n.d).

Howeidy, A. (January, 2009). All eyes on Rafah. Al Ahram weekly.

Kadman, N. (March, 2009). Rafah Crossing: Who holds the keys? Physicians for Human
Rights-Israel.

McArthur, S. (April, 2009). 111th Congress expresses its “vigorous support” for Israel’s Gaza
massacre. Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 28 (3), pp. 22-23.

Mark W. Janis & John E. Noyes (2006). International Law: Cases and Commentary (3rd ed). St.
Paul, MN: West Publishing

Mitnick, J. (January, 2009). Can Egypt broker a Gaza true again? Christian Science Monitor, 101 (30), pp. 1-5.

Prusher, I. & Murphy, D. (October, 2006). Trouble sealing Egypt-Gaza border. Christian
Science Monitor, 98 (233) pp. 1-6.

UN-Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA), retrieved from
http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/361eea1cc08301c485256cf600606959/c9a5aa5245d910bb852570bb0051711c!OpenDocument,

Keeping the peace in 21st century, role of international organizations

2009-05-04T10:58:00.000-07:00

In the 19th and 20th centuries, the international legal circuits rejected the just war doctrine prevailed during the 5th and 6th centuries, which was pursued to avenge injuries against the enemy. War became a legitimate exercise of sovereign power, and sometimes inevitable if the parties involved chose so. Despite of its perceived legality, use of force was subject to restraints set forth by treaties, for example the 1907 Hague Convention No. II, and the authority of the general international law.

According the UN Charter, the Security Council should be the sole grantor of legitimacy regarding the use of force, assuming that all member states abide by Article 2 (4). The exceptions to the use of force without Security Council's approval would be the states' inherent right of self-defense (individual or collective) against an armed attack and only pending UN measures. Chapter VII lists several other measures to combat a belligerent state such as sanctions, with the approval of the major powers, before agreeing on the collective use of force to counter threats to peace and security. Article 51, which held legitimate “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in response to an “armed attack” even before the Security Council takes “the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security”

The Caroline case has been regarded as legal foundation of international law rules governing the legality of use of force in self-defense. The Caroline dictum says that every state has a right to strike first when the threat posed is "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.". The Nuremberg Tribunal invoked the rule in Caroline when rejecting German leaders’ arguments that they had been entitled to attack Norway in self-defense. The concept of anticipatory or preemptive self-defense was then created, particularly in the context of nuclear strategy by some publicists as result of the Caroline case arguing that the right of self-defense was available when “the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation”. However, following WWI, states adopted new legal constraints on the use of force (p. 547). After WWII, the UN Charter generally prohibited the unilateral use of force by states.

Less than a decade into the 21st century, there is already a widespread sense that the world faces challenges and threats of unprecedented scope, scale and complexity. Global terrorism emerged as one of the main challenges to international peace and security since beginning of the 21st century. The current rules of international law were written for conventional, inter-state conflicts, while even the definition of terrorism and terrorists remains elusive and ill-defined. Yet, in the era of globalization and heightened interconnectedness, the existing international organizations, mainly the UN through its organizations such the Security Council, the General Assembly and International Court of Justice should remain at the forefront to meet the challenges of world peace in the 21 century.

Paul Szasz in 2002 argued that in recent years the Security Council has increasingly adopted decisions that deal not with any particular conflict or situation but, rather with conflicts in general. Thus, it has addressed the protection of children and civilians, the role of women with respect to peace and security, humanitarian questions and even international terrorism. Nevertheless, the operative paragraphs of these resolutions are not formulated in compulsory terms. He added that the council might even consider extreme violations of human rights or humanitarian law, or massive assaults on the international environment, to constitute unacceptable threats to the peace. Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change endorsed the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent

On September 28, 2001, the Security Council departed from its previous limited and cautious practice and adopted Resolution 1373, by which it decided that all states shall take certain actions against the financing of terrorist activities, as well as a miscellany of other actions designed to prevent any support for terrorist activities. Security Council’s Resolution 1373 added another dimension to the concept of “armed attack” to include attacks by non-state actors such as terrorist groups, which then gave the State(s) the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51. However, in order to ensure that the authorization to use force to combat terrorism will further contribute to peace and stability; the UN Charter still imposed restriction on the right of states to use force in self-defense against an armed attack of sufficient scale and effect by requiring the victim state to abide by the rules of “necessity” and “proportionality” in assessing an armed attack and measuring its [state] response.

Richard Gardner, critic of the Bush's Doctrine, suggested four modest reinterpretations of the UN Charter, which seem to be in the right direction that the world should head into in response to unprecedented circumstances of terrorism and issues of states’ rights to self-defense. These measures include:

(1) Armed force may be used by UN member even without the Security Council approval to destroy terrorist groups operating on the territory of other members when those other members fail to discharge their international law obligations to suppress them
(2) Armed force may also be used to prevent a UN member from transferring WMDs to terrorist groups
(3) Article 51 continues to limit self-defense to cases of actual or imminent armed attack in accordance with the Caroline doctrine, but self-defense can be extended to permit a state to rescue its citizens (and others) faced with clear threat to their security.
(4) A right of “humanitarian intervention” permits military action by the UN or regional organizations to prevent genocide or similar massive human rights violaitons

Furthermore, the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, in 2004, asserted that the effectiveness of the global collective security system depends ultimately not only on the legality of decisions but also on the common perception of their legitimacy. In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Security Council should always address at least five basic criteria of legitimacy:

(a) Seriousness of threat. The threat must be considered clear and serious.
(b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question?
(c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been explored?
(d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
(e) Balance of consequences. Will the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction?

However, wider participation by other states is required the decision-making process in order to ensure Security Council’s Resolutions regarding war and peace more credible and representative of the will of the international community. The Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950, or Acheson Plan, argued based on Articles 10, 11, 14 of the Charter making the Assembly the Council’s partner in wielding “authority and responsibility for matters affecting international peace, sounds more promising today in circumventing the veto-bound Council, which has often been accused of yielding to the wishes of its permanent members. By giving the Assembly more authority, it would step in to organize the collective use of force against an aggressor as it happened during the Korean conflict.

Among areas where international organizations’ efforts are falling short are peacekeeping efforts and effects of economic sanctions invoked by Chapter VII on ordinary population and non-target states. The Suez crisis in 1956 thus confirmed the UN in its most fruitful line of endeavor: the stationing of international peacekeeping forces between mutually hostile antagonists at the crucial moment in a dispute when both sides perceive disengagement as preferable to continued hostilities. In order to make the complex peacekeeping or peace-building operations more effective, it is important to identify specific authority for peacekeeping in the text of the Charter.

Furthermore, the 1962 ICJ ruling that the Assembly should not recommend measures while the Council is dealing with the same matter unless the Council requests it to do should also be overturned in order to allow the Assembly to approve peacekeeping operations when the Council refused to act. Another challenge to make the peacekeeping or building more effective is to ensure reliable funding for and national support of broad UN mandates.

Sanctions imposed through Chapter VII of the UN Charter prohibit imports into a target country, exporters in other states and the economies of other states may be harmed (double-edged sword). Security Council should take appropriate measures to ensure that sanctions do not create severe hardships for the ordinary population of a target state and to mitigate the hardships of sanctions in non-target states. Furthermore, a mechanism must be regularly available to review the humanitarian impact of sanctions.

References
Anthony D’Amato & Jennifer Abbassi (2006). International Law Today (1st ed). St. Paul, MN: West Publishing

Mark W. Janis & John E. Noyes (2006). International Law: Cases and Commentary (3rd ed). St. Paul, MN: West Publishing

International Law and Individuals' Rights

2009-04-15T11:00:00.000-07:00

During the 19th and early 20th century, individuals were viewed as “objects” of IL, and were not deemed to be”subjects” of IL (Janis & Noyes, 2006, p. 363). Positivists like Jeremy Bentham in 1789 created the term “International Law”, which he defined as the law that relates to the “mutual transactions between sovereigns as such”, and therefore, categorizing laws on the basis of “the persons whose conduct is the object of the law”. Bentham concluded that IL had only states as its subjects (Janis & Noyes, p. 364).

Positivists viewed International Law (IL) as a set of rules with states as its subjects, whereas municipal law was thought of as pertaining to individuals who are subjects of a single state. Legal positivism had taken the 18th century law of nations, a law common to individuals and states, and transformed it into public and private IL. The former was deemed to apply to states, the latter to individuals. Positivists criticized both sides of the discipline. Public IL was “international” but not really “law”. Private IL was “law” but not really “International”. In short, positivists reject the notion that individuals are proper subjects of IL (p. 364)

Before positivism, there was no theoretical insistence that the rules f the law of nations applied only to states (Janis & Noyes, p. 363). The dominant sentiment was of those like William Blackstone who viewed both individuals and states were as the proper subjects of the law of nations. Blackstone distinguished his law of nations from other sorts of law not on the basis of its subjects, and saw that the rule of law of nations as universal, emanating either from natural justice or from the practice of many states. Municipal legal rules, however, emanated from a single state (p. 364)

However, only in recent decades has there been a fundamental shift in beliefs that the rights of individuals may be more important than the needs of states, not simply within nations but across the international system (Week 6 lecture, IL and Human Rights, p. 1). While law can be categorized on the basis of its subjects, in practice, the law of nations and IL have concerned more than the legal rights of states (Janis & Noyes, p. 365). Even during the high tide of positivism, the US Supreme Court had no difficulty seeing individuals as subjects of IL. The Court held that “IL is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination (p. 364)

As Janis & Noyes explained, the concept that individuals can be subjects, as well as objects, of IL logically divides into individual rights at IL and individual duties. The principle that law should protect the rights of individuals against the abuses of governments can be at least be dated back to John Locke’s Two Treaties of Government published in 1690. He believed that human rights, not governments, came first in the natural order of things. In the 18th century, the American declaration of Independence, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, and the US Bill of Rights constituted the documentary foundation on which two centuries of legal protection of human rights in municipal law which has been built (p. 368)

Nonetheless, the trials of Nazi war criminals after the Second World War highlighted the limitations of positivism. Nuremberg re-established plainly and forcefully that the rules of IL should and do apply to individuals. The Charter of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg explicitly made individuals subjects to Int’l rules relating to crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Janis & Noyes, p. 365). Among the main lessons from the Nuremberg Tribunal is that there are individual international rights and obligations that transcend state boundaries. Prior to Nuremberg, it was argued that one of the cornerstones of the Westphalian system of international relations was the principle that sovereign states should be free of outside interference in regulating their own citizens in their own territories (p. 367).

However, the Nuremberg tribunals upheld the fact that individuals rights at IL permeate state sovereignty, permitting outsiders to evaluate how well a state does protecting the rights of inviduals, citizens as well as aliens, in its own territory. It argued that it is wrong, both in terms of describing reality and in terms of preferential expression, for the theory of IL to hold that individuals are outside the ambit of IL rules. Hence, the definition of “nation” under International Law became not limited only to the national state but also the individuals who are the nationals of state. Furthermore, necessary measures taken by all states and international organization to suppress behaviors contrary to IL were consistent with generally recognized principles of IL and should not be considered as intervening in the internal affairs of a state (preservation of the right to self-determination, the prevention of discrimination, the prevention and punishment of genocide, the prohibition against slavery and similar systems and customs, and the prevention and punishment of terrorism) ( D’Amato & Abbassi, p. 111)

Moreover, during the Nuremberg Trial, it was argued that individuals who commit atrocities against humanity must have known that they were acting in defiance of all international laws, and it would be unjust if their wrong was allowed to go unpunished (Janis & Noyes, pp. 373-374). Therefore, the Tribunal rejected the argument that IL is concerned with the actions of sovereign states and provides no punishment for individuals, and further, that where the act in question is an act of state, those who carry it out are not personally responsible, but are protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of the State (p. 375). The judges ruled that crimes against IL are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of IL be enforced (p. 376). The judges in the Nuremberg Tribunal have relied on precious treaties to reach their verdict, among them was the Treaty of Versailles, which was signed in 1919, and whose Article 7 stipulated that “the official position of defendants shall not be considered as freeing from responsibility, or mitigating punishment. Individuals have int’l duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state. Article 3 indicated that “the fact that defendant acted pursuant to orders of his government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment (Janis & Noyes, p. 370). However, the emergence of int’l human rights law in the mid-20th century has been described as the most radical development in the whole history of IL, since it so speedily reestablished individuals as well as states as subjects if IL, although, the rapid emergence of the rules of int’l human rights law, the development of effective international human rights legal process has been more gradual (p. 377)

Among the main challenges to extending International Law to the individuals rights and wrongs are the notions of state protections and responsibilities. However, the traditional doctrines of state protections and state responsibility have at least three significant limitations. First, individuals may only be protected by their national states, with its elusive national links. Second, when the notion of national links is extended to corporations, even more confusion can result. Finally, and most importantly, the objective view of individuals leaves nationals open to abuse by their own states, since its impractical to conceive of a state protecting its own nationals against itself in IL (Janis & Noyes, p. 339)

Furthermore, the doctrine of state responsibility examined in the Nottebohm and Barcelona Traction provided partial protection, but only so as long as a foreign national injured by a state was effectively protected at the international level by that individual’s national state. However, neither the doctrine of the state sovereignty nor its counterpart, the doctrine of state protection, could shield individuals from abuses committed by their own governments (Janis & Noyes, p. 370)

Among other challenges is that international human rights treaties can trigger a “backlash” against international human rights regimes even in democratic societies when treaties call for behavior with which most voters disagree (Janis & Noyes, p. 388). Cultural norms and religious beliefs constitute another challenge in dealing with both states and individuals who violate international law. Proponents of universal international law like Robert Sloane argued that it’s not cultural values that inhibit societies from realizing a legal order that respects universal human rights; it is the self-serving manipulation of these values by elites. Authoritarian leaders often invoke cultural relativism to cloak the characteristic abuses of totalitarian rule (D’Amato & Abbassi, p. 112). The same argument was echoed by Celestine Naymu, who added that the vague notion of culture provides a convenient scapegoat for government institutions and obscures the state’s responsibility in redressing inequalities (p. 115). Ann Elizabeth, rejected international law should accept that fundamental human rights to be restricted by reference to the requirement of any particular religion (p. 115). Therefore, aggrieved citizens within those religious or cultural communities are thus left without formal legal or constitutional remedies. Unless the overlap between cultural norms and formal law and policy is acknowledged and analyzed, the government can exonerate itself by attributing any negative outcome to culture (p. 117).

To conclude, expanding the reach of international law beyond traditional state-to-state interactions into matters directly involving the rights and wrongs of individuals, have ensured that violators of international law will be brought to justice and held accountable for their crimes, and can argued to have improved the status of international human rights in particular. However, despite the rapid emergence of the rules of international human rights law, the development of effective international human rights legal process has been more gradual (Janis & Noyes, p.377). The debate also continues as to whether culture, religion and matters related to state protection, sovereignty and responsibility (as in the case of US rejection of ICJ) can be reconciled with International Law, or whether International Law should transcend all these factors.

References

Anthony D’Amato & Jennifer Abbassi (2006). International Law Today (1st ed). St. Paul, MN: West Publishing

Mark W. Janis & John E. Noyes (2006). International Law: Cases and Commentary (3rd ed). St. Paul, MN: West Publishing

International and Municipal Law

2009-04-02T12:10:00.000-07:00

The term International Law (IL) in itself implies a framework of rules and regulations, which states are either legally or morally bound by (D’Amato & Abbassi, 2006, p. 13 & p. 26, Janis & Noyes,2006, p. 3). J.L. Brierly in his classic British introduction to International Law defined the discipline “as the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another” (Janis & Noyes, p. 24).

Mark Janis, 2006, wrote about the historical background of International Law and how has it developed over time. He explained how the Romans knew of a jus gentium, a law of nations or a law “common to all men” (Janis & Noyes, p. 1). In the Seventeenth century, a Dutch jurist named Hugo Grotius in his 1625 writing “The Law of War and Peace” recognized law of nations as a set of rules that bound sovereign states, which then became the foundation of the modern discipline of the law of nations. In 1789, the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham renamed “international law”. Today, the law of nations and International Law are used interchangeably (p. 1).

There is an inherent reciprocity in International Law in a sense that for an independent state to be entitled to full benefits of sovereignty and recognition by the international community it must respect the sovereignty and the entitlements of other states (D’Amato & Abbassi, p. 17). Therefore, international law restrains the state power from threatening the sovereignty of other states; otherwise the offending state will lose its entitlements and be subject to hostilities by other countries. The international community accepted the legality of violating nation’s entitlements in order to repudiate that nation initial offense (D’Amato & Abbassi, p. 22).

Among the various sources of International Law where such rules and regulations are identified are treaties and customary laws accepted by the international community. When neither treaties nor customary laws provide a rule or able to decide on a case involving IL; then the judge may look at other sources including the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, natural law, and jus cogens or compelling norms (Janis & Noyes, p. 128 & p. 138)

Treaties are contracts between two countries or group of countries. Each country can negotiate the terms of such contracts and either becomes a party obligated to fully carry out the terms of the agreement, or makes specific reservations, understandings or declarations. In practice, treaties have become the main source of International Law, where states are bound to the terms of the agreement and are held accountable if they violate them (D’Amato & Abbassi, pp. 24-26). Disputes are often brought before International Court of Justice (ICJ), whose opinions are not legally binding; however, it provides states with rationale to resolve their problems (Janis & Noise, pp. 27-57). Therefore, treaties are considered international contracts, similar to the domestic legal analogy of drafting a contract (Janis & Noise, p. 54). “Whatever the term used, all agreements have the same legal status, except as their provisions or the circumstances of their conclusion indicate otherwise” ( p. 55).

Among the main criticism to the treaty practice is that treaties never bind all states—only signatories. Moreover, treaties don’t cover every aspect of International Law, hence the need for customary law and other sources of IL. Some treaties are not self-executing, which means that a treaty cannot be enforced without an implanting legislation (D’Amato & Abbassi, p. 53). Furthermore, except for humanitarian treaties (D’Amato & Abbassi, p. 51), and in order to obtain a universal ratification; States can generally refrain from binding by certain provisions of a treaty either by declining to be a party in a treaty or submit reservations as a condition of ratifications in order to protect its domestic interests. However, in treaties covering human rights issues, states might get away with submitting reservations that violate the basic understanding of the treaty, since other states might not object to such reservations if their domestic interests are not implicated (p. 56)

On the other hand, customary law seems to have all the answers to the critics of treaties’ law—it is binding to all states even without their consent, which seems more compelling than law of treaties, and it applies to every dispute whenever a more specific treaty provision does not (D’Amato & Abbassi. p. 59). Customary law is formatted based on previous similar “incidents” or disputes and consequently draw a similar resolution or points in the same direction to obtain one (p. 60). However, developing criteria for what really constitute an incident and when it starts or ends remains a challenge (D’Amato & Abbassi, pp. 64-65). Moreover, certain facts surrounding an incident might not be available till years later, which in turn undermine the validity of the initial resolution (p. 65). Furthermore, since customary law is designed to settle disputes that had precedents in history, it is not capable of addressing non conventional threats like terrorism and WMDs (p. 66).

As Janis and Noyes explained, International Law depends on municipal law—in most instances, when legal rules are applied in practice, they are applied by municipal courts. Moreover, the incorporation of international legal rules into domestic laws is usually done by municipal law governed by the constitution (Janis & Noyes, p. 180). However, there is a debate between monists and dualists as to whether the Constitution should be used as filter to ensure that International Law conforms to national laws—nationalization of International Law (Slaughter, 1997, p.192), or should International Law be allowed to penetrate through the national legal order—denationalization of Constitutional Law (De Burca & Gerstenberg, p. 244)-creating a more universal legal order (Week 4 PDF notes, p. 1). Most governments currently adhere to the ‘dualist’ paradigm, viewing national and international legal systems as separate, each with its own power to settle the effect of any rule from the other system within its own bounds (Week 4 lecture, p. 1)

The U.S constitution gives treaties (provided that treaties are self-executing) and federal laws equal force, and they both trump states laws. The most important US constitutional law decision concerning the relationship of international law and US municipal law is Foster & Elam (J & N., p. 180). Article VI (2) of the US constitution, the Supremacy Clause: The constitution, and the laws of the US and all treaties made or shall be made, under the authority of the US shall be the supreme law of the land. Anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. In the Asakura v. City of Seattle case is an example of a state law being trumped up by US treaty rule. The case cited Foster & Elam for the proposition that a treaty “operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts (J. & N. p. 185).

Moreover, the U.S. Constitution also recognizes customary law and, like treaty and federal law, receives the benefits of the Supremacy Clause (Week 4 lecture, p. 4). In the Sosa v. Alvarez-Machan, the Supreme Court Justices stipulated that the US bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement (N. & J., p. 248). However, more than 95 percent of all international agreements concluded by the US are in the form of executive agreements. Over the years, Congress tried to curb presidential executive power. The President still enjoys predominant power in foreign affairs (Week 4 lecture, p. 3). Even when the Senate consents to a treaty, the Constitution gives only the President the authority to negotiate, without intrusion by the Senate, as in the case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright (J. & N., p. 211).

