Jackson Diehl in the Washington Post predicted the Obama administration will abandon Bush's freedom agenda and democracy promotion in the Middle East, especially after we’ve seen its end results in the Palestinian elections. I think Mr. Diehle is right in his assesment of the incoming Obama administration.
I have listened to almost all of Obama's major speeches and I never heard any mentioning of democracy promotion in the ME, or any plans to do so. Even on the his campaign website, Obama's vision for the ME is focused on the peace process between Israel and Palestinians,war in Iraq, and Iran's nuclear program. So, democracy promotion is not on Obama's short term plans to protect U.S. interests in the ME.
If the Egyptian regime gives in to the U.S. demands by holding free and fair elections, most likely we will see the Muslim Brotherhood forming the new government. The question then: will the U.S. be willing to deal with an Islamic government that does not recognize Israel and opposes U.S. policies? Or will the U.S. isolate the new government and impose an economic and political blockade on 80 million Egyptians to punish them for their democratic choice?
I believe that this paradox in our foreign policy undermines our credibility to play any effective role in the future of democratization in the Middle East.
Mr. Diehle concluded that "Mubarak and other "pro-Western" autocrats seem to have drawn from Obama's election: that the threat of U.S. pressure for political liberalization has passed". Mr. Diehl has every reason to believe that the Democrats’' policies will be more along the line of "stability and security outweighs democracy", except that the sum will be zero, as we've learned on 9/11.
However, those who still believe that Ayman Nour is a viable opposition figure who can challenge President Mubarak, don't really understand the psyche of the Egyptian people or the political dynamics in Egypt. Mr. Nour enjoys no public support and cannot be looked at as rallying factor in Egyptian politics. On the one hand, the public sympathizes with Mr. Nour for the injustice and suffering he has endured, and widely respects him for speaking up against government corruption and oppression. On the other hand, he is branded as "America's man", and in Egypt, like most other parts of the ME nowadays, that’s enough to undermine his scanty popularity and cost him the support he once enjoyed among the elite. Mr. Nour's letter to then democratic presidential nominee Barack Obama seeking his support, was criticized by the opposition and the public who considered it humiliating for Mr. Nour and rejected the U.S. meddling in Egypt's internal affairs.
The U.S. should keep a hands-off approach to Egyptian politics and don't impose a model of change or implicitly support one opposition trend against the other, because it will automatically be rejected by the public which is highly skeptical of the U.S. agenda, resentful for its support of Israel, and the war in Iraq. Instead, the U.S. should make public diplomacy a priority and work on improving its image and combating anti-Americanism plaguing the ME, and threatening U.S. interests abroad and its security at home. The U.S should also be ready to respect people's democratic choices and deal with freely elected governments even if they're opposed to our policies, but they will be willing to cooperate and negotiate as long as there is recognition of mutual interests and we can find the common ground that bring all parties together. Even governments like Hamas and Iran can be contained through the negotiations and cooperation.
Unlike the West, the public opinion in the ME is highly emotional in general, and we’ve seen the reactions after the appointment of Rahm Emmanuel. However, the U.S. can use this to its advantage by engaging in aggressive public diplomacy. Words can do magic without even taking any actions, and that's how the ME operates.
Thursday, November 20, 2008
Monday, November 17, 2008
How rethinking globalization can avert the clash of civilizations: Case study of the Muslim Brotherhood
By: Ali G. Mansour, MD
Globalization has affected every aspect of international relations, including economic, social and political realms. From the development of new technologies, new ideas and free trade, to the spread of democracies and forms of governments, globalization has profoundly transformed the human condition in all of its aspects. On the one hand, Muslim Brotherhood views globalization as a threat to cultural identity and national economy in developing countries and as a new form of American imperialism that is seeking to impose its hegemony and control the world’s economy. On the other hand, the West, driven by realist views and preoccupied by its security dilemma, is equally skeptical of political Islam, which it accuses of seeking to destroy western values and wage global jihad to conquer Western states and reestablish Islamic Caliphate
Muslim Brotherhood’s views on globalization are similar to those expressed in the dependency theory, which remains a pervasive force in Third World notions of the international political economy even as Marxist experiments in Russia and Eastern Europe has collapsed. Rethinking globalization through the alternative lenses of international relations can help find a common ground between political Islam and the Western civilization by allowing localization to co-exist with globalization, hence preserve cultural identity and social norms. The concept of Islamic Caliphate can also be redefined in economic and political terms in a way that promote cooperation and mutual dependence. Resolving these two highly contentious issues can avert an imminent clash between Western and Islamic civilizations.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the notion of an Islamic threat to world peace and security has become even more highlighted. Globalization and post-modernization has led to the rise of political Islam in the Muslim world. Therefore, political Islam deserves scholarly attention and not just a threat to regional stability, it deserves to be treated as a probable contender for future political rule over states with which the West must continue relations with. Among movements of political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) is considered the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization.
Since its establishment in Egypt in 1928 by a school teacher named Hassan el-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has sought to fuse religious revival with anti-imperialism—resistance to foreign domination through the exaltation of Islam. From mid-to late 1940s, the MB began to expand beyond Egypt, and today it is impressively a worldwide movement having many branches in both Muslim countries and none Muslim countries alike.
The MB’s participation in electoral politics has enjoyed some success, particularly in the Indonesian, Egyptian and Palestinian elections—the last through Hamas, which is the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), which evolved out of the MB movement, is represented in the current Iraqi government by Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi who is the General Secretary of the IIP. As a result, the Brotherhood has apparently demonstrated considerable popularity. In fact, it is likely to become the leading voice within the Muslim world generally by virtue of its widespread character.
Samuel Huntington in 1993 argued that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. He added that civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and that the most critical attributes responsible for this gross division is indeed the undeniable cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.
Huntington defined civilization as the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that, which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. He divided world civilizations into two camps—Western civilization, which has two major variants, European and North American, and Islamic, which has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions.
Mohamed Mahdi Akef, General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, underscored the deepening animosity between the Western and Islamic Civilizations described in Huntington’s theory. In his message titled “Humankind between the slavery of globalization and the glory of Islam”, Mr. Akef sarcastically criticized globalization for "transforming the world into a small village whose mayor is the master of the White House", and which "mainly serve the interests of the American politicians". He then accused globalization of racism for "favoring Judeo-Christian faith and depriving humanity of the noble values of the divine laws". He drew an example of how "the globalized world is biased against any successful Islamic economic or developmental projects, and targeting of Islamic culture by rejecting the Turkish and Malaysian models based on allegations of their enmity towards secularization". Akef sees "the hope in the glory of Islam and in the Muslims' ability to confront the slavery of globalization and their steadfast in resisting occupation and tyranny".
In the interviews I conducted with six prominent leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt via email, they all rejected globalization if it conflicts with Islamic teachings, rules, and regulations. The six were all professionals (doctors and lawyers), who had decent knowledge of world affairs. They echoed the views of Mr. Akef—equating globalization with Americanization, which they considered a threat to their Islamic identity, beliefs, values, language, and social norms.
Abdel el-Mone’m Abu el-Fotoh, leading figure of the MB and member of its Guidance Bureau- the highest decision-making body within the MB- and the General Secretary of the Arab Physicians’ Union, described globalization as a form of ”modern imperialism“, which uses culture, politics and even military power to impose its hegemony as in the case of the U.S. In other words, globalization according to Abu el-Fotoh became an “American fascism” depriving the Third World countries from technological advances and controlling its resources for the benefits of the First World countries.
Hamdy Hassan, physician, a parliamentarian, and spokesperson of MB parliamentary bloc, and Osama Naser Uldeen, member of the MB Guidance Bureau, emphasized the same meaning blaming globalization for the condition of inequality in world economy, in which the industrialized countries are gaining more power and enjoy more prosperity by exploiting the developing countries which suffer more backwardness and authoritarianism.
