In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. with the support of the international community launched the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), positioning Islamist terrorists in the center of this war (Raghavan, pp. 149-150). However, the GWOT did not make a strategic distinction between Salafi-jihadist groups waging global jihad, such as al Qaeda (AQ), and other Islamist movements regarded by the majority within the Muslim world as resistance movements fighting Israeli occupation and enjoy considerable popular support, such as HAMAS and Hezbollah. Instead, the U.S. has sought to weaken HAMAS and undermine its control of Gaza, arguing that weak HAMAS is well positioned within the overall war against Islamist terrorism.
Therefore, the international community boycotted HAMAS and enforced complete blockade against the 1.5 million Palestinians living in Gaza Strip under HAMAS control, following its violent takeover of the Strip in 2008, at the heal of domestic dispute with its rival Fattah. The Gaza blockade and the human suffering, combined with the worldwide financial crackdown against HAMAS financing, have angered the Muslim public opinion, which considered the GWOT a war against Islam.
Due to the significance that Palestine has assumed in Islamic discourse for more than half a century, AQ has used Palestine to be at the heart of its propaganda campaign against the West. The genuine evolution of HAMAS from a terrorist group to an insurgency abiding by the Laws of Armed Conflict in its fight against Israel deserves a review of US strategy towards the group. Removing HAMAS from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) will better serve the GWOT by improving the relations with the Muslim world, isolate AQ and deprive it from one of its major weapons to gain sympathy and support for its terrorism
1- Understanding HAMAS
It is essential for US policy makers to recognize the ideological roots of the HAMAS movement, and the Islamic framework of its identity in order to formulate an effective strategy that further pushes the movement into the path of moderation, away from terrorist tactics. Without some knowledge of Islamic reasoning and discourse, actions and statements by HAMAS and other Islamist organizations will remain opaque and meaningless, and the West will remain oblivious to significant developments on the part of its adversaries. This is not arguing that everything HAMAS or one of its officials says should be taken at face, instead, pointing out that HAMAS, within its own frame of reference, is signaling real shifts that are understood in the Arab and Islamic world. If Israel and the West wish to attempt to coexist peacefully with HAMAS, which is itself not at all a given, they must develop the capability to understand its language (Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, 2009, p. 15)
HAMAS, known in Arabic as Harakat al Muqawama al Islamiyya (the Islamic Resistance Movement), was first established by a group of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leaders in the Gaza Strip led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, as the first Palestinian intifada (uprising) erupted in mid-December 1987 (Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, 2009, p. 4).
Therefore, it’s critical to recognize the fact that HAMAS since its inception has been embedded in the culture and jurisprudence of the Muslim Brotherhood (p. 17). HAMAS's traditional projection of itself as an uncompromising resistance movement, and its popularity is derived from its resistance to the Israeli occupation (Hroub, 2006, p.10). Although many Palestinians do not necessarily identify with HAMAS’s Islamist ideology, they are nonetheless sympathetic to the movement and its role within their society, particularly because HAMAS is not perceived to be tainted by corruption (Malka, 2005, p.43)
Less than a year after its formation, HAMAS issued its Charter (or covenant), which has continued to define the organization in Western eyes. Scham and Ibn-Irshaid in their critique of HAMAS’s Charter argued that the Charter, drawn up in direct response to the outbreak of the first intifada and when its raison d’être was armed resistance to the occupation (Hroub, 2006, p. 7), is an unapologetically hard-line document that vividly promises destruction to Israel.
Article 1 of the Charter characterizes HAMAS as an Islamic movement, with “Islam as its doctrine and source of notions, concepts, and perceptions regarding the universe, life, and man; and by which HAMAS’s conduct is governed, inspired, and guided righteously.”
Article 2 defines HAMAS’s ideological identity and orientation as an extension of the intellectual school of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is referred to as “a global organization, the largest Islamic movement in the modern era, [which] features deep understanding, precise perception, and a comprehensive approach to all Islamic concepts in various spheres of life.”(Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, p. 5)
Thus, HAMAS’s conceptual framework, including its approach to Palestinian nationalism, is unequivocally rooted in Islam. For example, Article 11 of the charter affirms “that the land of Palestine is an Islamic waqf (trust) endowed for Muslim generations until the Day of Resurrection, and should not be compromised entirely or partially, or relinquished entirely or partially.”
Article 13 states that “various initiatives of [settlement], and the so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences to resolve the Palestinian issue contradict the tenets of the Islamic Resistance Movement, as compromising any part of Palestine is equivalent to the omission of a part of our religion.” Hence, according to the same article: “[There is] no solution to the Palestinian cause save jihad (religious struggle); for initiatives, proposals, and international conferences are nothing but a waste of time and absurd nonsense; and the Palestinian people are too dignified and righteous to allow tampering with its future, rights and self-determination.”. In HAMAS’s communiqué of December 7, 1993, issued to commemorate the sixth anniversary of the intifada, the movement reiterated that “jihad is the only way to liberate Palestine, and that force is the only language of understanding with the enemy.”
HAMAS was organized on the basis of rejecting Israel and its existence. Article 9 defines the objectives of HAMAS—“fighting, humiliating, and defeating untruth in order for truth to prevail; wresting the homeland.” It states further that “from its mosques, the call for prayer [adhan] shall start over announcing the establishment of the state of Islam.” This is reasserted in HAMAS’s twenty-eighth communiqué, issued on August 18, 1988, which states that “Palestine is Islamic from the [Mediterranean] sea to the [Jordan] river” and that HAMAS’s purpose is the liberation of “Palestine, all of Palestine.”
A simple reading certainly suggests that declared ideology of rejecting Israel and denying its right to exist necessarily mean, in practice, that it is impossible to deal with HAMAS or come to terms with its ideological and political discourse that is the case. Nevertheless, as Scham and Ibn-Irshaid continued to argue, these hard-line, unequivocal assertions do not necessarily reflect the movement’s current positions, which have evolved over time. They further argued that there is a wide disparity between the movement’s early ideological assertions, which were composed at its inception, and much of its everyday political conduct and discourse. Indeed, the movement’s actions and direction cannot be understood without recognizing this distinction (p. 5)
Furthermore, Scham and Ibn-Irshaid argued that HAMAS’s literature and statements during the movement’s early years reflect a genuine confusion over how to deal with Jews, a confusion which has been resolved by the eventual adoption of a much clearer position that reflects hostility to actions by Jews against Palestinians and not hostility to Jews simply on the basis of belief or because they are Jewish (p. 6)
2- HAMAS and the recognition of Israel
Scham & Ibn-Irshaid in 2009, explained that the issue or recognizing Israel is much bigger than HAMAS, and one of the most sensitive and dangerous issues for the entire Muslim world. According to the tenets of Shari‘a, it is unlawful to recognize Israel since it is founded on aggression, injustice, and the usurpation of Muslim land—that is, Palestine. This view is supported by dozens of fatwas (Islamic edicts) by Muslim scholars who have prohibited the recognition of Israel under any circumstance. Palestine’s land, according to these scholars, constitutes a waqf, and no portion of it may be surrendered, of whatever size and thus cannot be ruled by non-Muslims (p. 9). Moreover, it is particularly sacred because it contains the third most important city for Muslims, after Mecca and Medina.
Therefore, according to Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, for HAMAS, “recognition” of Israel would represent a negation of the rightness of its own cause and would be indefensible under Islam. Furthermore, HAMAS’s incessant declarations that it will never recognize Israel are based on the overwhelming preponderance of Islamic jurisprudence on the subject. Recognition would be a matter of grave theological and political import that affects the whole Islamic world (p. 16)
Although HAMAS, as an Islamic organization, will not transgress Shari‘a, which it understands as forbidding recognition, it has formulated mechanisms that allow it to deal with the reality of Israel as a fait accompli. These mechanisms include the religious concepts of tahadiya and hudna and HAMAS’s own concept of “Palestinian legitimacy.” A tahadiya stopped most violence between HAMAS and Israel from June to December 2008.
