Cooperation theories in international relations

The study of conflict and cooperation has been an enduring task of scholars, with the most recent arguments being between realists and neoliberal institutionalists. Among the dominant Idealist theories that support cooperation are the Democratic Peace Theory by Bruce Russett in 1993, the Regime Theory by Robert Keohane in 1984, and the Complex Interdependence by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 1977.

Keohane (1984) focused his regime theory on cooperation in the world political economy. He stated that International coordination of policy seems highly beneficial in an interdependent economy, but cooperation in world politics is particularly difficult. Keohane’s argument is based on the need to analyze cooperation systematically within the context of international organizations and shared beliefs before its meaning can be properly understood. Thus, understanding the patterns of cooperation through concepts of international regimes will enable actors to predict future patterns of interactions among states and accordingly plan proper economic arrangements and related political activities.

Keohane stipulated that conflicts arise when actor’s policies pursued without regard for the interests of others are regarded by others as hindering the attainment of their goals. He then added that once areas of potential or actual conflicts are identified; states should then resort to cooperation by communicate with each other and coordinate in attempt to adjust their policies so they become significantly more compatible with one another. International regimes are then established to lay down a set of implicit or explicit principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures around which their expectations converge in a given area of international relations.

Since the creation of international regimes involves cooperation, each state is expected to pursue its national interests and maximize its relative gains compared to others’ when negotiating an international regime agreement. Therefore, international regimes should not be interpreted as elements of a new international order beyond the nation-state; they should be comprehended chiefly as arrangements motivated by self-interest. However, once an agreement has been reached on the principles of certain policies, states will lose part of its autonomy by having to comply with the norms and rules of the agreement

Nonetheless, states still retain their sovereignty in implementing actual policies—mainly economic—through state institutions rather than international organizations. Therefore, as Keohane contended, although the impact of the principles, norms and decision-making procedures of regimes must be exerted on national control, regimes are not of superior importance to national controls. Furthermore, Keohane explained that because world politics are decentralized and not hierarchic, sovereignty and self-help mean that the principles and rules of international regimes will necessarily be weaker than in domestic society.

Although international regimes consist of injunctions that are non specific and are simply obligations not enforceable by hierarchical legal system, some are specific enough that violations and changes can be identified.

Realists like Morgenthau downplayed the need for international institutions to maintain order—he argued that if each state pursues its respective interest in terms of power, justice will be served in dual sense—which means that states will be mindful of other states pursuing their interests as each state pursues its own interest. Robert Gilpin in his analysis of Hegemonic Stability Theory contended that maintaining transnational cooperation requires a hegemonic or dominant power to stabilize world liberal economy, while the decline of the hegemon state will cause a dramatic collapse of the system and undermines cooperation .

Neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz recognize the importance of international organizations but they argue that their performance is either influenced by the capabilities of the states, or they might become unable to act without the support of the states concerned with the matter at hand.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) offered a theory of complex interdependence as an alternative to explain cooperation and state behavior. They tried to blend the wisdom in both realism and idealism by developing a coherent theoretical framework for the political analysis of interdependence. They defined Interdependence as mutual dependence characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries. In other words, it is a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces.

Moreover, they argued that whenever the transactions among states involve reciprocal costly effects, then this relationship can be described as interdependence. A compelling example of interdependence is the current financial crisis facing the U.S. economy and the crumpling of several of its major financial institutions and the resulting aftershocks felt in the markets across Europe and Asia. The costly global economic effects caused by bad U.S. economy led to a collective action by world leaders in order to prevent worldwide economic disaster.

Furthermore, interdependence could be symmetrical (equal) where each country enjoys an equal portion of gains and losses and which does mostly exists among industrialized nations, or asymmetrical (unequal) where the more powerful countries enjoy more benefits and fewer losses than the weaker ones which is the case between industrialized and developed countries.

