Global terrorism is one of the major threats facing the world in the 21st century, and that threat is only going to get more serious (Colby, 2008, p. 43). Deterring stateless terrorists in globalized world posses even further significant challenges for the international community (Whiteneck, 2005, p. 193). The progress of technology, the increasing interconnectedness of global systems, and the accelerating advances in science and technology have increased both the productive and destructive powers (Colby, p. 43). Terrorist groups that share the same ideology can now easily operate from different parts of the world in the form of networks, exchanging resources and planning synchronized powerful attacks. Since hysterical overreaction about terrorism can be costly and counterproductive (Mueller, 2005, p. 229; Krepon 2009, p. 3); only through understanding of these new terror networks and their social movement will enable the world to mount an effective defense (Segeman, 2004, p.VII)
According to Brian Hoffman in 2005, religion provided the only justification of terrorism until the 19th century (p. 84). Then the emergence of the notions of nationalism and self-determination at the beginning of 19th century, and the growing popularity of radical political thought embracing Marxist ideology completed the transformation of terrorism from a mostly religious to predominately secular phenomenon. Hoffman added that while terrorism and religion share a long history, this manifestation was overshadowed by ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideologically motivated terrorism. This process of “secularization” was given fresh impetus by the anti-colonial/national liberation movements that arose after the Second World War to challenge continued Western rule in Asia, the ME, and Africa and subsequently exerted so profound an influence on ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideological terrorist organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s (p. 84)
Moreover, Hoffman argued that it was not until 1980—as a result of the repercussions of the revolution in Iran the previous year—did the first “modern” religious terrorist groups appear. Daniel Byman in 2007 stated that after the Islamic Revolution, Iran has been one of the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism (p. 169). Before the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1980 there were only two out of 64 terrorist groups active could be classified as predominately religious in character and motivation: the Iranian-backed Shi’a organization al-Dawa and the Committee for Safeguarding the Islamic Revolution (Hoffman, p. 84). However, in 1992, the number of religious terrorist groups had increased from 2 to 11 and expanded to embrace major world religions other than Islam, as well as various obscure religious sects and cults. Moreover, as the number of religious terrorist groups was increasing, the number of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist groups declined (p. 84). Throughout the1990s the growth in the number of religious terrorist groups continued to increase (p.86).
The end of Soviet war on Afghanistan in 1988 marked the birth of global Salafi jihad and its present vanguard, al Qaeda religious social movement (Sageman, pp.37-38) ,which now directed its jihad efforts to other areas where infidels had conquered or threatened former Muslim lands (p. 36), as well as Muslim governments which oppose and oppress jihadists. The evolution of Salafi jihadists throughout the course of their struggle which began during the Afghan war, meant that jihad is to be redefined to fight far enemy first (the infidels), or the “greater master” (p. 22 & p. 44) before directing their fight against the near enemy (oppressive Muslim regimes). Hence the contemporary global jihad or the new jihad (p. 20) was born in 1991 in Sudan, which witnessed an important milestone in the history of Salafi Jihad (p. 55)
Furthermore, the Saudi reliance on US and Western troops during the 1990-1992 Gulf War fueled al Qaeda’s fear that the presence of foreign troops in the holy land was part of a strategy to conquer Muslim lands, hence, the war against the West and the “crusaders” was declared by Al Qaeda on August 23, 1996, which then marked the emergence of the true global Salafi jihad (Sageman, p. 40 & p. 45). Paranoia about Western influence has become a prime motivator for Islamist groups in the ME (Abuza, 2007, p. 22). Defense against “Cultural NATO” is a theme that Iranian hardliners have also recently adapted (p. 22)
Sageman argued that the contentious concept of jihad in Islam remains one of the most useful tools for global Salafi Jihadi terrorist groups (Sageman, 2004, p.1), and one of its main factors that provide Islamist terrorists with strength and resiliency. The distinction between the greater and lesser jihad, or between defensive and offensive jihad is rejected by Salafi jihadists, who believe that da’wa and peaceful political activism are not viable strategies for the establishment of a strict and true Islamic state they saw a solution to the decadence afflicted Muslim communities (pp. 4-7). Their ideology is based on the literal interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna, or hadith, rejecting as innovation (bi’dah) any other religious and legal interpretations by scholars especially in dealing with situations no encountered in the Qur’an or Sunna (p. 4)
Furthermore, unlike the notion of separation between church and state widely accepted in the West, Salafi jihadists believe that Islam teaches its followers that religion is not simply a theory but a way of life, translating their beliefs into a living reality (p. 11) in the form of a state, system of laws and regulations (p. 10).
