Why is terrorism hard to define?

Bruce Hoffman in 2006 argued that terrorism is so difficult to define mainly because “the meaning of the term has changed so frequently over the past two decades” (p. 3). Furthermore, Jenkins contended that terrorism should be defined “by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause” (p. 25).

In his summary of the changing nature of terrorism, Bruce Hoffman explained that until the 19th century, religion provided the only justification of terrorism (p. 84). He added that the emergence of the notions of nationalism and self-determination at the beginning of 19th century, and the growing popularity of radical political thought embracing Marxist ideology completed the transformation of terrorism from a mostly religious to predominately secular phenomenon. According to Hoffman, this process of “secularization” was given fresh impetus by the anticolonical/national liberation movements that arose after the Second World War to challenge continued Western rule in Asia, the ME, and Africa and subsequently exerted so profound an influence on ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideological terrorist organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s (p. 84)

Going back to the French Revolution, Hoffman explained that “terrorism”-or régime de la terreur- was first used to refer to “revolutionary or antigovernmental activity undertaken by nonstate or subnational entities, and an instrument of governance wielded by the recently established revolutionary state” (p. 3). Then the meaning of terrorism changed at the end of the French Revolution to be associated with “the abuse of office and power—with overt criminal implications”, when the French executed those who abused their power and resorted to régime de la terreur to eliminate political opponents (p. 4)

According to Hoffman, the French Revolution led to the spread of antimonarchical sentiment elsewhere in Europe during a period of time when nationalism and Industrial Revolution have generated massive socioeconomic changes, and hence a new era of terrorism emerged; terrorism based on ideology (p. 5). Pisacane’s dictum of “propaganda by deed” became the inspiration for new form of revolutionary antimonarchical terrorist movements, which dominated the nineteenth’s century, based on new “universalist” ideologies such as communism/Marxism (p. 5). Pisacane wrote “ideas result from deeds, not the latter from the former, and the people will not be free when they’re educated, but educated when they’re free” (p. 5). He argued that violence was necessary not only to draw attention to, or generate publicity for, a cause, but also to inform, educate, and ultimately rally the masses behind the evolution (p. 5). The Russian Narodnaya Volya, or People’s Will in 1878; the Anarchist International, or Black International in London; the Fenian Brotherhood in 1858; the Irish Clan na Gael in 1873; and the Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in 1880s, all have had revolutionary connotations and have been influenced by the Pisacane dictum (p. 11)

By the 1930s, the meaning of terrorism changed again to become more internal, where it became “used less to refer to revolutionary movements and violence directed governments and their leaders and more to describe the practices of mass repression employed by totalitarian states and their dictatorial leaders against their own citizens”( p. 14), a term Hoffman identified as “terror” (p. 16). Hoffman suggested that terror and terrorism are two distinctive terms—terror is described as “ state-sanctioned or ordered acts of internal political violence directed mostly against domestic populations—that is, rule by violence and intimidation by those already in power against their own citizenry”, whereas terrorism is committed by nonstate actors, (Hoffman, pp. 15-16). Examples of terror committed by states are the Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Stalinist Russia (p. 14)

Hoffman’s distinction between terror and terrorism would mean that policy-makers should approach and handle them differently. While terrorism committed by nonstate actors-groups or individuals- is dealt with through countermeasures that may involve military operations across state borders, terror committed by states against its own citizenry is considered a domestic or internal issue that might not invite the same international collective response. For example, several autocratic and authoritarian regimes in the Third World continue to use terror against political opponents and engage in systematic campaign of intimidation, but yet are not dealt with the same way as those groups or entities that practice terrorism. Therefore, in that regards, policy-makers do make distinction between terror and terrorism and that difference is reflected in their policies

Following WWII, Hoffman argued that terrorism regained its revolutionary connotations with which it is most commonly associated today with contemporary terrorism (p. 16). He added that terrorism was used to refer to the violent revolts by “the various indigenous nationalist/anticolonialist groups that emerged in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East during the late 1940s and 1950s to oppose continued European rule” and waging “wars of liberation” (p. 16). Although such movements in Israel, Kenya, Cyprus and Algeria were labeled as “terrorist” groups, many newly independent Third World countries, supported by communist-bloc states, argued that any movement that fought against “colonial” oppression and/or Western domination should not be described as “terrorist” but instead deemed to be “freedom fighters”, according to Hoffman (p.16).

In the 1960s and 1970s, the term terrorism continued to be viewed within its revolutionary contexts but expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist groups outside the colonial framework, for example the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), (p. 16)

The PLO, established in 1946, has significantly contributed to transform terrorism into a new era of internationalization by being the first terrorist group to send its members across international borders to attack symbolic targets of its enemy state, Israel (Hoffman, pp. 63-64). The 1968, hijacking of an Israeli El Al flight en route from Rome to Tel Aviv by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre of Israeli athletes by the PLO’s Black September Organization (BSO), have achieved significant successes for the Palestinian cause, by PLO accounts, which exceeded what diplomats, lobbyists and humanitarian workers have tried to do to (Hoffman, p. 70). Consequently, Israel was forced to negotiate with PLO terrorists, creating a de facto recognition and major media events (p. 64). The incidents also represented a precedent where civilians were targeted to in order to attract worldwide attention to their cause (p. 64). Moreover, PLO ability to accumulate capital wealth (around $600 million of annual income flow) was unprecedented, mainly because the unlimited support it enjoyed from petrodollar rich Arab states and masses in the Muslim world in general.