Essam el-Erian, physician and chief of MB political bureau, and Sobhi Saleh, member of parliament and prominent attorney, reiterated the same meaning by dismissing the” American concept” of globalization, which forces its culture and values on other nations even through military power. Saleh went further by calling globalization “the U.S. bullying the world to stain it with American culture and norms”.
Gamal Heshmat, prominent MB writer, physician, and former Member of Parliament, asserted that globalization is bad for the Muslim world because it disintegrates its identity. He rejected the notion that civilizations can be “dissolved in one pot” stating “any nation that has respect and appreciation to its culture and values would not submit to the concepts of universal civilization”
Furthermore, the MB argues that the failure of both socialism and capitalism to address Egypt's (and the entire Muslim nation's) grievances indicates that only a return to Islam at both the individual and collective levels will bring God back to the side of the Muslims.
However, all the Brothers I interviewed agreed that there are positive aspects of globalization which Muslims should benefit from, including the technological advances in communication, science, and informatic, and the ability to exchange ideas of democracy and liberty. The contemporary Brotherhood’s views on globalization among Islamic nations seem to contrast with their views when it involves relations between Western and Islamic civilizations. Abu el-Fotoh and Heshmat favored globalizing the Muslim countries, creating a unified “Ummah” or the Muslim nation, which to them makes sense because those countries share the same culture, religion, and values.
Abo el-Fotoh elaborated further on the idea of the Islamic Caliphate which, according to him, now in light of globalization can be based on economic and political principles, not religious ones. He compared the Islamic Caliphate to the European Union which is composed of sovereign and powerful states united around economic, security and political agenda.
This fairly progressive view by some in the second MB generation represents a considerable pragmatic shift from the earlier theocratic concept of the Caliphate expressed by founder Hassan el Banna, who stated that the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate is an Islamic duty for all Muslims, in which the Khalifa (the one ruler for all Muslim countries) is entrusted to impose God’s laws. Therefore, el-Banna placed the reestablishment of Islamic Caliphate at the top of the MB agenda.
Some of the criticism of globalization and world relations between developed and developing nations is also expressed by theorists like Theotonio Dos Santos in 1968, in his analysis of the dependency theory, and James Rosenau in 1997, in his alternative views of globalization
Thomas Lynch III described dependency theory, born in the Third World, as variant of Marxism that must be evaluated independently from the Marxist-Leninist communism. Dependency theory was developed over the period from 1950 to the early 1970s, which coincided with the 1952 Free Officers’ Revolution in Egypt and the Nasserite era, attributed to President Gamal Abdul Nasser who ruled Egypt from 1956-1970. Nasser sought out rapprochement with the Soviet Union; hence Egypt was controlled by Soviet ideas. Although the older generation of the MB underwent fierce repression and persecution during the Nasser’s era, they would still embrace his ideology of anti-imperialism and socialism during that time of Egypt’s history, which has influenced their views till today.
However, since the 1980s, middle-class professionals within the MB have pushed it in a more transparent and flexible direction. Working within labor unions and professional organizations, these reformers have learned to forge coalitions with and provide services to their constituents.
Unlike Marxism which addresses “classes of people”, dependency theory focuses on the relations between “classes of states”. Dos Santos in 1968 defined dependence “as a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustained, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can either be a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development”
Dos Santos added that to understand what is happening in the underdeveloped countries, we need to put it within the framework of a process of dependent production and reproduction. According to Dos Santos, this system reproduces backwardness, misery, and social marginalization within its borders—it reproduces a productive system whose development is limited by those world relations which necessarily lead to the development of only certain economic sectors, to trade under unequal conditions, to domestic competition with international capital under unequal conditions, to the imposition of relations of super exploitation of the domestic labor force with a view to dividing the economic surplus thus generated between internal and external forces of domination.
Rethinking globalization through alternative lenses of international relations can offer us the opportunity to find one common ground between the Western and Islamic civilizations, represented in the research by political Islam, which we can build on.
James Rosenau contended that commonly used definitions of `globalization in the literature are elusive and”misleading”, because they are often used by different observers to describe different phenomena, with little overlap among the various usages. Alternatively, Rosenau viewed globalization from a different perspective by describing globalization as the opposite of localization. He attempted to further explain globalization by drawing a comparison between the two, and by arguing that while localization is boundary-heightening, globalization on the other hand is boundary-broadening.
Rosenau in his alternative views of globalization did not underestimate its powerful or negative influence in undermining other people’s culture, values and way of life, which led many across the globe, including the MB, to consider the incursions of globalization a threat to their identity and cultural mores. Rosenau then built on the common ground he established with the critics of globalization to provide a solution based on his alternative view. Rosenau believed that there is no inherent contradiction between localizing and globalizing tendencies, and that both can coexist to a degree which will depend on ethnic and noneconomic factors actively contributing to localization. In other words, localization and globalization need not to be mutually exclusive, and it is possible to reconcile globalization and localization by accepting the boundary-broadening processes and make the best of them by integrating them into local customs and practices
Rosenau offered another solution if the process of integration fails to reconcile both globalization and localization in a given culture or within a state. Rosenau shared Michael Zurn optimistic hypothesis of “uneven fragmegration” which allows for continuing pockets of antagonism between globalization and localizing tendencies hopping that eventually these pockets of fragmentations will be overcome by the opportunities and requirements of interdependence and will conform to globalization. Rosenau based his optimism on the assumption that the failure of the states to solve “pressing problems” will lead to a decline in their capabilities and a loss of legitimacy, which will undermine the people’s loyalty to their states in favor of multiple loyalties to national or transnational organizations that are able fulfill their needs.
Gross in 2004 weighted in on this argument by stating that the social reactions to globalization should be understood at its local level, and when people are denied the choice as how to deal with globalizing forces, protests often erupt. Gross added that “It is important to understand that the protests are not against globalization so much as the tyranny of governments which prevent choices from being made. Conversely, people who freely choose the extent to which they will accept global ideas are less likely to see globalization as a threat”. Gross cited an example of Malaysians, when given free choice; appear to have taken advantage of the economic opportunities without the anticipated concomitant social or political upheavals.
The concept of successful mixing globalization with localization was described by several social scientists as “glocalization”. Gross cited in his article Patrice C. Brodeur’s “From Postmodernism to Glocalism” in which she advocated the replacement of the term globalization with “glocalism”. The term takes into consideration the complexity of interactions between global and local forces which constantly change our definitions of ourselves and others. In particular, the term can help academics to better understand the world from the perspective of non–Westerners.
Ritzer in 2003 defined glocalization as the interpenetration of the global and the local, resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas. This view emphasizes global heterogeneity and tends to reject the idea that forces emanating from the West in general and the United States in particular are leading to economic, political, institutional, and-most importantly-cultural homogeneity. Ritzer added that the above definition of glocalization makes what is local is seen as increasingly insignificant and a marginal player in the dynamics of globalization. Yet, according to Ritzer, glocalization does represent some measure of hope. For one thing, it is the last outpost of most lingering forms of the local.
Robert Keohane added another dimension to the relations between countries with different interests and set of values by focusing on the possibility to achieve cooperation in the world political economy. Keohane acknowledged that international coordination of policy seems highly beneficial in an interdependent economy, but cooperation in world politics is particularly difficult. He based his theory of cooperation on the premise that nonhegemonic cooperation is possible and it can be facilitated by international regimes. When shared interests are sufficiently important and other key conditions are met, cooperation can emerge and regimes can be created without hegemony. Therefore, the key to Keohane’s cooperation is presence of shared interests among states, and the mutual recognition of their importance.
Keohane argued that cooperation requires the actions of separate individuals or organizations—which are not in pre-existent harmony—be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as “policy coordination”. Therefore, cooperation occurs when actors (governmental and nongovernmental) attempts to adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination, and these attempts succeed in making policies more compatible. He further clarified that “intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objective, as the result of process of policy coordination” . In other words, and building on Keohane’s theory, both Western and Islamic civilizations should develop a partial, self-interested perspective on their mutual interactions, and engage in negotiation and bargaining designed to induce the other to adjust their policies to one’s own. Each government pursues what it perceives as its self-interest, but looks for bargains that can benefit all parties.