Hudna is a truce for a specific period, which is based on the practice of the Prophet Mohammad and on subsequent events in Muslim history. HAMAS has indicated on a number of occasions its willingness to accede to a hudna with Israel, assuming basic Palestinian rights as set forth in the Arab Peace Initiative (API) are agreed to first. However, since there is a consensus among Muslim jurists that an open-ended or, more specifically, a permanent hudna is prohibited, because in their reasoning is that a hudna without a time certain will lead to the nullification of jihad, therefore according to HAMAS, hudna with Israel expresses the continuity of conflict, but does not convey an end to the conflict (p.11)
Moreover, though HAMAS would not directly participate in peace negotiations with Israel, HAMAS has indicated that it would be willing to be part of a Palestinian coalition government with Fatah under which Fatah would negotiate the actual treaty.
Understanding the Islamic bases of HAMAS’s policies and worldview will be essential for the success of any process in which it is engaged (Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, p. 3)
3- Current Western strategy towards HAMAS
HAMAS was listed by the US as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), the US government refused to deal with Palestinian government formed by democratically elected HAMAS following its landslide victory in free and transparent legislative elections in 2006. At a White House press conference with Abbas held on May 26, 2005, President George W. Bush reiterated the U.S. stance that HAMAS is a terrorist organization that must be dismantled, stating that “[o]ur position on Hamas is very clear, it’s a well-known position and it hasn’t changed. …HAMAS is a terrorist group, it’s on a terrorist list for a reason.” This has been the U.S. position since the organization was designated a “Terrorist Organization Which Threatens To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process” by Executive Order 12947 on January 23, 1995, and by the U.S. Department of State as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” since 1997 (Malka, 2005, p. 50)
However, the EU and U.S. diverge on policies toward militant Islamist groups like Hezbollah and HAMAS (p. 10). Officially, the EU does not communicate with HAMAS, although over the past year, there has been a softening in the European position, with France admitting to having had contacts with the group. British, Italian, and Greek members of parliament have met with HAMAS officials in early 2009. Despite increasing international pressure to alter its position, the United States, under both the Bush and Obama administrations, has so far refused to talk to HAMAS until it renounces violence and recognizes Israel (Hamid & Kadlek, 2010, p. 11)
Furthermore, Scham & Ibn-Irshaid in 2009 contended that the strategy of both the United States and Israel was and still is based on the following assumptions:
- HAMAS is irrevocably opposed to recognizing or coming to terms with Israel’s existence
- Economic, political, and military pressure will affect the Hamas regime either by prying away its popular base, forcing it to modify its behavior significantly, destroying it as an organization.
- Direct talks with HAMAS are pointless and likely to be counterproductive, because
there is nothing to talk about. This assumption is reinforced by HAMAS’s virtually
identical stance with regard to its talking with Israel, though HAMAS is eager to talk
with the United States (pp. 3-4)
Moreover, the “Quartet” (consisting of the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations), which had a role in overseeing Palestinian-Israeli negotiations,
enunciated three conditions that had to be accepted by HAMAS in order for sanctions
to be lifted and for it to be accepted as a player in the Palestinian-Israeli political
process. Hamas had to:
(1) recognize the right of Israel to exist
(2) repudiate violence and “terrorism” (which HAMAS considers legitimate resistance)
(3) recognize previously signed agreements between the PLO and Israel—agreements that HAMAS had consistently rejected (Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, p. 13).
This represents a common dynamic in Western responses to Muslim and Arab approaches—that is, demanding clear, explicit, and unambiguous language. Such language is the norm in the West but not in the Middle East, where indirection and nuance are often used to indicate change, largely in order to spare the party making the change from public humiliation (p. 13)
Therefore, the West’s strategy towards HAMAS is based on isolation, even though HAMAS has been elected to government. In doing so, the West has imposed policy of collective retribution against the Palestinian people for their democratic choice, especially those living in Gaza. However, the costs of collective retribution outweigh the benefits, and therefore can’t be an effective deterrent. As Colby in 2008 explained, such policy “has the potential to radicalize fence-sitting populations, alienate public opinion, ease al Qaeda efforts to establish common cause with other groups, generate anti-Americanism, weaken friendly states” (p. 52).
Furthermore, what weakens the US war on terrorism when it includes Palestinian terrorism is lack of clear definition of terrorism itself by the international community. Following the attacks of September 11, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Arab League (AL) stressed their empathy for the Palestinians and reiterated their positions rejecting “any linkage between terrorism and Islamic and Arab peoples, including the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples, right to self-determination, self-defense, sovereignty, resistance against Israeli and foreign occupation, all of which are legitimate rights enshrined in the UN Charter and
international law” (Miskel, 2004)
4- HAMAS’s Evolution
The evolution of HAMAS from predominately terrorist organization—based on Western definition—into an insurgency fighting an illegal occupation, began in the fall of 2004, and took shape in two major aspects: Political strategies and military tactics.
A- Political strategies:
In 2004, HAMAS decided to participate in the Palestinian municipal elections, which
were held in four stages in 2005. HAMAS’s candidates met with considerable electoral
success, despite strong opposition by Fatah. Running municipalities fit nicely within HAMAS’s ideology of providing daily services to the needy Palestinians and shoring up its grassroots support. However, from its establishment, HAMAS had steadfastly refused to run in any national elections, either for PC or for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority (PA), as both these structures grew out of the Oslo accords, which HAMAS opposed and considered illegitimate, it had never recognized the legitimacy of either (Hroub, 2006, p. 6).
Therefore, when HAMAS announced in 2005, its intention to participate in the Palestinian legislative elections, it was a surprise for both its friends and foes. HAMAS’s participation in legislative elections represented a de facto acceptance of the Oslo Accords. Furthermore, HAMAS’s participation would necessarily require Hamas to deal with Israel and the international community and engage in political compromises, which are a major shift in HAMAS’s attitude (Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, 2009, p.12).
However, for HAMAS, participation in the legislative elections falls within its comprehensive program for the liberation of Palestine, the return of the Palestinian people to their homeland, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. Furthermore, this participation [in the elections] was a means of supporting the resistance and the intifada program, which the Palestinian people have approved as its strategic option to end the occupation (Hroub, 2006, p. 8).
HAMAS’s landslide victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections of January 2006 came as an unwelcome and unexpected shock to both Middle Eastern and international regimes, with the organization winning nearly 58 percent of the Palestinian Legislative Council seats (p. 3). Nonetheless, HAMAS attempts to form a National Unity Government along with Fattah movement and other factions, failed due to domestic and international pressure (Hroub, 2006, p. 16), which led HAMAS to form its own government, but was quickly boycotted by the West and Israel.
However, during the run off for legislative elections in the fall of 2005, and in the course of negotiating National Unity Government in March of 2006, to forming its own government, HAMAS has produced three important documents: the 2005 electoral program; the 2006’s draft National Unity Government program, and government platform after the collapse of coalition talks, as presented by Prime Minister-elect Ismail Haniyeh in his inaugural address to the Palestinian Council (PC) on 27 March.
The three documents reveal beyond question that the demands of the national arena have driven HAMAS in dramatically new directions, and represent in themselves an evolution in HAMAS's political thinking toward pragmatism and the Palestinian "mainstream”, compared to its radical Charter (Hroub, 2006, p. 7 & 25). HAMAS’s electoral platform , which chose “Change and Reform” as its slogan, focused primarily on domestic issues, with particular emphasis on governance and reform and was designed to carry out exactly the kinds of reform that had been demanded by Western governments and financial institutions (Hroub, 2006, p. 11).
Furthermore, though the language of the electoral platform overall is secular and bureaucratic, with the virtual absence of military resistance from the platform, the religious references that it does contain fuelled suspicions (arising from HAMAS's origins and history) that the movement was quietly working toward its true agenda, the Islamization of society. For its part, HAMAS justifies its Islamic language and positions on the grounds that they reflect the true nature and aspirations of society (Hroub, 2006, p. 15 & 19).
