Gawdat Bahgat in 2004, argued that the ongoing transformation of Libya, from a “pariah state” (p. 374, & p. 386) refusing to abide by international norms and laws (p. 390), and a state-sponsoring terrorism, into a partner in the fight against terrorism, engaging fully in multilateral economic and political relations with the rest of the world, represents the first time in the history of the international struggle against modern terrorism that the international community has succeeded in imposing and enforcing effective sanctions against a terrorism-sponsoring state under the auspices of the UNSC (p. 384). Furthermore, Ray Takeyh in 2004 contended “the Libya case can provide a model for how to deal with a revolutionary regime that has grown weary of its isolation and ostracism” (p. 72)
Libya’s strained relations with the West began shortly after September of 1969, when the 27 years old Mu’ammar el-Qaddafi, seized power toppling the conservative monarchy of King Idris. As young revolutionary, el-Qaddafi had ambitions to assume the leadership position in the Arab world once held by late Egyptian President and Arab nationalist Gamal abdel Nassar (1954-1970), which led him to direct his anger at what he perceived as “Western injustice” (Bahgat, p. 390), and blaming the West for the Arab world’s problems. Libya also provided terrorist groups throughout the world with money and arms; on top of them was the PLO, which was regarded by all Arab countries as liberation movement (p. 383). Libya’s policies as revolutionary state was similar to other revolutionary regimes in the Middle East like Egypt’s Nasser, Iran, and Iraq, which traditionally antagonized Western interests in the region and allied themselves with terrorist groups they considered liberation movements (p. 374 & 383).
John Cooley argued in 1981 explained how the US oil companies have helped create the conditions that led to Qaddafi’s seize of power in 1969 by supporting and allying themselves in the public eye with the corrupt Libyan elite (p. 74 & 78). Therefore, the US administration initially accepted Qaddafi’s regime, praising his anticommunist ideology and anti-Soviet rhetoric, and showed no sympathy to the ousted king (p. 81). The Nixon administration was also pleased when Qaddafi denounced the Soviet role in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war in the area, and his approval of the Egyptian President Sadat’s expulsion of the Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July 1972 (p. 75)
However, in mid 1970s, Qaddafi’s support for global revolution and terrorism became more apparent (Cooley, p.84), further straining its relations with the West, in particular the United States. On April 15, 1973, at the peak of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Qaddafi attempted to sink the ship Queen Elizabeth II, which had many Jewish Americans on board (Cooley, p. 86). Furthermore, the US and its European allies were greatly concerned by Qaddafi’s apparent reversal of attitudes toward the Soviet Union since 1974 (p.77). Qaddafi also took a series of decisions that would increase Libyan control over the foreign oil companies (p. 82), and by mid-1974 Libya controlled about 2/3 of its production (p. 83)
Consequently, on May 2, 1980, the US closed its embassy in Tripoli, at times when the Soviets were trying to repair their relations with Qaddafi (Cooley, pp.84-85). Moreover, Qaddafi’s regime opposed Camp David’s peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and joined the camp of Arab states that threatened to wipe Israel off the map (Cooley, p. 75). He elevated his anti-American rhetoric when he accused the Saudi Royal family of desecrating Islamic holy places by allowing a US military presence in their country following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 (Cooley, p. 89)
In the 1980s, Libya’s support of international terrorism widened, and in 1986 the US attacked Libya for its involvement in the bombing of Berlin disco killing two US servicemen (Bahgat, p. 383). Libya responded by the 1988 and 1989 terrorist attacks against Pan Am and French UTA respectively, killing hundreds of civilians from different countries (Bahgat, p. 383). Furthermore, Qaddafi has made it known that his next ambition is to make Libya the first Arab nuclear power. Libya sought but failed to buy nuclear bomb from China, and arranged to share in the efforts and proceeds of the Pakistani nuclear program by financing the Pakistani nuclear program (Cooley, p. 87). Furthermore, in pursuing his nuclear ambitions, Qaddafi attempted to obtain uranium from northern Chad occupied by Libyan troops since 1975 (Cooley. P. 88).
However, Libya’s international hostile policies did not come without a price. The UN in 1992 and 1993 imposed comprehensive sanctions against Libya, which had greatest impact weakening Libyan economy especially the hydrocarbon industry, costing Libya an estimated $26.5 billion (Bahgat, p. 384). The country’s growing oil production declined to less than half by 2003, losing its booming edge of 1960s due bilateral and multilateral devastating sanctions against Libya’s oil and gas industry. The deteriorating economic conditions in Libya-30% unemployment and 50% inflation rates (Takeyh, p. 65)- compounded by the collapse of the oil prices in 1998/1999, which revenues constitute 75% of the government expenditure and the main source of its foreign currency (p. 377-378), led to mounting popular unrest in Libya fueled by Islamist insurgency, and competing politics between pragmatics and hardliners within the Libyan elites, sending the country into chaos by mid-1990s (Takeyh, p. 65).
