"Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country?" General Colin Powell

The most important thing endorsed by Colin Powell today was an America that's worth leading and worth fighting for, an America that encapsulates the idea of what some might call a "more perfect union." To that end, Powell invoked a picture to illustrate his point.

"Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country? The answer is no. That's not America. Is there something wrong with a seven-year-old Muslim-American kid believing he or she could be president? Yet I have heard senior members of my own party drop the suggestion that he is a Muslim and might have an association with terrorists. This is not the way we should be doing it in America.

I feel particularly strong about this because of a picture I saw in a magazine. It was a photo essay about troops who were serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. And one picture at the tail end of this photo essay, was of a mother at Arlington Cemetery and she had her head on the headstone of her son's grave. And as the picture focused in, you could see the writing on the headstone, and it gave his awards - Purple Heart, Bronze Star - showed that he died in Iraq, gave his date of birth, date of death, he was 20 years old. And then at the very top of the head stone, it didn't have a Christian cross. It didn't have a Star of David. It has a crescent and star of the Islamic faith.

And his name was Kareem Rashad Sultan Khan. And he was an American. He was born in New Jersey. He was fourteen years old at the time of 9/11, and he waited until he could serve his country and he gave his life."

This is the picture of Elsheba Khan, taken by Platon for the New Yorker:So, yeah. Sometimes, America does benefit when we share our wealth with one another. And some people, in fact, do have it harder than Joe The Plumber.

stumble digg reddit del.ico.us news trust mixx.com October 19, 2008 03:29 PM

Critiquing classical realism and neo-realism

Classical realism has been at the heart of the study of world politics in the United States since it was introduced in 1948 by Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations—realist international theory (Doyle et al, 1997). It was considered natural response to the failure of liberalism to maintain world peace when the WWII erupted.

Neorealist or structural realism developed by Kenneth Waltz in 1979, came as a response by realists to the new forces represented by the emergence of globalization and acceleration of states interdependence in the 1970s, and the renewal of the cold war in the 1980s. Structural realism was able to address some of the limitations of classical realism. However, it failed in predicting and explaining the end of cold-war and the collapse of Soviet Union in 1989 since it omitted domestic politics from its system structure which became a major flaw in Neorealism.

First realists like Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, laid out the foundations of classical realism. Thucydides placed human beings at the heart of his analysis by incorporating the effects of domestic politics on foreign policy and the influence of individuals on decisions of state. Machiavelli emphasized on power at the center of international relations. Hobbes added another dimension to realism by making it a state-centric, where all international relations revolve around the state.

In 1948, Hans Morgenthau summarized his contemporary classical realism theory with six principles which included the three basic principles mentioned above—the influence of human nature on politics, power defined as interest, and the centrality of state –in addition, he then further elaborated on the relationship between politics and morality.

Morgenthau stated that there is natural tension between politics and morality, and that morality cannot be permitted to obstruct the successful pursuit of interest; although he admitted the importance of the moral significance of political action (Kauffman et al, pp154). His justification is that the definition of what is considered to be moral can vary from one state or individual to the other, instead he wanted both individuals and states to “ judge political action by universal moral principles” but only after being filtered through the circumstances of time and place (pp.154) In other words, political realism does not require indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible based on specific time and circumstances, and the interest of the state.

Morgenthau then concludes by stating that political realism maintains the autonomy of the political sphere by defining interest as power. He argued that if each state pursues its respective interest in terms of power, justice will be served in dual sense—which means that states will be mindful of other states pursuing their interests as each state pursues its own interest (Kauffman et al, pp. 154-155)

As I previously alluded to; realists strongly believe in the centrality of the nation-state in their international political structure. They recognize the importance and relevance of transnational organizations to international relations; however, they believe that state has the ultimate authority and that no state should pass on this authority to any foreign entity.