Despite the fact the both International Law and Municipal Law depend on each other as we previously explained, De Burca & Gerstenberg in 2006 argued that both politicians and legislators have expressed reservations about the role and function of International Law in domestic affairs. Moreover, legislators are usually skeptical about the authority and utility of International Law and how it should be given effect within domestic system (p. 243). De Burca & Gerstenberg suggested that both International and constitutional norms should be understood as “contextually competing rule-of-law rather than as conflicting legal sources vying against one another” (p. 244)

References

Anthony D’Amato & Jennifer Abbassi (2006). International Law Today (1st ed). St. Paul, MN: West Publishing

De Burca, G. & Gerstenberg, O. (2006, Winter). The denationalization of constitutional law. Harvard International Law Journal, 47(1), pp. 243-262.

Mark W. Janis & John E. Noyes (2006). International Law: Cases and Commentary (3rd ed). St. Paul, MN: West Publishing

Slaughter, A. (1997, Sep/Oct). The real new world order. Foreign Affairs, 76 (5), pp. 183-197

Islamic finance and the global economic crisis

2009-02-21T21:14:00.000-08:00

In search for the origins of the current financial crisis in the U.S, which led to global recession, economists observed that the flaws in the loan industry in the form of toxic subprime mortgage loans and the fraud committed by banks and non-bank lenders, in addition to insufficient regulations and standards in the loan industry have sparked the current economic crisis and shook investors’ confidence in the economy, resulting in further economic meltdown (Congressional report, 2009, p. 258-259).

Proponents of Islamic finance believe that if Islamic principles had been applied to Wall Street, the global economic crisis never would have happened (Power, 2009, p. 70). Islamic finance accounts for just 1 percent of the global market, with an annual growth of 15 percent (p. 72) and will continue to do so for at least the next decade (Di Meglio, 2007, p. 2). Khan, 2006 argued that many in the West are unaware of the richness and depth in which Islamic political economy deals with the important issues of poverty, debt, trade and land reform. An Islamic approach differs fundamentally with the current neo-liberal global paradigm as it is not shaped by a narrow monetary or utilitarian approach to human behavior (p. 252).

Islamic economists see the application of their ideas as a third way, neither capitalist nor socialist, but “drawing on the religion and traditions of the religion” (Wilson, 2002, p. 143). They added that there is neither an inherited conflict between western capitalism and Islamic economics, nor they represent competing ideologies. Moreover, Islamic finance should not be seen as alternative to capitalism, but rather source of evolution to fix and improve the current financial system. (p. 144)

The 2008 congressional report on the current financial crisis facing the US, attributed the causes of the financial turmoil to several factors, among them “rising defaults among residential mortgage borrowers sparked the initial loss in financial market confidence. Various observers place different emphasis on low interest rates that caused a housing bubble that in this view was bound to eventually burst, insufficient regulation of subprime mortgage lending practices, and insufficient monitoring of complex financial products and services, especially rating agencies and derivatives markets” (p. 258).

Furthermore, the report also emphasized on “loose lending standards that may have been fostered by a lack of regulation of non-bank lenders and a lack of market discipline by mortgage-backed securities issuers who sold the loans to other investors Another group places the blame on the failure of officials to regulate relatively recent innovations in finance. Still others emphasize potentially irresponsible marketing practices or fraud by subprime lenders. Some observers blame investors and borrowers who did not adequately investigate the risks of their decisions” (p. 259).

Moreover, according to the report, “Complexities of mortgage-related securities have made it difficult to ascertain their value; thus, those assets have become less liquid. Furthermore, investors know that some banks have suffered loan losses that reduced their capital, but the complexities of the mortgage-related assets have made it difficult to identify which banks are under-capitalized. As a result, the liquidity of mortgage related assets has been reduced, and the liquidity of financial firms has been reduced” (p. 259-260). “The result of this financial turmoil also affected anyone seeking credit, including homeowners who wish to refinance out of a troubled mortgage. Restrictions in credit have contributed to a downward spiral in home prices. The people most directly affected by financial market turmoil are investment bankers and investors. These people may lose their jobs and livelihood. Business firms are also affected because their cost of financing possible projects has risen, which in turn can hurt the broader economy” (p. 258)

Until the credit crunch of 2008, Islamic finance was a fast-growing, if still relatively obscure, new specialty of international finance. But after Wall Street’s implosion, Islamic finance’s champions began to promote the sector as a safe haven from the ills of the global economy (Power, 2009, p. 72). At a time of almost unprecedented financial volatility, and as the credit market imploded triggering global economic crisis; Islamic banks are being hailed as bastions of stability (Quinn, 2008, p. 1). Investors who did not invest in interest-based economy were mostly unharmed by investments in financial services companies, whose stocks have collapsed, and out of traditional mortgages (Kuruvilla, 2009, p. 1). Moreover, Dow Jones Islamic Market Indexes, which represent benchmarks for islamically correct investment categories, have been outperforming their non-Islamically compliant counterparts by 3 to 4 percent in key indexes (Kuruvilla, p. 1)

Therefore, a growing numbers of individuals and companies are now embracing their workings, which are based on Koranic principles (Quinn, 2008, p. 1). Today, there is an increasing number of financial products and services available that are compliant with Islamic finance. Rising petroleum prices, increased attention on the Middle East as a result of politics, and competition between Bahrain and Dubai for the title of Middle Eastern financial center are other factors contributing to the economic surge (Di Meglio, 2007, p. 2)

The resurgence of Islamic finance is seen by Islamists as an indication of the failure of capitalism. At a Doha conference in late 2008, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, arguably the world’s most influential Islamic scholar asserted that “the collapse of capitalism . . . shows that the Islamic economic philosophy is holding up.” Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, Islamic finance expert, is even more sweeping in his claims. “If you had sukuk [or interest free bonds based on actual assets], the subprime crisis never would of happened” he says (Power, p. 72).

In most Islamic countries, Islamic banking coexists with conventional banking. In some countries, for example Iran and Pakistan, Islamic banks are the only mainstream financial institutions. Islamic finance is also offered in Europe by a small number of conventional banks and through the recently established Islamic Bank of Britain (Chiu, Newberger, Paulson, p. 64)

Like political Islam, Islamic finance began as a search for authenticity and independence from the West (Power, p. 73). Add a booming Muslim middle class and non-Muslim eager to profit, and it is easy to understand why some of the world’s biggest banks are spending millions to enter the market. The 300 dedicated Islamic banks and funds worldwide, operating in 75 countries, are beginning to face stiff competition from top-tier global firms such as Deutsche Bank, HSBC, and Citibank (Power, p. 72). Islamic economists argue that imported economic systems have not worked in the Arab world, as the very poor economic performance of the twentieth century clearly demonstrates, but governments that are dependent on western financial support and accountable at least in some degree to international institutions such as the MF and WTO are increasingly isolated from important sections of their own populations (Wilson, 2002, pp. 143-144)

According to Chiu, Newberger and Paulson, 2005, Islamic finance is the act of providing financial products or services that conform to Islamic law, which is based on a profit and loss structure rather than a lender-borrower arrangement. A profit and loss structure requires that a financial institution enters into a joint venture with a client in order to provide capital. The risk associated with the joint venture entitles the financial institution to profit from the financial transaction (p. 64)

In principle, Koran requires Muslims to share the risk of an investment while sharing the prospect of profits and prohibits contracts in which one party must repay a certain amount of money in a specific amount of time (Goffe, 2001, p. 1). Therefore, as Qutub in 2008 explained, money cannot be sold for more money (i.e. charging an interest for a loan). Loans are strictly meant for charity and not as investments. As a result, investment contracts are never currency-based, rather asset-backed or based on commodities. This would mean one would have to be more involved in an actual investment, either partnering with the individual who is looking to purchase a commodity, or buying a stake in an organization on is choosing to assist (p. 1)

Another basic tenet of Islamic finance is that Sharia law prohibits investing in morally questionable companies, such as enterprises involved with alcohol, gambling, tobacco, and pornography (Quinn, 2008. P. 1& Power, 2009 p. 70) and debt can't exceed 30% of equity (Balfour, 2008, p. 1)

Carla Power in her article “faith in the market” explained eloquently the basics of Islamic finance. She stated that the central concept in Islamic finance is justice, and explained how risks must be shared. In other words, transactions that could be unjust for either the borrower or the lender are discouraged (Power, p. 73). Furthermore, a big part of the appeal of Islamic finance is its simplicity. Speculation is taboo under Islamic law, and there's a ban on assessing interest because the Prophet Mohammed said debts must be repaid in the amount that was loaned. Money proffered must be backed by collateral, and if financial instruments are traded, they generally have to sell for face value, which deters banks from repackaging debt (Balfour, p. 1). Therefore, money cannot be invested in financial derivatives or debt products (Chiu, Newberger, & Paulson, 2005, p. 66). Islamic finance prohibits selling assets you don't own, selling someone's debt and engaging in high-risk investments. Thus, there was no participation in practices that have been blamed for Wall Street's meltdown: complex derivatives trading, short-selling and the $30 trillion market in credit default swaps (Kuruvilla, p. 1)

To get around the Koran’s ban on interest, Power, 2009, explained how the Islamic banking has relied heavily on what is called murabaha: a loan or sale in which a markup is added to the transaction’s cost. So when a Muslim borrower goes to a bank to buy a car or a house, he/she agrees to a contract in which he pays the cost of the item, plus a certain amount of profit. The bank is technically a partner, rather than a just a financier (p. 73). For example, According to Goffe, 2001, a prospective home owner is required to put down 20 per cent of the home purchase price and enter into a 10-year lease with an option to buy. The prospective home owner's monthly rental payments will cover the mortgage, tax and insurance payments on the property. The homeowner may buy the home during the lease term. At the end of the lease term in 10 years, the home owner may extend the lease and purchase an option for an additional 7 years (Goffe, 2001, pp. 2-3). When the deed of transfer is finally given to the borrower, the bank gets a slice of the home's increased value - or take a loss if the price has gone down (Kuruvilla, p. 2).The lease allows the prospective home owner to benefit from price appreciation at any time by exercising the purchase option and then selling the property to a new home buyer (Goffe, 2001, pp. 2-3). However, homeowners who bought homes through an islamically compliant lender don't have to worry whether their lender will work with them if they lose their jobs. Islamic lenders are required to work in good faith with distressed borrowers to figure out ways to make payments manageable - and co-op leaders say they will (Kuruvilla, p. 1). Moreover, recession has had would have no impact on homeownership for reasons that have much to do with an Islamic requirement that the lender and the borrower share the risks and rewards of a loan (Kuruvilla, p. 2)

An Ijara, or Islamic lease, according to Power, allows a bank to buy a car or a house for a customer and then earn a profit by renting it to them. An Islamic investor who wants to start a business can go to a bank and embark on mudharaba, or partnership, in which the bank supplies the money and the customer, brings the business skills. Profits are shared in a predeterimental ratio; losses are borne by the bank. For insurance, companies offer policies in which a group of subscriber creates a pool of funds that can then be invested and drawn on in cases of legitimate claims. Unclaimed profits are then distributed among policyholders (Power, p. 73)

The Musharaka transaction is a declining balance or shared equity purchase. Whereby the financial institution provides a percentage of the capital desired by the client. The financial institution and the customer proportionately share in profits and losses in accordance with a formula agreed upon before the transaction is completed (Chiu, Newberger & Paulson, p. 66). Even depositors at Islamic banks are supposed to share profits and losses with the bank, instead of receiving interest payments -- an arrangement that U.S. banking regulators have so far balked at approving (Wiseman, 2008, p. 2)

These methods are believed to meet the spirit of the law because they avoid the exploitation of the borrower. Under this model, Islamic banks have created scores of financial products for Muslims to avoid Western-style interest of risk. The result is a parallel system of Islamic offerings that mirror those available from conventional banks: Islamic mortgages, Islamic car loans, Islamic credit cards, and Islamic insurance (Power, p. 73)

According to a new study by International Financial Services London (IFSL), an independent organization representing Britain's financial services industry, Islamic finance will emerge largely unscathed from the current global crisis, largely because its structures make little or no use of many of the complicated instruments blamed for the current problems in conventional finance, such as derivatives and short-selling.(Quinn, 2008, p. 1).

Therefore, Muslim investors haven’t suffered from falling bank stocks because the Koran bans investment in financial institutions. Since the Koran bans gambling, the related practice of risk is forbidden. So too is the short-selling of stocks (on the grounds that you can’t sell what u don’t own) and the sale of debt. Indeed, the practice of repacking and trading debt, as well as credit-default swaps, both so central do the financial crisis, never could have happened under Islamic law (Power, p. 73).

Islamic finance experts and investors caution that the crisis doesn't mean that Islamic finance is a better model than Western capitalism. They say Islamic finance, a system of ethical finance supported on an institutional level, provides unique insight into an economic meltdown created in part by financial practices forbidden by strict observance of Islam (Kuruvilla, p. 1)

For investors in stocks, Islamic finance doesn't differ dramatically from Western principles.. Such rules leave more than half the companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index--including Microsoft, Southwest Airlines, and Nike--in compliance. "You can be an ethical investor without being Muslim," says Arne Lindman, CEO of Prudential Fund Management in Asia.

Indeed, an increasing number of non-Muslims are becoming more interested in Islamic loan products. Half of HSBC’s Islamic mortgages in Malaysia went to non-Muslims the first year the company offered them . . . All of which raises the ironic possibility that Islamic finance, in its quest to develop a more spiritually pure alternative to modern materialism for the world’s Muslims, may have ended up creating a large and attractive market for Western investors (Power, p. 74).

On other hands, emerging economies in Islamic countries have also benefited from western economic models. Onis in 1997 gave an example of the Turkish Welfare Party (pro-Islamic), which was striking to observe how the party has been heavily influenced by the successful models of East Asian capitalism. Looking towards the East for a broad model of development, the hierarchic, semi-authoritarian models of capitalism in East Asia and Southeast Asia, with a strong communitarian element, appear more congenial from an Islamic perspective compared to Western models of capitalism and their associated emphasis on individualism, secularism and liberal democracy . The Welfare party presented itself as more Eastern-orientated, heavily influenced by the successful cases of East and Southeast Asian capitalism and finding close affinities between the communitarian traditions of Islam and the communitarian features of the Asian models (p. 760). In fact the Welfare Party as the political expression of rising Islamic capital reflects the cooperative attempts of these groups to obtain a large share of the benefits associated with globalization . Onis therefore concluded that the mechanisms of economic globalization and the associated process of neoliberal restructuring have been instrumental in the rise of the pro-Islamic Welfare Party to a position of prominence in the mid-1990s (p. 763)

Therefore, as Wilson in 2002 argued, it might be misleading and indeed mistaken, to take the view that there is an inevitable conflict between western capitalism and an Islamic economic system and that the two represent competing alternatives. Both systems are evolving, and both encompass many variants. The juxtaposition of Islamic economics and western capitalism has yet to be determined in the Arab world, and indeed indigenous capitalism has already taken on some features that are consistent with Islamic economic principles and may well take on more (p. 144).

Furthermore, the rejection of integrating Islamic economic models into western capitalism will eventually force Islamic countries seeking to adhere to Islamic laws into forging regional integration among other Islamic countries. The European refusal to admit Turkey to the European Union has resulted in the Welfare Party’s strong rejection of the Customs Union with Europe and a corresponding emphasis on the need to reorient the country's economic relationship and foreign policy stance away from the West towards a closer union with the Islamic world. A number of the association's research publications investigate the potential benefits to be derived from closer cooperation between Turkey and other Islamic countries. As part of its grand strategy involving a closer union with the Islamic world, the organization has also formulated concrete projects for economic union among Islamic countries (Onis, p. 759)

And as Khan in 2006 put it, the neo-liberal world may have delivered technological transformation and selective economic prosperity but it has lost its moral compass and therefore fitness to lead mankind on this problem. Within neo-liberal societies there is now growing individualism, a huge spiritual deficit, and an unethical foreign policy. The time is ripe for a serious and rational debate to take place as to the suitability of alternative paradigms to neo-liberalism, such as the Islamic political economy or those that are now being implemented in Latin America and South East Asia (p. 254)

That doesn't mean Islamic finance won't suffer in an economic downturn. As some economists argued, since they must hold collateral; Islamic financial institutions tend to have more real estate assets than Western banks do. So far, sharia-compliant banks--mostly in the Gulf region--haven't suffered because housing prices there have held up relatively well. But if those markets were to dive, there could be trouble (Balfour, 2008, p. 1). However, a globalized market means Islamic investments are exposed along with mainstream ones. According to Standard & Poor’s, Sharia-compliant stocks lost 23 percent of their value during the first three quarters of 2008, compared with a 25 percent fall for non-Sharia-sanctioned stocks. And Islamic finance, just like conventional finance, is vulnerable to sloppy vetting of customers’ creditworthiness. Potential pitfalls for Islamic finance, then, are the same as those for conventional finance: greed and lax regulation (Power, p. 74). But performance alone isn't the point of compliance with Islamic law, known as Sharia. For the committed, investing finance with faith is about living with values (Kuruvilla, p. 2)

Critics of Islamic finance also argued that the majority of so called Sharia products do not uphold pure Islamic principles. One recent study concluded that 85 percent of bonds marketed as Sharia-complaint were illegitimate. Mahmoud El-Gamal, a professor at Rice University and author of Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice stated “There’s a whole industry now—supported by a show of religious authority provided by Islamic scholars—with banks promoting conventional products as Islamic” (Power, p. 72)

Moreover, as Chiu, Newberger and Paulson argued, providers of Islamic finance in the United State’s face two principal challenges. One challenge is to offer products that conform not only to Islamic religious doctrine, but also to state and federal regulations. Islamic finance is sometimes better understood by the banks and finance experts who have developed and marketed the Islamic finance products than by the regulators whose approval they need. The second challenge for financial institutions involves the cost of offering new products that have little precedent in the United States.( p. 65). Moreover, While Islamically correct investing is a booming industry, Islamic financial products tend to generate less profit on a per transaction basis than conventional products. Although, for most of the providers, the volume of these sales bas compensated for the increased costs. The Iman Fund, run by Allied Asset Advisors and one of the largest Islamic mutual funds in the country, has performed worse than the S&P 500 and others in its category, according to Morningstar, a mutual fund rating service (Kuruvilla, p. 2)

Chiu, Newberger & Paulson added that further potential cost relates to the sale of Islamic financial products in the secondary market. Opportunities for selling assets on the secondary market may be limited, which is more likely to affect the appeal of these products both to Islamic investors and to financial institutions.

Furthermore, opponents of Islamic finance also described it as “religious hypocrisy”, where scholars can come up with fatwas (religious decree) to suit the needs of their local governments or large business corporations (Wilson, 2008. p. 153). Such contradicting and often confusing religious regulations pose another challenge for Islamic finance. Wiseman, 2008, explained how scholars at the Al-Azhar Institute in Cairo -- influential in Islam's chief Sunni denomination -- declared in 2002 that the Quran did not prohibit all interest payments and charges (p. 2), and that the interest paid by conventional banks on deposits should be regarded as profits rather than usury or riba [usury] (Wilson, 153). The implication of this ruling was that there was no difference between Islamic and conventional banks which have been widespread for years in the Islamic world. A stricter interpretation -- barring all interest -- has been gaining ground over the past decade and driving the growth of no-interest Islamic finance (Wiseman p, 2). The Fiqh Academy in Jeddah being much more respected throughout the Sunni Muslim World, including fatwa that all interest recipients or payments constitute riba and are therefore prohibited (Wilson, 153)

Another hurdle for Islamic finance even in Islamic countries is the perception that Islamic finance is seen as part of a wider agenda by political Islamists, which could threaten and undermine the state itself (Wilson, 143). Although most Arab governments have been prepared to tolerate Islamic banking, but apart from the Sudan, there has been no attempt to convert the conventional banking system to Islamic financing methods through the enactment of legislation prohibiting riba (p. 145). Both the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian governments have been reactive rather than proactive towards Islamic finance, with much indecision as to how best to respond to these experiments in applying Sharia law to modern finance (p. 167).