According to Keohane, “cooperation therefore does not imply the absence of conflict. On the contrary, it is typically mixed with conflict and reflects partially successful efforts to overcome conflict, real or potential”.
Samuel Huntington underscored the importance of cooperation among civilizations as a long term strategy to avert the clash of Western and non-Western civilizations. He pointed out that the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. Huntington added that this will require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with one another.
I conclude that both globalization and localization to co-exist with each other. It is essential that we encourage more cooperation and accommodation and “an appreciation of the reality that allows for multiple loyalties and memberships will likely widen the benefits of global economy”. Glocalization can be seen as an alternative to the evil of globalization. Prosperous countries like those in the Persian Gulf in addition to several other Asian countries were able to play a central role in global world economy while to a large extent preserving their cultural identities and were able to integrate their norms and traditions into the globalized world.
Theories of international cooperation and alternative views on globalization can provide a framework within which the Western and Islamic civilizations thus redefining their relationship, which must be based on the mutual recognition of each other’s interest as well as respecting one another’s cultural, religious and social norms. Muslim Brotherhood’s rejection of globalization can be transformed into a desire and willingness to coexist with Western civilization knowing it no longer represents a threat to the Islamic culture and identity. Moreover, the Islamic Caliphate should be viewed, not as threat to Western civilization, but rather an economic and political formula that enables the Muslim world to meet the challenges of globalized world without sacrificing its culture, religious values and social norms.
It is both theoretically and practically important that we engage in an unbiased discourse on the thinking of the more moderate groups of political Islam, in an attempt first and foremost to deal with our own fears of the unknown and unfamiliar, and to determine the possibility of a peaceful coexistence alongside the Islamist movement, and I hope this paper contribute to this necessary discourse.
Muslim Brotherhood’s views on globalization are similar to those expressed in the dependency theory, which remains a pervasive force in Third World notions of the international political economy even as Marxist experiments in Russia and Eastern Europe has collapsed. Rethinking globalization through the alternative lenses of international relations can help find a common ground between political Islam and the Western civilization by allowing localization to co-exist with globalization, hence preserve cultural identity and social norms. The concept of Islamic Caliphate can also be redefined in economic and political terms in a way that promote cooperation and mutual dependence. Resolving these two highly contentious issues can avert an imminent clash between Western and Islamic civilizations.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the notion of an Islamic threat to world peace and security has become even more highlighted. Globalization and post-modernization has led to the rise of political Islam in the Muslim world. Therefore, political Islam deserves scholarly attention and not just a threat to regional stability, it deserves to be treated as a probable contender for future political rule over states with which the West must continue relations with. Among movements of political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) is considered the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization.
Since its establishment in Egypt in 1928 by a school teacher named Hassan el-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has sought to fuse religious revival with anti-imperialism—resistance to foreign domination through the exaltation of Islam. From mid-to late 1940s, the MB began to expand beyond Egypt, and today it is impressively a worldwide movement having many branches in both Muslim countries and none Muslim countries alike.
The MB’s participation in electoral politics has enjoyed some success, particularly in the Indonesian, Egyptian and Palestinian elections—the last through Hamas, which is the Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), which evolved out of the MB movement, is represented in the current Iraqi government by Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi who is the General Secretary of the IIP. As a result, the Brotherhood has apparently demonstrated considerable popularity. In fact, it is likely to become the leading voice within the Muslim world generally by virtue of its widespread character.
Samuel Huntington in 1993 argued that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. He added that civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and that the most critical attributes responsible for this gross division is indeed the undeniable cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.
Huntington defined civilization as the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that, which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. He divided world civilizations into two camps—Western civilization, which has two major variants, European and North American, and Islamic, which has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions.
Mohamed Mahdi Akef, General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, underscored the deepening animosity between the Western and Islamic Civilizations described in Huntington’s theory. In his message titled “Humankind between the slavery of globalization and the glory of Islam”, Mr. Akef sarcastically criticized globalization for "transforming the world into a small village whose mayor is the master of the White House", and which "mainly serve the interests of the American politicians". He then accused globalization of racism for "favoring Judeo-Christian faith and depriving humanity of the noble values of the divine laws". He drew an example of how "the globalized world is biased against any successful Islamic economic or developmental projects, and targeting of Islamic culture by rejecting the Turkish and Malaysian models based on allegations of their enmity towards secularization". Akef sees "the hope in the glory of Islam and in the Muslims' ability to confront the slavery of globalization and their steadfast in resisting occupation and tyranny".
In the interviews I conducted with six prominent leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt via email, they all rejected globalization if it conflicts with Islamic teachings, rules, and regulations. The six were all professionals (doctors and lawyers), who had decent knowledge of world affairs. They echoed the views of Mr. Akef—equating globalization with Americanization, which they considered a threat to their Islamic identity, beliefs, values, language, and social norms.
Abdel el-Mone’m Abu el-Fotoh, leading figure of the MB and member of its Guidance Bureau- the highest decision-making body within the MB- and the General Secretary of the Arab Physicians’ Union, described globalization as a form of ”modern imperialism“, which uses culture, politics and even military power to impose its hegemony as in the case of the U.S. In other words, globalization according to Abu el-Fotoh became an “American fascism” depriving the Third World countries from technological advances and controlling its resources for the benefits of the First World countries.
Hamdy Hassan, physician, a parliamentarian, and spokesperson of MB parliamentary bloc, and Osama Naser Uldeen, member of the MB Guidance Bureau, emphasized the same meaning blaming globalization for the condition of inequality in world economy, in which the industrialized countries are gaining more power and enjoy more prosperity by exploiting the developing countries which suffer more backwardness and authoritarianism.
Essam el-Erian, physician and chief of MB political bureau, and Sobhi Saleh, member of parliament and prominent attorney, reiterated the same meaning by dismissing the” American concept” of globalization, which forces its culture and values on other nations even through military power. Saleh went further by calling globalization “the U.S. bullying the world to stain it with American culture and norms”.
Gamal Heshmat, prominent MB writer, physician, and former Member of Parliament, asserted that globalization is bad for the Muslim world because it disintegrates its identity. He rejected the notion that civilizations can be “dissolved in one pot” stating “any nation that has respect and appreciation to its culture and values would not submit to the concepts of universal civilization”
Furthermore, the MB argues that the failure of both socialism and capitalism to address Egypt's (and the entire Muslim nation's) grievances indicates that only a return to Islam at both the individual and collective levels will bring God back to the side of the Muslims.
However, all the Brothers I interviewed agreed that there are positive aspects of globalization which Muslims should benefit from, including the technological advances in communication, science, and informatic, and the ability to exchange ideas of democracy and liberty. The contemporary Brotherhood’s views on globalization among Islamic nations seem to contrast with their views when it involves relations between Western and Islamic civilizations. Abu el-Fotoh and Heshmat favored globalizing the Muslim countries, creating a unified “Ummah” or the Muslim nation, which to them makes sense because those countries share the same culture, religion, and values.
Abo el-Fotoh elaborated further on the idea of the Islamic Caliphate which, according to him, now in light of globalization can be based on economic and political principles, not religious ones. He compared the Islamic Caliphate to the European Union which is composed of sovereign and powerful states united around economic, security and political agenda.
This fairly progressive view by some in the second MB generation represents a considerable pragmatic shift from the earlier theocratic concept of the Caliphate expressed by founder Hassan el Banna, who stated that the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate is an Islamic duty for all Muslims, in which the Khalifa (the one ruler for all Muslim countries) is entrusted to impose God’s laws. Therefore, el-Banna placed the reestablishment of Islamic Caliphate at the top of the MB agenda.