Moreover, HAMAS’s problematic previous rejection of international agreements on Palestine signed by PLO, was transformed into a more moderate approach expressed by HAMAS’s government Prime Minister Ismail Hanieyh who stated that “The government [HAMAS] will deal with the international resolutions [on the Palestine issue] with national responsibility and in accordance with protecting the immutable rights of our people.", which represent a major shift on HAMAS's part, showing an obvious attempt to maintain a delicate balance between appeasing international observers and HAMAS's own constituency (Hroub, 2006, p. 17)
Most importantly, the entire HAMAS’ government platform, is based on the concept of the two-state solution according to the 1967 borders, without a hint of the "liberation of the entire land of Palestine" or "the destruction of Israel" or even “armed struggle” found in the Charter (Hroub, 2006, p.17 & 22). HAMAS’s government went further and declared for the first time its intention to deal with Israeli officials, assuring Israel of non-belligerence and smooth interaction, when Prime Minister Haniyeh announced in a major departure from its 1988 Charter "The government and relevant ministries will take into consideration the interests and needs of our people and the mechanisms of daily life, thus dictating necessary contacts with the occupation in all mundane affairs: business, trade, health, and labor.".
Thus, evidence that HAMAS had implicitly responded positively to some of the demands to comply with international order, was by no means sufficient for the West and Israel to recognize or acknowledge any progress. Presumably they understood that HAMAS could never accede to their demands directly and publicly; that would be understood by HAMAS’s friends and enemies alike as surrender of its ideological identity and virtually an end to its raison d’être (Scham & Ibn-Irshaid, 2009). Thus, although HAMAS had, in its own frame of reference, moved its position significantly closer to what the Quartet demanded, this was not understood, accepted, or valued because, in Western terms, it clearly did not represent an unambiguous acceptance of the Quartet’s demands.
B. Military tactics
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks by Islamist terrorists, HAMAS suspended its attacks against Israel, especially its suicide attacks, and sought to maintain a low profile and avoid being targeted by the war on terrorism (Malka, 2005, p. 41). However, for HAMAS, there is no contradiction between political activity and military activity; both, they claim, go hand in hand as dual parts of the resistance. In fact, HAMAS believes that military action and resistance will strengthen the Palestinian political and negotiating position. As Masha’al has stated, “[N]egotiating without resistance leads to surrender but negotiating with resistance leads to real peace. Therefore, HAMAS will never give up its military struggle against Israel, as long as Israel existed.
However, what has evolved in HAMAS’s military strategy is refraining from using terrorist tactics, specifically suicide attacks targeting Israeli civilians, and restricting its military operations against Israeli military targets, and within the parameters of armed struggle. This evolution in HAMAS’s military tactics was caused by the following factors:
1) HAMAS’s desire to gain international legitimacy, recognition and support for its cause.
HAMAS’s new strategy to win international recognition was fueled by its ascent to power after its victory in legislative elections, and its desire to present itself to the world as moderate governing political party, which might result to an end of its economic and diplomatic blockade by the international community. Furthermore, gaining popular support is one of the insurgents’ most important strategies to ensure the success of their operations (O’Neill, p. 49), and a key to overcome the deficiencies of their military power in face of government’s resources superiority (p. 93).
Gaining popular support can be decisive factor in achieving final victory for an insurgency even when the government forces win on the battlefield, as in the case of Algerian insurgents against French forces (p. 54). Civilian support is the essential element of successful guerrilla operations employed by insurgents, and renders them hard to subdue and control (p. 94). As Ignatieff in 2002 argued that targeting civilians would alienate valuable support. Furthermore, according to Bard O’Neill popular support to insurgents could take the form of passive or active support, with the latter being the most important kind (p. 95).. What counts as valuable support depends critically on whether the struggle needs international approval to succeed. Struggles that need such support may be more willing to subject themselves to ethical restraint than those that believe they can win on their own terms.
2) Distancing itself from Salfi-Jihadi Islamist groups, such as AQ, and other groups operating in Palestinian territories.
In order for HAMAS to evade being an immediate target in the GWOT, and portray itself as a liberation movement resisting occupation, HAMAS had to practice a different form of violence than that often used by AQ, including suicide attacks and targeting civilians. Instead HAMAS ameliorated Hezbollah’s successful model of guerrilla warfare against Israel, while running for elections and participating in governments (Malka, 2005, p. 43).
According to Hoffman, guerilla warfare although share the same tactics as terrorism, it “refers to numerically larger group of armed individuals, who operates a military unity, attack enemy military forces [hit -and -run style], and seize and hold territory, while exercising some form of sovereignty or control over a defined geographical area and its population” (p. 35). Hoffman argued that the distinction between guerilla warfare and modern terrorism is important because while the latter is condemned the former can be considered legitimate in certain cases such as fighting a foreign occupation or to attain independence. However, an overlap does exist between the two (p. 36).
Within the context of seeking international recognition as legitimate liberation movement fighting occupation, HAMAS seemed to have abandoned its reliance on terrorism to achieve political gain. Furthermore, HAMAS’s violent takeover of the Gaza Strip, provided the movement with a territory to defend, and needed to be branded an insurgency waging guerrilla warfare against Israel.
3) Qaradawi’s revisions concerning jihad
In order to maintain legitimacy and credibility among its supporters, HAMAS, as nationalist movement embedded in Islamic ideology, always sought to justify its actions or ideological shifts within Islamic jurisprudence. The Islamic justification of HAMAS’s tactical shift leading to its military evolution away from terrorism and more towards guerrilla warfare against occupation, was provided by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, probably the single most influential living Sunni Islamist figure and closely associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, in his 2009 book entitled Fiqh al-Jihad (The Jurisprudence of Jihad) which decisively repudiates al Qaeda's conception of jihad as a "mad declaration of war upon the world." (Lynch, 2009).
Qaradawi also offers an intriguing broadening of the concept of jihad, away from violence to the realm of ideas, media, and communication -- which he calls the "jihad of the age." The weapons of this jihad should be TV, the internet, email and the like rather than guns. Persuading Muslims of the message of Islam and the importance of this jihad in the path of God should be the first priority, he argues: "the jihad of the age, a great jihad, and a long jihad." He also goes into great detail about the different forms of jihad, the need for pragmatism, and the diverse nature of possible relations between Muslims and non-Muslims (Lynch, 2009).
Therefore, it’s fair to argue that HAMAS’s vision of waging jihad has broadened to include the greater jihad, which is the building an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, after succumbing to the reality that it will not be able to defeat Israel militarily—the lesser jihad.
5- Conclusion
While the 9/11 attacks occurred in the U.S., the casualties came from approximately 80 countries and any reprisals have the potential to impact the people of many nations (Gray & Wilson, 2006, p. 33). Despite the psychological barriers erected as a result of the war on terrorism, U.S. policymakers must adjust to the new realities taking shape in the Palestinian political arena (Malka, 2005, p. 51).
The genuine evolution of HAMAS, which began in 2005 following its landslide victory in legislative elections, from resistance movement using terrorist tactics to an insurgency using guerrilla warfare, and abiding by Laws of Armed Conflict, deserves a reassessment by the U.S. of its strategy towards the movement. Engaging HAMAS and removing it from the list of FTO, which many observers challenge its fairness (Best, 2001, p. 8), will result in an end to the blockade of Palestinian civilians in Gaza, deprive AQ and other Islamist terrorists from their main weapon in their anti-American rhetoric, and remove a major hurdle in reaching an international agreement on the definition of terrorism.
Furthermore, Western governments can improve their image in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims by demonstrating a willingness to engage popular Islamist movements, and that they are serious about democracy promotion. A “strategic dialogue with HAMAS allows Western governments to influence Islamist groups to respect regional security interests, including Israeli security, Iraqi stability, and combating terrorist groups” (Hamid & Kadlek, 2010, p. 12)
Without doubt, there are many who remain highly skeptical of HAMAS's new face, suspecting a ploy to gain power by concealing true agendas. But it is equally true that the "new" discourse of diluted religious content-to say nothing of the movement's increasing pragmatism and flexibility in the political domain-reflects genuine and cumulative changes within HAMAS. Whether HAMAS would destroy the system given the opportunity remains subject to speculation.
