Dominant issues in free trade

The trading system has been transformed by forces of globalization, which dramatically increased global trade, an ever greater interdependence (Spero & Hart, p. 92), and increased international economic interactions (p. 8). Liberal economic and trade policies advocated by the WTO, IMF, and World Bank reinforced globalization and new forms of trade in services and trade-related intellectual property and investments emerged. Economic globalization has been fundamentally redesigning and centralizing the world’s political and economic arrangements in a way unsurpassed since the Industrial Revolution (Barker & Mander, p. 251).

However, globalization created conflicting political demands. On the one hand, calls were made for expansion of trade liberalization and international management of old and new trade issues, on the other hand, many groups demanded protection and a halt on the forces of globalization (Spero & Hart, p. 92). Furthermore, domestic politicization of trade matters in the U.S. and throughout the world has been an important constraint on globalization in general and trade order in particular (Spero & Hart, pp. 67& 68).

One of the main issues in free trade in the international economic system is protectionism, which had dominated the interwar era (Spero & Hart, p.68) but is becoming increasingly significant since the beginning of the era of interdependence in 1971 (p.10 ), during which, developments in domestic politics conflicted with international trade managements and undermined the GATT agreements shifting the world economy towards protectionism (pp. 73-74). Protectionist nations usually restrict free trade to balance market objectives with social ones (Vogel, p. 15). Moreover, Nations-whether developed, less developed or developing-become under increased protectionist pressures to maintain its competitive edge and protect its domestic products against foreign competitors (Spero & Hart, p. 75). Periods of inflation and economic recession generally contribute to more protectionism and implementation of trade restricting policies, where liberalization and cooperation might be perceived as contributing factors to economic meltdown.

Several barriers to international trade are forms of protectionism. These barriers include tariffs, quotas, agricultural subsidies, non tariff barriers (NTBs), safeguards, voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs) and antidumping measures (Spero & Hart, p. 87). In 1948 countries convening in Bretton Woods, agreed to generate a system that would accelerate worldwide economic development. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created mainly to set tariffs and quotas on manufactured goods. In the years following, however, business interests exerted considerable pressure to extend GATT rules to regulate investments, services, intellectual property rights, and so on (Barker & Mander, p. 252).

Although the GATT succeeded in reducing tariffs, quotas and liberalizing international trade (Spero & Hart, p. 87), agriculture was subject o a separate GATT regime and did not benefit from the liberalization process of the postwar era. Therefore, national agricultural policies of most developed countries (US, Japan, EU) remained interventionist and protectionist (p. 86). NTBs such as government procurement policies, customs procedures, health and sanitary regulations, national standards, and a broad range of other laws and regulations that discriminate against imports or offer assistance to exporters, remained major barriers to free trade (p. 87). This situation was complicated by the fact that the GATT offered few guidelines to reduce NTBs, (p. 88), and were also ineffective on safeguards (p. 97).

Another form of protectionism was the use of VRAs (Voluntary Restraint Agreements). VRAs began in 1950s and 1960s and soared in 1980s (Spero & Hart, p. 89) and were designed to protect import-sensitive industries, which countries believed were inadequately protected by unclear laws of the GATT antidumping measures and safeguards (p. 88) Therefore, the NTBs and the VRAs, and the increased government interventions in the economy along with the shift in comparative advantages, rendered the GATT regime increasingly irrelevant since it was designed to manage mainly quantitative import restrictions and tariffs (Spero & Hart, p. 90).

Tokyo Round (1973-1979), succeeded to make progress in regulating NTBs by establishing new NTB codes. However, these codes were incomplete and applied only to its signatories—developing countries were no convinced of their values and chose not to sign, which made them subject to discrimination legal under GATT rules. Moreover, the Tokyo Round did not succeed in reaching an agreement in agricultural trade liberalization (Spero & Hart, pp. 90-92). As result, the world moved away from multilateral trade agreements in favor of bilateral and regional ones, in order to address the deficiencies of the GATT. Moreover, trade with Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) and other developed countries grew in the 1980s and 1990s, organized labor and environmental groups tried to advance their laws and practices in other countries and to modify NAFTA to include such provisions (p. 95)

The 1970 and 1980s, witnessed the growing importance of services in the international economies and international trade of the developed countries, accounting of 20-30% of world trade, whether services produced and consumed within the same market or traded internationally. This trend of growing production and trade in services continued in the 1990s, especially in the telecommunication, banking, insurance, law and accounting areas (Spero & Hart, p. 107). Barriers to trade in services had not been subject to the process of liberalization, because services were not covered by the GATT regime. (p. 97). The technological advances and Information Revolution have resulted in unprecedented number of innovations in telecommunications and pharmaceutical products. However, piracy undermined the ability of high-technology firms, especially computer software and pharmaceutical companies, to compete internationally and, thus, disrupting trade. Many firms and their governments argued that GATT should be broadened to cover intellectual property issues (Spero & Hart, pp. 93 & 94)

The Uruguay Round agreements (1987-1994), concluded by the Agreement of Marrakesh, became the foundation for further globalization of world trade (Spero & Hart, p. 101), and resulted in several breakthrough agreements that benefited both developing and developed countries. Among the main agreements reached during the Uruguay Round are: Further cuts in tariffs; Significant reductions in agricultural subsidies; Elimination of textile and apparel quotas over ten years; New trade rules for services; Intellectual property and trade-related investments, e.g. the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and the Trade-Related investment Measures (TRIMs); Binding procedures for the settlement of disputes; Agreement on safeguards with clearly defined rules and regulations; and finally establishment of the WTO (p. 97)

Since its inception in 1995 as part of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been globalization’s rule-making and governing regime, with free trade becoming the organizing principle of global trading system (Barker & Mander, p. 251). A key rule in governing global trade which the WTO follows is the “distinction between a product and the way it is produced” (Vogel, p. 15). This rule has led proponents of WTO to criticize it for favoring big corporations over human rights, democratic and environmental standards and labor laws (Baker & Mander, 251).

According to Spero & Hart (2003), despite of the significant breakthrough agreements during the Uruguay Round, which even continued beyond the Agreement of Marrakesh in 1994, there are major remaining issues the free trade that have not been adequately resolved. Among these remaining issues are: Agriculture remained highly protected, which is of much concern to developing nations. Griswold et al in 2006 argued rich countries agricultural trade barriers and subsidies remain the single greatest obstacle to a comprehensive WTO agreement on trade liberalization. They added that eliminating subsidies will Lower food prices, increase exports and help international peace and environment (pp. 42-49)

Other major issues that were not adequately addressed by the WTO include: Antidumping and safeguards measures were only partially controlled by the WTO; The WTO dispute settlement understandings (DSU) were criticized of being overly legalistic; The agreements on services, intellectual property and investment measures had gaps in coverage that needed to be closed; The significant reduction in tariffs and NTBs exposed new set of national policies that affected trade flows, e.g. competition and antitrust policies which included practices used by powerful local competitors that restrained trade; Barriers to open up use of telecommunication infrastructure to further enhance e-commerce; Environmental and labor policy and concerns that liberal international trade could result in environmental dumping (p. 102)

Furthermore, several NGOs called to reform the WTO to include interest groups to participate along with governments in the WTO decisions. Other groups and governments disagreed arguing that NGOs already have access to decision making through their national governments and national decision processes. More transparency in the operations of the WTO, making documents and drafts of treaties available to the general public (Spero & Hart, p. 104)

Finally, in my opinion, since the September 11 attacks, terrorism emerged as one of the dominant issues in global trade will undermine further trade and monetary liberalization. Global terrorism disrupts the movement of people, and finances, and threatens investments. The next round of multilateral trade negotiations will have to address the threat of global terror on continuous process of liberalization and globalization in general.

References
Barker, D., Mander, J. (2000, Fall). The WTO and invisible governments. Peace review, 12 (2), pp. 251-255.
Griswold, D., Silvinski, S., & Preble, C. (2006, February). 6 Reasons to kill farm subsidies and trade barriers. Reason 37(9), pp. 42-49.
J. E. Spero & J. A. Hart (2002). Politics of International Economic Relations, 6th ed. New York: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Vogel, D. (2000, June). The wrong whipping boy. The American prospect 11(14), pp. 15-17.

Obama, Middle East and the Freedom Agenda

Jackson Diehl in the Washington Post predicted the Obama administration will abandon Bush's freedom agenda and democracy promotion in the Middle East, especially after we’ve seen its end results in the Palestinian elections. I think Mr. Diehle is right in his assesment of the incoming Obama administration.

I have listened to almost all of Obama's major speeches and I never heard any mentioning of democracy promotion in the ME, or any plans to do so. Even on the his campaign website, Obama's vision for the ME is focused on the peace process between Israel and Palestinians,war in Iraq, and Iran's nuclear program. So, democracy promotion is not on Obama's short term plans to protect U.S. interests in the ME.