Some of the criticism of globalization and world relations between developed and developing nations is also expressed by theorists like Theotonio Dos Santos in 1968, in his analysis of the dependency theory, and James Rosenau in 1997, in his alternative views of globalization
Thomas Lynch III described dependency theory, born in the Third World, as variant of Marxism that must be evaluated independently from the Marxist-Leninist communism. Dependency theory was developed over the period from 1950 to the early 1970s, which coincided with the 1952 Free Officers’ Revolution in Egypt and the Nasserite era, attributed to President Gamal Abdul Nasser who ruled Egypt from 1956-1970. Nasser sought out rapprochement with the Soviet Union; hence Egypt was controlled by Soviet ideas. Although the older generation of the MB underwent fierce repression and persecution during the Nasser’s era, they would still embrace his ideology of anti-imperialism and socialism during that time of Egypt’s history, which has influenced their views till today.
However, since the 1980s, middle-class professionals within the MB have pushed it in a more transparent and flexible direction. Working within labor unions and professional organizations, these reformers have learned to forge coalitions with and provide services to their constituents.
Unlike Marxism which addresses “classes of people”, dependency theory focuses on the relations between “classes of states”. Dos Santos in 1968 defined dependence “as a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustained, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can either be a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development”
Dos Santos added that to understand what is happening in the underdeveloped countries, we need to put it within the framework of a process of dependent production and reproduction. According to Dos Santos, this system reproduces backwardness, misery, and social marginalization within its borders—it reproduces a productive system whose development is limited by those world relations which necessarily lead to the development of only certain economic sectors, to trade under unequal conditions, to domestic competition with international capital under unequal conditions, to the imposition of relations of super exploitation of the domestic labor force with a view to dividing the economic surplus thus generated between internal and external forces of domination.
Rethinking globalization through alternative lenses of international relations can offer us the opportunity to find one common ground between the Western and Islamic civilizations, represented in the research by political Islam, which we can build on.
James Rosenau contended that commonly used definitions of `globalization in the literature are elusive and”misleading”, because they are often used by different observers to describe different phenomena, with little overlap among the various usages. Alternatively, Rosenau viewed globalization from a different perspective by describing globalization as the opposite of localization. He attempted to further explain globalization by drawing a comparison between the two, and by arguing that while localization is boundary-heightening, globalization on the other hand is boundary-broadening.
Rosenau in his alternative views of globalization did not underestimate its powerful or negative influence in undermining other people’s culture, values and way of life, which led many across the globe, including the MB, to consider the incursions of globalization a threat to their identity and cultural mores. Rosenau then built on the common ground he established with the critics of globalization to provide a solution based on his alternative view. Rosenau believed that there is no inherent contradiction between localizing and globalizing tendencies, and that both can coexist to a degree which will depend on ethnic and noneconomic factors actively contributing to localization. In other words, localization and globalization need not to be mutually exclusive, and it is possible to reconcile globalization and localization by accepting the boundary-broadening processes and make the best of them by integrating them into local customs and practices
Rosenau offered another solution if the process of integration fails to reconcile both globalization and localization in a given culture or within a state. Rosenau shared Michael Zurn optimistic hypothesis of “uneven fragmegration” which allows for continuing pockets of antagonism between globalization and localizing tendencies hopping that eventually these pockets of fragmentations will be overcome by the opportunities and requirements of interdependence and will conform to globalization. Rosenau based his optimism on the assumption that the failure of the states to solve “pressing problems” will lead to a decline in their capabilities and a loss of legitimacy, which will undermine the people’s loyalty to their states in favor of multiple loyalties to national or transnational organizations that are able fulfill their needs.
Gross in 2004 weighted in on this argument by stating that the social reactions to globalization should be understood at its local level, and when people are denied the choice as how to deal with globalizing forces, protests often erupt. Gross added that “It is important to understand that the protests are not against globalization so much as the tyranny of governments which prevent choices from being made. Conversely, people who freely choose the extent to which they will accept global ideas are less likely to see globalization as a threat”. Gross cited an example of Malaysians, when given free choice; appear to have taken advantage of the economic opportunities without the anticipated concomitant social or political upheavals.
The concept of successful mixing globalization with localization was described by several social scientists as “glocalization”. Gross cited in his article Patrice C. Brodeur’s “From Postmodernism to Glocalism” in which she advocated the replacement of the term globalization with “glocalism”. The term takes into consideration the complexity of interactions between global and local forces which constantly change our definitions of ourselves and others. In particular, the term can help academics to better understand the world from the perspective of non–Westerners.
Ritzer in 2003 defined glocalization as the interpenetration of the global and the local, resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas. This view emphasizes global heterogeneity and tends to reject the idea that forces emanating from the West in general and the United States in particular are leading to economic, political, institutional, and-most importantly-cultural homogeneity. Ritzer added that the above definition of glocalization makes what is local is seen as increasingly insignificant and a marginal player in the dynamics of globalization. Yet, according to Ritzer, glocalization does represent some measure of hope. For one thing, it is the last outpost of most lingering forms of the local.
Robert Keohane added another dimension to the relations between countries with different interests and set of values by focusing on the possibility to achieve cooperation in the world political economy. Keohane acknowledged that international coordination of policy seems highly beneficial in an interdependent economy, but cooperation in world politics is particularly difficult. He based his theory of cooperation on the premise that nonhegemonic cooperation is possible and it can be facilitated by international regimes. When shared interests are sufficiently important and other key conditions are met, cooperation can emerge and regimes can be created without hegemony. Therefore, the key to Keohane’s cooperation is presence of shared interests among states, and the mutual recognition of their importance.
Keohane argued that cooperation requires the actions of separate individuals or organizations—which are not in pre-existent harmony—be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as “policy coordination”. Therefore, cooperation occurs when actors (governmental and nongovernmental) attempts to adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination, and these attempts succeed in making policies more compatible. He further clarified that “intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objective, as the result of process of policy coordination” . In other words, and building on Keohane’s theory, both Western and Islamic civilizations should develop a partial, self-interested perspective on their mutual interactions, and engage in negotiation and bargaining designed to induce the other to adjust their policies to one’s own. Each government pursues what it perceives as its self-interest, but looks for bargains that can benefit all parties.
According to Keohane, “cooperation therefore does not imply the absence of conflict. On the contrary, it is typically mixed with conflict and reflects partially successful efforts to overcome conflict, real or potential”.
Samuel Huntington underscored the importance of cooperation among civilizations as a long term strategy to avert the clash of Western and non-Western civilizations. He pointed out that the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. Huntington added that this will require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with one another.
I conclude that both globalization and localization to co-exist with each other. It is essential that we encourage more cooperation and accommodation and “an appreciation of the reality that allows for multiple loyalties and memberships will likely widen the benefits of global economy”. Glocalization can be seen as an alternative to the evil of globalization. Prosperous countries like those in the Persian Gulf in addition to several other Asian countries were able to play a central role in global world economy while to a large extent preserving their cultural identities and were able to integrate their norms and traditions into the globalized world.
Theories of international cooperation and alternative views on globalization can provide a framework within which the Western and Islamic civilizations thus redefining their relationship, which must be based on the mutual recognition of each other’s interest as well as respecting one another’s cultural, religious and social norms. Muslim Brotherhood’s rejection of globalization can be transformed into a desire and willingness to coexist with Western civilization knowing it no longer represents a threat to the Islamic culture and identity. Moreover, the Islamic Caliphate should be viewed, not as threat to Western civilization, but rather an economic and political formula that enables the Muslim world to meet the challenges of globalized world without sacrificing its culture, religious values and social norms.
It is both theoretically and practically important that we engage in an unbiased discourse on the thinking of the more moderate groups of political Islam, in an attempt first and foremost to deal with our own fears of the unknown and unfamiliar, and to determine the possibility of a peaceful coexistence alongside the Islamist movement, and I hope this paper contribute to this necessary discourse.