Another realists’ core assumption is that the international system characterized by an anarchy which shapes the state behavior. Anarchy makes each state always concerned about its own survival and in a constant state of apprehension of being attacked or its interests threatened by another state especially if the latter is seeking to strengthen its power. Therefore, traditional realists like Morgenthau believe that the state must rely on its own power, especially military power, to protect its interests.

Moreover, classical realism looks at the state as a rational and autonomous actor. Realists expand the state autonomy to not only include autonomy from international organizations but also sufficient autonomy from their national societies to recognize and pursue the interests of the nation as a whole. This domestic coherent attitude allows them to “exercise control over different national organizations to direct and control government actions in such a way as to implement the decisionmakers’ strategies” (Doyle et al, pp.166).

In their pursuit of domestic autonomy, realists believe they ought to be unconstrained by civil society preferences or opinions, which I believe creates dilemma. In a democratic society, the government is elected to represent the people and has to conform to their will and choice. How can realist choose to ignore national organizations and the civil society institutions which in many cases reflect and express the public opinion?

The realist system makes power the central, organizing principle of the system. States within this system are trying to remain in some kind of equilibrium despite the constant power maximizing behavior of all states.

Structural realism subscribes to three main conceptual elements as classical realism: Statism, Survival, and Self-help. Structural realism, however, overcame a number of limitations of classical realism by focusing on the distribution of power in the international system and by exploring how the system’s overall structure defined in terms of distribution of power, influences the political outcomes.

Neorealists acknowledge the increasing importance of interdependence and the influence of global economy on world politics, but they argue the each state’s policies continued to be determined by a desire to maximize its relative power, mainly military power (Week four lecture). However, neorealists believe that states need power to achieve security and that power in itself is not the goal. Realists on the other hand see state maximizing power is an end in itself.
Waltz views the system of international relations as a number of interacting units representing states, and refers to the structure as the mechanism through which these units are arranged in relation to each other. By understanding where a state is located in the structure it is possible not only to explain state behavior but also to predict it, although we cannot know with certainty what state will do (Kauffman et al, pp.296)

Unlike classical realism, structural realism does not include consideration of the effects of the policies and behavior of states on international politics. Instead, it considers the outcomes of a state policies depend mainly on the variation of the structure within which their actions occur (Neorealism: confusions and criticism, pp.3). Therefore, by trying to understand the state-level interaction, waltz omitted everything else that is not part of this process, including the state’s history, culture, ideology, political institutions or economic organizations, although he did not deny their importance

Waltz then later clarified that since “capability” is an attribute of the state, we cannot include it in the definition of the structure which must leave aside any characteristics of the states including their behavior and interactions. However, the “distribution capabilities” among the state units across the structure is an attribute of the system.

Furthermore, unlike the domestic political structures which are centralized and hierarchic; the ordering principles in the international-political structures are decentralized and anarchic. State units are alike in terms of sovereignty, and coordinate among each other with none is entitled to command.

Another fundamental concept in Neorealism is the polarity of the international system. Neorealists believe that a world with two superpowers has tendency for peace more than a world with only one superpower or multi-powers. The number of great powers affects the stability of the structure—bipolar system is more stable than multi-polar one because it provides clarity and predictability. They keep watch on each other, can divide the world between themselves and suppress smaller conflicts. So, alliances were not meant only to deter each other but to control states within each league. With multi-polarity, defections are a problem and might threaten the members of that alliance.

However, Neorealism argues that for liberal economy, not international economy, to survive and flourishes it requires a hegemon dominating power to maintain the rules and prevent other emerging powers from disturbing its stability. This Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) has been one of themes of Neorealism.

To conclude, both classical and structural realism argue that the most important actors in world politics are nation-states; these states are autonomous and rational. It assumes that the system of interacting states is characterized by anarchy, that domestic politics has a minimal effect on states’ foreign policies, and that the behavior of each state is affected significantly by the pursuit of power.