Moreover, Carla Power in 2009 stated that the industry’s chief critics see in Islamic finance the same rhetorical spin as Islamist politics. “The whole idea of giving [finance] a religious identity is just a form of identity politics,” says El-Gamal. “The claim that Islam has the perfect solution is questionable in economics, just as in politics.” Still others see outright deception. Mohammad Akram Nadwi, a prominent Britain-based scholar of Islamic jurisprudence, advises his students against taking out Islamic mortgages, because he thinks their structure is merely interest-bearing debt in disguise. “At least conventional mortgages are honest,” he shrugs. (p. 75). Indeed, Al-Rajhi and the National Commercial Bank , larges investment bank in Saudi Arabia for example, offer sharia compliant mutual funds to Saudi Arabian investors by, but much of the investments are in the US (Wilson, p. 161)

To conclude, principles of Islamic finance in interest-free loans carry a solution to some of the problems that led to the current financial crisis. However, Islamic finance should not been considered as alternative to capitalism, but rather an innovation to fix the current economic crisis and prevent future ones. Islamic finance and capitalism are not two competing models of economics; they both are evolving in ways that can benefit each other. Indeed indigenous capitalism has already taken on some features that are consistent with Islamic economic principles and may well take on more. A larger issue is whether Islam and the modern economy can be reconciled at all. Is it enough to create banking products that mimic those of traditional finance but also meet the letter of Islamic law? (Power, p. 75). Western governments may find it difficult to enforce Islamic social norms and are against aspects of Islamic criminal law, but there is more scope for co-operation in the economic and financial field (Wilson, p. 144). If Islamic culture and identity can be preserved in a globalized world (Mansour, 2008), then, adopting some of the principles of Islamic finance will strengthen the International Political Economy by fostering the integration of the Islamic world into global economy.

References

Balfour, F. (2008, November 24). Islamic finance may be on to something. Business Week,

Chiu, S., Newberger, R., & Paulson, A. (2005, September). Islamic finance in the United
States. Society, 42(6), pp. 64-68.

Congressional Research Service Report (2008, September). Current financial crisis: Origins
and government response.

Cushnie, L. (2006, July 10). Islamic finance presents firms with new opportunity to make
their mark. Lawyer, 20(27), pp. 17-17.

Di Meglio, F. (2007, March 27). A Fresh Take on Islamic Finance. Business Week Online,

Goffe, L. (2001, October). US Islamic finance initiatives take off. Middle East.

Khan, S. (2006, June). Global poverty: A perspective from Islamic political economy.
Globalizations, 3(2), pp. 251-254.

Kuruvilla, M. (2009, February). Muslim investors profit by adhering to faith. San Francisco
Chronicle.

Mansour, A. (2008, November). Muslim Brotherhood and globalization: How rethinking
globalization can avert the clash of civilization. Seminar 1 final research paper, MDY

Öniş, Z. (1997, December). The political economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey: Third
World Quarterly, 18(4), pp. 743-766.

Power, C (2009, January/February). Faith in the market. Foreign Policy, (170), pp. 70-75

Quinn, B. (2008, November 28). London warms to Islamic finance. Christian Science
Monitor, 101(3), pp. 6-6.

Qutub, H. (2008, September 2). An Islamic view on loans and interest. Christian Science
Monitor, 100(195), pp. 8-8.

Wilson, R. (2002, November). Arab Government Responses to Islamic Finance: The Case of
Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Mediterranean Politics, 7(3), pp. 143-163.

Theories of IPE and global integration

2009-01-25T20:08:00.000-08:00

Following WWII and throughout much of the Cold War, international relations were largely viewed through the security lens. Scholars continued to neglect the impact of growing economic integration coupled with the increasing role that non-state actors played in international relations (Keohane & Nye, 2004, p. 503). The end of cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered the beginning of the era of globalization and heightened global interdependence (Spero & Hart, p. 92). These dramatic political changes had profound impact on the international economic system, which led to the shift in the type of governance from collective management by U.S., Soviet Union, and Japan, into more global economic governance that included more new state actors like China, India and Brazil.

However, even with the evolvement of International Political Economy (IPE); Realism, liberalism and Marxism remained three dominant ideologies that form the basis of its current theories, which include: Mercantilist Theory, Hegemonic Stability Theory, Regime Theory, Complex Interdependence, Neo-Liberal Development, Imperialist, and Dependency theory (Gilpin, 2004, p. 419). Economic nationalism, liberalism, and Marxism are mutually exclusive approaches to IPE. They are composed of “different assumptions and reach conflicting conclusions regarding the nature and consequences of a world market economy” (p. 431). Political realism in international relations formed the basis for economic nationalism or mercantilism (p. 432), while Marxism became the precursor for Lenin’s Imperialism, which converted Marxism, from “essentially a theory of domestic economy to a theory of international political relations” (pp. 426-429)

Although Lenin’s Marxism and political realism emphasize the primacy of the state and national security, Marxists believe that the state is “ultimately the servant of the dominant economic class”, while realists believe that the state is an “autonomous entity pursuing national interests that cannot be reduced to particularistic interests of any class” (Gilpin, 2004, p. 432). While political realism favors open competing markets, and liberal governments pursue policies favorable to industrial development, economic nationalism sees relative gain by the state is more important than mutual gains between the state and other states (p. 425)

Marxists believe that economics drives politics, and that political struggle arises from the conflict between different classes in society over the distribution of wealth (Gilpin, 2004, p. 420). Marxism viewed market economy as capitalism (p. 426), which is characterized by private ownership of the means of production (p. 427) driven by the strife for profits and capital accumulation in a competitive market economy. Marxism was built on the rejection of capitalist or liberal economy. It denied the ability of a capitalist economy to balance itself based on the supply and demand laws.

Moreover, Marxists criticized capitalism for its tendency to accumulate capitals by seeking profits without regards to the supply and demand laws, which will eventually slow down investments since returns will diminish (pp. 427-428). Therefore, Marxists argued that capitalism will eventually cause its own destruction through capital accumulation and the decline in the rate of return (profit), something that liberal economists themselves observed and feared (p. 439).

Furthermore, Marxism predicted that wage disparity among domestic classes in once society, and wealth inequality among states, in addition to the fierce competition by capitalist states over markets and capital outlets will cause a revolution replacing capitalism, where wealth trickles down with socialist economic system, where wealth is distributed. However, revolution based on sole economics reasons to restore peace and harmony never occurred (Mansour, MDY discussion post). Marx’s failed prediction of a violent revolution in Western Europe by the masses which would reject the capitalism in favor of socialism and later communism created a dilemma for the advocates of Marxism. Gramscianism attributed the failure to the hegemony of the political, cultural and legal superstructure over the socioeconomic base, which takes place in the form of civil institutions allowing individuals to express themselves and enjoy some autonomy away from the state, and can derail or delay an impending revolution (Cox, 2004, pp. 751-754). While some argue that Soviet-style communism was a deviation from the core beliefs of Marx and that’s why it failed (Economist, 2002, p. 3), others describe this deviation as “reshaping” by these countries like China and Soviet Union to serve their own national interests (Gilpin, 2004, p. 426)

In order to save Marxism and make it relevant; Lenin added political dimension to Marx’s ideology, which then became theory in international relations known as imperialism (Gilpin, 2004, pp. 428-429). Lenin’s added law of unequal development stipulated that capitalism does grow international economy but does not develop evenly. Therefore, he argued that revolution will occur because of political tension either among capitalist states competing for colonies to create economic dependency, or between capitalist states and poor countries fueled by inequality and exploitations (p. 430). Therefore, Marxists believe that since trade and economic interdependence is asymmetric then it can only cause conflict and insecurity. National economic priorities are then supported over economic integration (p. 443)

Contrary to Marxists’ predictions, capitalism was able to reform itself in the form of welfare capitalism which addressed several of Marx’s rightful criticisms. However, Lenin’s law of uneven development remains in force, which continues to raise concerns about the ability of welfare capitalism to survive in none-welfare internationalist capitalist world (Gilpin, 2004, p. 445).

According to Gilpin (2004), liberal economy is committed to the open market and the price mechanism (p 421). Its basic premise is that the open market should be governed by rational and maximizing laws that are impersonal and politically neutral; therefore, economics is separate from politics (pp. 422 & 423). In a liberal economy there is no connection between economic growth and political development, although they can be influenced by each other (p. 423) Liberalism entrusted the market to correct and balance itself based on the supply and demand (P. 422). However, liberalism did not rule out government’s intervention to “police and maintain the market system” (p. 421) and impose regulations in case of market failure. However, the fundamental premise of liberalism is that the individual consumer, firm, or household is the basis of society.

Martin Wolf (2003) argued that the market economy rests on valuable moral qualities, which create opportunities for economic prosperity and free and democratic societies. However, opponents consider the social inequality and the self-interest maximizing behavior created and condoned by capitalism the center of their criticism of the market economy.

Wolf saw nothing surprising in self-interest based economic transactions, which he considered an innate human behavior (p. 2). He added that the vast opportunities created by market economy allow people to engage in non-wealth motivated activities like charities and NGOs. Moreover, in a free prosperous society; elected governments can interfere on the behalf of the people to impose regulations against practices by individuals or companies which don’t adhere to the rules of competition or violates environmental standards (p. 4)

Moreover, as Wolf contended, market economy is the foundation for democracy (Wolf, 2003, p. 3), and that all democracies have market economies, although not all market economies are quite yet democratic. John Ikenberry (1999) explained how open markets become a “kind of democratic solvent, dissolving the political supports of autocratic and authoritarian governments”. Ikenberry quoted sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset in 1950s who argued that economic development tend to make education more accessible, which in turn increases the demands for political participation and openness (pp. 3 & 4)

Furthermore, open markets seem to create economic prosperity based on competition among individual businesses, companies and governments to seek self-interest. Naturally, the benefits of competition are not, and should not be, distributed equally. Therefore, knowing the several benefits of the market system; inequality cannot be considered immoral but rather a motivation for better performance and more efficiency (Wolf, p. 3).

Liberal theorists, like Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane (2004), offered a theory of Complex Interdependence as an alternative to explain cooperation and state behavior. They tried to blend the wisdom in both realism and idealism by developing a coherent theoretical framework for the political analysis of interdependence (p. 504). Therefore, liberals argue that global integration and economic interdependence based on mutual benefits of trade will foster peaceful relations among nations, and consequently a liberal international economy will have a moderating influence on international politics (Gilpin, 2004, pp. 423-424).

However, one major criticism to liberalism is its full reliance on the market to correct and balance itself and its basic belief in the rationality of the market in absence of often needed government regulations that ensure market stability. Robert Gilpin described this as unrealistic approach by liberalism (p. 433). Judging liberalism by its results; the current global economic recession is a vivid example of the downsides of unregulated liberal economies.

Economic nationalism’s main objective is industrialization, through which states maintain its autonomy and strength especially its military power. Being based on political realism, economic nationalism believes that the tendency of state to compete among each other for economic resources is inherent in the international system (Gilpin, 2004, p. 425). Because of this competition, economic nationalists consider relative gain to be more important than mutual gain. Therefore, primacy of the state, its national security and military power remain the central idea of economic nationalism (p. 424). According to Gilpin, 2004, political realists believe that the process of uneven growth “generates conflict between rising and declining states as they seek to improve or maintain their relative position in the international political hierarchy” (p. 441). He added that if this conflict is not resolved, it can lead to “hegemonic war”, to decide which state will be dominant in the international hierarchy.

Similar to Marxists, economic nationalism considers global interdependence is asymmetrical, and it constitutes a source of continuous conflicts and insecurity (Gilpin, 2004, p. 426). Nationalist writers emphasize on national self-sufficiency and geographical location rather than economic interdependence, despite of deepening interconnectedness and complexities of global economy. Even among capitalist societies, the advent of national welfare states has accentuated the economic conflicts between domestic and international policies (p. 446).Furthermore, Gilpin warned the future of the open market economy is threatened unless the conflict between domestic autonomy and international norms is resolved. He argued that cooperation among capitalist states and coordination of their domestic policies is required to ensure the integrity of the market and avoid an imminent break down as Lenin predicted (p. 448).

Gilpin argued that although Marxism’s and Realism’s approaches to International Political Economy are evolving national identities and domestic priorities, they differ in their assessment of the motivation for economic dynamics within society and internationally. Marxists believe that classes’ struggle will bring harmony and peace following the inevitable revolution against capitalism, whereas Realists believe that the anarchy of the international system and the self-centered nature of human beings make such struggle unlikely to happen (p. 432). Whether or not economic interdependence leads to political conflicts or harmony remains continuous issue among Marxists, liberals and nationalists (Gilpin, 2004, p. 442)

Among the factors that determine the outcome economic interdependence among competing welfare capitalist states is the existence of absence of a hegemonic liberal power that can establish and manage the international trading system (Gilpin, 2004, p. 443). Robert Ethane in 2004 argued that cooperation is not antithetical of hegemony; on the contrary, hegemony depends on certain kind of asymmetrical cooperation, which successful hegemon support and maintain. (Keohane, p. 489). As Robert Gilpin in 2004 indicated, when the domination of this power waned and they are challenged by rising powers, trade conflict increases (p. 443).

Therefore, the theory of hegemony stability stipulated that for a liberal economy to develop and stabilize it requires a hegemonic power, however, its mere existence is not dependant on the presence of absence of this power (Gilpin, 2004, p. 477). Gilpin argued that for a hegemon to be able to lead and manage global economy, its power must be considered legitimate by the rest of the world (p. 478). The hegemon must also be able to impose order and prevent cheating, free riding and exploitation by some states over others, enforce the rules of liberal economy, and encourage others to share the costs of maintaining the system (p. 479)

Meanwhile, the same dominant power that hegemon relies on to induce order in the global economy can also be exploited to manipulate the system and interrupt international trade and finance. Moreover, trade conflicts could arise when a declining hegemon engages in protectionist behavior through subsidies and other trade barriers to shield domestic market from global competition, according to Gilpin (p. 443). He also added that declining rate of economic growth, as it is the case of the U.S., intensifies international trade competition. Another reason for developed countries to use protectionist measures and subsidies is to undermine other countries’ comparative advantage in one particular sector. For example, many developing countries, especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa, have comparative advantage over the U.S and other developed countries in the agricultural products mainly because of the abundant natural resources and cheap labor. Therefore, the U.S. farm subsidies and agricultural trade barriers by rich countries remain one most complicated issues undermining global trade.

Fareed Zakaria, 2008, explains eloquently that the real challenge for the future of American power is not its own decline but rather the rise of the rest. Zakaria predicts the power of the U.S. will ultimately be balanced by new rising nations and that the U.S. will face a choice of whether it stabilizes the world order by accepting a world with a diversity of voices and viewpoints. Or it can watch the world it helped to build over last 60 years to be slowly torn apart by greater nationalism, diffusion, and disintegration. Unlike the downfall of the British superpower trigged by its economic failures, the largest challenges facing the U.S. and seem to be undermining its hegemony are political rather than economic. Zakaria explains that although the economic problems in the U.S. today are real, but different policies can quickly put the economy back on track, however, the U.S. political system is dysfunctional and unable to make simple reforms that can secure the country’s future. He argues that Washington seems largely unaware of the new world rising around it and shows few signs of being able to reorient its policies for the new age.

To conclude, Realism, liberalism and Marxism’s approach to international political economy is based on different assumptions and reach different conclusions. Political realism formed the basis of economic nationalism or mercantilism whereas Marxism became the precursor of Lenin’s imperialism and dependency theory. Liberals believe economy should be free from the influence and interests of politics, while Lenin’s Marxism and political realism emphasize the primacy of the state and national security and. Marxists believe that economics drives politics. Marx’s failed prediction of a violent revolution in Western Europe by the masses which would reject the capitalism in favor of socialism and later communism created a dilemma for the advocates of Marxism. Contrary to Marxists’ predictions, capitalism was able to reform itself in the form of welfare capitalism which addressed several of Marx’s rightful criticisms. However, Lenin’s law of uneven development remains in force, which continues to raise concerns about the ability of welfare capitalism to survive in none-welfare internationalist capitalist world. However, the future of the open market economy is threatened unless the conflict between domestic autonomy and international norms is resolved. He argued that cooperation among capitalist states and coordination of their domestic policies is required to ensure the integrity of the market and avoid an imminent break down as Lenin predicted. Whether or not economic interdependence leads to political conflicts or harmony remains continuous issue among Marxists, liberals and nationalists. Among the factors that determine the outcome economic interdependence among competing welfare capitalist states is the existence of absence of a hegemonic liberal power that can establish and manage the international trading system. Meanwhile, the same dominant power that hegemon relies on to induce order in the global economy can also be exploited to manipulate the system and interrupt international trade and finance.

References

Cox, R. W. (2004). Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory. In D.J. Kauffman, J.M. Parker, P.V. Howell & G.R. Doty (Eds.), Understanding international
relations: The value of alternative lenses (5th ed., pp.751 -784). Boston: McGraw Hill

Ikenberry, G. (1999, Spring99). Why Export Democracy?. Wilson Quarterly, 23(2), 56.

J. E. Spero & J. A. Hart (2002). Politics of International Economic Relations, 6th ed. New York:
Wadsworth Publishing Company

Keohane, R. O. (2004). Cooperation and international regimes. In D.J. Kauffman, J.M.
Parker, P.V. Howell & G.R. Doty (Eds.), Understanding international relations: The
value of alternative lenses (5th ed., pp.489 -500). Boston: McGraw Hill

Keohane, R. O. & Nye, J. S. (2004). Complex interdependence. In D.J. Kauffman, J.M.
Parker, P.V. Howell & G.R. Doty (Eds.), Understanding international relations: The
value of alternative lenses (5th ed., pp.503-518). Boston: McGraw Hill.

Lynch III, T. F. (2004). Foundations of radicalism. In D.J. Kauffman, J.M. Parker,
P.V. Howell & G.R. Doty (Eds.), Understanding international relations: The
value of alternative lenses (5th ed., pp.535-551). Boston: McGraw Hill

Mansour, A. G. (2009, January 24). Formal discussion post, MDY

Marx after communism (2002, December). Economist, 365 (8304), pp. 17-19.

Wolf, M. (2003, September/October). The morality of the market. Foreign Policy, (138), pp. 47-50.

Zakaria, F. (2008, May). The future of American power. Foreign Affairs, 87(3), pp. 18-43.

International system and global integration

2009-01-05T21:00:00.000-08:00

Global integration and globalization can be considered two synonymous terms. In his article “States of discord” Thomas Friedman, 2002, defined globalization as “the integration of everything with everything else”. He added that “a more complete definition is that globalization is the integration of markets, finance, and technology in a way that shrinks the world from a size medium to a size small” (p. 64). Therefore, global integration or globalization describes a complex level of interconnectedness among countries, companies and even individuals and groups across the globe (Friedman, 2005, p. 2). It mainly involves aspects of economic, financial and trade relations, as well as the flow of ideas, technology, people and forms of governing. Moreover, Friedman called globalization “flattening of the world”, where the competition field is being leveled and the barriers of geography and distances are becoming increasingly irrelevant, and access to technology is becoming more readily available (p. 3).

Patrick Mendis in 2005 argued that no single theory perfectly captures the complexities of dynamic processes of globalization. However, he stated that there are three broad forces drive globalization and make the world a rapidly shrinking global village, and hence created and enabled global integration:
1-The rapidly changing Information Revolution driven largely by multinational corporations facilitated by open government economic policies and competitive business strategies
2-The spread of democratic values after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, which is reaching out to individuals in the form of freedom of religion and expression. Mendis then explained how that the footprints of globalization are less distinct in the autocratic and religious states of the ME than the free and open economies of East Asia. (p. 3)
3-Liberal economic and trade policies advocated by the WTO, IMF, and World bank, and benefited an unprecedented number of countries, rich and poor alike, which are seeing their overall economic performance boosted by strong export growth” (Naim, 2007, p. 96).

According to the A.T Kearny/Foreign Policy annual Globalization Index, the level at which any country is described as globally integrated is measured based on four different parameters of which include economic integration, technological connectivity, political engagement and personal contact (The global top 20, 2006, p. 75). For example, in the 1990s economies of several countries like China, India, Russia, Eastern Europe, Latin and Central Asia became integrated into the global economy (Friedman, 2005, p. 4) and their rank in the 2000s’ globalization index subsequently rose (The global top 20, pp. 76-78)

However, the same forces of globalization have downsides, which have shown to impede or slow down global integration. Naim Moises, 2003, listed five forms of trade that have been booming because of globalization, which include drugs, arms, intellectual property, people, and money (p. 28). Criminal networks have been freed from the geographic constraints of the state borders and their illegal markets have expanded. The same governments’ policies such as privatization, decentralization and deregulation, which were aimed at enhancing free trade and capital market, have also made fighting criminal networks more difficult (p. 30). Furthermore, Moises argued that “the fundamental changes that have given the five wars new intensity over the last decade are likely to persist” (p. 34), which can undermine further global integration.

Inequality and wage disparity is another major flaw in the global economy that can threaten further integration. Not only that low wages can undermine the quality of life for workers in developing countries but also it threatens workers in rich countries by having their jobs outsourced resulting in favoring protectionism over integration (Economist, 2007, pp. 1-2). Moreover, deepening global integration is considered threat to national sovereignty and the ability of governments to stay in control of its decision making process concerning economic policies (Ghemawat, 2007, p. 60)

Throughout the international monetary system’s history, states were both impeding and enabling factors behind global integration. When U.S assumed the leadership of the Bretton Woods’ system throughout the 1950s, it succeeded to rebuild European and Japanese economies. By the 1960, and due to the decline in the U.S. economy, the U.S. could no longer manage the system alone, and was obliged to join in collective management. (Spero & Hart, pp. 14-20). The new monetary system which began during the period of interdependence (1971-1989) and enlarged during the era of globalization (1989—present) is too complex to be managed by single dominant country, as the US role during the Bretton Woods System, or collectively managed by few key traditional actors such as the U.S, EU and Japan.