However, with the ever mounting external pressures on HAMAS, in the form both of ceaseless Israeli attacks on the Palestinians to embarrass the government and of United States-led Western cutting of aid to the Palestinian people and efforts to isolate the government, the chances of aborting the natural development of a "new HAMAS" appear great.
Historically, the U.S. has dealt with persons and groups that have engaged in terrorist activities, when they have been accepted as leaders of sovereign states that the U.S. might find it necessary to cooperate with to accomplish important national goals. Dealing with such leaders is distasteful, even abhorrent, but some observers will see it necessary (Best, 2001, p. 8).
In recent history, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. has made a distinction between the secular Ba’athist Party insurgents who stage guerrilla-like hit-and –run operations or carrying out attacks using IEDs, and the foreign terrorists belonging to al Qaeda who are responsible for suicide attacks and beheadings (Hoffman, p. 36). Because of that distinction, it became part of the US policy in Iraq to negotiate with Sunni insurgents, for example members of al Sahwa (awakening) councils, and invited them to participate in the political process and armed them to fight al Qaeda, a strategy that has been proven very effective in weakening al Qaeda in Iraq and saving US lives according to General David Petraeus.
Much as President Ronald Reagan did with the PLO during his administration’s final days in office, the US should set out clear and unambiguous guidelines for a political dialogue with HAMAS. If HAMAS agrees to suspend its terrorist attacks and is able to impose discipline on its military cadres, enforce rule of law, and accept the parameters of a negotiated agreement with Israel leading to the creation of an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, the United States should reconsider its position of banning contacts with HAMAS’s political leadership, tone down rhetoric calling for its elimination, consequently removing it from list of FTO, and resolve HAMAS’s future as a military organization another day.
Such strategic engagement should be viewed as part of the global war on terrorism and not a softening of U.S. resolve (Malka, 2005, p.51). Weakening HAMAS within the Palestinian territory will create a vacuum were Salfi-Jihadi groups are striving for decades to have a foot and export Islamist terrorism within Israel’s borders. HAMAS not only can constitute a safeguard against AQ attempts to gain access to Israel, but also an ideological barrier against the infiltration of AQ ideology within Palestinian society (Levitt & Cohen, 2010)
Finally, one way to reduce terrorism is to create incentives for liberation movements to comply with the Geneva Conventions during armed struggle and to penalize them, with international ostracism, when they do not (Ignatieff, 2002, p. 1154)
6- References
Best, R.A. Jr. (2001, December). Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S. , Congressional Research Service, pdf document
Colby, E. (2008, June). Expanded Deterrence. Policy Review
Gray, J. M. & Wilson, M.A. (2006, January). Understanding the “War on Terrorism”:
Responses to 11 September 2001.
Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside terrorism. (2nd ed). New York: Columbia University Press
Hroub, K. (2006, Summer). A “New Hamas” through its documents. Journal of Palestinian
Studies, 35 (4), pp. 6-27.
Ignatieff, M. (2002). Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Terrorism. Social Research, 69(4), 1137-1158.
Levitt, M. & Cohen, Y. (2010, January). Deterred but determined: Salfi-Jihadi groups in the
Palestinian arena. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, pp. 1-47, public
website
Lynch, M. (2009, July). Qaradwai’s Revisions. Foreign Policy Blog, public website,
retrieved from http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/09/qaradawis_revisions
Malka, H. (2005). Forcing Choices: Testing the Transformation of Hamas. Washington
Quarterly, 28(4), 37-53
Miskel, J. (2005, June). Arab and Muslim Approaches to the Definition of Terrorism.
Norwich faculty paper, pp. 1-5
O’Neil, B. (2005). From Revolution to Apocalypse: Insurgency & Terrorism (2nd ed).
Potomac Books, Inc. : Washington DC
Raghavan, V. (2004). The Double-Edged Effect in South Asia. Washington Quarterly,
27(4), 147-155. http://search.ebscohost.com.library.norwich.edu/
Monday, March 1, 2010
Sunday, January 31, 2010
Overcoming impediments to international cooperation against terrorism
Transnational terrorism waged by Islamist terrorists represents a major challenge to international security, which necessitates an unwitting cooperation by all countries in order to effectively confront this asymmetric and unpredictable form of threat (Gray, 2002, pp. 8-11). The Global war on terrorists is not only a battle of arms and ideas (Posen, 2002, p.1), but also a battle for the hearts and minds, where all elements of international power including intelligence; law enforcement; military; financial, diplomatic and intellectual to defeat the terrorists and isolate their radical ideology that inspired others to join or support them (Probst, 2001, pp. 4-5: Posen, 2002, p.1))
Effective international cooperation in the war against terrorists cannot be achieved without addressing the impediments to such cooperation; among them are the lack of international agreement on the definition of terrorism itself, and placing domestic politics and national interests ahead of those of the international community as a whole. Using examples from ongoing policy efforts describe impediments to international cooperation against terrorism and assess ways in which these impediments can be overcome
Barry Posen in 2001 argued that the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States today is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends (p. 5). Al Qaeda (AQ), formed by Salafi Jihadists and led by Osama Ben Laden (OBL), perpetuated the most horrific terrorist attack in history on September the 11th, in New York and Washington, and is the main transnational Islamist terrorist group that exists today. AQ is seeking to establish pan-Islamic regime, create and exploit a division between the Muslim and non-Muslim world and within the Muslim world itself, and ignite a clash of civilizations, which OBL himself firmly believes
Therefore, the war on Islamist terrorism cannot be won without winning the war of ideas, which require the cooperation between the Muslim world and the West in particular, and among the entire nations in general. Such cooperation will not be achieved without reaching a common ground based on the shared human values and address the impediments that undermine international cooperation in the war on terrorism. Among these impediments are:
1- Absence of international agreement on the definition of terrorism
Islamist terrorism is not monolithic (Posen, 2001, p.5). Most of the ME and the Muslim world doesn't see eye for eye with the West in their classification of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), and in this regard, unlike AQ, HAMAS and Hezbollah are not considered terrorist organizations, but rather resistance movements against Israeli occupation (Bahgat, p. 58). John Waszark in 2004 argued that “the major weapon in the arsenal of the counterterrorist financing regime is the criminalization of material support for terrorist Organizations” (p. 683). Therefore, support to these organizations lie at the heart of disagreement between the West and Muslim world and is a major impediment to the war on Islamist terrorism, where the vast majority of the public, according to opinion polls in the Muslim world, are not willing to alter their financial practices to comply with anti-terrorism written laws (p. 692)
Furthermore, Gawdat Bahgat in 2004 explained how the opposition to US policies in the ME, Israel’s support, “America’s failure to be even-handed” in the Arab-Israeli conflict, invasion of Iraq, and labeling the GWOT as war against Islam, have contributed to rising anti-Americanism in the Muslim world in which terrorists and terrorism breed (p. 58).