References
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321-339. Retrieved November 2, 2008, from JSTOR
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Muslim World, 96(3), 487-505. Retrieved November 12, 2008, from JSTOR
3-Akef, M. M. (2008, July). Humankind between the slavery of globalization to the glory
of Islam. Accessed November 12, 2008. Translated by Ali Mansour
http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=38571&SecID=213
4-Amineh, M. (2007, June). The Challenges of Modernity: The Case of Political Islam.
Perspectives on Global Development & Technology, 6(1-3), pp.215-228. Retrieved
November 12, 2008, from Academic Search Premier
5-Bsoul, L. (2007, Fall). Theory of International Relations in Islam. DOMES, 16(2), 71-96.
Retrieved November 12, 2008, from Academic Search Premier
6-Dos Santos, T. (2004). The structure of dependence. In D.J. Kauffman, J.M. Parker, P.V.
Howell & G.R. Doty (Eds.), Understanding international relations: The value of
alternative lenses (5th ed., pp.555 -562). Boston: McGraw Hill
7-El-Banna, H. (2006). Group of messages of Imam Hassan el-Banna (1st ed, pp. 364-
366). Cairo: Islamic House for Publications and Distributions, translated by Ali Mansour
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and something/nothing. Sociological Theory, 21(3), pp. 193-209. Retrieved November 14, 2008, from JSTOR
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Search Premier
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Turkey’s welfare Party. International Journal of Middle East Stdudies, 33 (3), 433-
448. Retrieved September 22, 2008, from JSTOR
10-Hillel, F. (2008, March). The history and unwritten future of Salafism. Retrieved
November 2, 2008, from http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction= publication_details&id=5509&pubType=Islam
11-Huntington, S. (1993, summer). The Clash of Civilizations?. Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22-
49. Retrieved November 12, 2008, from Academic Search Premier
12-Leiken, R., & Brooke, S. (2007, March). The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood. Foreign
Affairs, 86(2), pp. 107-121. Retrieved September 25, 2008, from Academic Search Premier
13-Lynch III, T. F. (2004). Foundations of radicalism. In D.J. Kauffman, J.M. Parker,
P.V. Howell & G.R. Doty (Eds.), Understanding international relations: The value of alternative lenses (5th ed., pp.535-551). Boston: McGraw Hill
14-Keohane, R. O. (2004). Cooperation and international regimes. In D.J. Kauffman, J.M.
Parker, P.V. Howell & G.R. Doty (Eds.), Understanding international relations: The value of alternative lenses (5th ed., pp.489 -500). Boston: McGraw Hill
15-Mansour, A. G. (2008a, October 29). Has globalization affected IR.? Formal discussion post. Message posted to https://
norwich.angellearning.com/section/default.asp?id= 20084242166_GR_GD510E
16-Mansour, A.G. (2008b, November). Interviews with Egyptian MB leaders, pp. 1-6
17-Ritzer, G. (2003, September). Rethinking globalization: Glocalization/grobalization
and something/nothing. Sociological Theory, 21(3), pp. 193-209. Retrieved November 14, 2008, from JSTOR
18-Rosenau, J. N. (2004). The complexities and contradictions of globalization. In D.J.
Kauffman, J.M. Parker, P.V. Howell & G.R. Doty (Eds.), Understanding international relations: The value of alternative lenses (5th ed., pp.489 -500). Boston: McGraw Hill
Sunday, November 9, 2008
Alternative theories in globalization
Anthony McGrew (2008) described globalization in terms of the massive advances in global communications, transport and informatics technologies over the past several decades, which have created worldwide interconnectedness causing transnational spread of ideas, cultures and information in an accelerating pace. The result is a world that became a single social space with global tendency evident in all sectors including economic, military, legal, ecological, cultural and social aspect.
James Rosenau (2004) contended that concept of “globalization” in the literature is elusive, with no widely accepted definition. He argued that globalization was used by different observers to describe different phenomena, with little overlap among the various usages, which he described as “”misleading”. Alternatively, Rosenau looked at globalization from a different perspective by describing globalization as the opposite of localization. He attempted to further explain globalization by drawing a comparison between the two, and by arguing that while localization is boundary-heightening, globalization on the other hand is boundary-broadening.
Rosenau added more depth to his understanding of globalization and focused on its political repercussions by noting how authoritarian regimes tend to favor localization and fragmentation over globalization because localization restricts the movement of people, goods, norms and practices and impose constraints on the exchange of new ideas, information and institutions which serve the undemocratic nature of their governing and ensure their clinging to power. However, Rosenau predicts these authoritarian governments will eventually fail and their policies are bound to be undermined with increasingly interdependent economies and communication technologies that are not easily monitored.
Rosenau in his understanding of globalization did not fail to recognize its perceived powerful and negative influence and the ability to undermine people’s culture, norms and way of life, which led many across the globe to consider the incursions of globalization a threat to their identity and cultural mores. However, Rosenau believed that there is no inherent contradiction between localizing and globalizing tendencies, and that both can coexist to a degree which will depend on ethnic and noneconomic factors actively contributing to localization. In other words, localization and globalization need not to be mutually exclusive. He believed it is possible to reconcile globalization and localization by accepting the boundary-broadening processes and make the best of them by integrating them into local customs and practices.
But what if the process of integration failed to reconcile both globalization and localization in a given culture or within a state? Rosenau shared Michael Zurn optimistic hypothesis of “uneven fragmegration” which allows for continuing pockets of antagonism between globalization and localizing tendencies hopping that eventually these pockets of fragmentations will be overcome by the opportunities and requirements of interdependence and will conform to globalization.
Rosenau argued that the failure of the states to solve “pressing problems” has led to a decline in their capabilities and a loss of legitimacy, which will undermine the people’s loyalty to their states in favor of multiple loyalties to national or transnational organizations that are able fulfill their needs.
Although Rosenau views on globalization seem to be in line with the liberal theories on cooperation by Keohane in 1984, and complex interdependence by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 1997, however, Rosenau focused on another dimension by addressing the dynamics between globalization and domestic culture and politics. Rosenau criticized the traditional theories on globalization for not offering alternative interpretations as to how the interaction of economic, political, and social dynamics will play out. Keohane and Nye (2004) explained that there are costs that comes with these interdependent relationship in globalized world, but similar to Rosenau they also argued that the benefits of this interdependence will exceed costs and each state is expected to analyze an interdependent relationship based on the potential benefits and the costs and joint gains or losses.
Neorealists like Kenneth Waltz (2004) definition of structure leaves aside questions about the cultural, economic, political, and military interactions of states.—requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another (how they are arranged or positioned).
Susan Strange in 1996 looked at another aspect of globalization, which is its relationship to state power. She argued that the state authority is retreating to the power of global economy—structural changes in world economy and society have eroded the quality of state authority, not its quantity, rendering it less influential. Strange added that the scope of states’ authority is not only limited to economy but extends to society where states are becoming unable to protect the interests of special social groups—landowners, pensioners or shareholders. Strange called her theory the “new realism”, which denied any basic distinction between domestic and international political economy, however, it remains by large open questions that require empirical research in political theorizing to substantiate it.
Contrary to liberal theories, Strange considers complex interdependence a way to conceal the reality of inequality of dependence between states and “the structural power” exercised by some states over other governments and over other societies. The same meaning was expressed by Morgenthau in 1948 when he considered the structure of international relations which assumes “sovereign equality” of all nations, is dominated by extreme inequality among nations and causing anarchy.
Moreover, Strange described international regimes as “instrument [by national governments] for the pursuit of national interest by other means” and realists’ perception obscured by extensive literature on international regimes. These views are similar to those echoed by neorealists like Kenneth Waltz (2004) who recognizes the importance of international organizations but argues that their performance is either influenced by the capabilities of the states, or they might become unable to act without the support of the states concerned with the matter at hand.