Neorealism differs from realism in two fundamental ways. First, Neorealism believes that states are more interested in security than power, and that states might forego power if it will undermine their security. Second, Neorealism argues that the polarity of the international system influence the state behavior. However, the validity of Neorealism was questioned when it failed to predict and explain the end of cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union. By ignoring the domestic changes that took place inside the USSR, neorealists have missed the opportunity to predict and understand the changes in that state behavior.

The Middle East is another area where domestic turmoil and cultural complexities significantly alter the state behavior, its choices and political-military alliances, which in turn represent a challenge to the neorealists’ view of world politics. The War in Iraq and the pre-war expectations as to how the Iraqi people would welcome an American invasion demonstrated a major flaw in our realist understanding of how culture and religion can play an essential role in the state behavior and its people. Our strategies in dealing with Iran and the assumption that Iranian military would crumple similar to what happened in Iraq in face of American superpower in any given military confrontation are overlooking the fundamental differences between the theocracy-based Iranian military ideology and the secular authoritarian nature of former Iraqi regime

Situational ethics

Although Classical Realism and Machiavelli do not require indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but they condone hypocrisy and double standards when dealing with domestic and foreign policy issues. Machiavelli attempts to rationalize this hypocrisy by calling it a distinction between what’s desirable and what’s possible, or as Lincoln contends “distinguishing between official duty in terms of national interest and personal wish in terms of one’s moral values and political principles realized throughout the world” (Kauffman et al, pp. 149)

This double standard approach and the disregard to the less powerful nations’ political and economic interests seem to have characterized the U.S. foreign policy during the last several decades, leading to rise in Anti-Americanism, which in turn provided Islamic fanatics with the fuel they needed to inflict terror and destruction upon the U.S. and promote their ideology of hate across the Muslim world.

After 9/11, U.S. seemed to realize that it has to be mindful of the popular demands for freedom, justice and democracy dominating the world which the U.S. itself championed, and it can no longer apply the same Machiavellian standards in dealing with domestic and foreign affairs in an era of globalization and interconnectedness.

In June 20 of 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave a historic speech at the American University in Cairo that seemed to have put an end to “situational ethics” and marked a major U.S. policy shift from political realism to neo-liberalism when she declared that “For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East -- and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people”

Unfortunately, the hopes for more liberal foreign policy faded away after the rise of political Islam on the wings of democracy, which prompted the U.S. to revert back to its realist views and pursuit stability and security at the expense of democracy by continuing to support authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.

Role of religion in politics and public life

Recent study by the Pew research center indicates the falling support among Americans for the role of religion in politics and draws a distinction between secular Europe and religions America. There are two separate issues; the role of religion in public life, and the role of religion in politics.

In my previous post, I did not suggest that most Americans believe religion should have a bigger role in politics, because clearly that is not what the public opinion is heading, according to Pew forum. My argument was that among the majority of individuals across the world, religion is gradually taking bigger role in their public life. By majority, I meant most of people in Asia and the Middle East who represent more than two thirds of the world population. My statement was a reflection of opinions and subjective observations circulating in foreign literature, however, I could not find objective data to support it, and it is subject to scrutiny.

Furthermore, on the issue of role of religion in public life most recent data show that Americans are equally divided, although the rise of religious issues to the center of debate in the U.S. is an indication of what could be an impending shift in the public opinion in favor of more assertive role for religion. Issues like stem cell research, abortion, gay marriage, school prayers and the display of the Ten Commitments on government property, are all becoming of huge public interest that is even reshaping our political discourse.

Nonetheless, we ought to define exactly what do we mean by “religion” when we ask these questions. If by religion we mean invoking the scriptural interpretations of the Bible and sectarian religious ideology into political life, then I believe that would be a violation of the Bill of Rights which declared that “the legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” which was later expressed by Thomas Jefferson in 1785 in his infamous “wall of separation between church and state. However, if by “religion” we mean the moral values and traditions that strengthen the society social fabric and the commitment to family and equitable justice, then I believe that current trend in the U.S public opinion favor that role by religion.