However, unlike the Bretton Woods’ system where dominant states have helped growing world economy, the collective management and global governance systems have witnessed growing regionalism in addition to tension between developed and developing nations, which can impede global integration. As Abdelal & Segal in 2007 pointed out, new barriers in the form of increasing governments’ control and ownership over economic assets have weakened the institutional foundations of globalization in the past few years, therefore, “the idea of unrestrained globalization will wane in force” (p. 2 & 6). Domestic politicization of trade matters in the U.S. and throughout the world has been an important constraint on globalization and trade order

Barriers to trade and agricultural subsidies imposed mainly by rich countries have been a major obstacle impeding global integration. According to Griswold et al (2006), rich countries agricultural trade barriers and subsidies remain “the single greatest obstacle to a comprehensive World Trade Organization agreement on trade liberalization”.

In the era of interdependence, developments in domestic politics conflicted with international trade managements and undermined the GATT agreements shifting the world economy towards protectionism (Spero & Hart, pp. 73-74). Protectionist nations usually restrict free trade to balance market objectives with social ones (Vogel, 2000, p. 1). Moreover, nations tend to restrict free trade when it begins to lose its competitiveness in world economy. In this case, all nations-whether developed, less developed or developing-become under increased protectionist pressures to maintain its competitive edge and protect its domestic products against foreign competitors (Spero & Hart, p. 75)

States can also change the shape of global integration or globalization. According to the 2004 National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project “Mapping the global future”, new states and emerging economies are likely to give globalization a much more a non Western face by the year 2020, partly due to the current growing influence of China and India over the world economy, and the boom in the information technology. Rising Asia will the use the power of its fastest-growing consumer markets to set the rules for world economy, attracts innovative technology and become hotbed for jobs outsourcing from Western countries. Transnational corporations and NGOs will be major non-state actors in world political economy

Among other factors that can impede global integration is regionalism. As Spero & Hart indicated that the power shift within the industrialized nations, which began to take place in 1957 when six European countries united to form the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Union (EU) in 1986, has now evolved into an economic integration that included around 380 million consumers by the 2000, creating a significant economic powerhouse balancing that of the U.S. (pp. 6-9). Similar but smaller regional aggregations were forming in Latin America and Asia. They added that the resulting tension between the benefits of globalization and the threat to national sovereignty emerged as a central theme of the current globalization (p. 10)

Institutions and regimes enable global integration. The two main International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were created in 1944 as part of the Bretton Woods system to achieve financial stability and security in the international monetary system in the postwar era (Spero & Hart, p. 13). Since its inception in 1995 as part of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been globalization’s rule-making and governing regime, with free trade becoming the organizing principle of global trading system (Baker & Mander, 2005, p. 251). The WTO is concerned with creating agreements that regulate global trade, enforces these agreements through its Dispute Trade Settlement System and it promotes future trade negotiations (p. 251). However, opponents of the IFIs like Jeffery Sachs (2004) argued that these institutions prioritizes the interests of rich countries ahead of the interests of the mostly developing nations which utilize the services of these institutions to finance developmental projects essential for their economic growth and stability. Moreover, lack of international coordination of domestic fiscal and monetary policy remained one major factor that is undermining the performance of the IFIs (Spero & Hart, pp. 38 & 39)

To conclude, global integration can be further enabled by more cooperation among states and none-state actors, enhancing free trade and incorporating emerging economies and different cultures into global economy. States, Multinational Corporations and International Financial Institutions play an essential role in bolstering global integration. Growing regionalism can impede global integration in absence of adequate cooperation. Other factors that can impede global integration include protectionism, global terrorism, and conflicts among civilizations. Addressing these issues underline the importance of cooperation, which can be managed through international regimes and institutions.

References

Abdelal, R., & Segal, A. (2007, January). Has globalization passed its peak?. Foreign Affairs, 86(1), pp. 103-114.

Barker, D., Mander, J. (2000, Fall). The WTO and invisible governments. Peace review, 12 (2), pp. 251-255.

Economist (2007, January). Rich man, poor man. Economist, 382 (8512), pp15-16.

Friedman,T., & Kaplan, R. (2002, March/April). States of discord. Foreign Policy, pp. 64-70.

Friedman, T. (2005, April). It's a Flat World, After All. New York Times Magazine, pp. 32-37.

Ghemawat, P. (2007, March). Why the world isn’t flat. Foreign Policy, 159, pp. 54-60.

Griswold, D., Slivinski, S., & Preble, C., (2006, February). 6 Reasons to kill farm subsidies and trade barriers, Reason (9) 36, pp. 42-49).

E. Spero & J. A. Hart (2002). Politics of International Economic Relations, 6th ed. New York:
Wadsworth Publishing Company

Mendis, P. (2005, fall). Americanization of globalization. Public Manager, 34 (3), pp. 3-8.

Naím, M. (2007, Sep/Oct). The free trade paradox. Foreign Policy, 162, pp. 96-95.

Naim, M. (2003, January). The five wars of globalization. Foreign Policy, 134 (28), pp. 28-38.

Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project. Read “The Contradictions of
Globalization.”, pp. 27-45

The Global Top 20. (2005, May). Foreign Policy, 148, pp. 74-81.

Vogel, D. (2000, June). The wrong whipping boy. The American prospect 11(14), pp. 15-17.

Dominant issues in free trade

2008-12-14T20:55:00.000-08:00

The trading system has been transformed by forces of globalization, which dramatically increased global trade, an ever greater interdependence (Spero & Hart, p. 92), and increased international economic interactions (p. 8). Liberal economic and trade policies advocated by the WTO, IMF, and World Bank reinforced globalization and new forms of trade in services and trade-related intellectual property and investments emerged. Economic globalization has been fundamentally redesigning and centralizing the world’s political and economic arrangements in a way unsurpassed since the Industrial Revolution (Barker & Mander, p. 251).

However, globalization created conflicting political demands. On the one hand, calls were made for expansion of trade liberalization and international management of old and new trade issues, on the other hand, many groups demanded protection and a halt on the forces of globalization (Spero & Hart, p. 92). Furthermore, domestic politicization of trade matters in the U.S. and throughout the world has been an important constraint on globalization in general and trade order in particular (Spero & Hart, pp. 67& 68).

One of the main issues in free trade in the international economic system is protectionism, which had dominated the interwar era (Spero & Hart, p.68) but is becoming increasingly significant since the beginning of the era of interdependence in 1971 (p.10 ), during which, developments in domestic politics conflicted with international trade managements and undermined the GATT agreements shifting the world economy towards protectionism (pp. 73-74). Protectionist nations usually restrict free trade to balance market objectives with social ones (Vogel, p. 15). Moreover, Nations-whether developed, less developed or developing-become under increased protectionist pressures to maintain its competitive edge and protect its domestic products against foreign competitors (Spero & Hart, p. 75). Periods of inflation and economic recession generally contribute to more protectionism and implementation of trade restricting policies, where liberalization and cooperation might be perceived as contributing factors to economic meltdown.

Several barriers to international trade are forms of protectionism. These barriers include tariffs, quotas, agricultural subsidies, non tariff barriers (NTBs), safeguards, voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs) and antidumping measures (Spero & Hart, p. 87). In 1948 countries convening in Bretton Woods, agreed to generate a system that would accelerate worldwide economic development. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created mainly to set tariffs and quotas on manufactured goods. In the years following, however, business interests exerted considerable pressure to extend GATT rules to regulate investments, services, intellectual property rights, and so on (Barker & Mander, p. 252).

Although the GATT succeeded in reducing tariffs, quotas and liberalizing international trade (Spero & Hart, p. 87), agriculture was subject o a separate GATT regime and did not benefit from the liberalization process of the postwar era. Therefore, national agricultural policies of most developed countries (US, Japan, EU) remained interventionist and protectionist (p. 86). NTBs such as government procurement policies, customs procedures, health and sanitary regulations, national standards, and a broad range of other laws and regulations that discriminate against imports or offer assistance to exporters, remained major barriers to free trade (p. 87). This situation was complicated by the fact that the GATT offered few guidelines to reduce NTBs, (p. 88), and were also ineffective on safeguards (p. 97).

Another form of protectionism was the use of VRAs (Voluntary Restraint Agreements). VRAs began in 1950s and 1960s and soared in 1980s (Spero & Hart, p. 89) and were designed to protect import-sensitive industries, which countries believed were inadequately protected by unclear laws of the GATT antidumping measures and safeguards (p. 88) Therefore, the NTBs and the VRAs, and the increased government interventions in the economy along with the shift in comparative advantages, rendered the GATT regime increasingly irrelevant since it was designed to manage mainly quantitative import restrictions and tariffs (Spero & Hart, p. 90).

Tokyo Round (1973-1979), succeeded to make progress in regulating NTBs by establishing new NTB codes. However, these codes were incomplete and applied only to its signatories—developing countries were no convinced of their values and chose not to sign, which made them subject to discrimination legal under GATT rules. Moreover, the Tokyo Round did not succeed in reaching an agreement in agricultural trade liberalization (Spero & Hart, pp. 90-92). As result, the world moved away from multilateral trade agreements in favor of bilateral and regional ones, in order to address the deficiencies of the GATT. Moreover, trade with Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) and other developed countries grew in the 1980s and 1990s, organized labor and environmental groups tried to advance their laws and practices in other countries and to modify NAFTA to include such provisions (p. 95)

The 1970 and 1980s, witnessed the growing importance of services in the international economies and international trade of the developed countries, accounting of 20-30% of world trade, whether services produced and consumed within the same market or traded internationally. This trend of growing production and trade in services continued in the 1990s, especially in the telecommunication, banking, insurance, law and accounting areas (Spero & Hart, p. 107). Barriers to trade in services had not been subject to the process of liberalization, because services were not covered by the GATT regime. (p. 97). The technological advances and Information Revolution have resulted in unprecedented number of innovations in telecommunications and pharmaceutical products. However, piracy undermined the ability of high-technology firms, especially computer software and pharmaceutical companies, to compete internationally and, thus, disrupting trade. Many firms and their governments argued that GATT should be broadened to cover intellectual property issues (Spero & Hart, pp. 93 & 94)

The Uruguay Round agreements (1987-1994), concluded by the Agreement of Marrakesh, became the foundation for further globalization of world trade (Spero & Hart, p. 101), and resulted in several breakthrough agreements that benefited both developing and developed countries. Among the main agreements reached during the Uruguay Round are: Further cuts in tariffs; Significant reductions in agricultural subsidies; Elimination of textile and apparel quotas over ten years; New trade rules for services; Intellectual property and trade-related investments, e.g. the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and the Trade-Related investment Measures (TRIMs); Binding procedures for the settlement of disputes; Agreement on safeguards with clearly defined rules and regulations; and finally establishment of the WTO (p. 97)

Since its inception in 1995 as part of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been globalization’s rule-making and governing regime, with free trade becoming the organizing principle of global trading system (Barker & Mander, p. 251). A key rule in governing global trade which the WTO follows is the “distinction between a product and the way it is produced” (Vogel, p. 15). This rule has led proponents of WTO to criticize it for favoring big corporations over human rights, democratic and environmental standards and labor laws (Baker & Mander, 251).

According to Spero & Hart (2003), despite of the significant breakthrough agreements during the Uruguay Round, which even continued beyond the Agreement of Marrakesh in 1994, there are major remaining issues the free trade that have not been adequately resolved. Among these remaining issues are: Agriculture remained highly protected, which is of much concern to developing nations. Griswold et al in 2006 argued rich countries agricultural trade barriers and subsidies remain the single greatest obstacle to a comprehensive WTO agreement on trade liberalization. They added that eliminating subsidies will Lower food prices, increase exports and help international peace and environment (pp. 42-49)

Other major issues that were not adequately addressed by the WTO include: Antidumping and safeguards measures were only partially controlled by the WTO; The WTO dispute settlement understandings (DSU) were criticized of being overly legalistic; The agreements on services, intellectual property and investment measures had gaps in coverage that needed to be closed; The significant reduction in tariffs and NTBs exposed new set of national policies that affected trade flows, e.g. competition and antitrust policies which included practices used by powerful local competitors that restrained trade; Barriers to open up use of telecommunication infrastructure to further enhance e-commerce; Environmental and labor policy and concerns that liberal international trade could result in environmental dumping (p. 102)

Furthermore, several NGOs called to reform the WTO to include interest groups to participate along with governments in the WTO decisions. Other groups and governments disagreed arguing that NGOs already have access to decision making through their national governments and national decision processes. More transparency in the operations of the WTO, making documents and drafts of treaties available to the general public (Spero & Hart, p. 104)

Finally, in my opinion, since the September 11 attacks, terrorism emerged as one of the dominant issues in global trade will undermine further trade and monetary liberalization. Global terrorism disrupts the movement of people, and finances, and threatens investments. The next round of multilateral trade negotiations will have to address the threat of global terror on continuous process of liberalization and globalization in general.

References
Barker, D., Mander, J. (2000, Fall). The WTO and invisible governments. Peace review, 12 (2), pp. 251-255.
Griswold, D., Silvinski, S., & Preble, C. (2006, February). 6 Reasons to kill farm subsidies and trade barriers. Reason 37(9), pp. 42-49.
J. E. Spero & J. A. Hart (2002). Politics of International Economic Relations, 6th ed. New York: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Vogel, D. (2000, June). The wrong whipping boy. The American prospect 11(14), pp. 15-17.

Obama, Middle East and the Freedom Agenda

2008-11-20T11:29:00.000-08:00

Jackson Diehl in the Washington Post predicted the Obama administration will abandon Bush's freedom agenda and democracy promotion in the Middle East, especially after we’ve seen its end results in the Palestinian elections. I think Mr. Diehle is right in his assesment of the incoming Obama administration.

I have listened to almost all of Obama's major speeches and I never heard any mentioning of democracy promotion in the ME, or any plans to do so. Even on the his campaign website, Obama's vision for the ME is focused on the peace process between Israel and Palestinians,war in Iraq, and Iran's nuclear program. So, democracy promotion is not on Obama's short term plans to protect U.S. interests in the ME.

If the Egyptian regime gives in to the U.S. demands by holding free and fair elections, most likely we will see the Muslim Brotherhood forming the new government. The question then: will the U.S. be willing to deal with an Islamic government that does not recognize Israel and opposes U.S. policies? Or will the U.S. isolate the new government and impose an economic and political blockade on 80 million Egyptians to punish them for their democratic choice?

I believe that this paradox in our foreign policy undermines our credibility to play any effective role in the future of democratization in the Middle East.

Mr. Diehle concluded that "Mubarak and other "pro-Western" autocrats seem to have drawn from Obama's election: that the threat of U.S. pressure for political liberalization has passed". Mr. Diehl has every reason to believe that the Democrats’' policies will be more along the line of "stability and security outweighs democracy", except that the sum will be zero, as we've learned on 9/11.

However, those who still believe that Ayman Nour is a viable opposition figure who can challenge President Mubarak, don't really understand the psyche of the Egyptian people or the political dynamics in Egypt. Mr. Nour enjoys no public support and cannot be looked at as rallying factor in Egyptian politics. On the one hand, the public sympathizes with Mr. Nour for the injustice and suffering he has endured, and widely respects him for speaking up against government corruption and oppression. On the other hand, he is branded as "America's man", and in Egypt, like most other parts of the ME nowadays, that’s enough to undermine his scanty popularity and cost him the support he once enjoyed among the elite. Mr. Nour's letter to then democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama seeking his support, was criticized by the opposition and the public who considered it humiliating for Mr. Nour and rejected the U.S. meddling in Egypt's internal affairs.

The U.S. should keep a hands-off approach to Egyptian politics and don't impose a model of change or implicitly support one opposition trend against the other, because it will automatically be rejected by the public which is highly skeptical of the U.S. agenda, resentful for its support of Israel, and the war in Iraq. Instead, the U.S. should make public diplomacy a priority and work on improving its image and combating anti-Americanism plaguing the ME, and threatening U.S. interests abroad and its security at home. The U.S should also be ready to respect people's democratic choices and deal with freely elected governments even if they're opposed to our policies, but they will be willing to cooperate and negotiate as long as there is recognition of mutual interests and we can find the common ground that bring all parties together. Even governments like Hamas and Iran can be contained through the negotiations and cooperation.

Unlike the West, the public opinion in the ME is highly emotional in general, and we’ve seen the reactions after the appointment of Rahm Emmanuel. However, the U.S. can use this to its advantage by engaging in aggressive public diplomacy. Words can do magic without even taking any actions, and that's how the ME operates.

How rethinking globalization can avert the clash of civilizations: Case study of the Muslim Brotherhood

2008-11-17T23:01:00.000-08:00

By: Ali G. Mansour, MD

Globalization has affected every aspect of international relations, including economic, social and political realms. From the development of new technologies, new ideas and free trade, to the spread of democracies and forms of governments, globalization has profoundly transformed the human condition in all of its aspects. On the one hand, Muslim Brotherhood views globalization as a threat to cultural identity and national economy in developing countries and as a new form of American imperialism that is seeking to impose its hegemony and control the world’s economy. On the other hand, the West, driven by realist views and preoccupied by its security dilemma, is equally skeptical of political Islam, which it accuses of seeking to destroy western values and wage global jihad to conquer Western states and reestablish Islamic Caliphate

Muslim Brotherhood’s views on globalization are similar to those expressed in the dependency theory, which remains a pervasive force in Third World notions of the international political economy even as Marxist experiments in Russia and Eastern Europe has collapsed. Rethinking globalization through the alternative lenses of international relations can help find a common ground between political Islam and the Western civilization by allowing localization to co-exist with globalization, hence preserve cultural identity and social norms. The concept of Islamic Caliphate can also be redefined in economic and political terms in a way that promote cooperation and mutual dependence. Resolving these two highly contentious issues can avert an imminent clash between Western and Islamic civilizations.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the notion of an Islamic threat to world peace and security has become even more highlighted. Globalization and post-modernization has led to the rise of political Islam in the Muslim world. Therefore, political Islam deserves scholarly attention and not just a threat to regional stability, it deserves to be treated as a probable contender for future political rule over states with which the West must continue relations with. Among movements of political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) is considered the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization.

Since its establishment in Egypt in 1928 by a school teacher named Hassan el-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has sought to fuse religious revival with anti-imperialism—resistance to foreign domination through the exaltation of Islam. From mid-to late 1940s, the MB began to expand beyond Egypt, and today it is impressively a worldwide movement having many branches in both Muslim countries and none Muslim countries alike.

The MB’s participation in electoral politics has enjoyed some success, particularly in the Indonesian, Egyptian and Palestinian elections—the last through Hamas, which is the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), which evolved out of the MB movement, is represented in the current Iraqi government by Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi who is the General Secretary of the IIP. As a result, the Brotherhood has apparently demonstrated considerable popularity. In fact, it is likely to become the leading voice within the Muslim world generally by virtue of its widespread character.

Samuel Huntington in 1993 argued that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. He added that civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and that the most critical attributes responsible for this gross division is indeed the undeniable cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

Huntington defined civilization as the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that, which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. He divided world civilizations into two camps—Western civilization, which has two major variants, European and North American, and Islamic, which has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions.

Mohamed Mahdi Akef, General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, underscored the deepening animosity between the Western and Islamic Civilizations described in Huntington’s theory. In his message titled “Humankind between the slavery of globalization and the glory of Islam”, Mr. Akef sarcastically criticized globalization for "transforming the world into a small village whose mayor is the master of the White House", and which "mainly serve the interests of the American politicians". He then accused globalization of racism for "favoring Judeo-Christian faith and depriving humanity of the noble values of the divine laws". He drew an example of how "the globalized world is biased against any successful Islamic economic or developmental projects, and targeting of Islamic culture by rejecting the Turkish and Malaysian models based on allegations of their enmity towards secularization". Akef sees "the hope in the glory of Islam and in the Muslims' ability to confront the slavery of globalization and their steadfast in resisting occupation and tyranny".

In the interviews I conducted with six prominent leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt via email, they all rejected globalization if it conflicts with Islamic teachings, rules, and regulations. The six were all professionals (doctors and lawyers), who had decent knowledge of world affairs. They echoed the views of Mr. Akef—equating globalization with Americanization, which they considered a threat to their Islamic identity, beliefs, values, language, and social norms.

Abdel el-Mone’m Abu el-Fotoh, leading figure of the MB and member of its Guidance Bureau- the highest decision-making body within the MB- and the General Secretary of the Arab Physicians’ Union, described globalization as a form of ”modern imperialism“, which uses culture, politics and even military power to impose its hegemony as in the case of the U.S. In other words, globalization according to Abu el-Fotoh became an “American fascism” depriving the Third World countries from technological advances and controlling its resources for the benefits of the First World countries.