The internationalization of Palestinian cause through acts of terror and the success it achieved, has served a model for other ethno-nationalist movements to follow. Groups such as the Armenian ASALA, the Indonesian Free South Moluccan Organization, and the Kurdish PKK attempted to follow the PLO model of international terrorism but with limited success (p. 78).

In the 1980s, and as repercussion of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, terrorism restored its religious face and became “a calculated means to destabilize the West as part of a vast global conspiracy” (Hoffman, p.17). According to Hoffman, in the1980, the first “modern” religious terrorist groups appeared, but there were only 2 out of 64 terrorist groups active in 1980 that could be classified as predominately religious in character and motivation: the Iranian-backed Shi’a organization al-Dawa and the Committee for Safeguarding the Islamic Revolution (p. 85). In 1992, the number of religious terrorist groups had increased from 2 to 11 and expanded to embrace major world religions other than Islam, as well as various obscure religious sects and cults (p. 85). As the number of religious terrorist groups was increasing, the number of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups declined. Moreover, the post Iranian Revolution era witnessed the emergence of state-sponsored terrorism, whereby weaker regimes in Iran, Libya, Iraq, and Syria became actively involved in sponsoring terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, as way to inflict harm on strong rival countries without running the risk of seeking direct confrontation (p. 85)

Therefore, as Hoffman has shown the changing nature of terrorism through his historical analysis, he then admitted that “if we cannot define terrorism, then we can at least usefully distinguish it from other types of violence and identify the characteristic that make terrorism the distinct phenomenon of political violence that it is” (p. 34). He concluded it is that distinction between terrorism and other forms of “crime and irregular warfare”, which can help us understand the meaning of terrorism, and consequently attempt to define it (p. 40) . One significant distinction that Hoffman was keen to make is between terrorists, guerrilla fighters, and criminals. According to Hoffman, guerilla warfare, although share the same tactics as terrorism, “refers to numerically larger group of armed individuals, who operates a military unity, attack enemy military forces [hit -and -run style], and seize and hold territory, while exercising some form of sovereignty or control over a defined geographical area and its population” (p. 35). As implied by Hoffman, it seems that the distinction between guerilla warfare and modern terrorism is important because while the latter is condemned the former can be considered legitimate in certain cases such as fighting a foreign occupation or to attain independence. However, an overlap does exist between the two (p. 36)

Moreover, the distinction between terrorism and guerilla warfare can have far reached implications on foreign policies. For example, while a country might efuse to negotiate or deal with terrorists, it might find it strategically acceptable to negotiate with insurgents who stage guerrilla-like hit-and –run operations against its soldiers in attempt to dissuade them from violence

Another area where the distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare can have implications of policies is the decision by governments whether or not to engage these groups either in dialogue or to have diplomatic relations with them if they reach power in their countries. For example, the U.S. categorized Hamas’ militants as terrorists—not freedom fighters, guerilla fighters or insurgents—and therefore, the US refuses to recognize or deal with Palestinian government that include members of Hamas, imposed economic blockade on Gaza and prosecuted US citizens who contributed money to any Hamas entity , as was in the case of the Holy Land Foundation trial.

Moreover, Hoffman found that a distinction between terrorists and criminals can be helpful to further demarcate the boundaries of terrorism. While terrorists, especially religious terrorism, tend to rationalize their violence based on premeditated ideology, criminals, Hoffman argued, use violence to achieve personal gains and based on personal motivations. Therefore, violence in crimes is not designed or intended to have consequences or create psychological impact beyond the act itself (Hoffman, p.36). Similarly, Kornard Kellen argued that a “terrorist without a cause is not a terrorist” (p.37).

However, Walter Laqueur in 1996 argued that “the decision [by terrorists] to use terrorist violence is not always rational one; seldom achieves its aims” (Laqueur, p. 31). He drew examples of futile terrorism in several parts of the world where terrorism failed to bring about any change, including India, Israel, Sri Lanka, Spain and Algeria (p. 27). He added that even in cases where terrorism was effective to the extent of terrorist leaders becoming heads of governments; it only happened after terrorists abandoning violence and adjusted to political success (p. 28).

