The role of Moderate Islamists in the fight against terrorism, case study of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

The attacks of September 11, 2001, the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq, and the war on terror, mainly Islamist terrorism, have strained the relations with the Muslim world, which considered the US and the West at war with Islam. Part of the failure of the US strategy to engage the Muslim world in the war on terror is the lack of a clear strategy that distinguishes between moderate and radical Islamists. By lumping both radicals and moderates in one basket, the US policy makers and the West have alienated a large number of the Muslims who supported moderate Islamists in general elections, and considered them the hope to change the status quo in the Middle East and end corruption and oppression.

Moderate Islamists can be an effective partner in the fight against terrorism, for their enmity to radical Islamists and the stark differences in their ideologies. Most Mideast analysts would agree that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, is the most popular and the most formidable grassroots organization in the Islamic world (Walsh, p. 84), and is also a safety valve for moderate Islam (Leiken, p. 6), seeking to translate the abstract theoretical principles of Islamic governance into a practical political platform (Rutherford, p. 707). Moderate Islamists with their effective strategies to combat radicalism, while wining the hearts and minds in their constituencies, can serve well the goals of the fight against international Islamist terrorism. Furthermore cooperation [between MB and US] in specific areas of mutual interest—such as opposition to al Qaeda, the encouragement of democracy, and resistance to expanding Iranian influence—could well be feasible (Leiken, p.14)

Terrorism remains the primary national security challenge confronting the United States and will be for many years (Hamilton, 2005, p. 379). Until the 19th century, religion provided the only justification of terrorism. Then the emergence of the notions of nationalism and self-determination at the beginning of the 19th century, and the growing popularity of radical political thought, embracing Marxist ideology completed the transformation of terrorism from a mostly religious to a predominately secular phenomenon (Hoffman, p. 84). This process of “secularization” was given fresh impetus by the anticolonical/national liberation movements that arose after the Second World War to challenge continued Western rule in Asia, the ME, and Africa and subsequently exerted so profound an influence on ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideological terrorist organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s (p. 84). While terrorism and religion share a long history, this manifestation was overshadowed by ethno-nationalist/separatist and ideologically motivated terrorism. At the height of the cold war, when the majority of terrorist groups (eight) were left-wing, revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideological organizations, the remaining three-including the various constituent groups of the PLO—reflected the emergence of the first postcolonial ethno-nationalist/separatist organizations (p. 85). It was not until 1980—as a result of the repercussions of the revolution in Iran the previous year—did the first “modern” religious terrorist groups appear

The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the resurgence of religious terrorism by radical Islamic movements, made it important for policy makers to realize the difference in ideology these groups have with moderate and mainstream Islamic movements (Walsh, 2003, p.82). Mideast experts, following 911, argued that force alone has not resulted in the defeat of terrorism and that diplomatic initiatives directed at coaxing local leaders to encourage or implement change have not yielded the expected effects. As a consequence, these experts favor a “new” idea—namely, bringing the Islamist movements into the political processes of the individual countries of the region. The United States and its allies should therefore encourage Islamists to participate in democratic reforms (Hoveyda, 2005, p. 119)

The dramatic events that followed the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran brought concept of contemporary political Islam to the forefront of the world’s attention. Journalists, scholars, and other specialists have developed and are continuing to create concepts and a vocabulary to describe the Muslim world and its relationship to the West. The use of the adjective moderate to describe some Muslim leaders and movements is one example of this phenomenon (Hoveyda, 2001, p. 53).

The phrase “moderate Islamists” as opposed to “hard-line Islamists” was first introduced by American journalist of Middle East origin, Geneive Abdo. Until then “Islamist” used as both a noun and an adjective designated Muslims who adhered to the more fundamentalist and extremist views than those of mainstream. Therefore, from that perspective, an Islamist, by definition, is an extremist and cannot be labeled a moderate (Hoveyda, 2001, p. 53)

Especially after 9/11, the phrase “moderate Islamist” is often used in the literature and media to refer to movements of political Islam which reject global jihad while embracing elections and other features of democracy (Leiken, 2007, p. 2), and an extension to the 19th century’s reform ideologies of prominent scholars such as Muhammad Abdoh and Jamal-ed-Din Afghani, who had traveled to Europe, became convinced of the necessity of reforming certain parts of the theological interpretations in light of modern scientific knowledge (Hoveyda, 2001, p. 55)

Most Mideast analysts would agree that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, is the most popular and the most formidable grassroots organization in the Islamic world (Walsh, p. 84), and has also became a safety valve for moderate Islam (Leiken, p. 6), seeking to translate the abstract theoretical principles of Islamic governance into a practical political platform (Rutherford, p. 707). The Brotherhood differs from earlier reformers by combining a profoundly Islamic ideology with modern grass-roots political activism (Leiken, p.2)

In contrast, radical Islamists, or Jihadists, movements, which developed in an unchanged environment steeped in fundamentalism since the twelfth century, and influenced by scholars such as ibn Taymiyya (fourteenth century, Syria); and Abdal Wahhab (eighteenth century, Arabia) (Hoveyda, 2005, p. 506). These ‘‘extremists’’ are often called Salafis, whose central ideas were crystallized in the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya. Its adherents seek to transform the Muslim community and ensure that Islam as a system of belief and governance will eventually dominate the globe (p. 509)