Hamdy Hassan, physician, a parliamentarian, and spokesperson of MB parliamentary bloc, and Osama Naser Uldeen, member of the MB Guidance Bureau, emphasized the same meaning blaming globalization for the condition of inequality in world economy, in which the industrialized countries are gaining more power and enjoy more prosperity by exploiting the developing countries which suffer more backwardness and authoritarianism.

Essam el-Erian, physician and chief of MB political bureau, and Sobhi Saleh, member of parliament and prominent attorney, reiterated the same meaning by dismissing the” American concept” of globalization, which forces its culture and values on other nations even through military power. Saleh went further by calling globalization “the U.S. bullying the world to stain it with American culture and norms”.

Gamal Heshmat, prominent MB writer, physician, and former Member of Parliament, asserted that globalization is bad for the Muslim world because it disintegrates its identity. He rejected the notion that civilizations can be “dissolved in one pot” stating “any nation that has respect and appreciation to its culture and values would not submit to the concepts of universal civilization”

Furthermore, the MB argues that the failure of both socialism and capitalism to address Egypt's (and the entire Muslim nation's) grievances indicates that only a return to Islam at both the individual and collective levels will bring God back to the side of the Muslims.

However, all the Brothers I interviewed agreed that there are positive aspects of globalization which Muslims should benefit from, including the technological advances in communication, science, and informatic, and the ability to exchange ideas of democracy and liberty. The contemporary Brotherhood’s views on globalization among Islamic nations seem to contrast with their views when it involves relations between Western and Islamic civilizations. Abu el-Fotoh and Heshmat favored globalizing the Muslim countries, creating a unified “Ummah” or the Muslim nation, which to them makes sense because those countries share the same culture, religion, and values.

Abo el-Fotoh elaborated further on the idea of the Islamic Caliphate which, according to him, now in light of globalization can be based on economic and political principles, not religious ones. He compared the Islamic Caliphate to the European Union which is composed of sovereign and powerful states united around economic, security and political agenda.

This fairly progressive view by some in the second MB generation represents a considerable pragmatic shift from the earlier theocratic concept of the Caliphate expressed by founder Hassan el Banna, who stated that the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate is an Islamic duty for all Muslims, in which the Khalifa (the one ruler for all Muslim countries) is entrusted to impose God’s laws. Therefore, el-Banna placed the reestablishment of Islamic Caliphate at the top of the MB agenda.

Some of the criticism of globalization and world relations between developed and developing nations is also expressed by theorists like Theotonio Dos Santos in 1968, in his analysis of the dependency theory, and James Rosenau in 1997, in his alternative views of globalization

Thomas Lynch III described dependency theory, born in the Third World, as variant of Marxism that must be evaluated independently from the Marxist-Leninist communism. Dependency theory was developed over the period from 1950 to the early 1970s, which coincided with the 1952 Free Officers’ Revolution in Egypt and the Nasserite era, attributed to President Gamal Abdul Nasser who ruled Egypt from 1956-1970. Nasser sought out rapprochement with the Soviet Union; hence Egypt was controlled by Soviet ideas. Although the older generation of the MB underwent fierce repression and persecution during the Nasser’s era, they would still embrace his ideology of anti-imperialism and socialism during that time of Egypt’s history, which has influenced their views till today.

However, since the 1980s, middle-class professionals within the MB have pushed it in a more transparent and flexible direction. Working within labor unions and professional organizations, these reformers have learned to forge coalitions with and provide services to their constituents.

Unlike Marxism which addresses “classes of people”, dependency theory focuses on the relations between “classes of states”. Dos Santos in 1968 defined dependence “as a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustained, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can either be a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development”

Dos Santos added that to understand what is happening in the underdeveloped countries, we need to put it within the framework of a process of dependent production and reproduction. According to Dos Santos, this system reproduces backwardness, misery, and social marginalization within its borders—it reproduces a productive system whose development is limited by those world relations which necessarily lead to the development of only certain economic sectors, to trade under unequal conditions, to domestic competition with international capital under unequal conditions, to the imposition of relations of super exploitation of the domestic labor force with a view to dividing the economic surplus thus generated between internal and external forces of domination.

Rethinking globalization through alternative lenses of international relations can offer us the opportunity to find one common ground between the Western and Islamic civilizations, represented in the research by political Islam, which we can build on.

James Rosenau contended that commonly used definitions of `globalization in the literature are elusive and”misleading”, because they are often used by different observers to describe different phenomena, with little overlap among the various usages. Alternatively, Rosenau viewed globalization from a different perspective by describing globalization as the opposite of localization. He attempted to further explain globalization by drawing a comparison between the two, and by arguing that while localization is boundary-heightening, globalization on the other hand is boundary-broadening.

Rosenau in his alternative views of globalization did not underestimate its powerful or negative influence in undermining other people’s culture, values and way of life, which led many across the globe, including the MB, to consider the incursions of globalization a threat to their identity and cultural mores. Rosenau then built on the common ground he established with the critics of globalization to provide a solution based on his alternative view. Rosenau believed that there is no inherent contradiction between localizing and globalizing tendencies, and that both can coexist to a degree which will depend on ethnic and noneconomic factors actively contributing to localization. In other words, localization and globalization need not to be mutually exclusive, and it is possible to reconcile globalization and localization by accepting the boundary-broadening processes and make the best of them by integrating them into local customs and practices

Rosenau offered another solution if the process of integration fails to reconcile both globalization and localization in a given culture or within a state. Rosenau shared Michael Zurn optimistic hypothesis of “uneven fragmegration” which allows for continuing pockets of antagonism between globalization and localizing tendencies hopping that eventually these pockets of fragmentations will be overcome by the opportunities and requirements of interdependence and will conform to globalization. Rosenau based his optimism on the assumption that the failure of the states to solve “pressing problems” will lead to a decline in their capabilities and a loss of legitimacy, which will undermine the people’s loyalty to their states in favor of multiple loyalties to national or transnational organizations that are able fulfill their needs.

Gross in 2004 weighted in on this argument by stating that the social reactions to globalization should be understood at its local level, and when people are denied the choice as how to deal with globalizing forces, protests often erupt. Gross added that “It is important to understand that the protests are not against globalization so much as the tyranny of governments which prevent choices from being made. Conversely, people who freely choose the extent to which they will accept global ideas are less likely to see globalization as a threat”. Gross cited an example of Malaysians, when given free choice; appear to have taken advantage of the economic opportunities without the anticipated concomitant social or political upheavals.

The concept of successful mixing globalization with localization was described by several social scientists as “glocalization”. Gross cited in his article Patrice C. Brodeur’s “From Postmodernism to Glocalism” in which she advocated the replacement of the term globalization with “glocalism”. The term takes into consideration the complexity of interactions between global and local forces which constantly change our definitions of ourselves and others. In particular, the term can help academics to better understand the world from the perspective of non–Westerners.

Ritzer in 2003 defined glocalization as the interpenetration of the global and the local, resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas. This view emphasizes global heterogeneity and tends to reject the idea that forces emanating from the West in general and the United States in particular are leading to economic, political, institutional, and-most importantly-cultural homogeneity. Ritzer added that the above definition of glocalization makes what is local is seen as increasingly insignificant and a marginal player in the dynamics of globalization. Yet, according to Ritzer, glocalization does represent some measure of hope. For one thing, it is the last outpost of most lingering forms of the local.

Robert Keohane added another dimension to the relations between countries with different interests and set of values by focusing on the possibility to achieve cooperation in the world political economy. Keohane acknowledged that international coordination of policy seems highly beneficial in an interdependent economy, but cooperation in world politics is particularly difficult. He based his theory of cooperation on the premise that nonhegemonic cooperation is possible and it can be facilitated by international regimes. When shared interests are sufficiently important and other key conditions are met, cooperation can emerge and regimes can be created without hegemony. Therefore, the key to Keohane’s cooperation is presence of shared interests among states, and the mutual recognition of their importance.

Keohane argued that cooperation requires the actions of separate individuals or organizations—which are not in pre-existent harmony—be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as “policy coordination”. Therefore, cooperation occurs when actors (governmental and nongovernmental) attempts to adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination, and these attempts succeed in making policies more compatible. He further clarified that “intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objective, as the result of process of policy coordination” . In other words, and building on Keohane’s theory, both Western and Islamic civilizations should develop a partial, self-interested perspective on their mutual interactions, and engage in negotiation and bargaining designed to induce the other to adjust their policies to one’s own. Each government pursues what it perceives as its self-interest, but looks for bargains that can benefit all parties.

According to Keohane, “cooperation therefore does not imply the absence of conflict. On the contrary, it is typically mixed with conflict and reflects partially successful efforts to overcome conflict, real or potential”.

Samuel Huntington underscored the importance of cooperation among civilizations as a long term strategy to avert the clash of Western and non-Western civilizations. He pointed out that the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. Huntington added that this will require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with one another.

I conclude that both globalization and localization to co-exist with each other. It is essential that we encourage more cooperation and accommodation and “an appreciation of the reality that allows for multiple loyalties and memberships will likely widen the benefits of global economy”. Glocalization can be seen as an alternative to the evil of globalization. Prosperous countries like those in the Persian Gulf in addition to several other Asian countries were able to play a central role in global world economy while to a large extent preserving their cultural identities and were able to integrate their norms and traditions into the globalized world.

Theories of international cooperation and alternative views on globalization can provide a framework within which the Western and Islamic civilizations thus redefining their relationship, which must be based on the mutual recognition of each other’s interest as well as respecting one another’s cultural, religious and social norms. Muslim Brotherhood’s rejection of globalization can be transformed into a desire and willingness to coexist with Western civilization knowing it no longer represents a threat to the Islamic culture and identity. Moreover, the Islamic Caliphate should be viewed, not as threat to Western civilization, but rather an economic and political formula that enables the Muslim world to meet the challenges of globalized world without sacrificing its culture, religious values and social norms.

It is both theoretically and practically important that we engage in an unbiased discourse on the thinking of the more moderate groups of political Islam, in an attempt first and foremost to deal with our own fears of the unknown and unfamiliar, and to determine the possibility of a peaceful coexistence alongside the Islamist movement, and I hope this paper contribute to this necessary discourse.

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Alternative theories in globalization

2008-11-09T22:25:00.000-08:00

Anthony McGrew (2008) described globalization in terms of the massive advances in global communications, transport and informatics technologies over the past several decades, which have created worldwide interconnectedness causing transnational spread of ideas, cultures and information in an accelerating pace. The result is a world that became a single social space with global tendency evident in all sectors including economic, military, legal, ecological, cultural and social aspect.

James Rosenau (2004) contended that concept of “globalization” in the literature is elusive, with no widely accepted definition. He argued that globalization was used by different observers to describe different phenomena, with little overlap among the various usages, which he described as “”misleading”. Alternatively, Rosenau looked at globalization from a different perspective by describing globalization as the opposite of localization. He attempted to further explain globalization by drawing a comparison between the two, and by arguing that while localization is boundary-heightening, globalization on the other hand is boundary-broadening.

Rosenau added more depth to his understanding of globalization and focused on its political repercussions by noting how authoritarian regimes tend to favor localization and fragmentation over globalization because localization restricts the movement of people, goods, norms and practices and impose constraints on the exchange of new ideas, information and institutions which serve the undemocratic nature of their governing and ensure their clinging to power. However, Rosenau predicts these authoritarian governments will eventually fail and their policies are bound to be undermined with increasingly interdependent economies and communication technologies that are not easily monitored.

Rosenau in his understanding of globalization did not fail to recognize its perceived powerful and negative influence and the ability to undermine people’s culture, norms and way of life, which led many across the globe to consider the incursions of globalization a threat to their identity and cultural mores. However, Rosenau believed that there is no inherent contradiction between localizing and globalizing tendencies, and that both can coexist to a degree which will depend on ethnic and noneconomic factors actively contributing to localization. In other words, localization and globalization need not to be mutually exclusive. He believed it is possible to reconcile globalization and localization by accepting the boundary-broadening processes and make the best of them by integrating them into local customs and practices.

But what if the process of integration failed to reconcile both globalization and localization in a given culture or within a state? Rosenau shared Michael Zurn optimistic hypothesis of “uneven fragmegration” which allows for continuing pockets of antagonism between globalization and localizing tendencies hopping that eventually these pockets of fragmentations will be overcome by the opportunities and requirements of interdependence and will conform to globalization.

Rosenau argued that the failure of the states to solve “pressing problems” has led to a decline in their capabilities and a loss of legitimacy, which will undermine the people’s loyalty to their states in favor of multiple loyalties to national or transnational organizations that are able fulfill their needs.

Although Rosenau views on globalization seem to be in line with the liberal theories on cooperation by Keohane in 1984, and complex interdependence by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 1997, however, Rosenau focused on another dimension by addressing the dynamics between globalization and domestic culture and politics. Rosenau criticized the traditional theories on globalization for not offering alternative interpretations as to how the interaction of economic, political, and social dynamics will play out. Keohane and Nye (2004) explained that there are costs that comes with these interdependent relationship in globalized world, but similar to Rosenau they also argued that the benefits of this interdependence will exceed costs and each state is expected to analyze an interdependent relationship based on the potential benefits and the costs and joint gains or losses.

Neorealists like Kenneth Waltz (2004) definition of structure leaves aside questions about the cultural, economic, political, and military interactions of states.—requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another (how they are arranged or positioned).

Susan Strange in 1996 looked at another aspect of globalization, which is its relationship to state power. She argued that the state authority is retreating to the power of global economy—structural changes in world economy and society have eroded the quality of state authority, not its quantity, rendering it less influential. Strange added that the scope of states’ authority is not only limited to economy but extends to society where states are becoming unable to protect the interests of special social groups—landowners, pensioners or shareholders. Strange called her theory the “new realism”, which denied any basic distinction between domestic and international political economy, however, it remains by large open questions that require empirical research in political theorizing to substantiate it.

Contrary to liberal theories, Strange considers complex interdependence a way to conceal the reality of inequality of dependence between states and “the structural power” exercised by some states over other governments and over other societies. The same meaning was expressed by Morgenthau in 1948 when he considered the structure of international relations which assumes “sovereign equality” of all nations, is dominated by extreme inequality among nations and causing anarchy.

Moreover, Strange described international regimes as “instrument [by national governments] for the pursuit of national interest by other means” and realists’ perception obscured by extensive literature on international regimes. These views are similar to those echoed by neorealists like Kenneth Waltz (2004) who recognizes the importance of international organizations but argues that their performance is either influenced by the capabilities of the states, or they might become unable to act without the support of the states concerned with the matter at hand.

Strange cited as a paradox in the state-market balance of power “the growing intervention of state authority and of the agencies of the state in the daily lives of the citizens” in areas where “the market left to itself has never been able to provide”. However, similar to Rosenau (2004) she argued that even this role by the state is becoming “less respected and lacks its erstwhile legitimacy” and that many states are failing to fulfill these basic responsibilities.

Strange cited ten major powers where states once used to exercise their authority in areas of economic and territorial nationalism that now have declined or have been challenged by forces of global market economy. Strange argued that even states most fundamental responsibilities in taxation, building its domestic infrastructure, and providing social welfare have not been immune to changes imposed by global economy which set limits on the level of states contributions and regulations.

To conclude, I agree with Rosenau’s view that globalization and localization can accommodate each other. I believe international relations theories like realism and leftist views are not suitable to deal with a world where antagonism between globalization and the desire to maintain cultural norms, and local values is threatening world peace.

Prosperous countries like those in the Persian Gulf in addition to several other Asian countries were able to play a central role in global world economy while to large extent preserving their cultural identities and were able to integrate their norms and traditions into globalized world. With more cooperation and accommodation and “an appreciation of the reality that allows for multiple loyalties and memberships will likely widen the benefits of global economy”.

Although Susan Strange argued for the retreat of the state power in face of global world economy, however, in my opinion, there are two major challenges to Strange’s conclusions which are the current global economic meltdown and global terrorism. In order to meet challenges of global market economy, Western states have opted to limit their regulatory authorities over private enterprise, compared to their Asian counterparts. We now know that deregulations in the financial market have been one of major factors that contributed to the world’s biggest financial crisis since the great depression of 1930s. The United States now is moving towards more state interventions in the market economy, and the Democratic Party on the verge of assuming power is calling for regulations in the stock market.

Global terrorism since 1990s is representing a new type of threat within states territories which in turn reinforced the state’s responsibility for defending its citizens and the rise of nationalism and the rally around the state contradicting Strange’s assumption that there is a decline the perceived need for the state as an institution necessary to defend society against violence within or beyond its territory.

Cooperation theories in international relations

2008-11-01T22:14:00.000-07:00

The study of conflict and cooperation has been an enduring task of scholars, with the most recent arguments being between realists and neoliberal institutionalists. Among the dominant Idealist theories that support cooperation are the Democratic Peace Theory by Bruce Russett in 1993, the Regime Theory by Robert Keohane in 1984, and the Complex Interdependence by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 1977.

Keohane (1984) focused his regime theory on cooperation in the world political economy. He stated that International coordination of policy seems highly beneficial in an interdependent economy, but cooperation in world politics is particularly difficult. Keohane’s argument is based on the need to analyze cooperation systematically within the context of international organizations and shared beliefs before its meaning can be properly understood. Thus, understanding the patterns of cooperation through concepts of international regimes will enable actors to predict future patterns of interactions among states and accordingly plan proper economic arrangements and related political activities.

Keohane stipulated that conflicts arise when actor’s policies pursued without regard for the interests of others are regarded by others as hindering the attainment of their goals. He then added that once areas of potential or actual conflicts are identified; states should then resort to cooperation by communicate with each other and coordinate in attempt to adjust their policies so they become significantly more compatible with one another. International regimes are then established to lay down a set of implicit or explicit principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures around which their expectations converge in a given area of international relations.

Since the creation of international regimes involves cooperation, each state is expected to pursue its national interests and maximize its relative gains compared to others’ when negotiating an international regime agreement. Therefore, international regimes should not be interpreted as elements of a new international order beyond the nation-state; they should be comprehended chiefly as arrangements motivated by self-interest. However, once an agreement has been reached on the principles of certain policies, states will lose part of its autonomy by having to comply with the norms and rules of the agreement

Nonetheless, states still retain their sovereignty in implementing actual policies—mainly economic—through state institutions rather than international organizations. Therefore, as Keohane contended, although the impact of the principles, norms and decision-making procedures of regimes must be exerted on national control, regimes are not of superior importance to national controls. Furthermore, Keohane explained that because world politics are decentralized and not hierarchic, sovereignty and self-help mean that the principles and rules of international regimes will necessarily be weaker than in domestic society.

Although international regimes consist of injunctions that are non specific and are simply obligations not enforceable by hierarchical legal system, some are specific enough that violations and changes can be identified.

Realists like Morgenthau downplayed the need for international institutions to maintain order—he argued that if each state pursues its respective interest in terms of power, justice will be served in dual sense—which means that states will be mindful of other states pursuing their interests as each state pursues its own interest. Robert Gilpin in his analysis of Hegemonic Stability Theory contended that maintaining transnational cooperation requires a hegemonic or dominant power to stabilize world liberal economy, while the decline of the hegemon state will cause a dramatic collapse of the system and undermines cooperation .

Neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz recognize the importance of international organizations but they argue that their performance is either influenced by the capabilities of the states, or they might become unable to act without the support of the states concerned with the matter at hand.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) offered a theory of complex interdependence as an alternative to explain cooperation and state behavior. They tried to blend the wisdom in both realism and idealism by developing a coherent theoretical framework for the political analysis of interdependence. They defined Interdependence as mutual dependence characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries. In other words, it is a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces.

Moreover, they argued that whenever the transactions among states involve reciprocal costly effects, then this relationship can be described as interdependence. A compelling example of interdependence is the current financial crisis facing the U.S. economy and the crumpling of several of its major financial institutions and the resulting aftershocks felt in the markets across Europe and Asia. The costly global economic effects caused by bad U.S. economy led to a collective action by world leaders in order to prevent worldwide economic disaster.

Furthermore, interdependence could be symmetrical (equal) where each country enjoys an equal portion of gains and losses and which does mostly exists among industrialized nations, or asymmetrical (unequal) where the more powerful countries enjoy more benefits and fewer losses than the weaker ones which is the case between industrialized and developed countries.

According to Keohane and Nye (1977), there are three main characteristics that distinguish complex interdependence, which include; multiple channels connecting societies through interstate and transnational organizations, the absence of hierarchy among issues and a minor role of military power. Contrary to realism, interconnectedness is not only confined to formal governmental organizations and state agencies (interstate) but mainly involve transnational and transgovernmental interactions.

However, Keohane and Nye explained that interdependence restricts state autonomy, which they consider a cost that comes with interdependent relationship, but they also argue that the benefits of this interdependence will exceed costs. Each state is expected to analyze an interdependent relationship based on the potential benefits and the costs and joint gains or losses.