Palestinian suffering is a very sensational issue across the Muslim world, and is a weapon that has been used very effectively by terrorists, especially AQ, to rally support and win sympathy for their action and also to feed into anti-Americanism. Therefore, dealing with Palestinian terrorism with its complexities through a separate strategy and within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and not through narrow definitions that no one can agree on, will isolate AQ and give more momentum to the war on terrorism, which will be then defined as the brand of AQ terrorism. Consequently, the parameters for designating FTO need to be revisited, in which a distinction must be made between Islamist terrorist organizations with global agenda that use terrorist as a strategy, such as AQ, and other insurgencies that might of have used terrorism as a tactic during an armed conflict, but no longer do so, such as HAMAS and Hezbollah. Therefore, making such distinction, and engaging HAMAS and Hezbollah, provided that they end their terrorism against Israeli civilians, will pave the way to ending the blockade against Palestinians in Gaza which is galvanizing anti-American and sentiments in the region and aiding terrorists
2- Lack of clear understanding of foreign culture, especially Muslim culture
There is an inherent need by people in any country, religion or culture for prosperity, freedom and justice and aspiring to these values is not exclusive of particular countries or group of countries. In the Muslim world, tradition plays an important role, and most of these traditions stem from religion. Therefore, Anatol Lieven argued in 2001 that the USG should have basic knowledge of the Arab and Muslim world culture, traditions, value systems, and religious sects, as it conduct its GWOT. Such understanding of Muslim culture will help the GWOT on two fronts:
A) Build “culturally sophisticated profiles of asymmetric foes, so that we may stand some chance of understanding what might best discourage them [Islamist terrorists] from proceeding”, as Colin Gray argued in 2002 (p.11). Peter Probst in 2001 argued the greatest threat to national security that the US fails to appreciate remains problems of mindset and perception, which impacts terrorists thinking, operations, strategy, tactics, and planning (p. 4). Probst added that terrorists’ perception is their reality, and we must understand this reality through their lenses not through ours, which is colored by culture, history, personal experience and bureaucracy (p. 4)
B) Such knowledge and familiarity, according to Lieven, will enable the US to rightfully characterize the “enemy” and avoid alienating the majority of those in the Muslim world who perceive the GWOT as a war on Islam (p. 2). Furthermore, as George Perkovich in his fascinating 2005’s article “ Giving justice its due” argued it will enable us to realize how the ME today, contrary to Western thinking, is striving for justice more than freedom, and that should be the emphasis of US policies towards the Muslim world.
3- Respect of International Law, human rights and civil liberties
Several analysts criticize the GWOT, especially the US Patriot Act, and the war on Iraq for their encroachment on civil liberties, violating acceptable procedures of International Law, and creating the impression that US relies on brute force and undermines legal norms, which consequently compromise the international cooperation in the war on terrorists (Best, p. 26). Some argued that waging wars of choice on other countries in absence of credible and reliable evidence that they represented an imminent threat US (Record, 2003, p. 43 & p. 18)
The US cannot afford to lose the support of friendly nations in the war on terrorists, where security services of these nations can be important sources of information for US intelligence; they know their neighborhoods and have access that US agencies do not (Deutch & Smith, 2002, p. 65). Therefore, the US must work with the international organizations and avoid unilateral actions that threaten international unity.
However, as the nature of the enemy we face today has changed, and as governments are obliged to respect international law and make an effort to preserve civil liberties, people themselves, particularly in the US, might need to change their perception on what constitute violation of civil liberties and what does not.
Chalk and Rosenau explained how the European public opinion generally accepts government intrusion into citizens' personal life as "necessary evil" (p. 51). However, in the US, the single largest obstacle to domestic intelligence remains cultural, given the history and structure of the US, where "most Americans don’t like to feel that they are being spied upon by their government or neighbors (Burch, 2007, p. 19). Where to draw a line between security needs and civil liberties, is a question that Americans themselves are ought to reconcile and without infusing partisan politics in order to provide our intelligence agencies with the necessary tools to fight this asymmetric form of threat to our national security
4- Conflict with domestic politics
Since domestic politics often shape a country’s foreign policy decisions, governments tend to appease their domestic audience sometimes at the expense of its international standing and credibility. Barry Posen, in 2002, argued how the US has often failed to act out of fear of incurring modest costs; it has applied insufficient pressure on Israel to suppress its settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza. He added that short-term domestic political gains or losses has often dominated decision-making (p 6), which has significantly hurt the US foreign policies, especially in the Middle East, and hence undermine the international cooperation in the fight against terrorists.
Furthermore, domestic partisan politics can also undermine our intelligence and law enforcement capabilities and distract reform efforts. For example, although the US has a solid legal oversight structure, however, the lack of bipartisan approach and the politicization of intelligence reforms represent an obstacle to effectively implement these reform initiatives. Burch in 2007, argued how the CIA was insulated from partisan politics from 1947-1967 because secrecy normally expected by intelligence agency was maintained and congressional knowledge and monitoring of intelligence operations was very limited (p. 3). Therefore, having less legislative and more judicial and/or independent internal oversight might be the best approach to shield national security agencies from partisan politics, as it is happening in Italy, France and other European countries
Moreover, as the 2004’s National Commission Report on terrorists financings have indicated, domestic politics has also played a role in countries like Saudi Arabia, where the balance that the government has tried to strike between the Wahhabi clergy and the more liberal ruling elite, have rendered the Saudis skeptical of US new strategies in the war on terrorism, until the country itself became a victim of a series of terrorist attacks from May of 2003 and November of 2004. Since then, Saudi Arabia viewed AQ as a domestic threat (p. 123) and has dramatically increased its cooperation with the US in the fight against terrorism to an unprecedented level (p. 126), stepped up their crackdown on terrorist financiers, captured or killed many AQ suspects and disrupted several terrorist cells (pp. 124-128)
5- Differences in Intelligence and law enforcement agencies’ structures and philosophy from one country to the other
According to Chalk and Rosenau, 2004’s comparative study of four European countries—UK, France, Canada and Australia—differences exist in the culture and modes of operations between these countries and their counterparts in the US, despite of shared strengths and weaknesses in their operational and organizational structure. These differences might stall cooperation and adds to layers of bureaucracy and create some difficulties coordinating policies and strategies. Furthermore, foreign counterterrorism agencies, which include intelligence and law enforcement, might not have the same guidelines that regulate the balance between national security and civil liberties. Therefore, the quality of information gathered by intelligence, as well as its credibility might be undermined, especially if a country has history of human rights abuses, torture or racial discrimination, or if some countries perceive certain intelligence information politically motivated, which can prevent some countries from acting upon intelligence information gathered by that country
Among the various reasons cited in 2004’s National Commission’s report on terrorist financing for Saudis’ lack of cooperation with the US their inaction against Islamic charities, such as HIF, suspected of financing terrorists, was the lack of specific and credible intelligence available for the Saudis to move against these organizations
6- Deconflating the threat
Jeffrey Record in 2003 argued that in declaring the “we [US] make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them” (p. 10), the US broadened the scope of its enemies, risked international and popular support, and undermined the resources to fight wars of necessity by lumping in the same basket all terrorist organizations, in addition to rouge states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and failed states, such as Afghanistan, instead of focusing on AQ and Islamist terrorists as the main threat to US (p. 13 & p. 18). Therefore Record argued that while transnational terrorist organizations’ most potent protection is statelessness (p. 16) therefore they are undeterrable, there is no evidence that rouge states, such as North Korea and Iran, are not subject to effective deterrence (p. 17).
7- lack of written anti-terrorism laws in some countries and lack of enforcement
Among the major hurdles in waging an effective global financial war on terrorism is the lack of written anti-terrorism laws in some countries to disrupt the financial networks funneling monies to terrorists, or the lack of enforcement of such laws when they exist.
John Waszak in 2005 argued that “the problem of suppressing terrorist financing is not necessarily one of the laws or law enforcement. Rather, the suppression of terrorist financing is made difficult for [various] non-legal reasons” (p. 707), which include:
1- Sensitivity and restraint: since terrorists rely, among other sources, on money collected from Islamic charities and mandatory zakat paid by Muslim individuals and businesses, it will is logistically difficult to sort out and clamp down on terrorist finances without running into the risk of restricting one of the main pillars Islam—zakat—and offending majority of mainstream Muslims. Therefore, counterterrorist strategists must communicate effectively with Muslim leaders and communities in the US and “be sensitive to peaceful followers of Islam not materially supportive of terrorism or terrorist organizations” (pp. 707-708)
2- Lack of financial intelligence network with the essential resources and tools for law enforcement: The building of such global network requires strong political and economic will by countries which are major international players in the fight against terrorism, such as US, Saudi Arabia and UAE. This will might be lacking in some countries because of several complex political, economic, and cultural reasons that must be addressed by policy makers (pp. 708-709).