Takeyh argued that the UN sanctions following Lockerbie—particularly oil and technology embargo—and their devastating effect on Libya’s economy shattered Qaddafi’s long beliefs that Libya’s oil resources and wealth will undermine international unity and render the country immune to sanctions and that the world powers will not have the guts to interrupt the flow of oil from Libya for long (p. 64). Furthermore, according to Takeyh, the collapse of the Soviet Union left Qaddafi Isolated and exposed facing international pressure, especially at times when the Arab world began to negotiate peace with Israel, and seek better relations with the US (p. 64).
Faced with futile revolutionary ideology, deteriorating economy, mounting popular unrest, two military coups, and Islamic insurgency, Qaddafi realized in 1998 that that he had to accept the “passing of the age of revolutions and the arrival of globalization” and economic interdependence (pp. 64-65). As a result, Libya showed interests in multilateral institutions, and the desire to work within the international organizations to reconcile grievances, instead of resorting to terrorism (p. 72)
Qaddafi’s actions were indicative that he would steer Libya in favoring pragmatics within his regime, and shifted his international focus toward Africa & away from the Arab-Israeli conflict thus mediating crises as well as settling conflicts precipitated in working, multilateral institutions (Takeyh, p. 67). Qaddafi also began to implement a series of political and economic reforms aimed at ending Libya’s international isolation, seeking better relations with the West, and encourage foreign investment crucial for Libya’s economic recovery (Bahgat, p. 37 & p. 378; Takeyh, p. 68).
In 1999 and a result of Libya’s transformation, sanctions against Libya began to be lifted (Bahgat, p. 382). By September of 2000, Qaddafi declared the end of his anti-imperialist struggle and declared he will have to “follow the moment” and becomes a part of interdependent world shaped by globalization (Takeyh, p. 66). In 2002, Libya became a party to the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, thus Tripoli became a party to all the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (Bahgat, p. 386). By 2003 Libya became no longer isolated (Bahgat, p. 382). This allowed European and American oil and gas companies to resume working in Libya in full force to utilize Libya’s vast natural energy resources, which is anticipated to enhance global energy security and reduce prices (p. 382). By 2006, Libya’s oil production reached its 1970s level, and Libya became the 15th oil imports to the United States (Power Point presentation, Week 8)
Similar to Bahgat, Ray Takeyh (2004) contended that the successful shift in Libya’s policies was likely due to a combination of the above international, regional, and domestic developments. They both underscored the effect of economic sanctions on Libyan leader Mu’ammar el-Qaddafi’s “philosophical evolution” leading him to abandon his anti-imperialist struggle in September of 2000, and announcing “the world has changed radically and drastically. The methods and ideas should change, and being a revolutionary and a progressive man, I have to follow this moment” (p. 66).
Moreover, they both concluded adding that “the very fact that Qaddafi surrendered the suspects [in the Pan Am bombing] suggests that international pressure has prompted subtle yet significant changes in his foreign policy.” (p. 63). Furthermore, Bahgat argued that "rising political challenges from fundamentalist Islamist groups capitalizing on poor economy, and the desire by el-Qaddafi to groom his son to succeed him, "have convinced the Libyan leadership that economic reform and acceptance by the international community was a necessary". Therefore, "Libya decided to trade its involvement in international terrorism and its poorly developed WMD for lifting sanctions and the normalization of diplomatic and political relations with the West" (pp. 392-393).
As Qaddafi implemented his new policies towards the West and ended his support to international terrorism, Libya also began in 190s to shift its attitude towards another contentious issue in its relations with the West: the proliferation of WMDs, which the government decided was not in its best interests (Bahgat, p. 390). In December 0f 2003, Libya finally declared it is abandoning its ambitions to seek WMDs and would fully cooperate with the international community and IAEA to destroy tons of chemical weapons, and surrender documents related to its WMDs activities (pp. 386-390), a step praised by major powers including the US and UK (Bahgat, 2004, p. 373). Moreover, Libya took responsibility for several terrorist attacks committed by its intelligence services, agreed to pay compensations to victims’ families (pp. 384-385), and cooperated in the war against international terrorism (p. 386) dissociating itself from terrorist groups (p. 375 & 382). Furthermore, in 2002, Libya became a party to the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, thus Tripoli became a party to all the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (p. 386).