Shamuel Bar in 2004, argued that radical interpretation of Islamic teachings has become a source of terrorism committed by militant Islamists, which constitute the lion share of terrorists acts and the most devastating of them (p. 27). According to Bar, “radical leaders of Islamist Jihadist-type movements used deeply ingrained religious beliefs to motivate Islamist terrorists and provide them with religious and moral justification to sanction their actions” (p. 28)

Therefore, Bar contended, it’s important to recognize these cultural and religious sources of radical Islamic ideology and address them in order to develop an effective counterterrorism strategy, and without such recognition the war on terror will doom to failure (p. 28 & p .36)

The Islamic Awakening of the early twentieth century, which emerged in response to Western imperialism and colonization, led to the revival of the more “traditional” or “fundamental” form of Islam as a religion and governing system (din wa dawla), where no area of human activity is outside its remit (pp. 28-29). Fundamentalists saw that the decay of the Muslim nations caused by their deviation from the original mores of Islam (p. 28). “Perfection lies in the ways of the Prophet and the events of his time” (p.29) without taking into consideration historical circumstances and developments.

Therefore, in this radical Islamist worldview, the world was dichotomized into two opposing worlds, the House of Islam (Dar al-Islam—i.e. the Muslim countries) and the House of War (Dar al-Harb—non Muslim countries) as it was the case when Islam first appeared (p. 29). The military form of global Jihad was then declared when the Soviets (infidels) invaded Afghanistan in 1980s, which ended with spectacular victory over a superpower. The triumph of Jihadists in Afghanistan and the collapse of the USSR galvanized militant Islamists who argued that the renewal of Jihad against infidels “will result in the rule of Islam in the world” (p. 30)

Fatwas (religious decrees) by religious scholars stipulating that Jihad is a “personal duty” played pivotal role encouraging radicalism and building support for radicals within the traditional Islamic community (p. 32). The controversial concept of irreversibility of Islamic identity –individual or territory—was also instigated by radicals to support their ideology of militant Jihad and to open more fronts not only with non Muslim states but also with apostate Muslims (p. 29)


The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic radicals share the same long-term goals of implementing Shari’a laws as the basis of national law (Walsh, p. 82). However, Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy (Leiken, p. 2). Even among pro-terrorist tendencies within Islamist politics one must be careful not to create artificial uniformity (Schwartz, p. 283). The MB has committed itself to working within the current Egyptian system to achieve this objective and renounces—at least in its official statements—the violent tactics of militant splinter groups such as al-Gama’at al –Islamiyyah and al-Jihad (Walsh, p. 82). It offered the important message that Egyptians can return to “true” Islam and still be materially comfortable (p. 84)


It is important as we are trying to identify the enemy we are fighting (Hamilton, p. 380), to make the distinction between moderate and radical Islamists in order to win the fight against terrorism, but without losing the public support in the Muslim world, which is increasingly rallying behind the moderates in their respective countries for various domestic reasons. Distinction between “Islamist” and “radical Islamist” is as significant as the distinction between “reformer” and “revolutionary” in the contemporary United States (Walsh, p. 36). Islamists are not monolith and lumping them all together in the basket of “radicals” and “terrorists” will hamper the efforts to combat the real roots of terrorism and complicate the efforts to seek common ground with the Muslim world. Leiken and Brook argued in 2007 how the “nuance is lost in much of current Western discourse. Herding these different “beasts” into a single conceptual corral labeled “Salafi” or “Wahhabi” ignores the differences and fault lines between them—and has thwarted strategic thinking as a result” (p. 6)


In their 2007’s study of the “moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, Leiken and Brook elaborated further on the use of various nomenclatures and its different interpretation in Western and Middle Eastern literature. For example they explained that “When we asked Muslim Brothers in the Middle East and Europe whether they considered themselves Salafists (as they are frequently identified), they usually met our question with a Clintonian response: “That depends on what your definition of Salafist is.” If by Salafism we meant the modernist, renaissance Islam of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh (turn-of-the-twentieth-century reformers who influenced Banna), then yes, they were Salafists. Yet the ubiquitous Web site www.salafipublications.com, which is run by Salafists who believe that religion should never mix with politics and that existing rulers should be supported almost unconditionally, attacks Afghani and Abduh for being “far away from the Salafi aqidah [creed].” (This is the view, for obvious reasons, of the Saudi religious establishment.) Such “pietists,” most of whom were trained in official Saudi institutions, argue that the Brotherhood’s participation in politics has converted them into the “Bankrupt Brotherhood.”According to one, “The Muslim Brothers have political goals and strategies, which induce them to make concessions to the West. For us, the Salafists, the goal is purely religious.” (p. 6)


Hamilton in 2005, identified five essential elements in order to win the fight against terrorism; these five elements or five I’s” include: identification, integration, international, intelligence, and implementation. He argued the identifying the threat and knowing who the enemy is and therefore designing a strategy to confront it remains one of the most important of these elements (p. 379)

Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission listed al Qaeda, and other Jihadist groups inspired by its radical ideology, as the main terrorist threat to national security. Beyond these groups there are 1.3 billion Muslims around the world, many of whom may be empathetic to the jihadist agenda, even if they disagree with their violent methods. Therefore, it is the ideology of radical Islam that poses a grave and gathering threat, not simply individuals or groups who can be hunted and destroyed. This ideology joins anti-American political grievances with a radical strain of Islam. Sadly, this ideology reaches many Muslims: those who are hopeless or unsettled by modernity; people who hate America and their own repressive governments, and that is why the threat is bigger than just al Qaeda (Hamilton, p. 381)