Strange cited as a paradox in the state-market balance of power “the growing intervention of state authority and of the agencies of the state in the daily lives of the citizens” in areas where “the market left to itself has never been able to provide”. However, similar to Rosenau (2004) she argued that even this role by the state is becoming “less respected and lacks its erstwhile legitimacy” and that many states are failing to fulfill these basic responsibilities.
Strange cited ten major powers where states once used to exercise their authority in areas of economic and territorial nationalism that now have declined or have been challenged by forces of global market economy. Strange argued that even states most fundamental responsibilities in taxation, building its domestic infrastructure, and providing social welfare have not been immune to changes imposed by global economy which set limits on the level of states contributions and regulations.
To conclude, I agree with Rosenau’s view that globalization and localization can accommodate each other. I believe international relations theories like realism and leftist views are not suitable to deal with a world where antagonism between globalization and the desire to maintain cultural norms, and local values is threatening world peace.
Prosperous countries like those in the Persian Gulf in addition to several other Asian countries were able to play a central role in global world economy while to large extent preserving their cultural identities and were able to integrate their norms and traditions into globalized world. With more cooperation and accommodation and “an appreciation of the reality that allows for multiple loyalties and memberships will likely widen the benefits of global economy”.
Although Susan Strange argued for the retreat of the state power in face of global world economy, however, in my opinion, there are two major challenges to Strange’s conclusions which are the current global economic meltdown and global terrorism. In order to meet challenges of global market economy, Western states have opted to limit their regulatory authorities over private enterprise, compared to their Asian counterparts. We now know that deregulations in the financial market have been one of major factors that contributed to the world’s biggest financial crisis since the great depression of 1930s. The United States now is moving towards more state interventions in the market economy, and the Democratic Party on the verge of assuming power is calling for regulations in the stock market.
Global terrorism since 1990s is representing a new type of threat within states territories which in turn reinforced the state’s responsibility for defending its citizens and the rise of nationalism and the rally around the state contradicting Strange’s assumption that there is a decline the perceived need for the state as an institution necessary to defend society against violence within or beyond its territory.
James Rosenau (2004) contended that concept of “globalization” in the literature is elusive, with no widely accepted definition. He argued that globalization was used by different observers to describe different phenomena, with little overlap among the various usages, which he described as “”misleading”. Alternatively, Rosenau looked at globalization from a different perspective by describing globalization as the opposite of localization. He attempted to further explain globalization by drawing a comparison between the two, and by arguing that while localization is boundary-heightening, globalization on the other hand is boundary-broadening.
Rosenau added more depth to his understanding of globalization and focused on its political repercussions by noting how authoritarian regimes tend to favor localization and fragmentation over globalization because localization restricts the movement of people, goods, norms and practices and impose constraints on the exchange of new ideas, information and institutions which serve the undemocratic nature of their governing and ensure their clinging to power. However, Rosenau predicts these authoritarian governments will eventually fail and their policies are bound to be undermined with increasingly interdependent economies and communication technologies that are not easily monitored.
Rosenau in his understanding of globalization did not fail to recognize its perceived powerful and negative influence and the ability to undermine people’s culture, norms and way of life, which led many across the globe to consider the incursions of globalization a threat to their identity and cultural mores. However, Rosenau believed that there is no inherent contradiction between localizing and globalizing tendencies, and that both can coexist to a degree which will depend on ethnic and noneconomic factors actively contributing to localization. In other words, localization and globalization need not to be mutually exclusive. He believed it is possible to reconcile globalization and localization by accepting the boundary-broadening processes and make the best of them by integrating them into local customs and practices.
But what if the process of integration failed to reconcile both globalization and localization in a given culture or within a state? Rosenau shared Michael Zurn optimistic hypothesis of “uneven fragmegration” which allows for continuing pockets of antagonism between globalization and localizing tendencies hopping that eventually these pockets of fragmentations will be overcome by the opportunities and requirements of interdependence and will conform to globalization.
Rosenau argued that the failure of the states to solve “pressing problems” has led to a decline in their capabilities and a loss of legitimacy, which will undermine the people’s loyalty to their states in favor of multiple loyalties to national or transnational organizations that are able fulfill their needs.
Although Rosenau views on globalization seem to be in line with the liberal theories on cooperation by Keohane in 1984, and complex interdependence by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 1997, however, Rosenau focused on another dimension by addressing the dynamics between globalization and domestic culture and politics. Rosenau criticized the traditional theories on globalization for not offering alternative interpretations as to how the interaction of economic, political, and social dynamics will play out. Keohane and Nye (2004) explained that there are costs that comes with these interdependent relationship in globalized world, but similar to Rosenau they also argued that the benefits of this interdependence will exceed costs and each state is expected to analyze an interdependent relationship based on the potential benefits and the costs and joint gains or losses.
Neorealists like Kenneth Waltz (2004) definition of structure leaves aside questions about the cultural, economic, political, and military interactions of states.—requires ignoring how units relate with one another (how they interact) and concentrating on how they stand in relation to one another (how they are arranged or positioned).
Susan Strange in 1996 looked at another aspect of globalization, which is its relationship to state power. She argued that the state authority is retreating to the power of global economy—structural changes in world economy and society have eroded the quality of state authority, not its quantity, rendering it less influential. Strange added that the scope of states’ authority is not only limited to economy but extends to society where states are becoming unable to protect the interests of special social groups—landowners, pensioners or shareholders. Strange called her theory the “new realism”, which denied any basic distinction between domestic and international political economy, however, it remains by large open questions that require empirical research in political theorizing to substantiate it.
Contrary to liberal theories, Strange considers complex interdependence a way to conceal the reality of inequality of dependence between states and “the structural power” exercised by some states over other governments and over other societies. The same meaning was expressed by Morgenthau in 1948 when he considered the structure of international relations which assumes “sovereign equality” of all nations, is dominated by extreme inequality among nations and causing anarchy.
Moreover, Strange described international regimes as “instrument [by national governments] for the pursuit of national interest by other means” and realists’ perception obscured by extensive literature on international regimes. These views are similar to those echoed by neorealists like Kenneth Waltz (2004) who recognizes the importance of international organizations but argues that their performance is either influenced by the capabilities of the states, or they might become unable to act without the support of the states concerned with the matter at hand.
Strange cited as a paradox in the state-market balance of power “the growing intervention of state authority and of the agencies of the state in the daily lives of the citizens” in areas where “the market left to itself has never been able to provide”. However, similar to Rosenau (2004) she argued that even this role by the state is becoming “less respected and lacks its erstwhile legitimacy” and that many states are failing to fulfill these basic responsibilities.
Strange cited ten major powers where states once used to exercise their authority in areas of economic and territorial nationalism that now have declined or have been challenged by forces of global market economy. Strange argued that even states most fundamental responsibilities in taxation, building its domestic infrastructure, and providing social welfare have not been immune to changes imposed by global economy which set limits on the level of states contributions and regulations.
To conclude, I agree with Rosenau’s view that globalization and localization can accommodate each other. I believe international relations theories like realism and leftist views are not suitable to deal with a world where antagonism between globalization and the desire to maintain cultural norms, and local values is threatening world peace.
Prosperous countries like those in the Persian Gulf in addition to several other Asian countries were able to play a central role in global world economy while to large extent preserving their cultural identities and were able to integrate their norms and traditions into globalized world. With more cooperation and accommodation and “an appreciation of the reality that allows for multiple loyalties and memberships will likely widen the benefits of global economy”.
Although Susan Strange argued for the retreat of the state power in face of global world economy, however, in my opinion, there are two major challenges to Strange’s conclusions which are the current global economic meltdown and global terrorism. In order to meet challenges of global market economy, Western states have opted to limit their regulatory authorities over private enterprise, compared to their Asian counterparts. We now know that deregulations in the financial market have been one of major factors that contributed to the world’s biggest financial crisis since the great depression of 1930s. The United States now is moving towards more state interventions in the market economy, and the Democratic Party on the verge of assuming power is calling for regulations in the stock market.