If the Egyptian regime gives in to the U.S. demands by holding free and fair elections, most likely we will see the Muslim Brotherhood forming the new government. The question then: will the U.S. be willing to deal with an Islamic government that does not recognize Israel and opposes U.S. policies? Or will the U.S. isolate the new government and impose an economic and political blockade on 80 million Egyptians to punish them for their democratic choice?

I believe that this paradox in our foreign policy undermines our credibility to play any effective role in the future of democratization in the Middle East.

Mr. Diehle concluded that "Mubarak and other "pro-Western" autocrats seem to have drawn from Obama's election: that the threat of U.S. pressure for political liberalization has passed". Mr. Diehl has every reason to believe that the Democrats’' policies will be more along the line of "stability and security outweighs democracy", except that the sum will be zero, as we've learned on 9/11.

However, those who still believe that Ayman Nour is a viable opposition figure who can challenge President Mubarak, don't really understand the psyche of the Egyptian people or the political dynamics in Egypt. Mr. Nour enjoys no public support and cannot be looked at as rallying factor in Egyptian politics. On the one hand, the public sympathizes with Mr. Nour for the injustice and suffering he has endured, and widely respects him for speaking up against government corruption and oppression. On the other hand, he is branded as "America's man", and in Egypt, like most other parts of the ME nowadays, that’s enough to undermine his scanty popularity and cost him the support he once enjoyed among the elite. Mr. Nour's letter to then democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama seeking his support, was criticized by the opposition and the public who considered it humiliating for Mr. Nour and rejected the U.S. meddling in Egypt's internal affairs.

The U.S. should keep a hands-off approach to Egyptian politics and don't impose a model of change or implicitly support one opposition trend against the other, because it will automatically be rejected by the public which is highly skeptical of the U.S. agenda, resentful for its support of Israel, and the war in Iraq. Instead, the U.S. should make public diplomacy a priority and work on improving its image and combating anti-Americanism plaguing the ME, and threatening U.S. interests abroad and its security at home. The U.S should also be ready to respect people's democratic choices and deal with freely elected governments even if they're opposed to our policies, but they will be willing to cooperate and negotiate as long as there is recognition of mutual interests and we can find the common ground that bring all parties together. Even governments like Hamas and Iran can be contained through the negotiations and cooperation.

Unlike the West, the public opinion in the ME is highly emotional in general, and we’ve seen the reactions after the appointment of Rahm Emmanuel. However, the U.S. can use this to its advantage by engaging in aggressive public diplomacy. Words can do magic without even taking any actions, and that's how the ME operates.

How rethinking globalization can avert the clash of civilizations: Case study of the Muslim Brotherhood

By: Ali G. Mansour, MD

Globalization has affected every aspect of international relations, including economic, social and political realms. From the development of new technologies, new ideas and free trade, to the spread of democracies and forms of governments, globalization has profoundly transformed the human condition in all of its aspects. On the one hand, Muslim Brotherhood views globalization as a threat to cultural identity and national economy in developing countries and as a new form of American imperialism that is seeking to impose its hegemony and control the world’s economy. On the other hand, the West, driven by realist views and preoccupied by its security dilemma, is equally skeptical of political Islam, which it accuses of seeking to destroy western values and wage global jihad to conquer Western states and reestablish Islamic Caliphate

Muslim Brotherhood’s views on globalization are similar to those expressed in the dependency theory, which remains a pervasive force in Third World notions of the international political economy even as Marxist experiments in Russia and Eastern Europe has collapsed. Rethinking globalization through the alternative lenses of international relations can help find a common ground between political Islam and the Western civilization by allowing localization to co-exist with globalization, hence preserve cultural identity and social norms. The concept of Islamic Caliphate can also be redefined in economic and political terms in a way that promote cooperation and mutual dependence. Resolving these two highly contentious issues can avert an imminent clash between Western and Islamic civilizations.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the notion of an Islamic threat to world peace and security has become even more highlighted. Globalization and post-modernization has led to the rise of political Islam in the Muslim world. Therefore, political Islam deserves scholarly attention and not just a threat to regional stability, it deserves to be treated as a probable contender for future political rule over states with which the West must continue relations with. Among movements of political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) is considered the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization.

Since its establishment in Egypt in 1928 by a school teacher named Hassan el-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has sought to fuse religious revival with anti-imperialism—resistance to foreign domination through the exaltation of Islam. From mid-to late 1940s, the MB began to expand beyond Egypt, and today it is impressively a worldwide movement having many branches in both Muslim countries and none Muslim countries alike.

The MB’s participation in electoral politics has enjoyed some success, particularly in the Indonesian, Egyptian and Palestinian elections—the last through Hamas, which is the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), which evolved out of the MB movement, is represented in the current Iraqi government by Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi who is the General Secretary of the IIP. As a result, the Brotherhood has apparently demonstrated considerable popularity. In fact, it is likely to become the leading voice within the Muslim world generally by virtue of its widespread character.

Samuel Huntington in 1993 argued that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. He added that civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and that the most critical attributes responsible for this gross division is indeed the undeniable cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

Huntington defined civilization as the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that, which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. He divided world civilizations into two camps—Western civilization, which has two major variants, European and North American, and Islamic, which has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions.

Mohamed Mahdi Akef, General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, underscored the deepening animosity between the Western and Islamic Civilizations described in Huntington’s theory. In his message titled “Humankind between the slavery of globalization and the glory of Islam”, Mr. Akef sarcastically criticized globalization for "transforming the world into a small village whose mayor is the master of the White House", and which "mainly serve the interests of the American politicians". He then accused globalization of racism for "favoring Judeo-Christian faith and depriving humanity of the noble values of the divine laws". He drew an example of how "the globalized world is biased against any successful Islamic economic or developmental projects, and targeting of Islamic culture by rejecting the Turkish and Malaysian models based on allegations of their enmity towards secularization". Akef sees "the hope in the glory of Islam and in the Muslims' ability to confront the slavery of globalization and their steadfast in resisting occupation and tyranny".

In the interviews I conducted with six prominent leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt via email, they all rejected globalization if it conflicts with Islamic teachings, rules, and regulations. The six were all professionals (doctors and lawyers), who had decent knowledge of world affairs. They echoed the views of Mr. Akef—equating globalization with Americanization, which they considered a threat to their Islamic identity, beliefs, values, language, and social norms.

Abdel el-Mone’m Abu el-Fotoh, leading figure of the MB and member of its Guidance Bureau- the highest decision-making body within the MB- and the General Secretary of the Arab Physicians’ Union, described globalization as a form of ”modern imperialism“, which uses culture, politics and even military power to impose its hegemony as in the case of the U.S. In other words, globalization according to Abu el-Fotoh became an “American fascism” depriving the Third World countries from technological advances and controlling its resources for the benefits of the First World countries.

Hamdy Hassan, physician, a parliamentarian, and spokesperson of MB parliamentary bloc, and Osama Naser Uldeen, member of the MB Guidance Bureau, emphasized the same meaning blaming globalization for the condition of inequality in world economy, in which the industrialized countries are gaining more power and enjoy more prosperity by exploiting the developing countries which suffer more backwardness and authoritarianism.

Essam el-Erian, physician and chief of MB political bureau, and Sobhi Saleh, member of parliament and prominent attorney, reiterated the same meaning by dismissing the” American concept” of globalization, which forces its culture and values on other nations even through military power. Saleh went further by calling globalization “the U.S. bullying the world to stain it with American culture and norms”.

Gamal Heshmat, prominent MB writer, physician, and former Member of Parliament, asserted that globalization is bad for the Muslim world because it disintegrates its identity. He rejected the notion that civilizations can be “dissolved in one pot” stating “any nation that has respect and appreciation to its culture and values would not submit to the concepts of universal civilization”

Furthermore, the MB argues that the failure of both socialism and capitalism to address Egypt's (and the entire Muslim nation's) grievances indicates that only a return to Islam at both the individual and collective levels will bring God back to the side of the Muslims.

However, all the Brothers I interviewed agreed that there are positive aspects of globalization which Muslims should benefit from, including the technological advances in communication, science, and informatic, and the ability to exchange ideas of democracy and liberty. The contemporary Brotherhood’s views on globalization among Islamic nations seem to contrast with their views when it involves relations between Western and Islamic civilizations. Abu el-Fotoh and Heshmat favored globalizing the Muslim countries, creating a unified “Ummah” or the Muslim nation, which to them makes sense because those countries share the same culture, religion, and values.

Abo el-Fotoh elaborated further on the idea of the Islamic Caliphate which, according to him, now in light of globalization can be based on economic and political principles, not religious ones. He compared the Islamic Caliphate to the European Union which is composed of sovereign and powerful states united around economic, security and political agenda.