Morgenthau (1948) considered the structure of international relations which assumes “sovereign equality” of all nations, irrelevant to the reality of international politics which is dominated by extreme inequality among nations and causing anarchy. Therefore, he criticized interdependence for assuming sovereignty of states while in reality reinforces the control of superpowers and their exploitation of the “ministates”. Thus, classical realism and interdependence seem to be two opposing theories

Kenneth Waltz (1979) indicated that for a state to be sovereign and dependent are not contradictory. He stated that anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system’s units. Therefore, neo-realists seem to be more receptive to the idea of interdependence compared with classical realists.

Bruce Russett (1993) developed the democratic peace theory on the assumption that “democracies almost never fight each other”. Challenging the sameness of all states paradigm of realists, Russett argued that within a democracy, politics is seen as largely a nonzero-sum; by cooperating, all can gain something even if all do not gain equally.

While there is no consensus among scholars as to why democracies almost never fight each other, Russett in 1993 introduced two kinds of overlapping theories which are likely to offer explanations of this phenomenon; first is the democratic norms culture model, and the second is the structural and institutional constraints model. In the first model, Russett argued that democracies tend to resolve conflicts through cooperation and peaceful resolutions following the same culture of conflict resolution which characterizes their domestic political process, therefore violent conflicts with other democracies are rare, and even when they occur they have limited scale.

On the other hand, violent conflicts between democracies and nondemocracies will be more frequent because the latter does not abide by the same democratic roles in their domestic affairs and therefore, is more likely to use violence to settle their differences. Russett added that violent conflicts might erupt between democracies if one them still maturing in democracy or politically unstable especially at times of economic hardships.

Russet’s second model of structural and institutional constraints argues that the need to obtain the approval and the support of the public to use violence during conflict is complicated process and time consuming which will eventually reduce the likelihood that a decision will be made, and that leaders be constrained. However, since authoritarian leaders are not equally restrained, violent conflict with democracies is more frequent, and in this case both democracies and nondemocracies might initiate violence for fear of a surprise attack inflicted by the other.

Furthermore, Russett (1993) noted that the structural and institutional constraints on democracies do not prevent them from responding to sudden attacks by using emergency powers or even strike preemptively during crisis. An example of the two different types of violence used by a democracy in recent history is the war in Afghanistan in October 2001 as an immediate emergency response by the U.S. to destroy al Qaeda following the sudden attacks of September 11, while the war in Iraq in 2003 represented a preventive strike against an authoritarian state to destroy its alleged WMDs which the U.S. perceived as a threat.

To conclude, I believe Kenneth Waltz understanding of international organizations and how they work represent a more convincing depiction of the international system, while Keohane’s theory is needed to reform that system. The actions of the United Nations, the largest international regime, are constrained by the capabilities of only five permanent members of its Security Council who has the veto power—the UN cannot act without the support and the approval of these five states.

Although democratic peace theory seems to be the most promising in promoting international cooperation, however, one of the assumptions I find problematic in this theory is that it considered wars against authoritarian states both expected and legitimate, and consequently divide the world into a zone of peace, which include democracies, and zone of war which includes authoritarian states. This classification is troubling because during war there will be no distinction between authoritarian regimes and the people in these states who are mostly governed against their will and who will more likely pay the price of any given conflict. I believe promoting democracy in these countries and pressuring these regimes to reform will empower the people who live under authoritarian regimes to rise up against their leaders and demand freedom and democracy.

"Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country?" General Colin Powell

2008-10-22T07:52:00.000-07:00

The most important thing endorsed by Colin Powell today was an America that's worth leading and worth fighting for, an America that encapsulates the idea of what some might call a "more perfect union." To that end, Powell invoked a picture to illustrate his point.

"Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country? The answer is no. That's not America. Is there something wrong with a seven-year-old Muslim-American kid believing he or she could be president? Yet I have heard senior members of my own party drop the suggestion that he is a Muslim and might have an association with terrorists. This is not the way we should be doing it in America.

I feel particularly strong about this because of a picture I saw in a magazine. It was a photo essay about troops who were serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. And one picture at the tail end of this photo essay, was of a mother at Arlington Cemetery and she had her head on the headstone of her son's grave. And as the picture focused in, you could see the writing on the headstone, and it gave his awards - Purple Heart, Bronze Star - showed that he died in Iraq, gave his date of birth, date of death, he was 20 years old. And then at the very top of the head stone, it didn't have a Christian cross. It didn't have a Star of David. It has a crescent and star of the Islamic faith.

And his name was Kareem Rashad Sultan Khan. And he was an American. He was born in New Jersey. He was fourteen years old at the time of 9/11, and he waited until he could serve his country and he gave his life."

This is the picture of Elsheba Khan, taken by Platon for the New Yorker:So, yeah. Sometimes, America does benefit when we share our wealth with one another. And some people, in fact, do have it harder than Joe The Plumber.

stumble digg reddit del.ico.us news trust mixx.com October 19, 2008 03:29 PM

Critiquing classical realism and neo-realism

2008-10-13T21:12:00.000-07:00

Classical realism has been at the heart of the study of world politics in the United States since it was introduced in 1948 by Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations—realist international theory (Doyle et al, 1997). It was considered natural response to the failure of liberalism to maintain world peace when the WWII erupted.

Neorealist or structural realism developed by Kenneth Waltz in 1979, came as a response by realists to the new forces represented by the emergence of globalization and acceleration of states interdependence in the 1970s, and the renewal of the cold war in the 1980s. Structural realism was able to address some of the limitations of classical realism. However, it failed in predicting and explaining the end of cold-war and the collapse of Soviet Union in 1989 since it omitted domestic politics from its system structure which became a major flaw in Neorealism.

First realists like Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, laid out the foundations of classical realism. Thucydides placed human beings at the heart of his analysis by incorporating the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy and the influence of individuals on decisions of state. Machiavelli emphasized on power at the center of international relations. Hobbes added another dimension to realism by making it a state-centric, where all international relations revolve around the state.

In 1948, Hans Morgenthau summarized his contemporary classical realism theory with six principles which included the three basic principles mentioned above—the influence of human nature on politics, power defined as interest, and the centrality of state –in addition, he then further elaborated on the relationship between politics and morality.

Morgenthau stated that there is natural tension between politics and morality, and that morality cannot be permitted to obstruct the successful pursuit of interest; although he admitted the importance of the moral significance of political action (Kauffman et al, pp154). His justification is that the definition of what is considered to be moral can vary from one state or individual to the other, instead he wanted both individuals and states to “ judge political action by universal moral principles” but only after being filtered through the circumstances of time and place (pp.154) In other words, political realism does not require indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible based on specific time and circumstances, and the interest of the state.

Morgenthau then concludes by stating that political realism maintains the autonomy of the political sphere by defining interest as power. He argued that if each state pursues its respective interest in terms of power, justice will be served in dual sense—which means that states will be mindful of other states pursuing their interests as each state pursues its own interest (Kauffman et al, pp. 154-155)

As I previously alluded to; realists strongly believe in the centrality of the nation-state in their international political structure. They recognize the importance and relevance of transnational organizations to international relations; however, they believe that state has the ultimate authority and that no state should pass on this authority to any foreign entity.

Another realists’ core assumption is that the international system characterized by an anarchy which shapes the state behavior. Anarchy makes each state always concerned about its own survival and in a constant state of apprehension of being attacked or its interests threatened by another state especially if the latter is seeking to strengthen its power. Therefore, traditional realists like Morgenthau believe that the state must rely on its own power, especially military power, to protect its interests.

Moreover, classical realism looks at the state as a rational and autonomous actor. Realists expand the state autonomy to not only include autonomy from international organizations but also sufficient autonomy from their national societies to recognize and pursue the interests of the nation as a whole. This domestic coherent attitude allows them to “exercise control over different national organizations to direct and control government actions in such a way as to implement the decisionmakers’ strategies” (Doyle et al, pp.166).

In their pursuit of domestic autonomy, realists believe they ought to be unconstrained by civil society preferences or opinions, which I believe creates dilemma. In a democratic society, the government is elected to represent the people and has to conform to their will and choice. How can realist choose to ignore national organizations and the civil society institutions which in many cases reflect and express the public opinion?

The realist system makes power the central, organizing principle of the system. States within this system are trying to remain in some kind of equilibrium despite the constant power maximizing behavior of all states.

Structural realism subscribes to three main conceptual elements as classical realism: Statism, Survival, and Self-help. Structural realism, however, overcame a number of limitations of classical realism by focusing on the distribution of power in the international system and by exploring how the system’s overall structure defined in terms of distribution of power, influences the political outcomes.

Neorealists acknowledge the increasing importance of interdependence and the influence of global economy on world politics, but they argue the each state’s policies continued to be determined by a desire to maximize its relative power, mainly military power (Week four lecture). However, neorealists believe that states need power to achieve security and that power in itself is not the goal. Realists on the other hand see state maximizing power is an end in itself.
Waltz views the system of international relations as a number of interacting units representing states, and refers to the structure as the mechanism through which these units are arranged in relation to each other. By understanding where a state is located in the structure it is possible not only to explain state behavior but also to predict it, although we cannot know with certainty what state will do (Kauffman et al, pp.296)

Unlike classical realism, structural realism does not include consideration of the effects of the policies and behavior of states on international politics. Instead, it considers the outcomes of a state policies depend mainly on the variation of the structure within which their actions occur (Neorealism: confusions and criticism, pp.3). Therefore, by trying to understand the state-level interaction, waltz omitted everything else that is not part of this process, including the state’s history, culture, ideology, political institutions or economic organizations, although he did not deny their importance

Waltz then later clarified that since “capability” is an attribute of the state, we cannot include it in the definition of the structure which must leave aside any characteristics of the states including their behavior and interactions. However, the “distribution capabilities” among the state units across the structure is an attribute of the system.

Furthermore, unlike the domestic political structures which are centralized and hierarchic; the ordering principles in the international-political structures are decentralized and anarchic. State units are alike in terms of sovereignty, and coordinate among each other with none is entitled to command.

Another fundamental concept in Neorealism is the polarity of the international system. Neorealists believe that a world with two superpowers has tendency for peace more than a world with only one superpower or multi-powers. The number of great powers affects the stability of the structure—bipolar system is more stable than multi-polar one because it provides clarity and predictability. They keep watch on each other, can divide the world between themselves and suppress smaller conflicts. So, alliances were not meant only to deter each other but to control states within each league. With multi-polarity, defections are a problem and might threaten the members of that alliance.

However, Neorealism argues that for liberal economy, not international economy, to survive and flourishes it requires a hegemon dominating power to maintain the rules and prevent other emerging powers from disturbing its stability. This Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) has been one of themes of Neorealism.

To conclude, both classical and structural realism argue that the most important actors in world politics are nation-states; these states are autonomous and rational. It assumes that the system of interacting states is characterized by anarchy, that domestic politics has a minimal effect on states’ foreign policies, and that the behavior of each state is affected significantly by the pursuit of power.

Neorealism differs from realism in two fundamental ways. First, Neorealism believes that states are more interested in security than power, and that states might forego power if it will undermine their security. Second, Neorealism argues that the polarity of the international system influence the state behavior. However, the validity of Neorealism was questioned when it failed to predict and explain the end of cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union. By ignoring the domestic changes that took place inside the USSR, neorealists have missed the opportunity to predict and understand the changes in that state behavior.

The Middle East is another area where domestic turmoil and cultural complexities significantly alter the state behavior, its choices and political-military alliances, which in turn represent a challenge to the neorealists’ view of world politics. The War in Iraq and the pre-war expectations as to how the Iraqi people would welcome an American invasion demonstrated a major flaw in our realist understanding of how culture and religion can play an essential role in the state behavior and its people. Our strategies in dealing with Iran and the assumption that Iranian military would crumple similar to what happened in Iraq in face of American superpower in any given military confrontation are overlooking the fundamental differences between the theocracy-based Iranian military ideology and the secular authoritarian nature of former Iraqi regime

Situational ethics

2008-09-21T11:48:00.000-07:00

Although Classical Realism and Machiavelli do not require indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but they condone hypocrisy and double standards when dealing with domestic and foreign policy issues. Machiavelli attempts to rationalize this hypocrisy by calling it a distinction between what’s desirable and what’s possible, or as Lincoln contends “distinguishing between official duty in terms of national interest and personal wish in terms of one’s moral values and political principles realized throughout the world” (Kauffman et al, pp. 149)

This double standard approach and the disregard to the less powerful nations’ political and economic interests seem to have characterized the U.S. foreign policy during the last several decades, leading to rise in Anti-Americanism, which in turn provided Islamic fanatics with the fuel they needed to inflict terror and destruction upon the U.S. and promote their ideology of hate across the Muslim world.

After 9/11, U.S. seemed to realize that it has to be mindful of the popular demands for freedom, justice and democracy dominating the world which the U.S. itself championed, and it can no longer apply the same Machiavellian standards in dealing with domestic and foreign affairs in an era of globalization and interconnectedness.

In June 20 of 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave a historic speech at the American University in Cairo that seemed to have put an end to “situational ethics” and marked a major U.S. policy shift from political realism to neo-liberalism when she declared that “For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East -- and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people”

Unfortunately, the hopes for more liberal foreign policy faded away after the rise of political Islam on the wings of democracy, which prompted the U.S. to revert back to its realist views and pursuit stability and security at the expense of democracy by continuing to support authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.

Role of religion in politics and public life

2008-09-21T11:35:00.000-07:00

Recent study by the Pew research center indicates the falling support among Americans for the role of religion in politics and draws a distinction between secular Europe and religions America. There are two separate issues; the role of religion in public life, and the role of religion in politics.

In my previous post, I did not suggest that most Americans believe religion should have a bigger role in politics, because clearly that is not what the public opinion is heading, according to Pew forum. My argument was that among the majority of individuals across the world, religion is gradually taking bigger role in their public life. By majority, I meant most of people in Asia and the Middle East who represent more than two thirds of the world population. My statement was a reflection of opinions and subjective observations circulating in foreign literature, however, I could not find objective data to support it, and it is subject to scrutiny.

Furthermore, on the issue of role of religion in public life most recent data show that Americans are equally divided, although the rise of religious issues to the center of debate in the U.S. is an indication of what could be an impending shift in the public opinion in favor of more assertive role for religion. Issues like stem cell research, abortion, gay marriage, school prayers and the display of the Ten Commitments on government property, are all becoming of huge public interest that is even reshaping our political discourse.

Nonetheless, we ought to define exactly what do we mean by “religion” when we ask these questions. If by religion we mean invoking the scriptural interpretations of the Bible and sectarian religious ideology into political life, then I believe that would be a violation of the Bill of Rights which declared that “the legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” which was later expressed by Thomas Jefferson in 1785 in his infamous “wall of separation between church and state. However, if by “religion” we mean the moral values and traditions that strengthen the society social fabric and the commitment to family and equitable justice, then I believe that current trend in the U.S public opinion favor that role by religion.

Should the U.S. be contained or balanced?

2008-09-17T08:07:00.000-07:00

Despite of its unrivaled power after the World War II and then the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the United States has not only used its power responsibly but also helped create and participate in a range of international institutions that constrained its actions. The United States also introduced the fundamental liberal principles into the rules and regulations of the international society including democracy, global free trade, liberty and equality (Balyis et al pp. 116-117).

However, the U.S invasion of Iraq and the war on terror have raised concerns throughout the world about what is considered an unrestrained use of power by the United States, seen as a result of disturbance in the balance of power after the collapse of the USSR.

Liberals in general believe that U.S. power should be restrained and embedded into the international system as the most effective and acceptable way of exercising global hegemony. Most realists believe that other great powers would in time emerge to the balance the United States (Balyis et al, pp 76)

In his fascinating book “The Post-American World”, Fareed Zakaria explains eloquently that the real challenge for the future of American power is not its own decline but rather the rise of the rest. Zakaria predicts the power of the U.S. will ultimately be balanced by new rising nations and that the U.S. will face a choice of whether it stabilizes the world order by accepting a world with a diversity of voices and viewpoints. Or it can watch the world it helped to build over last 60 years to be slowly torn apart by greater nationalism, diffusion, and disintegration.

The integration of worldwide economy and the intensifying interdependence have made it almost impossible for a single country to stall the emergence of new political actors and regaining the balance of power. Baylis et al explain how countries like Britain in 1992 was forced to abandon its economic strategies to adjust to new global market realities, adding that no government even the most powerful has the resources to resist sustained speculations against its currency and thereby the credibility of its economic policy. (Balyis et al, pp. 16)

Unlike the downfall of the British superpower trigged by its economic failures, the largest challenges facing the U.S. and seem to be undermining its hegemony are political rather than economic. Fareed Zakaria explains that although the economic problems in the U.S. today are real, but different policies can quickly put the economy back on track, however, the U.S. political system is dysfunctional and unable to make simple reforms that can secure the country’s future. He argues that Washington seems largely unaware of the new world rising around it and shows few signs of being able to reorient its policies for the new age (The Post-American World, Fareed Zakaria)

In another word, and as Morgenthau puts it—the structure of the international relations in U.S foreign policy is irrelevant to the reality of international politics. The incompatibility between both will cause unmanageability of international relations and anarchy (Kauffman et al, pp. 148-149)

Therefore, I do not think the U.S. has a choice whether to allow other balancing powers to take its place at the helm, and should not resist it. A world in which the United States takes up less space, but is one in which the American ideas and ideals are overwhelmingly dominant, is a lot more stable than a world in which the U.S. is a superpower but Anti-Americanism is fueling hate and violence and making America less secure.

Muslim Brotherhood wants “scientific conference” before deciding to stand up against terrorism!

2008-09-15T10:04:00.000-07:00

The chief of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) political bureau, Dr. Mohamed Morsi issued a statement posted on the MB official English website, Ikhwanweb, on the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Dr. Morsi accused the U.S. of “irrational behavior” and rushing to wars before any “meaningful probe into the attacks” and adding that the MB “demanded fair trial for the 9/11 suspects and the issuance of a detailed scientific report about the attacks, but the U.S. administration did not respond till now”

The U.S. government has independently investigated the events leading to the 9/11 and the 9/11 commission report was released on November 2004 and took over two years to prepare. The report was issued by the National Commission on Terrorism Attacks Upon the US. The commission interviewed over 1200 people in 10 countries and reviewed over a half million pages of documents before it issues its final report.

As far as “fair trial” I believe Khaled Sheikh Mohamed and Ramzi bin al Shibh are currently on trial in U.S. courts and have attorneys appointed to defend their case paid for by taxpayers money!. I don’t know of any Islamic country that would put those who admittedly killed nearly 3000 of its innocent citizens on trial—their most likely fate would have been public beheading without trial.

The MB leader also suggested that the U.S holds “huge scientific conference” to analyze the 9/11 attacks, and should this happen the MB “will stand firmly against whoever committed this horrific crimes against innocent civilians” according to the website, which suggests that MB has not done that so far!

It is interesting how Dr. Morsi used the word “terrorism” only when describing the U.S. actions as “it [U.S.] assaulted entire nations and peoples without any evidence”. However, he stopped short from calling the 9/11 attacks terrorism—describing it as “horrific crimes”

MB did not of course forget to add its usual rhetoric to the statement by condemning the “zionist lobby” and its influence on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, which he warned will increase the anti-American sentiments and will harm the American people and spread hatred against them!

The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest political movements in the Islamic world that operates within religious framework. In Egypt, the MB enjoys wide support and recently won 20% of parliament seats representing the biggest opposition bloc in parliament.

Globalization and imperialism

2008-09-12T21:06:00.000-07:00

Critics of contemporary globalization, mainly Marxists theorists, argue it is latest phase of Western imperialism and it is a tool used by the West to impose new form of hegemony disguised in economic, humanitarian and democratization projects to control the wealth and resources of the less advantaged countries outside a central triad (U.S., Western Europe, and Japan) which comprises only %20 of the world population but benefited the most from a system where globalization only applies to the developed world, as Balyis et al argue

Moreover, Samir Amin in 2001 contends that the ideological discourse of this new phase of imperialism is now founded on a “duty to intervene” that is supposedly justified by the defense of “democracy” the “rights of peoples” and “humanitarianism” but it is designed to ensure the West’s absolute hegemony by a show of military might that will consolidate behind it all the other partners in the triad (Samir Amin: Imperialism and globalization, Independent Socialist Magazine, Jun2001, Vol. 53, Issue 2, pp.10)

Alexander Anievas adds that the world since September 11 is witnessing return to an era of “inter-imperialist rivalries” especially after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq (Cambridge Review of International Affairs, volume 19, June 2006)

However, Ray Kiely in 2006 explains that the current era is one of greater openness and international integration than the pre-1914 era, and there is far greater cooperation between the core capitalist states, as well as sovereign states in the developing world (United States hegemony and globalization: what role for theories of imperialism?, Cambridge review, June 2006)

Those who consider globalization a triumph for the Western, market-led values across the world stop could not explain the economic success that some national economies in Asia like Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore and Korea—known as Tigers’ of Asia—have had but meanwhile rejecting Western values.