Global terrorism since 1990s is representing a new type of threat within states territories which in turn reinforced the state’s responsibility for defending its citizens and the rise of nationalism and the rally around the state contradicting Strange’s assumption that there is a decline the perceived need for the state as an institution necessary to defend society against violence within or beyond its territory.
Saturday, November 1, 2008
Cooperation theories in international relations
The study of conflict and cooperation has been an enduring task of scholars, with the most recent arguments being between realists and neoliberal institutionalists. Among the dominant Idealist theories that support cooperation are the Democratic Peace Theory by Bruce Russett in 1993, the Regime Theory by Robert Keohane in 1984, and the Complex Interdependence by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 1977.
Keohane (1984) focused his regime theory on cooperation in the world political economy. He stated that International coordination of policy seems highly beneficial in an interdependent economy, but cooperation in world politics is particularly difficult. Keohane’s argument is based on the need to analyze cooperation systematically within the context of international organizations and shared beliefs before its meaning can be properly understood. Thus, understanding the patterns of cooperation through concepts of international regimes will enable actors to predict future patterns of interactions among states and accordingly plan proper economic arrangements and related political activities.
Keohane stipulated that conflicts arise when actor’s policies pursued without regard for the interests of others are regarded by others as hindering the attainment of their goals. He then added that once areas of potential or actual conflicts are identified; states should then resort to cooperation by communicate with each other and coordinate in attempt to adjust their policies so they become significantly more compatible with one another. International regimes are then established to lay down a set of implicit or explicit principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures around which their expectations converge in a given area of international relations.
Since the creation of international regimes involves cooperation, each state is expected to pursue its national interests and maximize its relative gains compared to others’ when negotiating an international regime agreement. Therefore, international regimes should not be interpreted as elements of a new international order beyond the nation-state; they should be comprehended chiefly as arrangements motivated by self-interest. However, once an agreement has been reached on the principles of certain policies, states will lose part of its autonomy by having to comply with the norms and rules of the agreement
Nonetheless, states still retain their sovereignty in implementing actual policies—mainly economic—through state institutions rather than international organizations. Therefore, as Keohane contended, although the impact of the principles, norms and decision-making procedures of regimes must be exerted on national control, regimes are not of superior importance to national controls. Furthermore, Keohane explained that because world politics are decentralized and not hierarchic, sovereignty and self-help mean that the principles and rules of international regimes will necessarily be weaker than in domestic society.
Although international regimes consist of injunctions that are non specific and are simply obligations not enforceable by hierarchical legal system, some are specific enough that violations and changes can be identified.
Realists like Morgenthau downplayed the need for international institutions to maintain order—he argued that if each state pursues its respective interest in terms of power, justice will be served in dual sense—which means that states will be mindful of other states pursuing their interests as each state pursues its own interest. Robert Gilpin in his analysis of Hegemonic Stability Theory contended that maintaining transnational cooperation requires a hegemonic or dominant power to stabilize world liberal economy, while the decline of the hegemon state will cause a dramatic collapse of the system and undermines cooperation .
Neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz recognize the importance of international organizations but they argue that their performance is either influenced by the capabilities of the states, or they might become unable to act without the support of the states concerned with the matter at hand.
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) offered a theory of complex interdependence as an alternative to explain cooperation and state behavior. They tried to blend the wisdom in both realism and idealism by developing a coherent theoretical framework for the political analysis of interdependence. They defined Interdependence as mutual dependence characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries. In other words, it is a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces.
Moreover, they argued that whenever the transactions among states involve reciprocal costly effects, then this relationship can be described as interdependence. A compelling example of interdependence is the current financial crisis facing the U.S. economy and the crumpling of several of its major financial institutions and the resulting aftershocks felt in the markets across Europe and Asia. The costly global economic effects caused by bad U.S. economy led to a collective action by world leaders in order to prevent worldwide economic disaster.
Furthermore, interdependence could be symmetrical (equal) where each country enjoys an equal portion of gains and losses and which does mostly exists among industrialized nations, or asymmetrical (unequal) where the more powerful countries enjoy more benefits and fewer losses than the weaker ones which is the case between industrialized and developed countries.
According to Keohane and Nye (1977), there are three main characteristics that distinguish complex interdependence, which include; multiple channels connecting societies through interstate and transnational organizations, the absence of hierarchy among issues and a minor role of military power. Contrary to realism, interconnectedness is not only confined to formal governmental organizations and state agencies (interstate) but mainly involve transnational and transgovernmental interactions.
However, Keohane and Nye explained that interdependence restricts state autonomy, which they consider a cost that comes with interdependent relationship, but they also argue that the benefits of this interdependence will exceed costs. Each state is expected to analyze an interdependent relationship based on the potential benefits and the costs and joint gains or losses.
Morgenthau (1948) considered the structure of international relations which assumes “sovereign equality” of all nations, irrelevant to the reality of international politics which is dominated by extreme inequality among nations and causing anarchy. Therefore, he criticized interdependence for assuming sovereignty of states while in reality reinforces the control of superpowers and their exploitation of the “ministates”. Thus, classical realism and interdependence seem to be two opposing theories
Kenneth Waltz (1979) indicated that for a state to be sovereign and dependent are not contradictory. He stated that anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system’s units. Therefore, neo-realists seem to be more receptive to the idea of interdependence compared with classical realists.
Bruce Russett (1993) developed the democratic peace theory on the assumption that “democracies almost never fight each other”. Challenging the sameness of all states paradigm of realists, Russett argued that within a democracy, politics is seen as largely a nonzero-sum; by cooperating, all can gain something even if all do not gain equally.
While there is no consensus among scholars as to why democracies almost never fight each other, Russett in 1993 introduced two kinds of overlapping theories which are likely to offer explanations of this phenomenon; first is the democratic norms culture model, and the second is the structural and institutional constraints model. In the first model, Russett argued that democracies tend to resolve conflicts through cooperation and peaceful resolutions following the same culture of conflict resolution which characterizes their domestic political process, therefore violent conflicts with other democracies are rare, and even when they occur they have limited scale.
On the other hand, violent conflicts between democracies and nondemocracies will be more frequent because the latter does not abide by the same democratic roles in their domestic affairs and therefore, is more likely to use violence to settle their differences. Russett added that violent conflicts might erupt between democracies if one them still maturing in democracy or politically unstable especially at times of economic hardships.
Russet’s second model of structural and institutional constraints argues that the need to obtain the approval and the support of the public to use violence during conflict is complicated process and time consuming which will eventually reduce the likelihood that a decision will be made, and that leaders be constrained. However, since authoritarian leaders are not equally restrained, violent conflict with democracies is more frequent, and in this case both democracies and nondemocracies might initiate violence for fear of a surprise attack inflicted by the other.
Furthermore, Russett (1993) noted that the structural and institutional constraints on democracies do not prevent them from responding to sudden attacks by using emergency powers or even strike preemptively during crisis. An example of the two different types of violence used by a democracy in recent history is the war in Afghanistan in October 2001 as an immediate emergency response by the U.S. to destroy al Qaeda following the sudden attacks of September 11, while the war in Iraq in 2003 represented a preventive strike against an authoritarian state to destroy its alleged WMDs which the U.S. perceived as a threat.
To conclude, I believe Kenneth Waltz understanding of international organizations and how they work represent a more convincing depiction of the international system, while Keohane’s theory is needed to reform that system. The actions of the United Nations, the largest international regime, are constrained by the capabilities of only five permanent members of its Security Council who has the veto power—the UN cannot act without the support and the approval of these five states.