Therefore, micromanaging an unfocused financial war on terrorism by going after every individual, charity, business or organization with suspected ties or links to terrorists, can be exhaustive, and will create an atmosphere of phobia that is counterproductive. It will be more effective to focus on identifying and detecting patterns of financial transactions that can predict early phases of terrorists’ operations. This can be achieved by combining financial information with counterterrorist intelligence, coordination between financial institutions, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, outreach to the private sector, and rely on diplomacy to achieve international engagement and ending state sponsorship of terrorism (FATF, pp. 29-35)
Conclusion
The Global war on Islamist terrorists is not only a battle of arms and ideas, but also a battle for the hearts and minds, where all elements of international power including intelligence; law enforcement; military; financial, diplomatic and intellectual to defeat the terrorists and isolate their radical ideology that inspired others to join or support them. Therefore, the war on terrorism cannot be won without winning the war of ideas, which require the cooperation between the Muslim world and the West in particular, and the entire world in general. Such cooperation will not be achieved without reaching a common ground based on the shared human values and addressing the impediments that undermine international cooperation in the war on terrorism.
International cooperation can be achieved by formulating new strategy in the GWOT that does not deal with Islamist terrorism as a monolithic threat. A distinction must be made between Islamist terrorist organizations with global agenda that use terrorist as a strategy, such as AQ, and other insurgencies that used terrorism as a tactic during an armed conflict, but no longer do so, such as HAMAS and Hezbollah. Dealing with Palestinian terrorism with its complexities through a separate strategy and within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and not through narrow definitions that no one can agree on, will isolate AQ and give more momentum to the war on terrorism.
Better understanding and appreciation of the Arab and Muslim world culture, traditions, value systems, and religious sects, will avoid alienating the majority of those in the Muslim world who perceive the GWOT as a war on Islam, and will help shape counterterrorism based on terrorists’ perception, and therefore reduce intelligence gaps and vulnerabilities
Furthermore, broadening the scope of enemies by lumping deterrable rouge states and undeterrable transnational terrorist groups will risk international agreement and unity and compromise cooperation.
As governments are obliged to uphold International Law, respect human rights, and work within international norms, peoples also need to redraw the line between national security and civil liberties, where sacrifice of some the personal freedoms might be necessary in order to meet the challenges of the new transnational terrorist threat posed by non state actors.
Effective international cooperation can also be achieved by improving quality of intelligence and seeking better coordination between law enforcement and intelligence services in different countries. Identifying and detecting patterns of financial transactions that can predict early phases of terrorists’ operations. This can be achieved by combining financial information with counterterrorist intelligence, coordination between financial institutions, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, outreach to the private sector, and rely on diplomacy to achieve international engagement and ending state sponsorship of terrorism
References
Bahgat, G. (2004, Winter). Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism. Arabic Studies
Quarterly, 26 (1), pp. 51-63. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier
Best, R. A. (2001, December). Intelligence and law enforcement: Countering transnational
threats to the U.S. , Congressional Research Service, pdf document
Chalk, P. & Rosenau, W. (2004). Confronting the "Enemy Within": Security intelligence,
the police, and counterterrorism in four democracies, RAND, Available at:
http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG100/
Deutch, J., & Smith, J. (2002). Smarter Intelligence. Foreign Policy, (128), 64. Retrieved
from Academic Search Premier .
FATF Report (2008, February). Terrorist Financing. Public website
Gray, C. (2002). Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror. Parameters: US Army War
College, 32(1), 5. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier
Perkovich, G. (2005). Giving Justice Its Due. Foreign Affairs, 84(4), pp. 79-93. Retrieved
from Academic Search Premier.
Posen, B. (2001, December). The struggle against terrorism: Grand strategy, strategy, and
tactics, International Security, 26 (3 )
Probst, P. (2001, March). Intelligence and Force Protection vs. Terrorism", in James M.
Smith and William C. Thomas, eds., The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government
Response: Operational and Organizational Factors, Colorado Springs, CO: USAF
Institute for National Security Studies, March 2001, pdf file Available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA409533&Location=U2&doc=GetTR
Lieven, A. (2001, October). Fighting Terrorism: Lessons from the Cold War. Policy Brief,
Carnegie Endowment
Record, J. (2003, December). Bounding the Global War on Terrorism. US Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute. Available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=207
Waszak, J. D.G. (2004). The obstacles to suppressing radical Islamic terrorist financing.
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 36(2/3), pp. 673-710. Retrieved
from Academic Search Premier
Effective international cooperation in the war against terrorists cannot be achieved without addressing the impediments to such cooperation; among them are the lack of international agreement on the definition of terrorism itself, and placing domestic politics and national interests ahead of those of the international community as a whole. Using examples from ongoing policy efforts describe impediments to international cooperation against terrorism and assess ways in which these impediments can be overcome
Barry Posen in 2001 argued that the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States today is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends (p. 5). Al Qaeda (AQ), formed by Salafi Jihadists and led by Osama Ben Laden (OBL), perpetuated the most horrific terrorist attack in history on September the 11th, in New York and Washington, and is the main transnational Islamist terrorist group that exists today. AQ is seeking to establish pan-Islamic regime, create and exploit a division between the Muslim and non-Muslim world and within the Muslim world itself, and ignite a clash of civilizations, which OBL himself firmly believes
Therefore, the war on Islamist terrorism cannot be won without winning the war of ideas, which require the cooperation between the Muslim world and the West in particular, and among the entire nations in general. Such cooperation will not be achieved without reaching a common ground based on the shared human values and address the impediments that undermine international cooperation in the war on terrorism. Among these impediments are:
1- Absence of international agreement on the definition of terrorism
Islamist terrorism is not monolithic (Posen, 2001, p.5). Most of the ME and the Muslim world doesn't see eye for eye with the West in their classification of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), and in this regard, unlike AQ, HAMAS and Hezbollah are not considered terrorist organizations, but rather resistance movements against Israeli occupation (Bahgat, p. 58). John Waszark in 2004 argued that “the major weapon in the arsenal of the counterterrorist financing regime is the criminalization of material support for terrorist Organizations” (p. 683). Therefore, support to these organizations lie at the heart of disagreement between the West and Muslim world and is a major impediment to the war on Islamist terrorism, where the vast majority of the public, according to opinion polls in the Muslim world, are not willing to alter their financial practices to comply with anti-terrorism written laws (p. 692)
Furthermore, Gawdat Bahgat in 2004 explained how the opposition to US policies in the ME, Israel’s support, “America’s failure to be even-handed” in the Arab-Israeli conflict, invasion of Iraq, and labeling the GWOT as war against Islam, have contributed to rising anti-Americanism in the Muslim world in which terrorists and terrorism breed (p. 58).
Palestinian suffering is a very sensational issue across the Muslim world, and is a weapon that has been used very effectively by terrorists, especially AQ, to rally support and win sympathy for their action and also to feed into anti-Americanism. Therefore, dealing with Palestinian terrorism with its complexities through a separate strategy and within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and not through narrow definitions that no one can agree on, will isolate AQ and give more momentum to the war on terrorism, which will be then defined as the brand of AQ terrorism. Consequently, the parameters for designating FTO need to be revisited, in which a distinction must be made between Islamist terrorist organizations with global agenda that use terrorist as a strategy, such as AQ, and other insurgencies that might of have used terrorism as a tactic during an armed conflict, but no longer do so, such as HAMAS and Hezbollah. Therefore, making such distinction, and engaging HAMAS and Hezbollah, provided that they end their terrorism against Israeli civilians, will pave the way to ending the blockade against Palestinians in Gaza which is galvanizing anti-American and sentiments in the region and aiding terrorists
2- Lack of clear understanding of foreign culture, especially Muslim culture
There is an inherent need by people in any country, religion or culture for prosperity, freedom and justice and aspiring to these values is not exclusive of particular countries or group of countries. In the Muslim world, tradition plays an important role, and most of these traditions stem from religion. Therefore, Anatol Lieven argued in 2001 that the USG should have basic knowledge of the Arab and Muslim world culture, traditions, value systems, and religious sects, as it conduct its GWOT. Such understanding of Muslim culture will help the GWOT on two fronts:
A) Build “culturally sophisticated profiles of asymmetric foes, so that we may stand some chance of understanding what might best discourage them [Islamist terrorists] from proceeding”, as Colin Gray argued in 2002 (p.11). Peter Probst in 2001 argued the greatest threat to national security that the US fails to appreciate remains problems of mindset and perception, which impacts terrorists thinking, operations, strategy, tactics, and planning (p. 4). Probst added that terrorists’ perception is their reality, and we must understand this reality through their lenses not through ours, which is colored by culture, history, personal experience and bureaucracy (p. 4)
B) Such knowledge and familiarity, according to Lieven, will enable the US to rightfully characterize the “enemy” and avoid alienating the majority of those in the Muslim world who perceive the GWOT as a war on Islam (p. 2). Furthermore, as George Perkovich in his fascinating 2005’s article “ Giving justice its due” argued it will enable us to realize how the ME today, contrary to Western thinking, is striving for justice more than freedom, and that should be the emphasis of US policies towards the Muslim world.