Should the U.S. be contained or balanced?

Despite of its unrivaled power after the World War II and then the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the United States has not only used its power responsibly but also helped create and participate in a range of international institutions that constrained its actions. The United States also introduced the fundamental liberal principles into the rules and regulations of the international society including democracy, global free trade, liberty and equality (Balyis et al pp. 116-117).

However, the U.S invasion of Iraq and the war on terror have raised concerns throughout the world about what is considered an unrestrained use of power by the United States, seen as a result of disturbance in the balance of power after the collapse of the USSR.

Liberals in general believe that U.S. power should be restrained and embedded into the international system as the most effective and acceptable way of exercising global hegemony. Most realists believe that other great powers would in time emerge to the balance the United States (Balyis et al, pp 76)

In his fascinating book “The Post-American World”, Fareed Zakaria explains eloquently that the real challenge for the future of American power is not its own decline but rather the rise of the rest. Zakaria predicts the power of the U.S. will ultimately be balanced by new rising nations and that the U.S. will face a choice of whether it stabilizes the world order by accepting a world with a diversity of voices and viewpoints. Or it can watch the world it helped to build over last 60 years to be slowly torn apart by greater nationalism, diffusion, and disintegration.

The integration of worldwide economy and the intensifying interdependence have made it almost impossible for a single country to stall the emergence of new political actors and regaining the balance of power. Baylis et al explain how countries like Britain in 1992 was forced to abandon its economic strategies to adjust to new global market realities, adding that no government even the most powerful has the resources to resist sustained speculations against its currency and thereby the credibility of its economic policy. (Balyis et al, pp. 16)

Unlike the downfall of the British superpower trigged by its economic failures, the largest challenges facing the U.S. and seem to be undermining its hegemony are political rather than economic. Fareed Zakaria explains that although the economic problems in the U.S. today are real, but different policies can quickly put the economy back on track, however, the U.S. political system is dysfunctional and unable to make simple reforms that can secure the country’s future. He argues that Washington seems largely unaware of the new world rising around it and shows few signs of being able to reorient its policies for the new age (The Post-American World, Fareed Zakaria)

In another word, and as Morgenthau puts it—the structure of the international relations in U.S foreign policy is irrelevant to the reality of international politics. The incompatibility between both will cause unmanageability of international relations and anarchy (Kauffman et al, pp. 148-149)

Therefore, I do not think the U.S. has a choice whether to allow other balancing powers to take its place at the helm, and should not resist it. A world in which the United States takes up less space, but is one in which the American ideas and ideals are overwhelmingly dominant, is a lot more stable than a world in which the U.S. is a superpower but Anti-Americanism is fueling hate and violence and making America less secure.

Muslim Brotherhood wants “scientific conference” before deciding to stand up against terrorism!

The chief of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) political bureau, Dr. Mohamed Morsi issued a statement posted on the MB official English website, Ikhwanweb, on the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. Dr. Morsi accused the U.S. of “irrational behavior” and rushing to wars before any “meaningful probe into the attacks” and adding that the MB “demanded fair trial for the 9/11 suspects and the issuance of a detailed scientific report about the attacks, but the U.S. administration did not respond till now”

The U.S. government has independently investigated the events leading to the 9/11 and the 9/11 commission report was released on November 2004 and took over two years to prepare. The report was issued by the National Commission on Terrorism Attacks Upon the US. The commission interviewed over 1200 people in 10 countries and reviewed over a half million pages of documents before it issues its final report.

As far as “fair trial” I believe Khaled Sheikh Mohamed and Ramzi bin al Shibh are currently on trial in U.S. courts and have attorneys appointed to defend their case paid for by taxpayers money!. I don’t know of any Islamic country that would put those who admittedly killed nearly 3000 of its innocent citizens on trial—their most likely fate would have been public beheading without trial.