Although democratic peace theory seems to be the most promising in promoting international cooperation, however, one of the assumptions I find problematic in this theory is that it considered wars against authoritarian states both expected and legitimate, and consequently divide the world into a zone of peace, which include democracies, and zone of war which includes authoritarian states. This classification is troubling because during war there will be no distinction between authoritarian regimes and the people in these states who are mostly governed against their will and who will more likely pay the price of any given conflict. I believe promoting democracy in these countries and pressuring these regimes to reform will empower the people who live under authoritarian regimes to rise up against their leaders and demand freedom and democracy.
Keohane (1984) focused his regime theory on cooperation in the world political economy. He stated that International coordination of policy seems highly beneficial in an interdependent economy, but cooperation in world politics is particularly difficult. Keohane’s argument is based on the need to analyze cooperation systematically within the context of international organizations and shared beliefs before its meaning can be properly understood. Thus, understanding the patterns of cooperation through concepts of international regimes will enable actors to predict future patterns of interactions among states and accordingly plan proper economic arrangements and related political activities.
Keohane stipulated that conflicts arise when actor’s policies pursued without regard for the interests of others are regarded by others as hindering the attainment of their goals. He then added that once areas of potential or actual conflicts are identified; states should then resort to cooperation by communicate with each other and coordinate in attempt to adjust their policies so they become significantly more compatible with one another. International regimes are then established to lay down a set of implicit or explicit principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures around which their expectations converge in a given area of international relations.
Since the creation of international regimes involves cooperation, each state is expected to pursue its national interests and maximize its relative gains compared to others’ when negotiating an international regime agreement. Therefore, international regimes should not be interpreted as elements of a new international order beyond the nation-state; they should be comprehended chiefly as arrangements motivated by self-interest. However, once an agreement has been reached on the principles of certain policies, states will lose part of its autonomy by having to comply with the norms and rules of the agreement
Nonetheless, states still retain their sovereignty in implementing actual policies—mainly economic—through state institutions rather than international organizations. Therefore, as Keohane contended, although the impact of the principles, norms and decision-making procedures of regimes must be exerted on national control, regimes are not of superior importance to national controls. Furthermore, Keohane explained that because world politics are decentralized and not hierarchic, sovereignty and self-help mean that the principles and rules of international regimes will necessarily be weaker than in domestic society.
Although international regimes consist of injunctions that are non specific and are simply obligations not enforceable by hierarchical legal system, some are specific enough that violations and changes can be identified.
Realists like Morgenthau downplayed the need for international institutions to maintain order—he argued that if each state pursues its respective interest in terms of power, justice will be served in dual sense—which means that states will be mindful of other states pursuing their interests as each state pursues its own interest. Robert Gilpin in his analysis of Hegemonic Stability Theory contended that maintaining transnational cooperation requires a hegemonic or dominant power to stabilize world liberal economy, while the decline of the hegemon state will cause a dramatic collapse of the system and undermines cooperation .
Neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz recognize the importance of international organizations but they argue that their performance is either influenced by the capabilities of the states, or they might become unable to act without the support of the states concerned with the matter at hand.
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) offered a theory of complex interdependence as an alternative to explain cooperation and state behavior. They tried to blend the wisdom in both realism and idealism by developing a coherent theoretical framework for the political analysis of interdependence. They defined Interdependence as mutual dependence characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries. In other words, it is a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces.
Moreover, they argued that whenever the transactions among states involve reciprocal costly effects, then this relationship can be described as interdependence. A compelling example of interdependence is the current financial crisis facing the U.S. economy and the crumpling of several of its major financial institutions and the resulting aftershocks felt in the markets across Europe and Asia. The costly global economic effects caused by bad U.S. economy led to a collective action by world leaders in order to prevent worldwide economic disaster.
Furthermore, interdependence could be symmetrical (equal) where each country enjoys an equal portion of gains and losses and which does mostly exists among industrialized nations, or asymmetrical (unequal) where the more powerful countries enjoy more benefits and fewer losses than the weaker ones which is the case between industrialized and developed countries.
According to Keohane and Nye (1977), there are three main characteristics that distinguish complex interdependence, which include; multiple channels connecting societies through interstate and transnational organizations, the absence of hierarchy among issues and a minor role of military power. Contrary to realism, interconnectedness is not only confined to formal governmental organizations and state agencies (interstate) but mainly involve transnational and transgovernmental interactions.
However, Keohane and Nye explained that interdependence restricts state autonomy, which they consider a cost that comes with interdependent relationship, but they also argue that the benefits of this interdependence will exceed costs. Each state is expected to analyze an interdependent relationship based on the potential benefits and the costs and joint gains or losses.
Morgenthau (1948) considered the structure of international relations which assumes “sovereign equality” of all nations, irrelevant to the reality of international politics which is dominated by extreme inequality among nations and causing anarchy. Therefore, he criticized interdependence for assuming sovereignty of states while in reality reinforces the control of superpowers and their exploitation of the “ministates”. Thus, classical realism and interdependence seem to be two opposing theories
Kenneth Waltz (1979) indicated that for a state to be sovereign and dependent are not contradictory. He stated that anarchy entails relations of coordination among a system’s units. Therefore, neo-realists seem to be more receptive to the idea of interdependence compared with classical realists.
Bruce Russett (1993) developed the democratic peace theory on the assumption that “democracies almost never fight each other”. Challenging the sameness of all states paradigm of realists, Russett argued that within a democracy, politics is seen as largely a nonzero-sum; by cooperating, all can gain something even if all do not gain equally.
While there is no consensus among scholars as to why democracies almost never fight each other, Russett in 1993 introduced two kinds of overlapping theories which are likely to offer explanations of this phenomenon; first is the democratic norms culture model, and the second is the structural and institutional constraints model. In the first model, Russett argued that democracies tend to resolve conflicts through cooperation and peaceful resolutions following the same culture of conflict resolution which characterizes their domestic political process, therefore violent conflicts with other democracies are rare, and even when they occur they have limited scale.
On the other hand, violent conflicts between democracies and nondemocracies will be more frequent because the latter does not abide by the same democratic roles in their domestic affairs and therefore, is more likely to use violence to settle their differences. Russett added that violent conflicts might erupt between democracies if one them still maturing in democracy or politically unstable especially at times of economic hardships.
Russet’s second model of structural and institutional constraints argues that the need to obtain the approval and the support of the public to use violence during conflict is complicated process and time consuming which will eventually reduce the likelihood that a decision will be made, and that leaders be constrained. However, since authoritarian leaders are not equally restrained, violent conflict with democracies is more frequent, and in this case both democracies and nondemocracies might initiate violence for fear of a surprise attack inflicted by the other.
Furthermore, Russett (1993) noted that the structural and institutional constraints on democracies do not prevent them from responding to sudden attacks by using emergency powers or even strike preemptively during crisis. An example of the two different types of violence used by a democracy in recent history is the war in Afghanistan in October 2001 as an immediate emergency response by the U.S. to destroy al Qaeda following the sudden attacks of September 11, while the war in Iraq in 2003 represented a preventive strike against an authoritarian state to destroy its alleged WMDs which the U.S. perceived as a threat.
To conclude, I believe Kenneth Waltz understanding of international organizations and how they work represent a more convincing depiction of the international system, while Keohane’s theory is needed to reform that system. The actions of the United Nations, the largest international regime, are constrained by the capabilities of only five permanent members of its Security Council who has the veto power—the UN cannot act without the support and the approval of these five states.
Although democratic peace theory seems to be the most promising in promoting international cooperation, however, one of the assumptions I find problematic in this theory is that it considered wars against authoritarian states both expected and legitimate, and consequently divide the world into a zone of peace, which include democracies, and zone of war which includes authoritarian states. This classification is troubling because during war there will be no distinction between authoritarian regimes and the people in these states who are mostly governed against their will and who will more likely pay the price of any given conflict. I believe promoting democracy in these countries and pressuring these regimes to reform will empower the people who live under authoritarian regimes to rise up against their leaders and demand freedom and democracy.
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