Therefore, in order to prevail over the ideology of radical Islamists that breeds terrorism, we cannot rely solely on massive military force (Schwartz, p. 291) instead we must implement a comprehensive strategy that uses all elements of America power (Hamilton, p. 382). Failure to address the political and sociological causes of terrorist recruitment will only lengthen the life of and increase the effectiveness of terrorist groups (Schwartz, p. 291)


Moreover, fighting wars against states with significant Islamic populations will curtail security cooperation with states in the Islamic world (Schwartz, p. 285) and enrage its people. However, lethal military force remains crucial to win the struggle against active terrorists by relying on target killing or apprehending them through Special Forces operations. The large number of civilian casualties caused by conventional wars between states is likely to be self-defeating, as they potentially enlarge the recruitment pool for terrorist groups. And such ‘‘collateral damage’’ can be ethically justified only if such attacks were absolutely necessary to curtail terrorism and if the casualties were unintended, as well as unavoidable in achieving a particular military objective (that is, in accord with the just-war doctrine of ‘‘double effects’’). The civilian casualties from high-altitude bombing in Afghanistan were not absolutely necessary to uproot Al Qaeda and its Taliban government hosts (the use of more ground troops would have been ethically preferable (Schwarz, p. 286)


The 9/11 Commission recommended that combating terrorism must rest on an effective strategy to isolate radical Islamists by engaging the people across Muslim world in the battle for ideas, and show them that we are on their side. Right now, millions of Muslims grow up lacking political freedom, economic opportunity, and hope, and suffering at hand of governments, including U.S. allies, which repress their populations and deny them political participation (Hamilton, p. 384)

Isolating radical Islamist ideology without alienating public Muslim opinion can be best achieved by empowering moderate Islamists and pragmatics who are, because of their knowledge of Islamic thinking and ideologies and their increasing public support are better suited to debate radical elements within their societies. The exact same meaning was uttered by the leader of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party in Jordan, said that his group outdoes the government in discouraging jihad: “We’re better able to conduct an intellectual confrontation, and not a security confrontation, with the forces of extremism and fanaticism.” (Leiken, p. 7). Especially when repressive and undemocratic governments can be a major source of radicalization of the young people which ultimately breeds terrorism.


Historically, oppression of moderate Islamists by their governments has resulted in waves of radicalization. According to Schwartz, 2004, the origins of pan-Islamic global terror partly derived from U.S.-backed regimes suppressing their moderate Islamist political opposition. Then in the late 1970s, Sadat’s brutal suppression of a fairly moderate Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi hostility to any religiously inspired dissent, and Algerian suppression of the Islamic Salvation Front engendered a pan-Islamic political sensibility, as nationally based Islamist parties were no longer viable (p. 282).


Walsh, in 2003, added that because the United States has long condoned the anti-terror campaigns in several Middle East countries; an unfortunate consequence is that though the threat to the regimes from the radicals has been successfully contained, these government continue to receive an international mandate for repression of all dissident Islamic groups, not only the violent ones (p. 82). These governments’ main goal is not to combat terrorism, but rather oppress their political rivals who happened to be moderate Islamists to ensure their continuous grip on power


Furthermore, the suppression of Islamist politics by secularist, often pro-Western regimes and the failure of both Arab socialist and Arab nationalist projects helped introduce global and anti-American elements into the strategy of ‘‘lesser jihad” (p. 282). Therefore, as Schwartz argued, the United States would be more likely to enhance its security through diplomatic and economic pressures in favor of liberalizing Middle Eastern and South Asian regimes, pressuring not just for more liberal treatment of secular dissidents but also for the expansion of political space for nonviolent Islamist movements (p. 284). Leaders who are cooperating with the West in general and with the United States in particular are doing so out of fear of their own people or their rivals at the helm of government in other Muslim countries. By supporting such rulers unconditionally, the United States is ensuring that it will be harmed when the people in the area turn against them and drive them from power (Hoveyda, 2001, p. 51)


Hoveyda in 2005 argued that in addition to the military force we are using in our own defense, we must find appropriate ways to isolate radicals inside the Arab world and to expose the dangers of their ideology for the Arabs themselves (p. 122). Rutherford in 2006 explained how moderate Islamist scholars, mainly in Egypt, with their contemporary interpretations of Islam can help bridge the gaps that divide the Muslim world and Western civilization and remove some of the roots of radicalization and terrorism. These moderate, reconciliatory, and most importantly “authentic” interpretations of Islam are the West’s best hope to end hostilities with the Muslim world and isolate radicals. Once isolated, these radicals can be apprehended or even killed with little sympathy from the public.