According to Keohane and Nye (1977), there are three main characteristics that distinguish complex interdependence, which include; multiple channels connecting societies through interstate and transnational organizations, the absence of hierarchy among issues and a minor role of military power. Contrary to realism, interconnectedness is not only confined to formal governmental organizations and state agencies (interstate) but mainly involve transnational and transgovernmental interactions.

However, Keohane and Nye explained that interdependence restricts state autonomy, which they consider a cost that comes with interdependent relationship, but they also argue that the benefits of this interdependence will exceed costs. Each state is expected to analyze an interdependent relationship based on the potential benefits and the costs and joint gains or losses.

Morgenthau (1948) considered the structure of international relations which assumes “sovereign equality” of all nations, irrelevant to the reality of international politics which is dominated by extreme inequality among nations and causing anarchy. Therefore, he criticized interdependence for assuming sovereignty of states while in reality reinforces the control of superpowers and their exploitation of the “ministates”. Thus, classical realism and interdependence seem to be two opposing theories

Kenneth Waltz (1979) indicated that for a state to be sovereign and dependent are not contradictory. He stated that anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system’s units. Therefore, neo-realists seem to be more receptive to the idea of interdependence compared with classical realists.

Bruce Russett (1993) developed the democratic peace theory on the assumption that “democracies almost never fight each other”. Challenging the sameness of all states paradigm of realists, Russett argued that within a democracy, politics is seen as largely a nonzero-sum; by cooperating, all can gain something even if all do not gain equally.

While there is no consensus among scholars as to why democracies almost never fight each other, Russett in 1993 introduced two kinds of overlapping theories which are likely to offer explanations of this phenomenon; first is the democratic norms culture model, and the second is the structural and institutional constraints model. In the first model, Russett argued that democracies tend to resolve conflicts through cooperation and peaceful resolutions following the same culture of conflict resolution which characterizes their domestic political process, therefore violent conflicts with other democracies are rare, and even when they occur they have limited scale.

On the other hand, violent conflicts between democracies and nondemocracies will be more frequent because the latter does not abide by the same democratic roles in their domestic affairs and therefore, is more likely to use violence to settle their differences. Russett added that violent conflicts might erupt between democracies if one them still maturing in democracy or politically unstable especially at times of economic hardships.

Russet’s second model of structural and institutional constraints argues that the need to obtain the approval and the support of the public to use violence during conflict is complicated process and time consuming which will eventually reduce the likelihood that a decision will be made, and that leaders be constrained. However, since authoritarian leaders are not equally restrained, violent conflict with democracies is more frequent, and in this case both democracies and nondemocracies might initiate violence for fear of a surprise attack inflicted by the other.

Furthermore, Russett (1993) noted that the structural and institutional constraints on democracies do not prevent them from responding to sudden attacks by using emergency powers or even strike preemptively during crisis. An example of the two different types of violence used by a democracy in recent history is the war in Afghanistan in October 2001 as an immediate emergency response by the U.S. to destroy al Qaeda following the sudden attacks of September 11, while the war in Iraq in 2003 represented a preventive strike against an authoritarian state to destroy its alleged WMDs which the U.S. perceived as a threat.

To conclude, I believe Kenneth Waltz understanding of international organizations and how they work represent a more convincing depiction of the international system, while Keohane’s theory is needed to reform that system. The actions of the United Nations, the largest international regime, are constrained by the capabilities of only five permanent members of its Security Council who has the veto power—the UN cannot act without the support and the approval of these five states.

Although democratic peace theory seems to be the most promising in promoting international cooperation, however, one of the assumptions I find problematic in this theory is that it considered wars against authoritarian states both expected and legitimate, and consequently divide the world into a zone of peace, which include democracies, and zone of war which includes authoritarian states. This classification is troubling because during war there will be no distinction between authoritarian regimes and the people in these states who are mostly governed against their will and who will more likely pay the price of any given conflict. I believe promoting democracy in these countries and pressuring these regimes to reform will empower the people who live under authoritarian regimes to rise up against their leaders and demand freedom and democracy.