The dramatic change in Libya’s policies and behavior was regarded by various European countries, as well as China, Russia, Iran and Arab leaders who have been strongly critical of the war in Iraq as indication of how effective economic and diplomatic pressure could be, without the need to use military power (p. 387)
Libyan involvement in international terrorism has been different from that of other countries. Bahgat cited at least five distinctive characteristics of the Libyan case can be identified. The combination of these characteristics makes Libya an almost unique case in the war on terrorism and the states that sponsor it. First, Tripoli’s backed-terrorist operations targeted citizens of several countries (p.383). Second, most states that are accused of sponsoring international terrorism strongly deny these accusations. Tripoli, however, under pressure has accepted legal responsibility for several terrorist operations and paid financial compensations to the victims’ families. Third, the international community was united in condemning Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and took specific measures to compel Tripoli to change its policy and abide by international norms (p. 384). Forth, international sanctions seem to have contributed to shaping a new Libyan attitude on terrorism in particular and on foreign policy in general. Al-Qaddafi has sought to position himself and his country as a power broker in Africa and as an economic intermediary between Europe and Africa (p. 385). Finally, Libya stated in 2004 that its intelligence had been sharing information on al-Qa’eda and other Islamic extremists with Western intelligence services and characterized such cooperation as “irrevocable” (p. 386)
As Bahgat elaborated, the Libyan case was unique compared with other states remaining on the list of sponsoring terrorism today, not only because Libya’s support of terrorism had distinctive characteristics, but also because the anti-terrorism strategies employed successfully by the international community will be difficult to achieve the same success today, for several reasons, among them is that the nature of terrorism itself has changed, in addition to the changing dynamic between the state and the sponsored terrorist group. Furthermore, despite of Qaddafi’s regime ‘s support and practice of terrorism and his anti-Western rhetoric, has never actually destabilized US interests, compared with leader like Saddam Hussien, who twice invaded his neighbors and continued to seek hegemony over the Persian Gulf (Takeyh, p. 68). Qaddafi also has shown himself to be more susceptible to international pressure compared with Saddam Hussien (p. 68), and Ahmadinejad.
While most of the 19th century terrorism that Libya supported was “secular” , driven by the notions of nationalism and self-determination and the growing popularity of radical political thought embracing Marxist ideology (Hoffman, 2006, p. 84), terrorism in last three decades and as a result of the repercussions of the revolution in Iran has began to take religious meaning (p. 85). States –sponsoring religious terrorism are usually less likely to bow to international pressure, since their relation with the sponsored group is based on firm ideology derived from religious belief. Example is the support that Iran provides to terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Unlike Iran, which refuses official contact with the US, Libya is eager to open a diplomatic dialogue (Takeyh, p. 70)
Cooley argued how the US dependence on Libyan oil has been a constant factor deterring US action against Qaddafi, even greater West European dependence on Libyan oil and gas (p. 90). Therefore, in order for the international community to an effective strategy against Libya, the US and European governments had to create contingency plans to cope with an embargo on Libyan oil. Hence, was the strategy to explore possible alternative sources for oil, such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia (p. 91)
Moreover, the US and allies strategy with Libya for two decades was based on the rejection of any direct military action against Libya, and on the constant consultation and coordination with European allies (Cooley, p. 91). Takeyh argued that such unified international pressure was crucial for the success of the anti-terrorism strategy against Libya (p. 63), something that is not possible today, especially with China and Russia’s deep economic relations with countries sponsoring terrorism such as Iran, Syria and Sudan. Therefore, diplomacy should not be mounted against states-sponsoring terrorism only, but also should involve countries that maintain economic relations with them, in order for UN sanctions achieve their desired effects. The US implemented this strategy against Libya, when its European allies fulfilled their part in enforcing the UN sanctions, blocking all life lines to the Libyan regime (Takeyh, p. 71). However, such cohesive and collective international action was threatened by the US unilateral action in waging war against Iraq without UN mandate, which consequently undermined international unity facing regimes such as Iran, Syria and Sudan.
In order for the international community to neutralize and weaken the Libyan regime, it was necessary to strengthen regimes threatened inside their own countries by overt Libyan action, and constantly monitor the Soviet arsenal in Libya (Cooley, p. 92). The international community is utilizing this strategy currently in Lebanon by aiding its government against attempts by Syria and Iran to destabilize the country to serve their own domestic and international interests.
Furthermore, Takeyh contended that the policy of incremental normalization was important in dealing with Libya in order to enhance constructive Libyan conduct and further pushes its regime towards moderation. This strategy is essential in encouraging more rouge states to seek rehabilitation and integration within the international community (p. 72)
References
Byman, D. (2005) Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (1st ed). New York:
Cambridge University Press
Bahgat, G. (Winter, 2004). Oil, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Libyan
Diplomatic Coup. Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies, 29 (4), pp. 373-394.
Retrieved July 27, 2009, from Academic Search Premier
Cooley, J.K. (Spring, 1981). The Libyan menace. Foreign Policy, (42), pp. 74-93. Retrieved July 28,
from Academic Search Premier
Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. (2nd ed). New York: Columbia University Press
Murphy, S.D. (2001). Verdict in the trial of the Lockerbie bombing suspects. The American Journal
of International Law, 95(2), pp.405-407. Retrieved July 28, 2009, from ProQuest Social
Science Journals
Takeyh, R. (2001, May). The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold. Foreign Affairs, 80(3), 62-72.
Retrieved July 28, 2009, from Academic Search Premier
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