3- Respect of International Law, human rights and civil liberties
Several analysts criticize the GWOT, especially the US Patriot Act, and the war on Iraq for their encroachment on civil liberties, violating acceptable procedures of International Law, and creating the impression that US relies on brute force and undermines legal norms, which consequently compromise the international cooperation in the war on terrorists (Best, p. 26). Some argued that waging wars of choice on other countries in absence of credible and reliable evidence that they represented an imminent threat US (Record, 2003, p. 43 & p. 18)
The US cannot afford to lose the support of friendly nations in the war on terrorists, where security services of these nations can be important sources of information for US intelligence; they know their neighborhoods and have access that US agencies do not (Deutch & Smith, 2002, p. 65). Therefore, the US must work with the international organizations and avoid unilateral actions that threaten international unity.
However, as the nature of the enemy we face today has changed, and as governments are obliged to respect international law and make an effort to preserve civil liberties, people themselves, particularly in the US, might need to change their perception on what constitute violation of civil liberties and what does not.
Chalk and Rosenau explained how the European public opinion generally accepts government intrusion into citizens' personal life as "necessary evil" (p. 51). However, in the US, the single largest obstacle to domestic intelligence remains cultural, given the history and structure of the US, where "most Americans don’t like to feel that they are being spied upon by their government or neighbors (Burch, 2007, p. 19). Where to draw a line between security needs and civil liberties, is a question that Americans themselves are ought to reconcile and without infusing partisan politics in order to provide our intelligence agencies with the necessary tools to fight this asymmetric form of threat to our national security
4- Conflict with domestic politics
Since domestic politics often shape a country’s foreign policy decisions, governments tend to appease their domestic audience sometimes at the expense of its international standing and credibility. Barry Posen, in 2002, argued how the US has often failed to act out of fear of incurring modest costs; it has applied insufficient pressure on Israel to suppress its settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza. He added that short-term domestic political gains or losses has often dominated decision-making (p 6), which has significantly hurt the US foreign policies, especially in the Middle East, and hence undermine the international cooperation in the fight against terrorists.
Furthermore, domestic partisan politics can also undermine our intelligence and law enforcement capabilities and distract reform efforts. For example, although the US has a solid legal oversight structure, however, the lack of bipartisan approach and the politicization of intelligence reforms represent an obstacle to effectively implement these reform initiatives. Burch in 2007, argued how the CIA was insulated from partisan politics from 1947-1967 because secrecy normally expected by intelligence agency was maintained and congressional knowledge and monitoring of intelligence operations was very limited (p. 3). Therefore, having less legislative and more judicial and/or independent internal oversight might be the best approach to shield national security agencies from partisan politics, as it is happening in Italy, France and other European countries
Moreover, as the 2004’s National Commission Report on terrorists financings have indicated, domestic politics has also played a role in countries like Saudi Arabia, where the balance that the government has tried to strike between the Wahhabi clergy and the more liberal ruling elite, have rendered the Saudis skeptical of US new strategies in the war on terrorism, until the country itself became a victim of a series of terrorist attacks from May of 2003 and November of 2004. Since then, Saudi Arabia viewed AQ as a domestic threat (p. 123) and has dramatically increased its cooperation with the US in the fight against terrorism to an unprecedented level (p. 126), stepped up their crackdown on terrorist financiers, captured or killed many AQ suspects and disrupted several terrorist cells (pp. 124-128)
5- Differences in Intelligence and law enforcement agencies’ structures and philosophy from one country to the other
According to Chalk and Rosenau, 2004’s comparative study of four European countries—UK, France, Canada and Australia—differences exist in the culture and modes of operations between these countries and their counterparts in the US, despite of shared strengths and weaknesses in their operational and organizational structure. These differences might stall cooperation and adds to layers of bureaucracy and create some difficulties coordinating policies and strategies. Furthermore, foreign counterterrorism agencies, which include intelligence and law enforcement, might not have the same guidelines that regulate the balance between national security and civil liberties. Therefore, the quality of information gathered by intelligence, as well as its credibility might be undermined, especially if a country has history of human rights abuses, torture or racial discrimination, or if some countries perceive certain intelligence information politically motivated, which can prevent some countries from acting upon intelligence information gathered by that country
Among the various reasons cited in 2004’s National Commission’s report on terrorist financing for Saudis’ lack of cooperation with the US their inaction against Islamic charities, such as HIF, suspected of financing terrorists, was the lack of specific and credible intelligence available for the Saudis to move against these organizations
6- Deconflating the threat
Jeffrey Record in 2003 argued that in declaring the “we [US] make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them” (p. 10), the US broadened the scope of its enemies, risked international and popular support, and undermined the resources to fight wars of necessity by lumping in the same basket all terrorist organizations, in addition to rouge states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and failed states, such as Afghanistan, instead of focusing on AQ and Islamist terrorists as the main threat to US (p. 13 & p. 18). Therefore Record argued that while transnational terrorist organizations’ most potent protection is statelessness (p. 16) therefore they are undeterrable, there is no evidence that rouge states, such as North Korea and Iran, are not subject to effective deterrence (p. 17).
7- lack of written anti-terrorism laws in some countries and lack of enforcement
Among the major hurdles in waging an effective global financial war on terrorism is the lack of written anti-terrorism laws in some countries to disrupt the financial networks funneling monies to terrorists, or the lack of enforcement of such laws when they exist.
John Waszak in 2005 argued that “the problem of suppressing terrorist financing is not necessarily one of the laws or law enforcement. Rather, the suppression of terrorist financing is made difficult for [various] non-legal reasons” (p. 707), which include:
1- Sensitivity and restraint: since terrorists rely, among other sources, on money collected from Islamic charities and mandatory zakat paid by Muslim individuals and businesses, it will is logistically difficult to sort out and clamp down on terrorist finances without running into the risk of restricting one of the main pillars Islam—zakat—and offending majority of mainstream Muslims. Therefore, counterterrorist strategists must communicate effectively with Muslim leaders and communities in the US and “be sensitive to peaceful followers of Islam not materially supportive of terrorism or terrorist organizations” (pp. 707-708)
2- Lack of financial intelligence network with the essential resources and tools for law enforcement: The building of such global network requires strong political and economic will by countries which are major international players in the fight against terrorism, such as US, Saudi Arabia and UAE. This will might be lacking in some countries because of several complex political, economic, and cultural reasons that must be addressed by policy makers (pp. 708-709).
Therefore, micromanaging an unfocused financial war on terrorism by going after every individual, charity, business or organization with suspected ties or links to terrorists, can be exhaustive, and will create an atmosphere of phobia that is counterproductive. It will be more effective to focus on identifying and detecting patterns of financial transactions that can predict early phases of terrorists’ operations. This can be achieved by combining financial information with counterterrorist intelligence, coordination between financial institutions, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, outreach to the private sector, and rely on diplomacy to achieve international engagement and ending state sponsorship of terrorism (FATF, pp. 29-35)
Conclusion
The Global war on Islamist terrorists is not only a battle of arms and ideas, but also a battle for the hearts and minds, where all elements of international power including intelligence; law enforcement; military; financial, diplomatic and intellectual to defeat the terrorists and isolate their radical ideology that inspired others to join or support them. Therefore, the war on terrorism cannot be won without winning the war of ideas, which require the cooperation between the Muslim world and the West in particular, and the entire world in general. Such cooperation will not be achieved without reaching a common ground based on the shared human values and addressing the impediments that undermine international cooperation in the war on terrorism.