For well over a century, Egypt has been an important center for legal thinkers seeking to adapt Islam to the challenges of contemporary governance. This effort began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the works of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, and Rashid Rida. It continues today with a new generation of Islamic thinkers. The most important figures in this effort are Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Tariq al-Bishri, Kamal Abu al-Majd, and Muhammad Salim al-'Awwa (Rutherford, p. 708). They are influential among the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly the "new guard" of younger leaders who have grown more powerful within the organization in recent years. Raymond Baker argues that they constitute a coherent school of Islamic reformist thought that he calls the "New Islamists”

These moderate Islamists argue that the Qur'an and Sunna (teachings of the Prophet Mohamed) are silent on many specifics of running a state and, thus, man-made law is needed to manage the details of day-to-day governance. Therefore, unlike radical Islamists, they favor the creation of man-made laws as long as they are compatible with Shari'a. (Rutherford, p. 711). Abu al-Majd argues that Shari'a plays the same role in Islamic legal thought that natural law plays in the American constitutional tradition. It defines the purposes of state power and delineates its boundaries. Within these boundaries, rulers and citizens are free to develop specific laws that respond to the needs of their community (p. 712)

Moderate Islamists believe that state power must be restrained, the government must be held accountable (Rutherford, p. 713), the political authority lies with the people and they are entitled to select their ruler and should participate in day-to-day governance (p. 714). They also believe that these ideas are best realized in contemporary political life through democratic institutions. These institutions include:

Elections: support for selecting public officials through free elections. Each citizen has a religious obligation to vote, since he has a religious duty to convey his knowledge of the candidate for office.

Political Parties: the theorists also endorse the creation of multiple political parties. Al-'Awwa adds that the presence of multiple parties reflects the principle of tolerance of dissent, which he considers fundamental to the faith. He concludes that, "The existence of political parties ... is necessary for the advancement [of Islamic societies] and for freedom of opinion within them, and to ensure the absence of oppression” (p. 715)

Parliament: The Islamic constitutionalists argue that a parliament is the most effective institution for enabling the public to participate in the drafting of laws in those areas where the Shari'a is silent (p. 716)


Rutherford added that moderate Islamist thinkers note that they borrow these institutions from Western democracies. However, each stresses that this borrowing is done in a highly selective manner. Al-Qaradawi's view is typical when he writes that the Islamic world must "take the best elements of democracy without seeking to duplicate it". The central goals of an Islamic state are to enhance justice and oppose tyranny. At this moment in history, democratic institutions are the best means for achieving these goals and, thus, democracy "is the form of government that is closest to Islam.'" However, democracy in an Islamic context must operate within the ethical framework defined by Shari'a. It must not lead to laws that allow what is forbidden in Islam (such as adultery or alcohol consumption) or prohibit what is required (p. 716)


Furthermore, moderate Islamists stress the importance of justice and freedom of choice in Islam, however, al-'Awwa adds an important caveat: the freedom to leave the Islamic faith is restricted. The Qur'an clearly declares that apostasy is a sin, although it does not specify a penalty. Freedom of thought, inquiry, and speech are essential to the full expression of each Muslim's faith." In addition, al-'Awwa proposes that each Muslim bears an obligation to "enjoin good and forbid evil" within the community. In order to fulfill this obligation, each Muslim must be free to speak out against evil and corruption. Speaking out in this manner is a religious duty and, thus, freedom of speech is divinely sanctioned and mandated (Rutherford, p. 716)


Al-Qaradawi offers the most detailed discussion of women’s rights. He stresses that women have the same duties as men, and that they play an important role in the life of the community. Trying to exclude them from public life "is like trying to breathe with one lung or fly with one wing (Rutherford, p. 716). In his view, women should be allowed to vote and to hold public office (p. 717), and be permitted to hold positions of authority, including the posts of judge and head of state (p. 718). They also advocate protecting the rights of non-Muslims. "No compulsion in religion." (Quran, 2:256). Al-'Awwa makes essentially the same argument, and proposes that sectarian strife has risen in recent years because of political opportunism by trouble makers on both sides (p. 718)


Moderate Islamists, therefore, share core beliefs of liberal democracy. They support freedom of choice and expression, rule of law, political participation and protect the rights of women and non-Muslims. The Muslim Brotherhood has frequently dismissed the notion of an incompatibility between Islam and democracy (Walsh, p. 85). Brotherhood seeks to create a "republican system of government that is democratic, constitutional, and parliamentary and that conforms to Islamic principles." (Rutherford, p. 721)

The Brotherhood’s evolving social network is probably more responsible than anything else for the enormous power the organization could now wield in an open election. These services are compatible with the organization’s Islamist message and thus can serve as an important counterbalance to the supposedly divinely-sanctioned violence of al Gama’ at and al-Jihad (Walsh, p. 84). The MB followed the path of toleration and eventually came to find democracy compatible with its notion of slow Islamization. An Islamic society, the idea goes, will naturally desire Islamic leaders and support them at the ballot box. The MB also repeatedly justified democracy on Islamic grounds by certifying that “the umma [the Muslim community] is the source of sulta [political authority].” In pursuit of popular authority, the Brotherhood has formed electoral alliances with secularists, nationalists, and liberals. Therefore, jihadists view the Brotherhood’s embrace of democracy as blasphemy (Leiken, p. 4)

Instead of the Madrasahs models, run by radicals and Jihadists, which teach students intolerance and radicalism, and even deny girls education, the Egyptian MB created modern schools, where boys and girls are offered equal opportunities for education, learned foreign languages and taught to be effective members in societies. The MB works to dissuade Muslims from violence, instead channeling them into politics and charitable activities (Leiken, p. 6)