Baylis et al argue that if these continue to follow their path towards modernization and economic prosperity while withstanding complete cultural take over by the West, then we must anticipate future disputes between “Western” and “Asian” values over issues like human rights, gender, and religion (Balyis et al, pp. 11)

To what extent can certain countries preserve their cultural identity, religious traditions and heritage in face of an enormous and merciless global economy and the tsunami of new ideas, values and technologies that fascinated people around the world— especially conservative nations across the Middle East and Asia—but meanwhile triggered fears of an imminent “clash of civilization” along geo-cultural fault lines as described by Huntington in 1996.

The September 11 attacks and the “Tigers of Asia” in addition to United Arab of Emirates, represent two competing examples of how the non-Western world might respond to globalization. While some countries and cultures were able to achieve economic success and progress and be part of global economy while adhering to its values and preserving its identity, on the other hand some of those in the Muslim world who rejected globalization as the latest stage of Western imperialism and hegemony undertook the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon which they considered the symbols of Western power and hegemony.

Mehdi Parvizi Amineh argues in 2007 that Huntington’s actual fault lines are socio-economic not geo-cultural, and that conflicts in today’s world do not take place between cultures but within them. Those societies that are more successful in adapting to the challenges of modernity show a relatively stronger capacity to cope with the growing complexity of political and cultural pluralism (The challenges of modernity: the case of political Islam, PGDT 6 (2007).

Democracy Vs. Apathy

2008-09-12T12:16:00.000-07:00

We often talk about the U.S. backtracking on democracy promotion in the Middle East and its abandoning of reformers in the region, however, it remains unclear to me as to what precisely Egyptians would like the U.S to do to help bring democracy to their country. Quite frankly, I don’t think Egyptians themselves have a clear answer to that question.

Ask any member of the opposition whether Islamist, liberal or leftist about U.S. role and they will immediately declare their rejection of any meddling by the U.S. in Egypt’s internal affairs, even refusing any pressure on the Egyptian regime from nationalist stand point. On the other hand, when the U.S. decide not to intervene in Egypt’s domestic affairs the same opposition cries out loud for its alleged backtracking on democracy and keeping blind eye the Egyptian government practices.

The truth of the matter is that Egyptians themselves are to be blamed for the crisis their country is facing right now mainly because of their political apathy and their worship of their rulers, something Egyptians are known for since the ancient days of the Pharos. Throughout history Egyptians have never revolted against their rulers and will never do no matter how corrupt and unjust they can get. It is the exactly the same overly forgiving , laid back, unconfrontational and apathetic nature of Egyptians that stands today a major obstacle in their way to attain freedom and democracy.

In a country that 60% of its people are illiterate and more than 45% earn less than $2 per day, it is almost impossible to mobilize them for the sake of democracy or human rights- they could care less. The average Egyptian is struggling to put bread on the table for his/her children and they can be beaten day and night by their heavy handed police forces and will not move a finger in protest. They’re prone to fear the government- typical feeling for those who are living in police state.

All the voices of reform you listed- journalists, moderate Islamists, judges, liberal opposition, bloggers, constitute small portion of the patriotic and educated elite and who are unable, so far, to mobilize the masses because simply politics is not the center of their attention- they are struggling to make living.
What does the U.S. have to do with this? And why should we get involved if the people themselves prefer the status quo!

When thousands of the people in Ukraine (population of 48 millions) took to the streets in 2004 protesting against their corrupt government forcing it to resign in what became known as the “Orange revolution” they did it by themselves and did not sit around waiting for the U.S. to rescue them.

I find it hard to believe that the 2 Billion dollars the U.S. give to Egypt in aid every year is the main reason responsible for keeping the Egyptian regime in power against the will of its own people. If Egyptians rise up against tyranny and corruption and demand change and democracy the U.S. will never object or intervene to save the regime or suppress the people.
Egyptians themselves are confused, divided and unwilling to change, so why bother!

Diplomacy discussions, week 1 & 2

2008-09-12T06:27:00.000-07:00

Are International Relations (IR) a science or an art?

I believe that contemporary international relations (relations between nation-states) are indeed an art crafted based on evidence that is derived from science; therefore International relations ought to be considered both an art and science. The application of evidence-based scientific prescriptive formulas setting forth ways of how states should behave requires an art that puts into perspective the cultural, religious and societal differences among nation-states and civilizations when deciding which “color to paint to world politics with”, as phrased by Baylis et al pp.4

The world has endured major transformations throughout the twentieth century which witnessed two global industrialized wars, decolonization of European empires, and the end of the cold war. The traditional philosophical theories of world politics seemed inadequate to better explain and deal with the challenges and intellectual complexities of a new globalized world.

Thus, a new approach to international relations has emerged utilizing to a greater extent the comparative study of quantitative data and reinforced by the rise of analytical and quantitative research concepts, models and methods in order to look for pattern of behavior and for probabilities that certain behavior would occur (Russett & Starr, pp 17-18)

What is the value of studying International Relations from a theoritical perspective?

Studying International Relations (IR) from theoretical perspective enables us to understand how a complex world works and helps us determine which things matter and which don’t when dealing with the dynamic and ambiguous nature of the post-Cold-War international environment.

In their chapter “How do we think about world politics” Russett & Starr defines theory as an intellectual tool that provides us with a way to organize the complexity of the world and order facts into data (Kauffman et al, pp 19). Similarly, Smith defines theory as a kind of simplifying device that allows us to decide which facts matter and which do not (Balyis et al, pp.4)

Yet, many scholars doubt the ability of the four dominant theories in IR to meet challenges and the dynamics that underline global politics. Therefore, a fifth debate has emerged intersecting traditional theories with the Complexity Theory (CT) which found its way into social science soon after its development in the natural science (Emilian Kavalski: Emergence of complex international relations theory. Cambridge Review, Sept. 2007, pp 437). Retrieved [September 8, 2008], [EBSCO host, Norwich]

Being theoretical means to be able to describe our world and explain policy decisions we make, as well as having the ability to predict events and prescribe solutions for the world’s challenges in a systematic fashion, as Kauffman et al explain in their analysis of the four primary tools of IR to measure against events (Kauffman et al, pp.1-2)

Do you agree with Rosenau that “to think theoretically one must be constantly ready to be proven wrong.”

Yes, I do agree with Rosenau that when thinking theoretically one must be constantly ready to be proven wrong. Since theory is a science—all relevant data pertaining to the theory in question including hypotheses, research methods and analysis must be laid out and scrutinized in order to determine the validity of its conclusions. Critiquing a theory and testing its hypothesis in systematic approach will uncover any possible flaws that might prove it to be wrong; such process highlights the hallmark of science.

Russet & Starr also explain that unlike clinical or laboratory experiments, in social science we simply cannot conduct a real-life experiment, therefore we depend on “thinking experiment” based on rigorous empirical data on the case we are discussing (Kauffman et al, pp.23). One major challenge is the complexity of human behavior and individual relations within a society, with many different factors influencing the probabilities of an event, and our knowledge of these complex phenomena is still so imperfect (Kauffman et al, pp. 21)

This complexity could be paramount when policy makers have to make decisions dealing with unfamiliar cultures where values, traditions, religion and history have to be taken into perspective. A vivid example is when the U.S invaded Iraq in 2003 and hypnotized that Iraqis would welcome U.S soldiers who came to topple Saddam Hussein and his authoritarian regime. The next thing we know is an insurgency that dramatically changed the war tactics and expectations. War strategists failed to carefully examine and recognize the complexity of Iraqi society where religious teachings and tribal values prohibiting aiding foreign occupation transcend political disagreements.

How is the state power measured?

According to David Armstrong, in modern international society, state power lies in its ability to establish centralized and efficient military power, in addition to other elements which include professional diplomatic service and an ability to manipulate the balance of power (Balyis, et al (Ed.), 5th ed., pp.44)

Although Armstrong emphasizes the state political power, I believe that in today’s world where globalization is the main international actor, a state power is more inclusive and can be mainly measured by the strength of its national economy and its ability to maintain its sovereignty and identity while competing in an open and free market. State power also can be measured by the abundance of its natural resources, the coherence of its social structure, and the level of freedom and equality its citizens enjoy.

Stopford and Strange in 1991 echoed similar meaning when they concluded that states were manifestly less interested in the acquisition of territory than in the pursuit of wealth for the national economy: "national choices of industrial policy and efficiency in economic management are beginning to override choices of foreign or defense policy as the primary influences on how resources are allocated" (Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (2000, March). Gobal economy and the decline of state power. Working paper. pp.4) Retrieved [September, 3, 2008) from [Ciao]

Measuring the power of the state by its ability to serve its best interests and resorting to the carrot and stick policies in dealing with other nation-states can be viewed as selfish, and imply a form of state supremacy which can be best described as a realist view of world politics (more accurately for realists international politics), which will eventually lead to struggle for power between states each trying to maximize their national interests, according to Balyis et al, pp. 5
Balyis also argue within this realist scheme, states must ultimately rely on its own military resources to achieve their ends and the potential for conflict is ever present.

Moreover, the definition of what exactly represent a national interest can vary from one political party to the other, and therefore the measure of the state power can be subjective based on which party is in power.

Most of the problems that we are encountering in the world today are caused by the desire and active pursuit of states to influence others. And if we expand this statement by including non-state actors like organizations and groups, we will actually get to the cause of the core problems the world is facing today ranging from wars to terrorism and their repercussions on global economy.

States should not attempt to influence others whether utilizing their soft or hard power, rather focus on achieving prosperity to its citizens and make a good example for other states to follow if they themselves deem suitable based on their cultural and religious values.

Huntington’s assumption in 1996 that Western and non-Western values are simply incompatible is true to a large extent especially when it comes to social values and religious beliefs, much as Christianity and Islam interacted in the Middle Ages. Huntington’s warning of an imminent clash civilization could be understood based on the desire by one culture to influence the other.

Hurrell argues the need to develop globally institutionalized political process in which norms and rules can be negotiated on the basis of dialogue and consent, rather than simply imposed by the most powerful (Balyis et al, pp. 50-51)

Is globalization an actor, which implies that it can accomplish things? Or is it a condition that has an effect?

Globalization is a much disputed term in itself, however analysts at least agree that it describes a one-world system where all actors have to play by the same economic rules. (Balyes et al pp. 75). Prahalad in 2007 described globalization like gravity: there is no point denying its existence. So, although we still cannot agree on what exactly that can best define globalization, but we have seen its impact on humankind and its accomplishments in the twentieth century.

Isn't the abundance of natural resources one of the strengths of a state, more like capital that can be put to good use during financial hardships than a true measure of power? For the coherence of social structure and level of freedom and equality of its citizens, I think those are actually things that are measures of a country's development, rather than the power they can bring to bear on a given situation. Although resources, development, freedom and equality are important, how does a state accomplish its international goals?

I agree that the abundance of natural resources is one of the strengths of a state, and I also agree with her that the coherence of its social structure and the level of freedom and equality of its citizens could be a measure of a country’s development. However, I consider that a nation’s economic strength and its social and political development are indeed some of the aspects of its power, and they’re things that we should be able to use to measure a state power.

I believe that a powerful state is the one that has strong economy, stable political environment, a free society, strong social structure and a powerful military power that can deter the enemies of the state from threatening its prosperity. This argument actually raises a fundamental question of how do we actually define state power?

What is globalization? How does it combine elements of politics, economics, culture, society, and more besides? What does it mean to speak of the "globalization of world politics"?

Globalization simply means a “shrinking world”. The massive advances in global communications, transport and informatics technologies over the past several decades have created worldwide interconnectedness causing transnational spread of ideas, cultures and information in an accelerating pace. The result is a world that became a single social space with global tendency evident in all sectors including economic, military, legal, ecological, cultural and social aspects (Balyis et al, pp. 16-21)

However, globalization is also complex process; it is asymmetrical (not uniformly experienced across all regions), and multidimensional (patterns of economic and cultural globalizations are not identical) (Balyis et al, pp22)

Globalization represents a conceptual shift in the way we think about global politics. It transformed politics from the state-centric geopolitics and the struggle for power to an era where states are becoming embedded in an overlapping web of a Global Governing Complex within which interests are articulated, decisions are made and policies are conducted through transnational political process (Balyis et al, pp24-25)

Within this global governance complex civil society or private and non-governmental agencies have become increasingly influential in the formulation and implementation of global public policy, and in some cases exercising political power across national boundaries and undermining the state authority (Balyis et al, pp.26-27). Thus, contemporary globalization although did not abolish but has shaken and transformed the very basic covenants of the Westphalian constitution (territoriality, state sovereignty and autonomy) which established the legal basis of modern statehood (Balyis et al, pp. 23-24)

American Muslims–Shed the Cynicism and Get Engaged

2008-09-11T21:24:00.000-07:00

By Parvez Ahmed
Muslim Media Network

I was there. One of the 84,000 at Invesco Field witnessing history. The day and the moment were as inspiring as it was profound. As the chants of “yes we can” reverberated through the stadium, they re-ignited feelings of optimism about America’s future, which in the last eight years had been jaded by the politics of fear and divisiveness. Perhaps no group has been more vilified and continues to bear the brunt of this politics of fear than Muslims and Arabs.

Seated next to me at Invesco was Mazen Asbahi, the Chicago attorney who was appointed as national coordinator for American Muslim and Arab outreach by the Obama campaign. Mazen lasted only a few weeks. His resignation came in the wake of discredited websites spuriously alleging his links to an imam (Muslim spiritual leader) and that imam’s links to the Muslim Brotherhood, a socio-political, albeit often controversial, movement that originated in Egypt.

Mazen resigned not because he did anything wrong but simply because he put his country first. He understood the importance of this election and did not want smears to distract the American public from failing to heed Obama’s message of change. He firmly believes that Obama will restore America’s respect abroad while addressing many of the pressing issues of our time from the economy to global warming.

In Mazen’s story is a lesson for all Americans. The first lesson is for those who fail to stand up to the merchants of fear. The American public and the mainstream media need to realize that there is a well coordinated effort to discredit promising American Muslims and thus marginalize the American Muslim community. These thugs of bigotry feed on ignorance and fear of the unknown. Not standing up to these bigots is not only un-American, but also leads to bad policy.
Although the Obama campaign never asked Mazen to resign, the perception remains that the campaign did not stand-up and challenge the underlying bigotry that led to his unfortunate departure. Obama was correct in denying that he was a Muslim, but in addition he should have added a Seinfeld moment by simply asserting, “Not that there’s anything wrong with it (being a Muslim).”

The second lesson is for American Muslims. Community organizers are reporting a lack of enthusiasm in the Muslim community’s support for Obama. Standing at the crossroads where history is being shaped, the American Muslim community must not backslide into the familiar comforts of cynicism. Despite the hurt that the Muslim community feels and the scorns they bear they need to look beyond their immediate discomfort to what serves America and the world best. Instead of the all too familiar horse-trading that special interest group’s engage-in, the American Muslim community needs to transcend their disappointments and look to the future and take into account the seriousness of the issues at stake in this election: the rule of law, war and peace, economic justice, education and health care. They must understand that an Obama presidency will not be perfect (no presidency ever is), but a John McCain presidency will only be worse. McCain’s selection of Sarah Palin reinforces the perception that McCain lacks both judgment and temperament. We had enough with one decider who makes decisions from the gut. We can ill-afford another.

Beyond the emotions, objectively is there any doubt that from economic policy to environmental stewardship, Obama offers superior solutions? Is it not plainly obvious that Obama prefers diplomacy over war? In Denver he clearly stated that the decision to commit our nation to war can only be made in the face of a clear and present danger and not in the pursuit of some ideological utopia. Is it not refreshing to hear Obama’s view that hearts and minds in the Muslim world can be won over by sustained American engagement in improving the lives of those affected by years of war and neglect? Yes not all is palatable in Obama’s position, especially his appeasement of the pro-Israeli lobby. But if Muslims define an Obama presidency by the one issue of Israel then they are as guilty of being parochial as AIPAC and ADL (major pro-Israeli organizations), which often ignore all other realities in their blind and obsessive defense of Israel.
Undoubtedly American Muslim participation this election cycle is at record highs. However, given the closeness of the race and the enormity of its consequences, the community will have to provide all hands on deck to make sure that the right candidate gets elected.

Muslims cannot repeat the mistakes of the past when major American Muslim organizations hastily endorsed George Bush over the objections of African American Muslims, the largest sub-group in the community. Nor can they tread the path of 2004 when they gave a “qualified endorsement” to John Kerry, which understandably dampened Muslim enthusiasm at the polls.
Back to Mazen. He has every reason to sulk because he was unfairly “swift-boated.” Yet he remains optimistic and enthusiastically chugs along (although not officially part of the campaign). Throughout the evening in Denver while remaining fully cognizant of the historicity of the moment, Mazen did not waste any time and kept furiously working his Blackberry making phone calls and texting friends urging them to support Obama and in the process hoping to contribute to the transformation of American politics.

Just as Mazen looks beyond the dirty politics he fell victim to, so should American Muslims look beyond the flaws of the Obama campaign and take into consideration the bigger picture.
The time has come for American Muslims to demonstrably show that they can make the necessary contributions to return American politics to be once again get rooted in the universal values of peace, liberty and justice for all. It is time for the Muslim community to join the growing legions of fellow Americans who are inspired by hope and powered by a sense of optimism that things can and do change. Change does not come from just wishing for it. The way forward is clearly indicated in the Quran, “God does not change the condition of a people unless they change that which is within themselves.”

[Parvez Ahmed is Associate Professor at University of North Florida.]

Still a 'Fellow Dissident'?

2008-08-30T11:42:00.000-07:00

Professor Saad Eddin Ibrahim is an American-Egyptian and one of the staunchest supporters of democracy in Egypt. He is a professor of Sociology at the American University in Cairo and the founder of Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies. Prof. Ibrahim is regarded as one of the pioneers of contemporary research-based civil movements in Egypt. He was recently sentenced in absentia to two years prison term on charges of "defaming Egypt's image abroad" for his harsh criticism of the Egyptian government and its clampdown on political dissent.

I strongly support Professor Ibrahim, true liberal hope for Egypt's future. In show of solidarity with Prof. Ibrahim, the Washington Post in its editorial reposted his Op-ed he wrote a year ago, which is believed to be the main reason behind his trial.

Still a 'Fellow Dissident'?

Editorial by the Washington Post

Today, we repost an opinion piece by Egyptian professor and dissident Saad Eddin Ibrahim that first appeared on our op-ed page one year ago. This month, Mr. Ibrahim was convicted of seditious libel or "tarnishing" the image of Egypt. For this transgression, the ailing, 69-year-old scholar was sentenced to two years in jail, with hard labor, and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to about $1,500. The prime piece of evidence against Mr. Ibrahim: The opinions he expressed in this newspaper.

Mr. Ibrahim, a dual Egyptian and American citizen, has for some time been living in exile in the Middle East and so may escape this sentence and other potentially draconian punishments. He is still subject to some 20 other legal actions brought against him by allies of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. He is accused, among other things, of grand treason, in part for organizing a forum for Arab democracy advocates and for meeting briefly with President Bush last year after a conference in Prague. A conviction on these charges could subject him to death by hanging.

The fact that Mr. Ibrahim faces imprisonment -- or worse -- if he sets foot in Egypt speaks to the tightening grip of tyranny in that country. It is also testament to the Bush administration's failure to hold Mr. Mubarak to his commitment to further freedom and democratic institutions there.

There was a time when President Bush spoke openly, eloquently and forcefully about his sense of solidarity with Mr. Ibrahim, so much so that the president referred to himself as a fellow dissident. There was a time, only a few years ago, when he withheld millions of dollars in aid to Egypt until the country released Mr. Ibrahim from an unjust incarceration. Now, the administration can only muster an official, feeble "expression of disappointment" through an organ of the State Department as it continues to funnel billions to Egypt, enabling Mr. Mubarak to run an increasingly repressive police state.

A strong relationship with Egypt and continuing financial assistance to the country are most likely in the interest of the United States. But the relationship need not be exclusively with a regime that is on the wrong side of history; the United States should support those many Egyptians who believe in reform. At the very least, it should not continue to freely subsidize a regime that abuses its bravest citizens. Or, as Mr. Ibrahim succinctly put it in an interview this week: "Don't give dictators money to oppress us."

How Biden Will Sway My Vote

2008-08-23T11:46:00.000-07:00

I was one of millions of Americans who woke up in the middle of the night on the sound of text message from Barack Obama’s campaign announcing his pick for the VP. At 3:29 AM EST, I woke up on the distinctive sound indicating a text message has arrived. I immediately reached to my cell phone and started reading the message “ Barack has chosen Senator Joe Biden to be our VP nominee”.

I have to admit, it was quite an exciting experience, another sign of new things happening in the country which Mr. Obama has inspired during his campaign. As an undecided voter, the choice of Joe Biden was certainly reassuring to me as I try to make an informed decision in an election that will probably drastically change the direction of our country.
I was not particularly fan of Obama during the primaries. As a social conservative, Obama’s liberal and far to the left views especially on illegal immigration, gun control, gay marriages and the war on Iraq, were a turn off to me. Moreover, as an American Muslim I was also disappointed at Obama’s continuous attempts to distance himself from the Muslim community and his refusal to visit with Muslim leaders in mosques as his campaign did with Christian and Jewish leaders in churches and synagogues. A contradiction to his opposition to politics as usual and being an agent for change.