This fairly progressive view by some in the second MB generation represents a considerable pragmatic shift from the earlier theocratic concept of the Caliphate expressed by founder Hassan el Banna, who stated that the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate is an Islamic duty for all Muslims, in which the Khalifa (the one ruler for all Muslim countries) is entrusted to impose God’s laws. Therefore, el-Banna placed the reestablishment of Islamic Caliphate at the top of the MB agenda.

Some of the criticism of globalization and world relations between developed and developing nations is also expressed by theorists like Theotonio Dos Santos in 1968, in his analysis of the dependency theory, and James Rosenau in 1997, in his alternative views of globalization

Thomas Lynch III described dependency theory, born in the Third World, as variant of Marxism that must be evaluated independently from the Marxist-Leninist communism. Dependency theory was developed over the period from 1950 to the early 1970s, which coincided with the 1952 Free Officers’ Revolution in Egypt and the Nasserite era, attributed to President Gamal Abdul Nasser who ruled Egypt from 1956-1970. Nasser sought out rapprochement with the Soviet Union; hence Egypt was controlled by Soviet ideas. Although the older generation of the MB underwent fierce repression and persecution during the Nasser’s era, they would still embrace his ideology of anti-imperialism and socialism during that time of Egypt’s history, which has influenced their views till today.

However, since the 1980s, middle-class professionals within the MB have pushed it in a more transparent and flexible direction. Working within labor unions and professional organizations, these reformers have learned to forge coalitions with and provide services to their constituents.

Unlike Marxism which addresses “classes of people”, dependency theory focuses on the relations between “classes of states”. Dos Santos in 1968 defined dependence “as a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustained, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can either be a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development”

Dos Santos added that to understand what is happening in the underdeveloped countries, we need to put it within the framework of a process of dependent production and reproduction. According to Dos Santos, this system reproduces backwardness, misery, and social marginalization within its borders—it reproduces a productive system whose development is limited by those world relations which necessarily lead to the development of only certain economic sectors, to trade under unequal conditions, to domestic competition with international capital under unequal conditions, to the imposition of relations of super exploitation of the domestic labor force with a view to dividing the economic surplus thus generated between internal and external forces of domination.

Rethinking globalization through alternative lenses of international relations can offer us the opportunity to find one common ground between the Western and Islamic civilizations, represented in the research by political Islam, which we can build on.

James Rosenau contended that commonly used definitions of `globalization in the literature are elusive and”misleading”, because they are often used by different observers to describe different phenomena, with little overlap among the various usages. Alternatively, Rosenau viewed globalization from a different perspective by describing globalization as the opposite of localization. He attempted to further explain globalization by drawing a comparison between the two, and by arguing that while localization is boundary-heightening, globalization on the other hand is boundary-broadening.

Rosenau in his alternative views of globalization did not underestimate its powerful or negative influence in undermining other people’s culture, values and way of life, which led many across the globe, including the MB, to consider the incursions of globalization a threat to their identity and cultural mores. Rosenau then built on the common ground he established with the critics of globalization to provide a solution based on his alternative view. Rosenau believed that there is no inherent contradiction between localizing and globalizing tendencies, and that both can coexist to a degree which will depend on ethnic and noneconomic factors actively contributing to localization. In other words, localization and globalization need not to be mutually exclusive, and it is possible to reconcile globalization and localization by accepting the boundary-broadening processes and make the best of them by integrating them into local customs and practices

Rosenau offered another solution if the process of integration fails to reconcile both globalization and localization in a given culture or within a state. Rosenau shared Michael Zurn optimistic hypothesis of “uneven fragmegration” which allows for continuing pockets of antagonism between globalization and localizing tendencies hopping that eventually these pockets of fragmentations will be overcome by the opportunities and requirements of interdependence and will conform to globalization. Rosenau based his optimism on the assumption that the failure of the states to solve “pressing problems” will lead to a decline in their capabilities and a loss of legitimacy, which will undermine the people’s loyalty to their states in favor of multiple loyalties to national or transnational organizations that are able fulfill their needs.

Gross in 2004 weighted in on this argument by stating that the social reactions to globalization should be understood at its local level, and when people are denied the choice as how to deal with globalizing forces, protests often erupt. Gross added that “It is important to understand that the protests are not against globalization so much as the tyranny of governments which prevent choices from being made. Conversely, people who freely choose the extent to which they will accept global ideas are less likely to see globalization as a threat”. Gross cited an example of Malaysians, when given free choice; appear to have taken advantage of the economic opportunities without the anticipated concomitant social or political upheavals.

The concept of successful mixing globalization with localization was described by several social scientists as “glocalization”. Gross cited in his article Patrice C. Brodeur’s “From Postmodernism to Glocalism” in which she advocated the replacement of the term globalization with “glocalism”. The term takes into consideration the complexity of interactions between global and local forces which constantly change our definitions of ourselves and others. In particular, the term can help academics to better understand the world from the perspective of non–Westerners.

Ritzer in 2003 defined glocalization as the interpenetration of the global and the local, resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas. This view emphasizes global heterogeneity and tends to reject the idea that forces emanating from the West in general and the United States in particular are leading to economic, political, institutional, and-most importantly-cultural homogeneity. Ritzer added that the above definition of glocalization makes what is local is seen as increasingly insignificant and a marginal player in the dynamics of globalization. Yet, according to Ritzer, glocalization does represent some measure of hope. For one thing, it is the last outpost of most lingering forms of the local.

Robert Keohane added another dimension to the relations between countries with different interests and set of values by focusing on the possibility to achieve cooperation in the world political economy. Keohane acknowledged that international coordination of policy seems highly beneficial in an interdependent economy, but cooperation in world politics is particularly difficult. He based his theory of cooperation on the premise that nonhegemonic cooperation is possible and it can be facilitated by international regimes. When shared interests are sufficiently important and other key conditions are met, cooperation can emerge and regimes can be created without hegemony. Therefore, the key to Keohane’s cooperation is presence of shared interests among states, and the mutual recognition of their importance.

Keohane argued that cooperation requires the actions of separate individuals or organizations—which are not in pre-existent harmony—be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as “policy coordination”. Therefore, cooperation occurs when actors (governmental and nongovernmental) attempts to adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination, and these attempts succeed in making policies more compatible. He further clarified that “intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objective, as the result of process of policy coordination” . In other words, and building on Keohane’s theory, both Western and Islamic civilizations should develop a partial, self-interested perspective on their mutual interactions, and engage in negotiation and bargaining designed to induce the other to adjust their policies to one’s own. Each government pursues what it perceives as its self-interest, but looks for bargains that can benefit all parties.

According to Keohane, “cooperation therefore does not imply the absence of conflict. On the contrary, it is typically mixed with conflict and reflects partially successful efforts to overcome conflict, real or potential”.

Samuel Huntington underscored the importance of cooperation among civilizations as a long term strategy to avert the clash of Western and non-Western civilizations. He pointed out that the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. Huntington added that this will require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with one another.

I conclude that both globalization and localization to co-exist with each other. It is essential that we encourage more cooperation and accommodation and “an appreciation of the reality that allows for multiple loyalties and memberships will likely widen the benefits of global economy”. Glocalization can be seen as an alternative to the evil of globalization. Prosperous countries like those in the Persian Gulf in addition to several other Asian countries were able to play a central role in global world economy while to a large extent preserving their cultural identities and were able to integrate their norms and traditions into the globalized world.

Theories of international cooperation and alternative views on globalization can provide a framework within which the Western and Islamic civilizations thus redefining their relationship, which must be based on the mutual recognition of each other’s interest as well as respecting one another’s cultural, religious and social norms. Muslim Brotherhood’s rejection of globalization can be transformed into a desire and willingness to coexist with Western civilization knowing it no longer represents a threat to the Islamic culture and identity. Moreover, the Islamic Caliphate should be viewed, not as threat to Western civilization, but rather an economic and political formula that enables the Muslim world to meet the challenges of globalized world without sacrificing its culture, religious values and social norms.

It is both theoretically and practically important that we engage in an unbiased discourse on the thinking of the more moderate groups of political Islam, in an attempt first and foremost to deal with our own fears of the unknown and unfamiliar, and to determine the possibility of a peaceful coexistence alongside the Islamist movement, and I hope this paper contribute to this necessary discourse.

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16-Mansour, A.G. (2008b, November). Interviews with Egyptian MB leaders, pp. 1-6
17-Ritzer, G. (2003, September). Rethinking globalization: Glocalization/grobalization
and something/nothing. Sociological Theory, 21(3), pp. 193-209. Retrieved November 14, 2008, from JSTOR
18-Rosenau, J. N. (2004). The complexities and contradictions of globalization. In D.J.
Kauffman, J.M. Parker, P.V. Howell & G.R. Doty (Eds.), Understanding international relations: The value of alternative lenses (5th ed., pp.489 -500). Boston: McGraw Hill

Alternative theories in globalization

Anthony McGrew (2008) described globalization in terms of the massive advances in global communications, transport and informatics technologies over the past several decades, which have created worldwide interconnectedness causing transnational spread of ideas, cultures and information in an accelerating pace. The result is a world that became a single social space with global tendency evident in all sectors including economic, military, legal, ecological, cultural and social aspect.