Moderate Islamists reject terrorism, violence and killing of innocent civilians who are not involved in combat. As Robert Leiken and Steven Brook argued in 2007, the MB itself played a role in resisting radicalization within its own ranks, when “Sayyid Qutb, then the MB’s most profound thinker, and in response to extreme oppression by Nasser’s regime, produced an answer that would echo into the twenty-first century: these were the acts of apostates, kafireen. Accordingly, the torturers and their regime were legitimate targets of jihad. But from his own cell, Hudaybi (MB General Guide) disputed Qutb’s conclusion. Only God, he believed, could judge faith. He rejected takfir (the act of declaring another Muslim an apostate), arguing that “whoever judges that someone is no longer a Muslim ... deviates from Islam and transgresses God’s will by judging another person’s faith.”Within the Brotherhood, Hudaybi’s tolerant view—in line with Banna’s founding vision—prevailed, cementing the group’s moderate vocation. But it appalled the takfiris, who streamed out of the Brotherhood. Qutb, who breathed his last on Nasser’s gallows in 1966, went on to become the prophet and martyr of jihad. “Qutb has influenced all those interested in jihad throughout the Islamic world,” said a founding member of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, an erstwhile jihadist group known for its vicious campaign against foreign tourists in Egypt during the 1980s. “The Brothers,” he continued sadly, “have abandoned the ideas of Sayyid Qutb.” (Leiken, p. 4)


Leiken and Brook further reputed a common myth accusing the MB, and movements of moderate Islam of spawning other terrorist groups. They argued that “having lost the internal struggle for the Brotherhood, the radicals regrouped outside it, in sects that sought to topple regimes throughout the Muslim world. (Groups such as al Jihad would furnish the Egyptian core of al Qaeda.) These jihadists view the Brotherhood’s embrace of democracy as blasphemy. Channeling Qutb, they argue that any government not ruling solely by sharia is apostate; democracy is not just a mistaken tactic but also an unforgivable sin, because it gives humans sovereignty over Allah. Osama bin Laden’s lieutenant, Zawahiri, calls it “the deification of the people.”Abu Hamza al-Masri, the one-eyed radical cleric who presided over London’s notorious Finsbury Park mosque, considers democracy “the call of self-divinity loud and clear, in which the rights of one group of people, who have put their idea to vote, have put their ideas and their decisions over the decisions of Allah.” Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (whom a recent West Point study found to be the most influential living jihadist thinker) inveighs, “Democracy is obvious polytheism and thus just the kind of infidelity that Allah warns against, in His Book.” (Leiken, p. 5). In London, Brotherhood leaders contrasted their approach to that of radical groups, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (ht), that “seek to bring society to a boiling point.” (Leiken, p. 7)


On the other hand, the MB’s success in elections, professional syndicates and social support institutions led to harsh response from the Egyptian government from the mid-1980s, onward. Initially, in 1981, Mubarak offered the MB olive branch, legitimizing it as the primary representative of centrist Islamism, which place militants outside the mainstream. Once they are isolated, he can take forceful measures against them with little protest from Egyptian sympathetic to centrist Islamists (Walsh, p. 82)


However, the MB gained popularity and penetrated professional and student association. In 1990s, the brotherhood had taken over nearly all of the prominent associations. The Brotherhood exploited the longstanding alienation of young, educated Egyptian professionals who had been guaranteed government jobs upon graduation since the days of Nasser but had become heavy burden on the state. The social support network that the Brotherhood had cultivated as the third wing of their campaign during this period was an enormous draw for these professionals; the Brotherhood offered full health insurance and other considerable welfare benefits that no other organization could provide (Walsh, p. 83). The MB experience in the past 20 years have suggested that it may be more capable of providing social services to the Egyptian population, more reliable in keeping the promises it has made, and even more democratic than the secular regime that has enjoyed consistent US support (Walsh, p. 82)


Therefore, and in order to undercut the MB’s chances of presenting itself as viable alternative to the dysfunctional government, Mubarak took measures to crackdown on MB activities that would show a lack of rigid discrimination between radicals and moderates, and very possibly Mubarak’s recognition of the moderates as the greater political threat. In the remainder of the 1990s, there were violent outbreaks that erased the distinction between radicals and moderate Islamists in Egyptian government policy. Warfare erupted between the government and Islamic radicals from al-Gama’at al-Islamiyyah and al-Jihad, launching series of terrorist attacks between 1995-1997, after the Gulf War. The government’s campaign against Islamic radicals succeeded in isolating the violence, but also struck the MB. The regime arrested a number of civic officials, academics, former parliamentarians, and members of professional syndicates

In 2001 and 2002, when several younger MB leaders who were imprisoned in 1995, were released and resumed their positions in the organization. Another turning point occurred in 2004, when the 84-year-old General Guide Ma'mun al-Hudaybi passed away. Al-Hudaybi had been one of the most eminent members of the old guard. His death marked the beginning of a transition toward a new generation of leadership. While the younger generation was not permitted to take the top spot, two of its most respected leaders — Muhammad Habib and Khayrat al-Shatir — were promoted to the post of Deputy General Guide. The new General Guide, Muhammad 'Akif, publicly endorsed the moderate political views articulated by the younger generation (Rutherford, p. 721)


Despite of the MB tolerance and moderation facing increasing repression by the Egyptian government; Egypt’s interior minister said to The Economist,” The Brotherhood is a greater threat to the safety of the state than the terrorists and the militant groups. We are determined not to go Algeria’s way”. In 1994, Mubarak told The New Yorker “The Middle East terrorism is a by-product of our own illegal Muslim Brotherhood” (Walsh, p. 84), despite of lack of evidence that supports the MB violent tendencies (p. 85). MB leader Ahmed Hassanein insists that the Brotherhood has never ordered an act of terrorism, even during the organization’s truly underground days in the peak of the Nasser revolutions. Even today, there have been no concrete links made between acts of terrorism and anyone who might be construed an official of the MB. The Brotherhood does not deny, however, that members of the organization have committed radical acts. Just because the Brotherhood shares the same long-term goal as radical group does not necessarily mean there is an overlap in their short-term methods, and at this point there is no evidence to undermine the Brotherhood’s peaceful rhetoric (p. 86).