The MB leader also suggested that the U.S holds “huge scientific conference” to analyze the 9/11 attacks, and should this happen the MB “will stand firmly against whoever committed this horrific crimes against innocent civilians” according to the website, which suggests that MB has not done that so far!

It is interesting how Dr. Morsi used the word “terrorism” only when describing the U.S. actions as “it [U.S.] assaulted entire nations and peoples without any evidence”. However, he stopped short from calling the 9/11 attacks terrorism—describing it as “horrific crimes”

MB did not of course forget to add its usual rhetoric to the statement by condemning the “zionist lobby” and its influence on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, which he warned will increase the anti-American sentiments and will harm the American people and spread hatred against them!

The Muslim Brotherhood is the largest political movements in the Islamic world that operates within religious framework. In Egypt, the MB enjoys wide support and recently won 20% of parliament seats representing the biggest opposition bloc in parliament.

Globalization and imperialism

Critics of contemporary globalization, mainly Marxists theorists, argue it is latest phase of Western imperialism and it is a tool used by the West to impose new form of hegemony disguised in economic, humanitarian and democratization projects to control the wealth and resources of the less advantaged countries outside a central triad (U.S., Western Europe, and Japan) which comprises only %20 of the world population but benefited the most from a system where globalization only applies to the developed world, as Balyis et al argue

Moreover, Samir Amin in 2001 contends that the ideological discourse of this new phase of imperialism is now founded on a “duty to intervene” that is supposedly justified by the defense of “democracy” the “rights of peoples” and “humanitarianism” but it is designed to ensure the West’s absolute hegemony by a show of military might that will consolidate behind it all the other partners in the triad (Samir Amin: Imperialism and globalization, Independent Socialist Magazine, Jun2001, Vol. 53, Issue 2, pp.10)

Alexander Anievas adds that the world since September 11 is witnessing return to an era of “inter-imperialist rivalries” especially after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq (Cambridge Review of International Affairs, volume 19, June 2006)

However, Ray Kiely in 2006 explains that the current era is one of greater openness and international integration than the pre-1914 era, and there is far greater cooperation between the core capitalist states, as well as sovereign states in the developing world (United States hegemony and globalization: what role for theories of imperialism?, Cambridge review, June 2006)

Those who consider globalization a triumph for the Western, market-led values across the world stop could not explain the economic success that some national economies in Asia like Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore and Korea—known as Tigers’ of Asia—have had but meanwhile rejecting Western values.

Baylis et al argue that if these continue to follow their path towards modernization and economic prosperity while withstanding complete cultural take over by the West, then we must anticipate future disputes between “Western” and “Asian” values over issues like human rights, gender, and religion (Balyis et al, pp. 11)

To what extent can certain countries preserve their cultural identity, religious traditions and heritage in face of an enormous and merciless global economy and the tsunami of new ideas, values and technologies that fascinated people around the world— especially conservative nations across the Middle East and Asia—but meanwhile triggered fears of an imminent “clash of civilization” along geo-cultural fault lines as described by Huntington in 1996.

The September 11 attacks and the “Tigers of Asia” in addition to United Arab of Emirates, represent two competing examples of how the non-Western world might respond to globalization. While some countries and cultures were able to achieve economic success and progress and be part of global economy while adhering to its values and preserving its identity, on the other hand some of those in the Muslim world who rejected globalization as the latest stage of Western imperialism and hegemony undertook the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon which they considered the symbols of Western power and hegemony.

Mehdi Parvizi Amineh argues in 2007 that Huntington’s actual fault lines are socio-economic not geo-cultural, and that conflicts in today’s world do not take place between cultures but within them. Those societies that are more successful in adapting to the challenges of modernity show a relatively stronger capacity to cope with the growing complexity of political and cultural pluralism (The challenges of modernity: the case of political Islam, PGDT 6 (2007).