Moreover, Laqueur argued that terrorists are irrational for the fact that since violence does not yield wanted results, therefore it must be abandoned. However, he did not discuss the rationality of the methods used by terrorists. In other word, he judged the rationality of the aim not the methods of terrorism. Therefore, for Laqueur, violence to achieve political aims—regardless of the nature of that violence—must cease in favor of political participation

Hoffman, on the other hand argued that contrary to the claims that terrorism “more than often has little political impact” as Laqueur argued (p. 27); the examples of anticolonial terrorists groups, most notably the Israel’s Irgun, Cyprus’ EOKA, and Algeria’s FLN, and ANC in South Africa, provide convincing evidence to the contrary (p. 61). These groups led terrorist campaign against an occupier and eventually succeeded in attaining independence for their people. Begin, Ahmed Ben Bella, Makarios, and Nelson Mandela, all leaders of terrorist groups who later became head of governments and states (Hoffman, p.61). Although Hoffman does not deny that in some cases change was also product of a distinct period of time and due to powerful forces other than terrorism (p. 61).

Hoffman also added that successful ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist organizations carefully choose their level of violence rationally, to be “effective, tolerable, tactically acceptable to the international opinion and sufficiently modulated not to provoke massive governmental crackdown and reaction” (p. 233). While, for example, Hamas’s use of suicidal bombers to indiscriminately and deliberately target Israeli civilians, including women and children, received worldwide condemnation regardless of their reasoning and motivations, and earned the group a spot in the list of terrorist groups. The fallout of these suicide operations is huge and the political consequences make Hamas’ choice of such tactic “irrational”

In summary, although the definition of terrorism remains elusive because it’s changing over time, in general terrorism has two essential characteristics; first, it’s a calculated, planned and systematic act, and second it’s inherently political (pp. 2-3).Therefore, according Hoffman, we can then argue that terrorism is basically is where politics and violence intersect.

However, Hoffman’s approach to understand terrorism by distinguishing it from other forms of political violence and based on historical based evidence did not fully succeed to persuade many countries to agree on the definition of terrorism. In this regards, Jenkins’ argument that terrorism should be defined by “the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators on the nature of their cause”, more compelling and resonates with many around the world, especially Muslims in dealing with Israel’s disproportionate response to Palestinian suicidal terrorists targeting Israeli civilians. In the 1999 Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 35 states have refrained from signing, which indicates that there are numerous geographic “holes” in the Int’l law regime as it relates to terrorism (Week 4 lecture, p. 2). These countries were not convinced by Hoffman’s differentiation between terrorism and guerilla warfare.

Because of the apparent lack of consensus among states on the definition of terrorism, there has been no single definition of terrorism in International Law, which remains elusive. One of the main sources of international law, as set forth by Article 38 (1) of the International Court of Justice, is treaty law based on international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the consenting states (D’Amato & Abassi, 2004, p. 13 & p. 26, Janis & Noyes, 2004, p. 138), therefore, a state consent is required for a treaty law to be binding.

The international community has attempted to set legal framework dealing with terrorism through the Laws Of Armed Conflict (LOAC), also known as the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which is the body of International Law applicable when armed violence reaches the level of armed conflict, whether international or non-international (ICRC, 2004, p. 1). Geneva Conventions treaties remain the main source of IHL dealing with terrorism, however, it does not provide a definition of terrorism. The fundamental purpose of the Geneva conventions is to protect and assist victims of armed conflict and therefore deal with acts of terrorism only as they occur in the context of an armed conflict or war (ICRC website). However, critics of the Geneva conventions argued of their irrelevance in the war on terrorism since al Qa’eda is a nontate actor and therefore cannot be party to an international agreement (de Nevers, 2006, p. 105) and that they [Geneva conventions] impose overly stringent limitations on interrogation of detainees (pp. 105-107)

On the other hand, supporters of the Geneva conventions argued that following the September 11 attacks, although the Security Council Resolution 1373 added another dimension to the concept of “armed attack” to include attacks by non-state actors such as terrorist groups, it focused primarily on improving states’ cooperation to fight terrorism, (UNSCR 1373, pp. 1-4) and it did not include any new laws or modifications in the 1949 Geneva conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols. This move by the UN suggests that the international community feels confident that the current IHL have the ability to combat terrorism by criminalizing, apprehending and successfully prosecuting terrorists issues related to terrorism.

Furthermore, as de Nevers argued, complying with the Geneva conventions laws in detaining and interrogating terrorists, will enhance the efforts to fight terrorism, and “reinforces the stark differences between the US and al Qa’eda” and serves US security (p. 107). He added that if populations see the US and its allies working to ensure stability and the rule of law, they are more likely to cooperate against terrorists (p. 109).

References

D’Amato, A. & Abbassi, J. (2006). International Law Today (1st ed). St. Paul, MN: West
Publishing

De Nevers, R. (2006, Spring). Modernizing the Geneva Conventions. The Washington Quarterly, 29 (2), pp. 99-113

Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. (2nd ed). New York: Columbia University Press
International Committee of the Red Cross, "International humanitarian law and terrorism: questions and answers", May 2004.
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/terrorism-faq-%20050504?opendocument
Laqueur, W. (1996, September). Postmodern Terrorism. Foreign Affairs, 75(5), 24-36. Retrieved

UNSCR 1373, p. 1-4.
https://norwich.angellearning.com/AngelUploads/Content/MDY_LOR_2008_12/

Week 4 Lecture,
https://norwich.angellearning.com/section/default.asp?id=20091212069%5FGR%5FGD542A