According to Leiken & Brook “The Brotherhood claims success at sifting radicalism out of its ranks through organizational discipline and a painstaking educational program. (One Muslim Brother noted that the organization’s motto could be “Listen and Obey.”) If a Muslim Brother wishes to commit violence, he generally leaves the organization to do so. That said, a number of militants have passed through the Brotherhood since its inception, and the path from the Brotherhood to jihad is not buried in sand. Defections have historically occurred when the organization has faced a conjunction of internal and external pressures, as when the takfiri element emerged under repression to produce the Egyptian jihadist movement. Today, however, Brothers who leave the organization are more likely to join the moderate center rather than to take up jihad” (p. 7)


Few of the vices the Western world seeks to combat in the Middle East apply to the Brotherhood, but many of them do apply to the Egyptian regime, which has unquestionably failed to deliver meaningful economic relief to an extremely poor population, remains undemocratic, and uses violence in an arbitrary fashion. In this light, the gap between Western and centrist Islamist interest seems significantly less difficult to close (Walsh, p. 86). Furthermore cooperation [between MB and US] in specific areas of mutual interest—such as opposition to al Qaeda, the encouragement of democracy, and resistance to expanding Iranian influence—could well be feasible (Leiken, p.14)



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Anti-terrorism lessons from the Libya case

Gawdat Bahgat in 2004, argued that the ongoing transformation of Libya, from a “pariah state” (p. 374, & p. 386) refusing to abide by international norms and laws (p. 390), and a state-sponsoring terrorism, into a partner in the fight against terrorism, engaging fully in multilateral economic and political relations with the rest of the world, represents the first time in the history of the international struggle against modern terrorism that the international community has succeeded in imposing and enforcing effective sanctions against a terrorism-sponsoring state under the auspices of the UNSC (p. 384). Furthermore, Ray Takeyh in 2004 contended “the Libya case can provide a model for how to deal with a revolutionary regime that has grown weary of its isolation and ostracism” (p. 72)


Libya’s strained relations with the West began shortly after September of 1969, when the 27 years old Mu’ammar el-Qaddafi, seized power toppling the conservative monarchy of King Idris. As young revolutionary, el-Qaddafi had ambitions to assume the leadership position in the Arab world once held by late Egyptian President and Arab nationalist Gamal abdel Nassar (1954-1970), which led him to direct his anger at what he perceived as “Western injustice” (Bahgat, p. 390), and blaming the West for the Arab world’s problems. Libya also provided terrorist groups throughout the world with money and arms; on top of them was the PLO, which was regarded by all Arab countries as liberation movement (p. 383). Libya’s policies as revolutionary state was similar to other revolutionary regimes in the Middle East like Egypt’s Nasser, Iran, and Iraq, which traditionally antagonized Western interests in the region and allied themselves with terrorist groups they considered liberation movements (p. 374 & 383).


John Cooley argued in 1981 explained how the US oil companies have helped create the conditions that led to Qaddafi’s seize of power in 1969 by supporting and allying themselves in the public eye with the corrupt Libyan elite (p. 74 & 78). Therefore, the US administration initially accepted Qaddafi’s regime, praising his anticommunist ideology and anti-Soviet rhetoric, and showed no sympathy to the ousted king (p. 81). The Nixon administration was also pleased when Qaddafi denounced the Soviet role in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war in the area, and his approval of the Egyptian President Sadat’s expulsion of the Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July 1972 (p. 75)


However, in mid 1970s, Qaddafi’s support for global revolution and terrorism became more apparent (Cooley, p.84), further straining its relations with the West, in particular the United States. On April 15, 1973, at the peak of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Qaddafi attempted to sink the ship Queen Elizabeth II, which had many Jewish Americans on board (Cooley, p. 86). Furthermore, the US and its European allies were greatly concerned by Qaddafi’s apparent reversal of attitudes toward the Soviet Union since 1974 (p.77). Qaddafi also took a series of decisions that would increase Libyan control over the foreign oil companies (p. 82), and by mid-1974 Libya controlled about 2/3 of its production (p. 83)


Consequently, on May 2, 1980, the US closed its embassy in Tripoli, at times when the Soviets were trying to repair their relations with Qaddafi (Cooley, pp.84-85). Moreover, Qaddafi’s regime opposed Camp David’s peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and joined the camp of Arab states that threatened to wipe Israel off the map (Cooley, p. 75). He elevated his anti-American rhetoric when he accused the Saudi Royal family of desecrating Islamic holy places by allowing a US military presence in their country following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 (Cooley, p. 89)


In the 1980s, Libya’s support of international terrorism widened, and in 1986 the US attacked Libya for its involvement in the bombing of Berlin disco killing two US servicemen (Bahgat, p. 383). Libya responded by the 1988 and 1989 terrorist attacks against Pan Am and French UTA respectively, killing hundreds of civilians from different countries (Bahgat, p. 383). Furthermore, Qaddafi has made it known that his next ambition is to make Libya the first Arab nuclear power. Libya sought but failed to buy nuclear bomb from China, and arranged to share in the efforts and proceeds of the Pakistani nuclear program by financing the Pakistani nuclear program (Cooley, p. 87). Furthermore, in pursuing his nuclear ambitions, Qaddafi attempted to obtain uranium from northern Chad occupied by Libyan troops since 1975 (Cooley. P. 88).