James Rosenau (2004) contended that concept of “globalization” in the literature is elusive, with no widely accepted definition. He argued that globalization was used by different observers to describe different phenomena, with little overlap among the various usages, which he described as “”misleading”. Alternatively, Rosenau looked at globalization from a different perspective by describing globalization as the opposite of localization. He attempted to further explain globalization by drawing a comparison between the two, and by arguing that while localization is boundary-heightening, globalization on the other hand is boundary-broadening.

Rosenau added more depth to his understanding of globalization and focused on its political repercussions by noting how authoritarian regimes tend to favor localization and fragmentation over globalization because localization restricts the movement of people, goods, norms and practices and impose constraints on the exchange of new ideas, information and institutions which serve the undemocratic nature of their governing and ensure their clinging to power. However, Rosenau predicts these authoritarian governments will eventually fail and their policies are bound to be undermined with increasingly interdependent economies and communication technologies that are not easily monitored.

Rosenau in his understanding of globalization did not fail to recognize its perceived powerful and negative influence and the ability to undermine people’s culture, norms and way of life, which led many across the globe to consider the incursions of globalization a threat to their identity and cultural mores. However, Rosenau believed that there is no inherent contradiction between localizing and globalizing tendencies, and that both can coexist to a degree which will depend on ethnic and noneconomic factors actively contributing to localization. In other words, localization and globalization need not to be mutually exclusive. He believed it is possible to reconcile globalization and localization by accepting the boundary-broadening processes and make the best of them by integrating them into local customs and practices.

But what if the process of integration failed to reconcile both globalization and localization in a given culture or within a state? Rosenau shared Michael Zurn optimistic hypothesis of “uneven fragmegration” which allows for continuing pockets of antagonism between globalization and localizing tendencies hopping that eventually these pockets of fragmentations will be overcome by the opportunities and requirements of interdependence and will conform to globalization.

Rosenau argued that the failure of the states to solve “pressing problems” has led to a decline in their capabilities and a loss of legitimacy, which will undermine the people’s loyalty to their states in favor of multiple loyalties to national or transnational organizations that are able fulfill their needs.

Although Rosenau views on globalization seem to be in line with the liberal theories on cooperation by Keohane in 1984, and complex interdependence by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 1997, however, Rosenau focused on another dimension by addressing the dynamics between globalization and domestic culture and politics. Rosenau criticized the traditional theories on globalization for not offering alternative interpretations as to how the interaction of economic, political, and social dynamics will play out. Keohane and Nye (2004) explained that there are costs that comes with these interdependent relationship in globalized world, but similar to Rosenau they also argued that the benefits of this interdependence will exceed costs and each state is expected to analyze an interdependent relationship based on the potential benefits and the costs and joint gains or losses.

Neorealists like Kenneth Waltz (2004) definition of structure leaves aside questions about the cultural, economic, political, and military interactions of states.—requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another (how they are arranged or positioned).

Susan Strange in 1996 looked at another aspect of globalization, which is its relationship to state power. She argued that the state authority is retreating to the power of global economy—structural changes in world economy and society have eroded the quality of state authority, not its quantity, rendering it less influential. Strange added that the scope of states’ authority is not only limited to economy but extends to society where states are becoming unable to protect the interests of special social groups—landowners, pensioners or shareholders. Strange called her theory the “new realism”, which denied any basic distinction between domestic and international political economy, however, it remains by large open questions that require empirical research in political theorizing to substantiate it.

Contrary to liberal theories, Strange considers complex interdependence a way to conceal the reality of inequality of dependence between states and “the structural power” exercised by some states over other governments and over other societies. The same meaning was expressed by Morgenthau in 1948 when he considered the structure of international relations which assumes “sovereign equality” of all nations, is dominated by extreme inequality among nations and causing anarchy.

Moreover, Strange described international regimes as “instrument [by national governments] for the pursuit of national interest by other means” and realists’ perception obscured by extensive literature on international regimes. These views are similar to those echoed by neorealists like Kenneth Waltz (2004) who recognizes the importance of international organizations but argues that their performance is either influenced by the capabilities of the states, or they might become unable to act without the support of the states concerned with the matter at hand.

Strange cited as a paradox in the state-market balance of power “the growing intervention of state authority and of the agencies of the state in the daily lives of the citizens” in areas where “the market left to itself has never been able to provide”. However, similar to Rosenau (2004) she argued that even this role by the state is becoming “less respected and lacks its erstwhile legitimacy” and that many states are failing to fulfill these basic responsibilities.

Strange cited ten major powers where states once used to exercise their authority in areas of economic and territorial nationalism that now have declined or have been challenged by forces of global market economy. Strange argued that even states most fundamental responsibilities in taxation, building its domestic infrastructure, and providing social welfare have not been immune to changes imposed by global economy which set limits on the level of states contributions and regulations.

To conclude, I agree with Rosenau’s view that globalization and localization can accommodate each other. I believe international relations theories like realism and leftist views are not suitable to deal with a world where antagonism between globalization and the desire to maintain cultural norms, and local values is threatening world peace.

Prosperous countries like those in the Persian Gulf in addition to several other Asian countries were able to play a central role in global world economy while to large extent preserving their cultural identities and were able to integrate their norms and traditions into globalized world. With more cooperation and accommodation and “an appreciation of the reality that allows for multiple loyalties and memberships will likely widen the benefits of global economy”.

Although Susan Strange argued for the retreat of the state power in face of global world economy, however, in my opinion, there are two major challenges to Strange’s conclusions which are the current global economic meltdown and global terrorism. In order to meet challenges of global market economy, Western states have opted to limit their regulatory authorities over private enterprise, compared to their Asian counterparts. We now know that deregulations in the financial market have been one of major factors that contributed to the world’s biggest financial crisis since the great depression of 1930s. The United States now is moving towards more state interventions in the market economy, and the Democratic Party on the verge of assuming power is calling for regulations in the stock market.

Global terrorism since 1990s is representing a new type of threat within states territories which in turn reinforced the state’s responsibility for defending its citizens and the rise of nationalism and the rally around the state contradicting Strange’s assumption that there is a decline the perceived need for the state as an institution necessary to defend society against violence within or beyond its territory.

Cooperation theories in international relations

The study of conflict and cooperation has been an enduring task of scholars, with the most recent arguments being between realists and neoliberal institutionalists. Among the dominant Idealist theories that support cooperation are the Democratic Peace Theory by Bruce Russett in 1993, the Regime Theory by Robert Keohane in 1984, and the Complex Interdependence by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 1977.

Keohane (1984) focused his regime theory on cooperation in the world political economy. He stated that International coordination of policy seems highly beneficial in an interdependent economy, but cooperation in world politics is particularly difficult. Keohane’s argument is based on the need to analyze cooperation systematically within the context of international organizations and shared beliefs before its meaning can be properly understood. Thus, understanding the patterns of cooperation through concepts of international regimes will enable actors to predict future patterns of interactions among states and accordingly plan proper economic arrangements and related political activities.

Keohane stipulated that conflicts arise when actor’s policies pursued without regard for the interests of others are regarded by others as hindering the attainment of their goals. He then added that once areas of potential or actual conflicts are identified; states should then resort to cooperation by communicate with each other and coordinate in attempt to adjust their policies so they become significantly more compatible with one another. International regimes are then established to lay down a set of implicit or explicit principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures around which their expectations converge in a given area of international relations.

Since the creation of international regimes involves cooperation, each state is expected to pursue its national interests and maximize its relative gains compared to others’ when negotiating an international regime agreement. Therefore, international regimes should not be interpreted as elements of a new international order beyond the nation-state; they should be comprehended chiefly as arrangements motivated by self-interest. However, once an agreement has been reached on the principles of certain policies, states will lose part of its autonomy by having to comply with the norms and rules of the agreement

Nonetheless, states still retain their sovereignty in implementing actual policies—mainly economic—through state institutions rather than international organizations. Therefore, as Keohane contended, although the impact of the principles, norms and decision-making procedures of regimes must be exerted on national control, regimes are not of superior importance to national controls. Furthermore, Keohane explained that because world politics are decentralized and not hierarchic, sovereignty and self-help mean that the principles and rules of international regimes will necessarily be weaker than in domestic society.

Although international regimes consist of injunctions that are non specific and are simply obligations not enforceable by hierarchical legal system, some are specific enough that violations and changes can be identified.

Realists like Morgenthau downplayed the need for international institutions to maintain order—he argued that if each state pursues its respective interest in terms of power, justice will be served in dual sense—which means that states will be mindful of other states pursuing their interests as each state pursues its own interest. Robert Gilpin in his analysis of Hegemonic Stability Theory contended that maintaining transnational cooperation requires a hegemonic or dominant power to stabilize world liberal economy, while the decline of the hegemon state will cause a dramatic collapse of the system and undermines cooperation .

Neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz recognize the importance of international organizations but they argue that their performance is either influenced by the capabilities of the states, or they might become unable to act without the support of the states concerned with the matter at hand.

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) offered a theory of complex interdependence as an alternative to explain cooperation and state behavior. They tried to blend the wisdom in both realism and idealism by developing a coherent theoretical framework for the political analysis of interdependence. They defined Interdependence as mutual dependence characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries. In other words, it is a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces.

Moreover, they argued that whenever the transactions among states involve reciprocal costly effects, then this relationship can be described as interdependence. A compelling example of interdependence is the current financial crisis facing the U.S. economy and the crumpling of several of its major financial institutions and the resulting aftershocks felt in the markets across Europe and Asia. The costly global economic effects caused by bad U.S. economy led to a collective action by world leaders in order to prevent worldwide economic disaster.

Furthermore, interdependence could be symmetrical (equal) where each country enjoys an equal portion of gains and losses and which does mostly exists among industrialized nations, or asymmetrical (unequal) where the more powerful countries enjoy more benefits and fewer losses than the weaker ones which is the case between industrialized and developed countries.

According to Keohane and Nye (1977), there are three main characteristics that distinguish complex interdependence, which include; multiple channels connecting societies through interstate and transnational organizations, the absence of hierarchy among issues and a minor role of military power. Contrary to realism, interconnectedness is not only confined to formal governmental organizations and state agencies (interstate) but mainly involve transnational and transgovernmental interactions.

However, Keohane and Nye explained that interdependence restricts state autonomy, which they consider a cost that comes with interdependent relationship, but they also argue that the benefits of this interdependence will exceed costs. Each state is expected to analyze an interdependent relationship based on the potential benefits and the costs and joint gains or losses.

Morgenthau (1948) considered the structure of international relations which assumes “sovereign equality” of all nations, irrelevant to the reality of international politics which is dominated by extreme inequality among nations and causing anarchy. Therefore, he criticized interdependence for assuming sovereignty of states while in reality reinforces the control of superpowers and their exploitation of the “ministates”. Thus, classical realism and interdependence seem to be two opposing theories

Kenneth Waltz (1979) indicated that for a state to be sovereign and dependent are not contradictory. He stated that anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system’s units. Therefore, neo-realists seem to be more receptive to the idea of interdependence compared with classical realists.

Bruce Russett (1993) developed the democratic peace theory on the assumption that “democracies almost never fight each other”. Challenging the sameness of all states paradigm of realists, Russett argued that within a democracy, politics is seen as largely a nonzero-sum; by cooperating, all can gain something even if all do not gain equally.

While there is no consensus among scholars as to why democracies almost never fight each other, Russett in 1993 introduced two kinds of overlapping theories which are likely to offer explanations of this phenomenon; first is the democratic norms culture model, and the second is the structural and institutional constraints model. In the first model, Russett argued that democracies tend to resolve conflicts through cooperation and peaceful resolutions following the same culture of conflict resolution which characterizes their domestic political process, therefore violent conflicts with other democracies are rare, and even when they occur they have limited scale.

On the other hand, violent conflicts between democracies and nondemocracies will be more frequent because the latter does not abide by the same democratic roles in their domestic affairs and therefore, is more likely to use violence to settle their differences. Russett added that violent conflicts might erupt between democracies if one them still maturing in democracy or politically unstable especially at times of economic hardships.

Russet’s second model of structural and institutional constraints argues that the need to obtain the approval and the support of the public to use violence during conflict is complicated process and time consuming which will eventually reduce the likelihood that a decision will be made, and that leaders be constrained. However, since authoritarian leaders are not equally restrained, violent conflict with democracies is more frequent, and in this case both democracies and nondemocracies might initiate violence for fear of a surprise attack inflicted by the other.

Furthermore, Russett (1993) noted that the structural and institutional constraints on democracies do not prevent them from responding to sudden attacks by using emergency powers or even strike preemptively during crisis. An example of the two different types of violence used by a democracy in recent history is the war in Afghanistan in October 2001 as an immediate emergency response by the U.S. to destroy al Qaeda following the sudden attacks of September 11, while the war in Iraq in 2003 represented a preventive strike against an authoritarian state to destroy its alleged WMDs which the U.S. perceived as a threat.

To conclude, I believe Kenneth Waltz understanding of international organizations and how they work represent a more convincing depiction of the international system, while Keohane’s theory is needed to reform that system. The actions of the United Nations, the largest international regime, are constrained by the capabilities of only five permanent members of its Security Council who has the veto power—the UN cannot act without the support and the approval of these five states.

Although democratic peace theory seems to be the most promising in promoting international cooperation, however, one of the assumptions I find problematic in this theory is that it considered wars against authoritarian states both expected and legitimate, and consequently divide the world into a zone of peace, which include democracies, and zone of war which includes authoritarian states. This classification is troubling because during war there will be no distinction between authoritarian regimes and the people in these states who are mostly governed against their will and who will more likely pay the price of any given conflict. I believe promoting democracy in these countries and pressuring these regimes to reform will empower the people who live under authoritarian regimes to rise up against their leaders and demand freedom and democracy.

"Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country?" General Colin Powell

The most important thing endorsed by Colin Powell today was an America that's worth leading and worth fighting for, an America that encapsulates the idea of what some might call a "more perfect union." To that end, Powell invoked a picture to illustrate his point.

"Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country? The answer is no. That's not America. Is there something wrong with a seven-year-old Muslim-American kid believing he or she could be president? Yet I have heard senior members of my own party drop the suggestion that he is a Muslim and might have an association with terrorists. This is not the way we should be doing it in America.

I feel particularly strong about this because of a picture I saw in a magazine. It was a photo essay about troops who were serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. And one picture at the tail end of this photo essay, was of a mother at Arlington Cemetery and she had her head on the headstone of her son's grave. And as the picture focused in, you could see the writing on the headstone, and it gave his awards - Purple Heart, Bronze Star - showed that he died in Iraq, gave his date of birth, date of death, he was 20 years old. And then at the very top of the head stone, it didn't have a Christian cross. It didn't have a Star of David. It has a crescent and star of the Islamic faith.

And his name was Kareem Rashad Sultan Khan. And he was an American. He was born in New Jersey. He was fourteen years old at the time of 9/11, and he waited until he could serve his country and he gave his life."

This is the picture of Elsheba Khan, taken by Platon for the New Yorker:So, yeah. Sometimes, America does benefit when we share our wealth with one another. And some people, in fact, do have it harder than Joe The Plumber.

stumble digg reddit del.ico.us news trust mixx.com October 19, 2008 03:29 PM

Critiquing classical realism and neo-realism

Classical realism has been at the heart of the study of world politics in the United States since it was introduced in 1948 by Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations—realist international theory (Doyle et al, 1997). It was considered natural response to the failure of liberalism to maintain world peace when the WWII erupted.

Neorealist or structural realism developed by Kenneth Waltz in 1979, came as a response by realists to the new forces represented by the emergence of globalization and acceleration of states interdependence in the 1970s, and the renewal of the cold war in the 1980s. Structural realism was able to address some of the limitations of classical realism. However, it failed in predicting and explaining the end of cold-war and the collapse of Soviet Union in 1989 since it omitted domestic politics from its system structure which became a major flaw in Neorealism.

First realists like Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, laid out the foundations of classical realism. Thucydides placed human beings at the heart of his analysis by incorporating the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy and the influence of individuals on decisions of state. Machiavelli emphasized on power at the center of international relations. Hobbes added another dimension to realism by making it a state-centric, where all international relations revolve around the state.

In 1948, Hans Morgenthau summarized his contemporary classical realism theory with six principles which included the three basic principles mentioned above—the influence of human nature on politics, power defined as interest, and the centrality of state –in addition, he then further elaborated on the relationship between politics and morality.

Morgenthau stated that there is natural tension between politics and morality, and that morality cannot be permitted to obstruct the successful pursuit of interest; although he admitted the importance of the moral significance of political action (Kauffman et al, pp154). His justification is that the definition of what is considered to be moral can vary from one state or individual to the other, instead he wanted both individuals and states to “ judge political action by universal moral principles” but only after being filtered through the circumstances of time and place (pp.154) In other words, political realism does not require indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible based on specific time and circumstances, and the interest of the state.

Morgenthau then concludes by stating that political realism maintains the autonomy of the political sphere by defining interest as power. He argued that if each state pursues its respective interest in terms of power, justice will be served in dual sense—which means that states will be mindful of other states pursuing their interests as each state pursues its own interest (Kauffman et al, pp. 154-155)

As I previously alluded to; realists strongly believe in the centrality of the nation-state in their international political structure. They recognize the importance and relevance of transnational organizations to international relations; however, they believe that state has the ultimate authority and that no state should pass on this authority to any foreign entity.