The freedom of Muslims to practice their religion is inherited in Islam, which implied the abolition of oppressive political systems which prevented people from freely choosing Islam (pp. 11-12). The message of Islam is also a universal that cannot be restricted by geographical, racial or social boundaries (p. 12). As Qutb explained “it is the duty of Islam to annihilate all such systems, as they are obstacles in the way of universal freedom” (p. 13). Salafi jihadists believe that only through jihad al-sayf, or violent revolt, against Jahiliyya can Muslims re-establish their once dominant Islamic state and allow Islam to lead mankind.
Radical interpretation of Islam by Salafi jihadists represents an important factor in the strength of their ideology. Islam is one of the most communal of all religions with many orchestrated shared rituals (Sageman, p. 116). Muslims are required to pray in groups five times a day at the mosques, and gather every Friday for mandatory Jumm’a (Friday)’s Prayer. Muslims also are required to perform Hajj (visit to Mecca and perform religious rituals) once in a life-time where millions of other Muslims from around the globe gather. Salafi jihadists use mosques, mostly private mosques unregulated by the state (Sageman, p. 143), to form friendship groups and begin the intensification of religious sentiment. Those social bonds seem to be the critical element in the process of radicalization, and usually precede the ideological commitment (p.135). As Victor Comras in 2005 argued, the line between being radical Islamist and Jihadist is a very thin one, and easily crossed religiously and intellectually (p. 4), therefore, Salafi jihadists can easily exploit those new potential mujahedeen into fanaticism and violence (pp. 114-115).
The technological advances in communications as a result of globalization and heightened interconnectedness (Sageman, p. 158) have enabled terrorist groups to work in robust small-networks pattern that resist fragmentation (p. 140), and enjoy flexibility (p. 164). Eliminating individuals, or hubs, through counter terrorism will not threaten the integrity of the network as whole, and a new network on the site of an incompletely destroyed one (p. 141). Furthermore, the new communication revolution in the form of satellite phones; internet; laptops; email; fax and web sites, coinciding with the rise of the global Salafi jihad in 1990s, have enabled terrorists to turn their geographical isolation into source of strength, for it provided a sanctuary and protected them from detection and retaliation (pp. 158-159). Moreover, the internet has offered terrorist a tremendous opportunity to propagate their ideology to the public and gain moral and or financial support for their operations (p. 160)
Resiliency in the tactics of global Salafi jihad was evident after the Afghan war and operation “Enduring Freedom”, which eliminated the safe-haven once used by al Qaeda and has degraded the operational capabilities of the global Salafi jihad and its ability to strike official targets in the West. Instead, the terrorist group was forced it to shift to operations on “soft targets” in their own sanctuaries (Sageman, p. 56)
Islamist terrorism may have its roots in the Middle East, but it has long since then expanded globally (Abuza, 2009, p. 15). Islamist terrorists exploited Muslims’ devotion to help the poor and the needy as ordered by Islam, in order to ensure their flow of money runs uninterrupted. The diverse sources of financing terrorist groups utilize under the umbrella of Islamic charities represent another major factor in their strength and resiliency. Middle Eastern Islamist groups embrace the inverse triangle in which a broad range of charities and nongovernmental agencies serve as cover for narrower terrorist mission (p. 17), and therefore show no intention of abandoning its core ideology. After beaten back by counter terror strategies, they regroup using both the democratic process they simultaneously fight (p. 17).
As Abuza in 2009 contended that Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestinian Territories, and Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia use a similar model of social organization and a network of schools, orphanages, clinics, and social welfare to bestow legitimacy on their activities and gain international support (p, 18). The existence of charities and social service networks has not made Hamas or Hezbollah any less violent although they have contributed to de-legitimization of governments (p. 23). Tactics may shift but strategy does not. Its assumption of political control in Gaza has not tempered its commitment to terrorism; indeed, Hamas has become even more aggressive since the January 2006 Palestinian elections (p. 23)
Furthermore, according to Zachary Abuza, 2003, the hawala system represents the primacy source of financial transfers used by terrorist groups, especially in Southeast Asia and the Middle East (p. 183). Hawala shops are spread throughout the Middle East, Asia, Latin American as well as Europe and North America (Comras, 2005, p.8). These heavily unregulated and relatively cheap transactions are also called “trust” system, works as an informal banking system (Comras, p. 8) in which the names of the individuals sending and receiving the monies are anonymous or unverified, and no records can be traced (Abuza, p. 183). Therefore, it remains the preferred and the most effective method of financing terrorist operations in different parts of the globe (Abuza, p. 183)
In countries that impose currency control measures, the hawala becomes more important. Therefore, it seems that abolishing exchange controls will encourage transactions through the regulated banking methods, but only for legitimate money transfers (Abuza, 2003, p. 185). Regulating the hawala system would also mean that names of senders and receivers and their identity is to be documented and verified, which can subsequently be invaluable tool for intelligence agencies to follow the money trails and help solve the puzzles and uncover secrets of terrorist finances (William, p.11)
Since small amount of money can be sufficient to execute even the most lethal terrorist operations (Williams, 2005, p. 1), imposing measures that would regulate the hawala system might play an important part in an overall strategy to prevent future terrorist operations. However, as Phil Williams in 2005 argued, knowing the inadequacy of the global regimes designed to combat terrorist financing and the capacity of terrorist organizations to quickly adapt to new regulations (William, p. 2) attacking terrorist finances in general can be self-defeating strategy in the intelligence process.