However, Libya’s international hostile policies did not come without a price. The UN in 1992 and 1993 imposed comprehensive sanctions against Libya, which had greatest impact weakening Libyan economy especially the hydrocarbon industry, costing Libya an estimated $26.5 billion (Bahgat, p. 384). The country’s growing oil production declined to less than half by 2003, losing its booming edge of 1960s due bilateral and multilateral devastating sanctions against Libya’s oil and gas industry. The deteriorating economic conditions in Libya-30% unemployment and 50% inflation rates (Takeyh, p. 65)- compounded by the collapse of the oil prices in 1998/1999, which revenues constitute 75% of the government expenditure and the main source of its foreign currency (p. 377-378), led to mounting popular unrest in Libya fueled by Islamist insurgency, and competing politics between pragmatics and hardliners within the Libyan elites, sending the country into chaos by mid-1990s (Takeyh, p. 65).


Takeyh argued that the UN sanctions following Lockerbie—particularly oil and technology embargo—and their devastating effect on Libya’s economy shattered Qaddafi’s long beliefs that Libya’s oil resources and wealth will undermine international unity and render the country immune to sanctions and that the world powers will not have the guts to interrupt the flow of oil from Libya for long (p. 64). Furthermore, according to Takeyh, the collapse of the Soviet Union left Qaddafi Isolated and exposed facing international pressure, especially at times when the Arab world began to negotiate peace with Israel, and seek better relations with the US (p. 64).


Faced with futile revolutionary ideology, deteriorating economy, mounting popular unrest, two military coups, and Islamic insurgency, Qaddafi realized in 1998 that that he had to accept the “passing of the age of revolutions and the arrival of globalization” and economic interdependence (pp. 64-65). As a result, Libya showed interests in multilateral institutions, and the desire to work within the international organizations to reconcile grievances, instead of resorting to terrorism (p. 72)


Qaddafi’s actions were indicative that he would steer Libya in favoring pragmatics within his regime, and shifted his international focus toward Africa & away from the Arab-Israeli conflict thus mediating crises as well as settling conflicts precipitated in working, multilateral institutions (Takeyh, p. 67). Qaddafi also began to implement a series of political and economic reforms aimed at ending Libya’s international isolation, seeking better relations with the West, and encourage foreign investment crucial for Libya’s economic recovery (Bahgat, p. 37 & p. 378; Takeyh, p. 68).


In 1999 and a result of Libya’s transformation, sanctions against Libya began to be lifted (Bahgat, p. 382). By September of 2000, Qaddafi declared the end of his anti-imperialist struggle and declared he will have to “follow the moment” and becomes a part of interdependent world shaped by globalization (Takeyh, p. 66). In 2002, Libya became a party to the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, thus Tripoli became a party to all the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (Bahgat, p. 386). By 2003 Libya became no longer isolated (Bahgat, p. 382). This allowed European and American oil and gas companies to resume working in Libya in full force to utilize Libya’s vast natural energy resources, which is anticipated to enhance global energy security and reduce prices (p. 382). By 2006, Libya’s oil production reached its 1970s level, and Libya became the 15th oil imports to the United States (Power Point presentation, Week 8)


Similar to Bahgat, Ray Takeyh (2004) contended that the successful shift in Libya’s policies was likely due to a combination of the above international, regional, and domestic developments. They both underscored the effect of economic sanctions on Libyan leader Mu’ammar el-Qaddafi’s “philosophical evolution” leading him to abandon his anti-imperialist struggle in September of 2000, and announcing “the world has changed radically and drastically. The methods and ideas should change, and being a revolutionary and a progressive man, I have to follow this moment” (p. 66).


Moreover, they both concluded adding that “the very fact that Qaddafi surrendered the suspects [in the Pan Am bombing] suggests that international pressure has prompted subtle yet significant changes in his foreign policy.” (p. 63). Furthermore, Bahgat argued that "rising political challenges from fundamentalist Islamist groups capitalizing on poor economy, and the desire by el-Qaddafi to groom his son to succeed him, "have convinced the Libyan leadership that economic reform and acceptance by the international community was a necessary". Therefore, "Libya decided to trade its involvement in international terrorism and its poorly developed WMD for lifting sanctions and the normalization of diplomatic and political relations with the West" (pp. 392-393).


As Qaddafi implemented his new policies towards the West and ended his support to international terrorism, Libya also began in 190s to shift its attitude towards another contentious issue in its relations with the West: the proliferation of WMDs, which the government decided was not in its best interests (Bahgat, p. 390). In December 0f 2003, Libya finally declared it is abandoning its ambitions to seek WMDs and would fully cooperate with the international community and IAEA to destroy tons of chemical weapons, and surrender documents related to its WMDs activities (pp. 386-390), a step praised by major powers including the US and UK (Bahgat, 2004, p. 373). Moreover, Libya took responsibility for several terrorist attacks committed by its intelligence services, agreed to pay compensations to victims’ families (pp. 384-385), and cooperated in the war against international terrorism (p. 386) dissociating itself from terrorist groups (p. 375 & 382). Furthermore, in 2002, Libya became a party to the 1999 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, thus Tripoli became a party to all the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (p. 386).