Another realists’ core assumption is that the international system characterized by an anarchy which shapes the state behavior. Anarchy makes each state always concerned about its own survival and in a constant state of apprehension of being attacked or its interests threatened by another state especially if the latter is seeking to strengthen its power. Therefore, traditional realists like Morgenthau believe that the state must rely on its own power, especially military power, to protect its interests.

Moreover, classical realism looks at the state as a rational and autonomous actor. Realists expand the state autonomy to not only include autonomy from international organizations but also sufficient autonomy from their national societies to recognize and pursue the interests of the nation as a whole. This domestic coherent attitude allows them to “exercise control over different national organizations to direct and control government actions in such a way as to implement the decisionmakers’ strategies” (Doyle et al, pp.166).

In their pursuit of domestic autonomy, realists believe they ought to be unconstrained by civil society preferences or opinions, which I believe creates dilemma. In a democratic society, the government is elected to represent the people and has to conform to their will and choice. How can realist choose to ignore national organizations and the civil society institutions which in many cases reflect and express the public opinion?

The realist system makes power the central, organizing principle of the system. States within this system are trying to remain in some kind of equilibrium despite the constant power maximizing behavior of all states.

Structural realism subscribes to three main conceptual elements as classical realism: Statism, Survival, and Self-help. Structural realism, however, overcame a number of limitations of classical realism by focusing on the distribution of power in the international system and by exploring how the system’s overall structure defined in terms of distribution of power, influences the political outcomes.

Neorealists acknowledge the increasing importance of interdependence and the influence of global economy on world politics, but they argue the each state’s policies continued to be determined by a desire to maximize its relative power, mainly military power (Week four lecture). However, neorealists believe that states need power to achieve security and that power in itself is not the goal. Realists on the other hand see state maximizing power is an end in itself.
Waltz views the system of international relations as a number of interacting units representing states, and refers to the structure as the mechanism through which these units are arranged in relation to each other. By understanding where a state is located in the structure it is possible not only to explain state behavior but also to predict it, although we cannot know with certainty what state will do (Kauffman et al, pp.296)

Unlike classical realism, structural realism does not include consideration of the effects of the policies and behavior of states on international politics. Instead, it considers the outcomes of a state policies depend mainly on the variation of the structure within which their actions occur (Neorealism: confusions and criticism, pp.3). Therefore, by trying to understand the state-level interaction, waltz omitted everything else that is not part of this process, including the state’s history, culture, ideology, political institutions or economic organizations, although he did not deny their importance

Waltz then later clarified that since “capability” is an attribute of the state, we cannot include it in the definition of the structure which must leave aside any characteristics of the states including their behavior and interactions. However, the “distribution capabilities” among the state units across the structure is an attribute of the system.

Furthermore, unlike the domestic political structures which are centralized and hierarchic; the ordering principles in the international-political structures are decentralized and anarchic. State units are alike in terms of sovereignty, and coordinate among each other with none is entitled to command.

Another fundamental concept in Neorealism is the polarity of the international system. Neorealists believe that a world with two superpowers has tendency for peace more than a world with only one superpower or multi-powers. The number of great powers affects the stability of the structure—bipolar system is more stable than multi-polar one because it provides clarity and predictability. They keep watch on each other, can divide the world between themselves and suppress smaller conflicts. So, alliances were not meant only to deter each other but to control states within each league. With multi-polarity, defections are a problem and might threaten the members of that alliance.

However, Neorealism argues that for liberal economy, not international economy, to survive and flourishes it requires a hegemon dominating power to maintain the rules and prevent other emerging powers from disturbing its stability. This Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) has been one of themes of Neorealism.

To conclude, both classical and structural realism argue that the most important actors in world politics are nation-states; these states are autonomous and rational. It assumes that the system of interacting states is characterized by anarchy, that domestic politics has a minimal effect on states’ foreign policies, and that the behavior of each state is affected significantly by the pursuit of power.

Neorealism differs from realism in two fundamental ways. First, Neorealism believes that states are more interested in security than power, and that states might forego power if it will undermine their security. Second, Neorealism argues that the polarity of the international system influence the state behavior. However, the validity of Neorealism was questioned when it failed to predict and explain the end of cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union. By ignoring the domestic changes that took place inside the USSR, neorealists have missed the opportunity to predict and understand the changes in that state behavior.

The Middle East is another area where domestic turmoil and cultural complexities significantly alter the state behavior, its choices and political-military alliances, which in turn represent a challenge to the neorealists’ view of world politics. The War in Iraq and the pre-war expectations as to how the Iraqi people would welcome an American invasion demonstrated a major flaw in our realist understanding of how culture and religion can play an essential role in the state behavior and its people. Our strategies in dealing with Iran and the assumption that Iranian military would crumple similar to what happened in Iraq in face of American superpower in any given military confrontation are overlooking the fundamental differences between the theocracy-based Iranian military ideology and the secular authoritarian nature of former Iraqi regime

Situational ethics

Although Classical Realism and Machiavelli do not require indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but they condone hypocrisy and double standards when dealing with domestic and foreign policy issues. Machiavelli attempts to rationalize this hypocrisy by calling it a distinction between what’s desirable and what’s possible, or as Lincoln contends “distinguishing between official duty in terms of national interest and personal wish in terms of one’s moral values and political principles realized throughout the world” (Kauffman et al, pp. 149)

This double standard approach and the disregard to the less powerful nations’ political and economic interests seem to have characterized the U.S. foreign policy during the last several decades, leading to rise in Anti-Americanism, which in turn provided Islamic fanatics with the fuel they needed to inflict terror and destruction upon the U.S. and promote their ideology of hate across the Muslim world.

After 9/11, U.S. seemed to realize that it has to be mindful of the popular demands for freedom, justice and democracy dominating the world which the U.S. itself championed, and it can no longer apply the same Machiavellian standards in dealing with domestic and foreign affairs in an era of globalization and interconnectedness.

In June 20 of 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave a historic speech at the American University in Cairo that seemed to have put an end to “situational ethics” and marked a major U.S. policy shift from political realism to neo-liberalism when she declared that “For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East -- and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people”

Unfortunately, the hopes for more liberal foreign policy faded away after the rise of political Islam on the wings of democracy, which prompted the U.S. to revert back to its realist views and pursuit stability and security at the expense of democracy by continuing to support authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.

Role of religion in politics and public life

Recent study by the Pew research center indicates the falling support among Americans for the role of religion in politics and draws a distinction between secular Europe and religions America. There are two separate issues; the role of religion in public life, and the role of religion in politics.

In my previous post, I did not suggest that most Americans believe religion should have a bigger role in politics, because clearly that is not what the public opinion is heading, according to Pew forum. My argument was that among the majority of individuals across the world, religion is gradually taking bigger role in their public life. By majority, I meant most of people in Asia and the Middle East who represent more than two thirds of the world population. My statement was a reflection of opinions and subjective observations circulating in foreign literature, however, I could not find objective data to support it, and it is subject to scrutiny.

Furthermore, on the issue of role of religion in public life most recent data show that Americans are equally divided, although the rise of religious issues to the center of debate in the U.S. is an indication of what could be an impending shift in the public opinion in favor of more assertive role for religion. Issues like stem cell research, abortion, gay marriage, school prayers and the display of the Ten Commitments on government property, are all becoming of huge public interest that is even reshaping our political discourse.

Nonetheless, we ought to define exactly what do we mean by “religion” when we ask these questions. If by religion we mean invoking the scriptural interpretations of the Bible and sectarian religious ideology into political life, then I believe that would be a violation of the Bill of Rights which declared that “the legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” which was later expressed by Thomas Jefferson in 1785 in his infamous “wall of separation between church and state. However, if by “religion” we mean the moral values and traditions that strengthen the society social fabric and the commitment to family and equitable justice, then I believe that current trend in the U.S public opinion favor that role by religion.

Should the U.S. be contained or balanced?

Despite of its unrivaled power after the World War II and then the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the United States has not only used its power responsibly but also helped create and participate in a range of international institutions that constrained its actions. The United States also introduced the fundamental liberal principles into the rules and regulations of the international society including democracy, global free trade, liberty and equality (Balyis et al pp. 116-117).

However, the U.S invasion of Iraq and the war on terror have raised concerns throughout the world about what is considered an unrestrained use of power by the United States, seen as a result of disturbance in the balance of power after the collapse of the USSR.

Liberals in general believe that U.S. power should be restrained and embedded into the international system as the most effective and acceptable way of exercising global hegemony. Most realists believe that other great powers would in time emerge to the balance the United States (Balyis et al, pp 76)

In his fascinating book “The Post-American World”, Fareed Zakaria explains eloquently that the real challenge for the future of American power is not its own decline but rather the rise of the rest. Zakaria predicts the power of the U.S. will ultimately be balanced by new rising nations and that the U.S. will face a choice of whether it stabilizes the world order by accepting a world with a diversity of voices and viewpoints. Or it can watch the world it helped to build over last 60 years to be slowly torn apart by greater nationalism, diffusion, and disintegration.