Victor Comras mentioned “an interesting nexus” between businesses and the charities they have used to mask their terrorism related funding (p. 6). He argued how these charities provided AQ donors with deniability of directly financing terrorism, while ensuring that the flow of funds to terrorist groups maintain its mask and escape detection. However, Comras also admitted that “much of this [business-charities nexus] is still speculation and little information has yet been gathered concerning this business-charities nexus” (ibid, p. 6)
Moreover, Comras explained how charity forms a very important part of Muslim law and tradition (p. 3). Donations in the form of the mandatory Zakat, or the optional Sadaqah, are highly encouraged and emphasized in Islam. In most part, these Islamic charities were legitimate and played an admirable role in alleviating suffering of millions of Muslims around the globe, most notably in Afghanistan, Sub-Saharan Africa, Palestine and Iraq. Therefore, cracking down on Islamic charities on the premise that they are guilty of supporting terrorism until proven otherwise, will play in the hands of terrorists who are aiming at further.
Stopping the flow of funds to terrorist organizations is impossible (William, p. 6). However, it’s essential as we search for measures to reduce prospect of using hawala system or other financial tools by terrorists to finance their operations, to realize that it’s the motivation and the ideology that has generated the dedication by many individuals, groups or organizations to provide financial aid to terrorist groups (Comras, p. 2). Winning the war of ideas against al Qaeda by empowering moderate Islamists, and addressing the growing resentment among Muslims caused by the Israeli-Palestinian situation and the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, will ensure that ordinary mainstream Muslims are engaged in the fight against terrorism, and deprive terrorists of their financial tools whether in the form of Hawala, Zakat, Saddaka monies.
Proper intelligence is essential to sort out any alleged link between an Islamic charity and terrorist activities. As Phil Williams contended, the difficulty facing intelligence today is “less about finding a needle in a haystack than finding a particular needle in a stack of needles” (p. 1). Almost all of the mosques, Islamic schools, educational centers, and major relief projects organized here in the US were all built through donations and charities. Clamping down on these charities might further alienate Muslim communities and aid radicals.
Bard O’Neill in 2004 explained that governments should try to cultivate support from the moderate religious leaders to make the case that those fanatics are disingenuous and violate the most sacred norms of the faith (p. 171). He added that popular support for Islamist terrorists could be “contained and reduced only by a focused, aggressive, and compelling battle of ideas led by respected clerics and intellectuals who could draw on Islamic theology and sacred sources to make compelling case that militant ideas and behavior, especially terrorist attacks against innocent civilians, are both un-Islamic and anti-Islamic” (p. 170)
Clamping down on Islamic charities will heighten anti-Americanism or anti-Western feelings, because it will certainly undermine numerous legitimate charities that benefit million of Muslims around the world. Moreover, since the world cannot agree on a single definition of terrorism, it will be impossible to agree on which charities or financial transactions constitute an aid to a terrorist group. Regulating, monitoring, and analyzing financial transactions is important for Western intelligence in pattern establishment and anomaly detection, but the actual battle ground against terrorists’ financial networks lies within the Muslim world
References
Abuza, Z. (2003, August). Funding terrorism in Southeast Asia: The financial network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya. Contemporary Southeast Asia, (2) 25, pp. 169-199.
Abuza, Z. (2009, Winter). Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model. Middle East
Quarterly, 16(1), 15-26.
Iran, terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, (31), pp. 169-181.
Colby, E. (2008, June). Expanded Deterrence. Policy Review
Comras, V. (2005, January). Al Qaeda finances and funding to affiliated groups. Strategic Insights, (1) IV, pp. 1-16.
Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. (2nd ed). New York: Columbia University Press
Krepon, M. (2009, May). The Mushroom Cloud That Wasn't. Foreign Affairs, 88(3), 2-6.
Sunday, October 4, 2009
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