To me, Obama lacked the confidence to be our commander in chief. I was not particularly concerned about his lack of executive experience or the length of his presence in Washington, but I was more interested in his views and his agenda for the country. Above all, a president does not govern by himself but relies on an army of experts and consultants. Obama, however, did pull himself more to the center following his winning of the nomination. His vote on FISA and his approval of the Supreme Court decision on gun control were clear signs of that change.

Joe Biden is someone that I tremendously respect. I value his experience in foreign policy and I can trust his judgment. Biden is the kind of leader that makes you feel very comfortable just listening to him talking and debating. Biden’s senate hearings as chairman of the foreign relations committees were really informative and exciting to watch. Joe Biden is the main reason I might actually vote for the Obama-Biden ticket, I just hope it was Biden-Obama instead.

US Muslims, Arabs becoming political faithful

2008-08-22T12:48:00.000-07:00

By JEFF KAROUB Associated Press Aug 22, 08

DETROIT (AP) _ Faced with a choice of White House hopefuls they fear are not entirely sympathetic to their issues, American Muslims are stepping up their activism to unprecedented levels in hopes they can influence the upcoming administration in its infancy.
The efforts stem in part from difficulties many Muslim- and Arab-Americans say they have experienced since the terror attacks of Sept. 11, in which they have found themselves on the defensive and struggling to convince at times skeptical fellow citizens that they can be both Muslims and loyal U.S. citizens.

"I've never seen the level of activism I now see," said Shibley Telhami, a Mideast scholar at University of Maryland and fellow at the Brookings Institution.
"The number of people who have become more active and visible on the national political front has increased dramatically because people have suddenly sensed that they have to be more active in order to ... defend themselves as Americans, defend themselves as Arabs and Muslims," he said.

While not all Arabs are Muslims or vice versa, they face similar problems and share many of the same concerns.

Tarek El-Messidi, 27, of Cincinnati, went door-to-door in South Carolina campaigning for Democratic candidate Barack Obama. But he had an unusual mission for a Muslim: the volunteer had to assure voters that Obama is not Muslim. El-Messidi said younger Muslims in particular lean more toward Obama than Sen. John McCain, the presumptive Republican nominee, but neither candidate should take that for granted.

"In talking to Muslims, they're really struggling between two things: They don't know whether to view Barack Obama as a lesser of two evils or a really good candidate that they are excited about," he said. "A lot are apprehensive whether to fully endorse Barack Obama (but) there's no doubt they view him as a better candidate than McCain."

Unease with McCain seems to stem as much from the conservative Bush administration's legacy as the candidate's own views. Arab-Americans are particularly concerned about laws, such as the post-Sept. 11 anti-terrorism Patriot Act, that activists argue have led to racial and ethnic profiling and eroding civil liberties.

McCain has, however, distanced himself from some conservative Christians whose comments about Islam were derided by critics as divisive and inflammatory. And both he and Obama have campaign-affiliated groups of Arab-American supporters.
Still, Obama has his own challenges.

El-Messidi's campaign-trail experience underscores young Muslim voters' dilemma. They felt an immediate connection with him _ partly because of his background _ that led to increased political involvement.
"He has a funny name like we do," El-Messidi said. "He has Arabic in his actual name."
"If he can do it, we can. We can reach very high goals. ... For many Muslims, especially after 9/11, have felt discriminated against. He has given us a lot of hope and inspiration."
But it also has led to disappointment.

The first-term Illinois senator, while a Christian, is the son of a Kenyan man. He has Muslim forebears and his middle name is Hussein, but he has aggressively debunked rumors that he is Muslim _ even labeling the claim a "smear" on a campaign Web site.
While he has said that some rumors about him also have been insulting to Muslims, the vehemency of his denials has stung the community.

In June, two Muslim women said they were separately refused seats directly behind Obama _ and in front of TV cameras _ at a Detroit rally because they wear head scarves. Obama called the women to apologize and issued a statement saying the actions were unacceptable and do not reflect campaign policies.

One of them, Hebba Aref, 25, said she is grateful for the apology and remains an Obama supporter, but she stressed it is up to the Arab-Muslim community to empower itself.
One of the biggest obstacles Obama faces is that expectations may have been set too high, said James Zogby, president of the nonpartisan Arab American Institute.
"People may have thought, this will be perfect and very different," he said. "It is different but it's not perfect because politics isn't perfect."

He said incidents some incidents have dampened, but not doused, enthusiasm for Obama among Arabs and Muslims. He sees the heightened level of Arab and Muslim involvement as a reflection of the broader population and evidence of a maturing community.
"Change is the issue _ and change is a word I think that (refers to) the economy, civil liberties and foreign policy and the general mess people think we're in," Zogby said.

Dawud Walid, executive director of the Michigan chapter of the Council on American Islamic Relations, said neither candidate has officially met with Muslims in Michigan, an important swing state with one of the largest Muslim populations in the U.S.
Walid said that may lead Muslim voters past the "lesser of two evils," to a third-party candidate or no candidate at all. In broader terms, it also raises concerns about both candidates' foreign policy skills, he said.

"If the candidates cannot engage the American Muslim community in a healthy way, which is the world's most educated Muslim community, then how can they strengthen economic ties or have a meaningful successful diplomacy in the Muslim world?" he said.
One fledgling group is more optimistic.

The American Muslim Democratic Caucus plans to debut at the Democratic National Convention Monday with a reception that organizers expect will draw delegates and Islamic leaders from across the country, including Democratic Rep. Keith Ellison.

"This is a way of raising our voice in a Democratic society," said Syed Fayyaz Hassan, a caucus board member from Dallas who also serves as president-elect of the Texas Muslim Democratic Caucus. The Pakistan native traces his political involvement to the 2001 terror attacks _ one week after gaining his U.S. citizenship.

"Since we're a Democratic Party group, we are sold on the idea of being Democrat. But we would raise concerns of the Muslim community in the Democratic Party."
El-Messidi, who leads activism training workshops for Muslim students, said taking a consistent stand against discrimination would be wise for both candidates, even if it engenders hostility.
"Part of being a leader is taking stances that are difficult _ standing up for what's right," El-Messidi said. "What's right is a vast majority of Muslims ... love this country and feel very blessed to be in this country.
"We are as American as anyone else is."

Air Force Welcomes New Chief of Staff

2008-08-21T11:35:00.000-07:00

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON -- Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said today that he has no doubt the new Air Force chief of staff will "give his all" to the job.
Air Force Gen. Norton A. Schwartz became the Air Force's 19th chief of staff during a ceremony today at Bolling Air Force Base here.

"[Schwartz's] goal is to recommit the Air Force to the high standards of excellence that have always been its hallmark," Gates said. "He is one who has lived the core values of airmen and women: integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do."

Gates said Schwartz "is the right man at the right time for this demanding job" because of his experience and expertise to further prepare the Air Force for "challenges on and beyond the horizon."

Some of these challenges include modernizing the Air Force's aging fighter and tanker fleets, restoring trust in the Air Force's stewardship of nuclear weapons and related materiel, protecting space and cyberspace and making the most effective use of air power in counterinsurgency operations while maintaining strategic deterrence and technological superiority, Gates said.

"Airmen and women led by General Schwartz are going after these tasks with zeal and, in so doing, will write new chapters of greatness for the Air Force," he said.

Schwartz said he is "humbled and honored" to serve as Air Force chief of staff. He reflected on the "incredible journey" he and his wife, Suzie, have had in the Air Force and the journey today's airmen have embarked on amid the global war on terror.

"We stand on a foundation built through blood and sweat of those who have gone before us," he said. "Through sacrifice and devotion alongside our joint and coalition partners, we continue to serve together in the defense of liberty."

He also noted the challenges recently faced by the Air Force regarding scrutiny over the service's handling of its nuclear weapons program. This eventually led to the resignation of Schwartz's predecessor, retired Air Force Gen. T. Michael Moseley, and former Air Force Secretary Michael W. Wynne.

"Knowing our nation expects our very, very best, we certainly have some things to fix, some fences to mend and some challenges to overcome," the general said. "We will show ourselves worthy of the sacred trust our leaders, our joint brethren and the American people place in us, because this business is all about trust."

Prior to becoming chief of staff, Schwartz spent nearly three years as commander of U.S. Transportation Command, at Scott Air Force Base, Ill., where he was the single manager for global air, land and sea transportation for the Defense Department.

Schwartz began his Air Force career in 1973 after graduating from the U.S. Air Force Academy with a bachelor's degree in political science and international affairs. During his 35-year career, he has logged more than 4,200 flying hours in a variety of aircraft and participated in war and peacetime operations in Vietnam, Iraq and Cambodia.

Schwartz served in several other command assignments, including Special Operations Command Pacific, Alaskan Command, Alaskan North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, and 11th Air Force. He also served as director of the Joint Staff at the Pentagon.

America Is Better Off Without Musharraf

2008-08-21T08:53:00.000-07:00

By HUSAIN HAQQANIAugust 21, 2008
WSJ

Pervez Musharraf's resignation as president of Pakistan allows the country to move toward full democracy. Some in Washington view this as a threat -- the replacement of a reputedly stalwart ally in the war against terrorism with a democratic government responsive to the unpredictability of public opinion.

But with Mr. Musharraf gone, the United States need not take blame for his actions, particularly those unrelated to international cooperation in fighting terrorists. Mr. Musharraf's exit is not a loss. It is an opportunity to jump-start a much more durable and stable relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan as nations sharing democratic values.

In national elections on Feb. 18, the people of Pakistan spoke with an uncharacteristically unified voice, voting overwhelmingly for moderate, democratic political parties and rejecting not only Mr. Musharraf's political party, but those aligned with extremism and fanaticism. Less than 5% of the vote went to Islamist parties sympathetic to the Taliban.

The democratic coalition led by the party of assassinated former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), was allowed to form a government, but Mr. Musharraf refused to step down as president or relinquish the lion's share of power within the government. His resignation this week under threat of impeachment has been celebrated by Pakistanis from all corners of the country.

Pakistan's greatest challenge now is to change its pattern of alternating between military strongmen and elected civilian governments that are ousted before their term is complete. The Pakistani military appears ready to join civilians in changing that pattern. Civilian elites who in the past have supported suspension of the constitution on grounds of alleged incompetence and corruption of elected officials may also have learned their lesson.

There is no shortcut to building democracy. Reforms pushed through governments installed by coups d'état have repeatedly failed to bring stability, and Mr. Musharraf's much-trumpeted economic achievements are in tatters at the end of his nine-year rule.
In the final analysis, Pakistan will only be as strong as its political system. Pakistan's democratic parties, most notably the current coalition partners PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League (N), must be given a chance to lay the foundations of lasting constitutional governance. Like all transitions, the transition from one-man rule to a pluralist system will be tough. But Pakistanis have proven their commitment to the democratic ideal after four failed military dictatorships in 60 years.

The U.S.'s primary concern in Pakistan remains the ongoing war against al Qaeda and the Taliban, mainly in the country's northwest region bordering Afghanistan. With Mr. Musharraf gone, the war against terror will in fact be pursued with much more vigor and much less political manipulation.

Anti-Americanism among Pakistan's people may ease, now that Washington is not seen as backing an unpopular strongman. That should make it easier for the elected government to fight terrorism without being accused of doing America's bidding in return for economic and military assistance.

The assumption that dealing with a single, authoritarian leader is the best way to do business with a foreign government is erroneous. In a nation of 160 million, the U.S. should not count on only one man as its ally. Those who are American allies by conviction and a shared belief in democracy, tolerance and free markets are bound to be better allies than an ally of convenience seeking only aid and political support.

The elected government of Pakistan can and will turn its attention to the immediate and critical problems of our nation -- inflation, a looming energy crisis, food shortages, an educational system that doesn't work, and a civil society that has been dismantled by dictatorship. And of course, above all, the people and government of Pakistan must contain and destroy the extremist insurgency which threatens the very soul of the nation.
With the mandate of the people behind it, the new Pakistani government can muster popular support to restore the writ of law to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and to marginalize extremists all over the country.

As Joe Biden has argued, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship should no longer be "transactional," i.e., based largely on the "exchange of aid for services." An economically viable Pakistan is a stable Pakistan, and a stable Pakistan would be better positioned to end fanaticism in our region. Pakistanis have been encouraged by the recent, unanimous passage in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of legislation introduced this month by Sens. Biden and Richard Lugar that would help build a U.S.-Pakistan relationship based not only on shared battle plans but shared values and shared economic and political interests.

Another critical piece of legislation that works toward that end is the Afghanistan and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act of 2008. Introduced by Chris Van Hollen in the House and Maria Cantwell in the Senate, and supported by the Bush administration, it would encourage economic investment and local factories and businesses in Taliban-infested areas through favored trade relationships with the U.S. The Biden-Lugar legislation and the ROZs are important signals to the people of Pakistan that the U.S. is indeed a genuine partner, not just a military ally.
'
Pakistan has weathered a very difficult period in our national history -- a near-decade-long dictatorship, the spread of terrorism, an economic crisis and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, our icon of democracy. But we have made it through. The Musharraf resignation is not anyone's loss; it could help turn Pakistan around and that would be the world's gain.
Mr. Haqqani is Pakistan's ambassador to the United States.

U.S. Army hopes to keep native Arabic speakers

2008-08-14T20:14:00.000-07:00

By Gordon Lubold - TCSMFriday, 08.08.2008
Washington — The Army may begin paying a retention bonus of as much as $150,000 to Arabic speaking soldiers in reflection of how critical it has become for the U.S. military to retain native language and cultural know-how in its ranks.

Only one other job in the Army, Special Forces, rates such a super-sized retention bonus. Now, as the military makes a fundamental shift toward rewarding the linguistic expertise it needs the most, it is expanding a program to train and retain native Arabic and other speakers from the same regions in which it is fighting.

"This is a war not only against the U.S., but against our way of freedom," says Sergeant Madi, a native interpreter and U.S. citizen who asked to be identified only by his surname due to security concerns for him and his family. "We have been fighting for over 16 years against Islamic extremism. It is also my war."

After the invasion of Iraq and the insurgency that followed, the U.S. military recognized its dearth of linguistic competence in the country it had just toppled, and it scrambled to identify Arabic and other linguists.

The military's conventional language training program, the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, Calif., could not churn out enough American soldiers proficient in Arabic, Kurdish, Dari, Pashtu, and Farsi, and the military quickly turned to private contractors to fill the gap. Numerous programs have sprouted up, including one at Fort Lewis, Wash., where soldiers are given a 10-month immersion program in language and culture.

But the Army has also been quietly growing its own capability to recruit and train Arab Americans and others as American soldiers to do high-level work overseas. The Army now has more than 600 such linguists, known by their military job designation as "09 Limas."
They come from places like Morocco, Egypt, and Sudan, but are recruited by the Army wherever there are large Arab American populations, including Dearborn, Mich.; Miami; Dallas; Los Angeles; and Washington, D.C.

The Defense Department is now authorized to put green-card holders on a fast track to U.S. citizenship. The 09 Lima linguists are in so much demand that the Army is raising the number it will recruit next year, from 250 to 275.

But as the U.S. government recognizes the long-term commitment it is making to Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the competition for these native speakers is fierce among other government agencies such as the FBI and CIA, as well as other military services and private contractors.

Army personnel officials want to put the 09 Lima retention program on par with Army Special Forces, which would mean paying those linguists as much as $150,000 each to stay in the service. The Army implemented the bonus program for Special Forces in 2005 after it watched the highly trained soldiers being lured by lucrative deals offered by such firms as Blackwater USA. That bonus, which is tax-free if paid in a war zone, helped to stabilize that community.

The Army has yet to decide if the 09 Limas will rate the same pay, but defense officials say it's important to put linguists on par with the "high-demand, low-density" nature of Special Forces.
"We've received numerous reports from combatant commanders on the effectiveness of the 09 Limas versus the private contract linguists, and demand is extremely high," says Errol Smith, assistant deputy secretary for foreign language programs at the Pentagon.

The program represents the shift within the U.S. government toward recognizing the value of native linguists while determining how best to assess any Trojan horse-like security threat they might pose. Mike McConnell, director of national security, is pushing to streamline the screening process.

"We have to make some breakthroughs on how we assign, trust, assess, and utilize those who have direct contact with foreign entities," says one source familiar with Mr. McConnell's plan. "That unfolding story carries a lot of implications with it, and it's a huge cultural shift for the entire nation."

Yet when it comes to linguistic and cultural expertise, few can compare to a native speaker, defense officials say. "They hear things that are said around them, they are able to see things that others can't see," says Mr. Smith.

Smith tells the story of a commander in Iraq who was using a civilian interpreter, or "terp" in the vernacular of the military, employed by a private contractor, as the American commander spoke to a local Iraqi. During the meeting, the civilian interpreted literally the words of the local Iraqi, who had told other Iraqis to feed the American commander parsley. But an 09 Lima standing nearby heard something different: feeding parsley to someone was a reference to an old expression in which parsley was fed to a bird to choke it to death.

"He was pretty much giving an order to have the commander killed," says Smith. "Right there, a life was saved .... You can see just by knowing a bit of slang, being a native speaker, it can make a difference."

The 09 Limas have become so much in demand that U.S. Central Command, Tampa, Fla., which oversees the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, has asked to extend their deployments. Current mobility regulations prevent it, Smith says, but the Army is working on a package of incentives that would allow the linguists to stay on in the war zone longer than 12 months if they chose to, he says.

Sergeant Madi, the 09 Lima, says he may be just a junior enlisted soldier, but the Army recognizes that it must know its enemy and the populations in which it operates. "There is a thirst to get this knowledge in any way," he says.By Gordon Lubold - TCSM -->

Air Force says officers fell asleep at nuke switch

2008-07-24T22:17:00.000-07:00

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Three Air Force officers fell asleep while in control of an electronic component that contained old launch codes for nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles, a violation of procedure, Air Force officials said Thursday.
The Air Force said the launch codes had been deactivated before the incident, but it was still a violation of protocol, prompting an investigation.
It is the fourth incident in the past year involving problems with secure handling of components of America's nuclear weapons.
The incident occurred July 12, during the changing out of components used to facilitate secure communications between an underground missile-control facility and missile silos near Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, according to Col. Dewey Ford, a spokesman for the Air Force Space Command in Colorado.
One of the parts, a code component, is for storage and processing. It is considered classified by the Air Force.

A code component was removed from the equipment at the remote missile-control facility and replaced with a new code component. That made the old component inoperable, but an Air Force source said old launch codes were still contained in the part.
Under standard procedure, the four-officer crew of the facility is supposed to keep the component secure until it is returned to the base. Ford said the crew took the component to a building above the facility and locked the component in a lockbox.
Then, three of the four crew members fell asleep.
This violated Air Force procedure, which calls for at least two of the crew members to remain awake while in control of the component. At the time they were asleep, the crew and the component were in a locked building that is guarded by at least one armed airman at all times.
It is believed that the airmen were asleep for about 45 minutes or so, according to Air Force officials.
The component was later returned to the Minot base, and the investigations of procedural violations were started by Missile Command, Space Command, the 20th Air Force and the National Security Agency.
The investigation revealed the codes were not compromised, according to the Air Force. The codes had remained secured, and the crew was inside an area protected by Air Force security at all times, the investigation concluded.
The incident, which was first made public by the Project on Government Oversight, was the fourth misstep involving the handling of America's nuclear weapons in the past year.
Last summer, a B-52 flew from Minot AFB to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana carrying six nuclear warheads that were not supposed to leave Minot. The crew of the bomber did not know that it was carrying nuclear missiles.
In March, the Department of Defense discovered that nuclear triggers had been mistakenly sent to Taiwan and left there for 18 months before being returned to the United States.
In May, Minot's 5th Bomb Wing failed a crucial security inspection. The wing was the same unit involved in the B-52 incident.

48 Billions Dollars in aid to Africa? give me a break!

2008-07-19T12:47:00.000-07:00

In what is described as the most ambitious foriegn public health spending program ever launched by the U.S., Congress voted 80-16 to approve a resolution allowing the U.S. government to triple its current spending on aid to Africa over the next 5 years to a staggering 48 billion of taxpayers money to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria. I am not against helping other poor nations, but trippling what we're already spending at a time when the average American is struggling to pay for gas and milk is just outrageous. The money U.S. government is planning on spending on AIDS patients in Africa is enough to hand every single cancer patient in the U.S. a hundred thousands dollars in cash, which I am sure can help these needy patients to spend on their cancer treatment and other essential needs.

I think it is time for our government to put Americans first and spend our own resources where it can help our ailing economy, the crumbling infrastructure, and alleviate the suffering of millions of Americans. We spent hundreds of billions of dollars on foreign nations thinking it's serving our national interests overseas but instead it is undermining our social peace here at home by squeezing the poor and the middle class out of more money so our politicians can afford their fantasy spending.