The integration of worldwide economy and the intensifying interdependence have made it almost impossible for a single country to stall the emergence of new political actors and regaining the balance of power. Baylis et al explain how countries like Britain in 1992 was forced to abandon its economic strategies to adjust to new global market realities, adding that no government even the most powerful has the resources to resist sustained speculations against its currency and thereby the credibility of its economic policy. (Balyis et al, pp. 16)

Unlike the downfall of the British superpower trigged by its economic failures, the largest challenges facing the U.S. and seem to be undermining its hegemony are political rather than economic. Fareed Zakaria explains that although the economic problems in the U.S. today are real, but different policies can quickly put the economy back on track, however, the U.S. political system is dysfunctional and unable to make simple reforms that can secure the country’s future. He argues that Washington seems largely unaware of the new world rising around it and shows few signs of being able to reorient its policies for the new age (The Post-American World, Fareed Zakaria)

In another word, and as Morgenthau puts it—the structure of the international relations in U.S foreign policy is irrelevant to the reality of international politics. The incompatibility between both will cause unmanageability of international relations and anarchy (Kauffman et al, pp. 148-149)

Therefore, I do not think the U.S. has a choice whether to allow other balancing powers to take its place at the helm, and should not resist it. A world in which the United States takes up less space, but is one in which the American ideas and ideals are overwhelmingly dominant, is a lot more stable than a world in which the U.S. is a superpower but Anti-Americanism is fueling hate and violence and making America less secure.

Muslim Brotherhood wants “scientific conference” before deciding to stand up against terrorism!

The chief of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) political bureau, Dr. Mohamed Morsi issued a statement posted on the MB official English website, Ikhwanweb, on the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Dr. Morsi accused the U.S. of “irrational behavior” and rushing to wars before any “meaningful probe into the attacks” and adding that the MB “demanded fair trial for the 9/11 suspects and the issuance of a detailed scientific report about the attacks, but the U.S. administration did not respond till now”

The U.S. government has independently investigated the events leading to the 9/11 and the 9/11 commission report was released on November 2004 and took over two years to prepare. The report was issued by the National Commission on Terrorism Attacks Upon the US. The commission interviewed over 1200 people in 10 countries and reviewed over a half million pages of documents before it issues its final report.

As far as “fair trial” I believe Khaled Sheikh Mohamed and Ramzi bin al Shibh are currently on trial in U.S. courts and have attorneys appointed to defend their case paid for by taxpayers money!. I don’t know of any Islamic country that would put those who admittedly killed nearly 3000 of its innocent citizens on trial—their most likely fate would have been public beheading without trial.

The MB leader also suggested that the U.S holds “huge scientific conference” to analyze the 9/11 attacks, and should this happen the MB “will stand firmly against whoever committed this horrific crimes against innocent civilians” according to the website, which suggests that MB has not done that so far!

It is interesting how Dr. Morsi used the word “terrorism” only when describing the U.S. actions as “it [U.S.] assaulted entire nations and peoples without any evidence”. However, he stopped short from calling the 9/11 attacks terrorism—describing it as “horrific crimes”

MB did not of course forget to add its usual rhetoric to the statement by condemning the “zionist lobby” and its influence on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, which he warned will increase the anti-American sentiments and will harm the American people and spread hatred against them!

The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest political movements in the Islamic world that operates within religious framework. In Egypt, the MB enjoys wide support and recently won 20% of parliament seats representing the biggest opposition bloc in parliament.

Globalization and imperialism

Critics of contemporary globalization, mainly Marxists theorists, argue it is latest phase of Western imperialism and it is a tool used by the West to impose new form of hegemony disguised in economic, humanitarian and democratization projects to control the wealth and resources of the less advantaged countries outside a central triad (U.S., Western Europe, and Japan) which comprises only %20 of the world population but benefited the most from a system where globalization only applies to the developed world, as Balyis et al argue

Moreover, Samir Amin in 2001 contends that the ideological discourse of this new phase of imperialism is now founded on a “duty to intervene” that is supposedly justified by the defense of “democracy” the “rights of peoples” and “humanitarianism” but it is designed to ensure the West’s absolute hegemony by a show of military might that will consolidate behind it all the other partners in the triad (Samir Amin: Imperialism and globalization, Independent Socialist Magazine, Jun2001, Vol. 53, Issue 2, pp.10)

Alexander Anievas adds that the world since September 11 is witnessing return to an era of “inter-imperialist rivalries” especially after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq (Cambridge Review of International Affairs, volume 19, June 2006)

However, Ray Kiely in 2006 explains that the current era is one of greater openness and international integration than the pre-1914 era, and there is far greater cooperation between the core capitalist states, as well as sovereign states in the developing world (United States hegemony and globalization: what role for theories of imperialism?, Cambridge review, June 2006)

Those who consider globalization a triumph for the Western, market-led values across the world stop could not explain the economic success that some national economies in Asia like Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore and Korea—known as Tigers’ of Asia—have had but meanwhile rejecting Western values.

Baylis et al argue that if these continue to follow their path towards modernization and economic prosperity while withstanding complete cultural take over by the West, then we must anticipate future disputes between “Western” and “Asian” values over issues like human rights, gender, and religion (Balyis et al, pp. 11)

To what extent can certain countries preserve their cultural identity, religious traditions and heritage in face of an enormous and merciless global economy and the tsunami of new ideas, values and technologies that fascinated people around the world— especially conservative nations across the Middle East and Asia—but meanwhile triggered fears of an imminent “clash of civilization” along geo-cultural fault lines as described by Huntington in 1996.

The September 11 attacks and the “Tigers of Asia” in addition to United Arab of Emirates, represent two competing examples of how the non-Western world might respond to globalization. While some countries and cultures were able to achieve economic success and progress and be part of global economy while adhering to its values and preserving its identity, on the other hand some of those in the Muslim world who rejected globalization as the latest stage of Western imperialism and hegemony undertook the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon which they considered the symbols of Western power and hegemony.

Mehdi Parvizi Amineh argues in 2007 that Huntington’s actual fault lines are socio-economic not geo-cultural, and that conflicts in today’s world do not take place between cultures but within them. Those societies that are more successful in adapting to the challenges of modernity show a relatively stronger capacity to cope with the growing complexity of political and cultural pluralism (The challenges of modernity: the case of political Islam, PGDT 6 (2007).

Democracy Vs. Apathy

We often talk about the U.S. backtracking on democracy promotion in the Middle East and its abandoning of reformers in the region, however, it remains unclear to me as to what precisely Egyptians would like the U.S to do to help bring democracy to their country. Quite frankly, I don’t think Egyptians themselves have a clear answer to that question.

Ask any member of the opposition whether Islamist, liberal or leftist about U.S. role and they will immediately declare their rejection of any meddling by the U.S. in Egypt’s internal affairs, even refusing any pressure on the Egyptian regime from nationalist stand point. On the other hand, when the U.S. decide not to intervene in Egypt’s domestic affairs the same opposition cries out loud for its alleged backtracking on democracy and keeping blind eye the Egyptian government practices.

The truth of the matter is that Egyptians themselves are to be blamed for the crisis their country is facing right now mainly because of their political apathy and their worship of their rulers, something Egyptians are known for since the ancient days of the Pharos. Throughout history Egyptians have never revolted against their rulers and will never do no matter how corrupt and unjust they can get. It is the exactly the same overly forgiving , laid back, unconfrontational and apathetic nature of Egyptians that stands today a major obstacle in their way to attain freedom and democracy.

In a country that 60% of its people are illiterate and more than 45% earn less than $2 per day, it is almost impossible to mobilize them for the sake of democracy or human rights- they could care less. The average Egyptian is struggling to put bread on the table for his/her children and they can be beaten day and night by their heavy handed police forces and will not move a finger in protest. They’re prone to fear the government- typical feeling for those who are living in police state.

All the voices of reform you listed- journalists, moderate Islamists, judges, liberal opposition, bloggers, constitute small portion of the patriotic and educated elite and who are unable, so far, to mobilize the masses because simply politics is not the center of their attention- they are struggling to make living.
What does the U.S. have to do with this? And why should we get involved if the people themselves prefer the status quo!

When thousands of the people in Ukraine (population of 48 millions) took to the streets in 2004 protesting against their corrupt government forcing it to resign in what became known as the “Orange revolution” they did it by themselves and did not sit around waiting for the U.S. to rescue them.

I find it hard to believe that the 2 Billion dollars the U.S. give to Egypt in aid every year is the main reason responsible for keeping the Egyptian regime in power against the will of its own people. If Egyptians rise up against tyranny and corruption and demand change and democracy the U.S. will never object or intervene to save the regime or suppress the people.
Egyptians themselves are confused, divided and unwilling to change, so why bother!