The dramatic change in Libya’s policies and behavior was regarded by various European countries, as well as China, Russia, Iran and Arab leaders who have been strongly critical of the war in Iraq as indication of how effective economic and diplomatic pressure could be, without the need to use military power (p. 387)


Libyan involvement in international terrorism has been different from that of other countries. Bahgat cited at least five distinctive characteristics of the Libyan case can be identified. The combination of these characteristics makes Libya an almost unique case in the war on terrorism and the states that sponsor it. First, Tripoli’s backed-terrorist operations targeted citizens of several countries (p.383). Second, most states that are accused of sponsoring international terrorism strongly deny these accusations. Tripoli, however, under pressure has accepted legal responsibility for several terrorist operations and paid financial compensations to the victims’ families. Third, the international community was united in condemning Libya’s involvement in international terrorism and took specific measures to compel Tripoli to change its policy and abide by international norms (p. 384). Forth, international sanctions seem to have contributed to shaping a new Libyan attitude on terrorism in particular and on foreign policy in general. Al-Qaddafi has sought to position himself and his country as a power broker in Africa and as an economic intermediary between Europe and Africa (p. 385). Finally, Libya stated in 2004 that its intelligence had been sharing information on al-Qa’eda and other Islamic extremists with Western intelligence services and characterized such cooperation as “irrevocable” (p. 386)


As Bahgat elaborated, the Libyan case was unique compared with other states remaining on the list of sponsoring terrorism today, not only because Libya’s support of terrorism had distinctive characteristics, but also because the anti-terrorism strategies employed successfully by the international community will be difficult to achieve the same success today, for several reasons, among them is that the nature of terrorism itself has changed, in addition to the changing dynamic between the state and the sponsored terrorist group. Furthermore, despite of Qaddafi’s regime ‘s support and practice of terrorism and his anti-Western rhetoric, has never actually destabilized US interests, compared with leader like Saddam Hussien, who twice invaded his neighbors and continued to seek hegemony over the Persian Gulf (Takeyh, p. 68). Qaddafi also has shown himself to be more susceptible to international pressure compared with Saddam Hussien (p. 68), and Ahmadinejad.


While most of the 19th century terrorism that Libya supported was “secular” , driven by the notions of nationalism and self-determination and the growing popularity of radical political thought embracing Marxist ideology (Hoffman, 2006, p. 84), terrorism in last three decades and as a result of the repercussions of the revolution in Iran has began to take religious meaning (p. 85). States –sponsoring religious terrorism are usually less likely to bow to international pressure, since their relation with the sponsored group is based on firm ideology derived from religious belief. Example is the support that Iran provides to terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Unlike Iran, which refuses official contact with the US, Libya is eager to open a diplomatic dialogue (Takeyh, p. 70)
Cooley argued how the US dependence on Libyan oil has been a constant factor deterring US action against Qaddafi, even greater West European dependence on Libyan oil and gas (p. 90). Therefore, in order for the international community to an effective strategy against Libya, the US and European governments had to create contingency plans to cope with an embargo on Libyan oil. Hence, was the strategy to explore possible alternative sources for oil, such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia (p. 91)
Moreover, the US and allies strategy with Libya for two decades was based on the rejection of any direct military action against Libya, and on the constant consultation and coordination with European allies (Cooley, p. 91). Takeyh argued that such unified international pressure was crucial for the success of the anti-terrorism strategy against Libya (p. 63), something that is not possible today, especially with China and Russia’s deep economic relations with countries sponsoring terrorism such as Iran, Syria and Sudan. Therefore, diplomacy should not be mounted against states-sponsoring terrorism only, but also should involve countries that maintain economic relations with them, in order for UN sanctions achieve their desired effects. The US implemented this strategy against Libya, when its European allies fulfilled their part in enforcing the UN sanctions, blocking all life lines to the Libyan regime (Takeyh, p. 71). However, such cohesive and collective international action was threatened by the US unilateral action in waging war against Iraq without UN mandate, which consequently undermined international unity facing regimes such as Iran, Syria and Sudan.
In order for the international community to neutralize and weaken the Libyan regime, it was necessary to strengthen regimes threatened inside their own countries by overt Libyan action, and constantly monitor the Soviet arsenal in Libya (Cooley, p. 92). The international community is utilizing this strategy currently in Lebanon by aiding its government against attempts by Syria and Iran to destabilize the country to serve their own domestic and international interests.
Furthermore, Takeyh contended that the policy of incremental normalization was important in dealing with Libya in order to enhance constructive Libyan conduct and further pushes its regime towards moderation. This strategy is essential in encouraging more rouge states to seek rehabilitation and integration within the international community (p. 72)
References
Byman, D. (2005) Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (1st ed). New York:
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Bahgat, G. (Winter, 2004). Oil, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Libyan
Diplomatic Coup. Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies, 29 (4), pp. 373-394.
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Cooley, J.K. (Spring, 1981). The Libyan menace. Foreign Policy, (42), pp. 74-93. Retrieved July 28,
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Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. (2nd ed). New York: Columbia University Press
Murphy, S.D. (2001). Verdict in the trial of the Lockerbie bombing suspects. The American Journal
of International Law, 95(2), pp.405-407. Retrieved July 28, 2009, from ProQuest Social
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Takeyh, R. (2001, May). The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold. Foreign Affairs, 80(3), 62-72.
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