Diplomacy discussions, week 1 & 2

Are International Relations (IR) a science or an art?

I believe that contemporary international relations (relations between nation-states) are indeed an art crafted based on evidence that is derived from science; therefore International relations ought to be considered both an art and science. The application of evidence-based scientific prescriptive formulas setting forth ways of how states should behave requires an art that puts into perspective the cultural, religious and societal differences among nation-states and civilizations when deciding which “color to paint to world politics with”, as phrased by Baylis et al pp.4

The world has endured major transformations throughout the twentieth century which witnessed two global industrialized wars, decolonization of European empires, and the end of the cold war. The traditional philosophical theories of world politics seemed inadequate to better explain and deal with the challenges and intellectual complexities of a new globalized world.

Thus, a new approach to international relations has emerged utilizing to a greater extent the comparative study of quantitative data and reinforced by the rise of analytical and quantitative research concepts, models and methods in order to look for pattern of behavior and for probabilities that certain behavior would occur (Russett & Starr, pp 17-18)

What is the value of studying International Relations from a theoritical perspective?

Studying International Relations (IR) from theoretical perspective enables us to understand how a complex world works and helps us determine which things matter and which don’t when dealing with the dynamic and ambiguous nature of the post-Cold-War international environment.

In their chapter “How do we think about world politics” Russett & Starr defines theory as an intellectual tool that provides us with a way to organize the complexity of the world and order facts into data (Kauffman et al, pp 19). Similarly, Smith defines theory as a kind of simplifying device that allows us to decide which facts matter and which do not (Balyis et al, pp.4)

Yet, many scholars doubt the ability of the four dominant theories in IR to meet challenges and the dynamics that underline global politics. Therefore, a fifth debate has emerged intersecting traditional theories with the Complexity Theory (CT) which found its way into social science soon after its development in the natural science (Emilian Kavalski: Emergence of complex international relations theory. Cambridge Review, Sept. 2007, pp 437). Retrieved [September 8, 2008], [EBSCO host, Norwich]

Being theoretical means to be able to describe our world and explain policy decisions we make, as well as having the ability to predict events and prescribe solutions for the world’s challenges in a systematic fashion, as Kauffman et al explain in their analysis of the four primary tools of IR to measure against events (Kauffman et al, pp.1-2)

Do you agree with Rosenau that “to think theoretically one must be constantly ready to be proven wrong.”

Yes, I do agree with Rosenau that when thinking theoretically one must be constantly ready to be proven wrong. Since theory is a science—all relevant data pertaining to the theory in question including hypotheses, research methods and analysis must be laid out and scrutinized in order to determine the validity of its conclusions. Critiquing a theory and testing its hypothesis in systematic approach will uncover any possible flaws that might prove it to be wrong; such process highlights the hallmark of science.

Russet & Starr also explain that unlike clinical or laboratory experiments, in social science we simply cannot conduct a real-life experiment, therefore we depend on “thinking experiment” based on rigorous empirical data on the case we are discussing (Kauffman et al, pp.23). One major challenge is the complexity of human behavior and individual relations within a society, with many different factors influencing the probabilities of an event, and our knowledge of these complex phenomena is still so imperfect (Kauffman et al, pp. 21)

This complexity could be paramount when policy makers have to make decisions dealing with unfamiliar cultures where values, traditions, religion and history have to be taken into perspective. A vivid example is when the U.S invaded Iraq in 2003 and hypnotized that Iraqis would welcome U.S soldiers who came to topple Saddam Hussein and his authoritarian regime. The next thing we know is an insurgency that dramatically changed the war tactics and expectations. War strategists failed to carefully examine and recognize the complexity of Iraqi society where religious teachings and tribal values prohibiting aiding foreign occupation transcend political disagreements.

How is the state power measured?

According to David Armstrong, in modern international society, state power lies in its ability to establish centralized and efficient military power, in addition to other elements which include professional diplomatic service and an ability to manipulate the balance of power (Balyis, et al (Ed.), 5th ed., pp.44)

Although Armstrong emphasizes the state political power, I believe that in today’s world where globalization is the main international actor, a state power is more inclusive and can be mainly measured by the strength of its national economy and its ability to maintain its sovereignty and identity while competing in an open and free market. State power also can be measured by the abundance of its natural resources, the coherence of its social structure, and the level of freedom and equality its citizens enjoy.

Stopford and Strange in 1991 echoed similar meaning when they concluded that states were manifestly less interested in the acquisition of territory than in the pursuit of wealth for the national economy: "national choices of industrial policy and efficiency in economic management are beginning to override choices of foreign or defense policy as the primary influences on how resources are allocated" (Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (2000, March). Gobal economy and the decline of state power. Working paper. pp.4) Retrieved [September, 3, 2008) from [Ciao]

Measuring the power of the state by its ability to serve its best interests and resorting to the carrot and stick policies in dealing with other nation-states can be viewed as selfish, and imply a form of state supremacy which can be best described as a realist view of world politics (more accurately for realists international politics), which will eventually lead to struggle for power between states each trying to maximize their national interests, according to Balyis et al, pp. 5
Balyis also argue within this realist scheme, states must ultimately rely on its own military resources to achieve their ends and the potential for conflict is ever present.

Moreover, the definition of what exactly represent a national interest can vary from one political party to the other, and therefore the measure of the state power can be subjective based on which party is in power.

Most of the problems that we are encountering in the world today are caused by the desire and active pursuit of states to influence others. And if we expand this statement by including non-state actors like organizations and groups, we will actually get to the cause of the core problems the world is facing today ranging from wars to terrorism and their repercussions on global economy.

States should not attempt to influence others whether utilizing their soft or hard power, rather focus on achieving prosperity to its citizens and make a good example for other states to follow if they themselves deem suitable based on their cultural and religious values.

Huntington’s assumption in 1996 that Western and non-Western values are simply incompatible is true to a large extent especially when it comes to social values and religious beliefs, much as Christianity and Islam interacted in the Middle Ages. Huntington’s warning of an imminent clash civilization could be understood based on the desire by one culture to influence the other.

Hurrell argues the need to develop globally institutionalized political process in which norms and rules can be negotiated on the basis of dialogue and consent, rather than simply imposed by the most powerful (Balyis et al, pp. 50-51)

Is globalization an actor, which implies that it can accomplish things? Or is it a condition that has an effect?

Globalization is a much disputed term in itself, however analysts at least agree that it describes a one-world system where all actors have to play by the same economic rules. (Balyes et al pp. 75). Prahalad in 2007 described globalization like gravity: there is no point denying its existence. So, although we still cannot agree on what exactly that can best define globalization, but we have seen its impact on humankind and its accomplishments in the twentieth century.

Isn't the abundance of natural resources one of the strengths of a state, more like capital that can be put to good use during financial hardships than a true measure of power? For the coherence of social structure and level of freedom and equality of its citizens, I think those are actually things that are measures of a country's development, rather than the power they can bring to bear on a given situation. Although resources, development, freedom and equality are important, how does a state accomplish its international goals?

I agree that the abundance of natural resources is one of the strengths of a state, and I also agree with her that the coherence of its social structure and the level of freedom and equality of its citizens could be a measure of a country’s development. However, I consider that a nation’s economic strength and its social and political development are indeed some of the aspects of its power, and they’re things that we should be able to use to measure a state power.

I believe that a powerful state is the one that has strong economy, stable political environment, a free society, strong social structure and a powerful military power that can deter the enemies of the state from threatening its prosperity. This argument actually raises a fundamental question of how do we actually define state power?

What is globalization? How does it combine elements of politics, economics, culture, society, and more besides? What does it mean to speak of the "globalization of world politics"?

Globalization simply means a “shrinking world”. The massive advances in global communications, transport and informatics technologies over the past several decades have created worldwide interconnectedness causing transnational spread of ideas, cultures and information in an accelerating pace. The result is a world that became a single social space with global tendency evident in all sectors including economic, military, legal, ecological, cultural and social aspects (Balyis et al, pp. 16-21)

However, globalization is also complex process; it is asymmetrical (not uniformly experienced across all regions), and multidimensional (patterns of economic and cultural globalizations are not identical) (Balyis et al, pp22)

Globalization represents a conceptual shift in the way we think about global politics. It transformed politics from the state-centric geopolitics and the struggle for power to an era where states are becoming embedded in an overlapping web of a Global Governing Complex within which interests are articulated, decisions are made and policies are conducted through transnational political process (Balyis et al, pp24-25)

Within this global governance complex civil society or private and non-governmental agencies have become increasingly influential in the formulation and implementation of global public policy, and in some cases exercising political power across national boundaries and undermining the state authority (Balyis et al, pp.26-27). Thus, contemporary globalization although did not abolish but has shaken and transformed the very basic covenants of the Westphalian constitution (territoriality, state sovereignty and autonomy) which established the legal basis of modern statehood (Balyis et al, pp. 23-24)