International cooperation can be achieved by formulating new strategy in the GWOT that does not deal with Islamist terrorism as a monolithic threat. A distinction must be made between Islamist terrorist organizations with global agenda that use terrorist as a strategy, such as AQ, and other insurgencies that used terrorism as a tactic during an armed conflict, but no longer do so, such as HAMAS and Hezbollah. Dealing with Palestinian terrorism with its complexities through a separate strategy and within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and not through narrow definitions that no one can agree on, will isolate AQ and give more momentum to the war on terrorism.
Better understanding and appreciation of the Arab and Muslim world culture, traditions, value systems, and religious sects, will avoid alienating the majority of those in the Muslim world who perceive the GWOT as a war on Islam, and will help shape counterterrorism based on terrorists’ perception, and therefore reduce intelligence gaps and vulnerabilities
Furthermore, broadening the scope of enemies by lumping deterrable rouge states and undeterrable transnational terrorist groups will risk international agreement and unity and compromise cooperation.
As governments are obliged to uphold International Law, respect human rights, and work within international norms, peoples also need to redraw the line between national security and civil liberties, where sacrifice of some the personal freedoms might be necessary in order to meet the challenges of the new transnational terrorist threat posed by non state actors.
Effective international cooperation can also be achieved by improving quality of intelligence and seeking better coordination between law enforcement and intelligence services in different countries. Identifying and detecting patterns of financial transactions that can predict early phases of terrorists’ operations. This can be achieved by combining financial information with counterterrorist intelligence, coordination between financial institutions, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, outreach to the private sector, and rely on diplomacy to achieve international engagement and ending state sponsorship of terrorism
References
Bahgat, G. (2004, Winter). Saudi Arabia and the War on Terrorism. Arabic Studies
Quarterly, 26 (1), pp. 51-63. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier
Best, R. A. (2001, December). Intelligence and law enforcement: Countering transnational
threats to the U.S. , Congressional Research Service, pdf document
Chalk, P. & Rosenau, W. (2004). Confronting the "Enemy Within": Security intelligence,
the police, and counterterrorism in four democracies, RAND, Available at:
http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG100/
Deutch, J., & Smith, J. (2002). Smarter Intelligence. Foreign Policy, (128), 64. Retrieved
from Academic Search Premier .
FATF Report (2008, February). Terrorist Financing. Public website
Gray, C. (2002). Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror. Parameters: US Army War
College, 32(1), 5. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier
Perkovich, G. (2005). Giving Justice Its Due. Foreign Affairs, 84(4), pp. 79-93. Retrieved
from Academic Search Premier.
Posen, B. (2001, December). The struggle against terrorism: Grand strategy, strategy, and
tactics, International Security, 26 (3 )
Probst, P. (2001, March). Intelligence and Force Protection vs. Terrorism", in James M.
Smith and William C. Thomas, eds., The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government
Response: Operational and Organizational Factors, Colorado Springs, CO: USAF
Institute for National Security Studies, March 2001, pdf file Available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA409533&Location=U2&doc=GetTR
Lieven, A. (2001, October). Fighting Terrorism: Lessons from the Cold War. Policy Brief,
Carnegie Endowment
Record, J. (2003, December). Bounding the Global War on Terrorism. US Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute. Available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=207
Waszak, J. D.G. (2004). The obstacles to suppressing radical Islamic terrorist financing.
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 36(2/3), pp. 673-710. Retrieved
from Academic Search Premier
Sunday, January 10, 2010
Key elements in counterterrorism strategies
Paul Pillar in 2001 argued that terrorism deserves to be condemned and actively opposed by all the world’s nations because it involves conduct that offend universal values involving human life and the suffering of innocents. In this regard, counterterrorism is of a piece with international humanitarian law as it has evolved for more than a century and been codified in The Hague and Geneva conventions on the conduct of warfare and is a similarly apt subject for multilateral diplomacy (Pillar, p. 78)
Following the attacks of 9/11, the US National Security Strategy became multifaceted, and more focused as far as its threat assessment and its articulation of the nature of the “new terrorism” the country faces, compared to pre 9/11. The presence of a comprehensive, integrated and more coordinated national strategy that includes several intelligence, law enforcement and security agencies highlights the main characteristics of counterterrorism (CT) today (Hoffman, 2001; Lieven, 2001, p. 1)
Furthermore, as Pillar explained, there are several elements upon which this new post 9/11 counterterrorism strategy should address, which includes: Roots, capabilities, intentions and defenses (pp. 29-40). According to Pillar, no single approach makes an effective counterterrorism policy, which must have several elements these elements.
1- Roots
Terrorism does not arise randomly (Pillar, 2001, p. 30). Nonetheless, the National Security Strategy for the US lacks a clear understanding of the roots of terrorism’s asymmetric threats (Gray, 2002, p. 5), and consequently, a clear strategy to deal with and address these threats, without which CT today remains ineffective in its ability to prevent future terrorist attack.
A major flaw in the US national counterterrorism strategy is its downplaying of the role of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the perceived US bias towards Israel among Arabs/Muslims public opinion, as well as the US policies in Iraq during the period of economic sanctions ending with the Iraq war as some of the causes of Islamist terrorism (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006, p. 8)
Another flaw in the US national counterterrorism strategy is its mischaracterization of the Al Qaeda (AQ)’s reasons of waging jihad against the “US and the crusaders” as their hatred towards Western civilization, freedom and democracy, which is not what AQ’s literature clearly indicated.
Barry Posen, in 2001/2002, argued that AQ targeted the US mainly for its policies in the Middle East responsible for the killing and suffering of millions of Muslims in countries such as Iraq, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and imposing upon Muslims a Western culture deeply offensive to traditional Islam (p. 1). Furthermore, the US military presence in Saudi Arabia is considered by bin Laden as a desecration of the Islamic holy land. Posen’s argument seem to correlate more accurately with AQ’s statements and videotapes released in Arabic
Furthermore, the US national counterterrorism strategy emphasized the role of democracy in combating terrorism through the”advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy.” (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,2006, p.8). However, democracy promotion does not seem to be a priority for the current US administration, which eased up pressure exerted by the Bush administration on autocratic regimes to in the Middle East to democratize, in favor of their cooperation the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, Iran, and other areas that serves the interests of the US. Therefore, the lack of consistency in US foreign policies in the Middle East represents a gap in the US counterterrorist strategy
Anatol Lieven in 2001 argued that the US Global War On Terror (GWOT) should be waged in a fashion similar to the Cold War and drawing from its lessons (p. 1). He makes a valid argument that the USG should have basic knowledge of the Arab and Muslim world culture, traditions, value systems, and religious sects, as it conduct its WOT, by incorporating experts in these areas (p. 2). A need to build “culturally sophisticated profiles of asymmetric foes, so that we may stand some chance of understanding what might best discourage them from proceeding”, as Colin Gray argued in 2002 (p.11). Such knowledge and familiarity, according to Lieven, will enable the US to rightfully characterize the “enemy” and avoid alienating the majority of those in the Muslim world who perceive the WOT as a war on Islam (P. 2)
However, as Paul Pillar argued, doing something about the roots involves the management of numerous foreign policy matters that are not primarily the responsibility of people in counterterrorism (p. 30), which remains a challenge in itself. Some of these grievances are expressed directly by terrorists such as political repression, lack of self-determination, the depravity of other rulers (p. 30). Therefore, policy initiatives, peace progress, political reforms and economic reforms should be made part of measures aimed at addressing the roots of terrorism (p. 31). Furthermore, counterterrorism is not the only consideration in determining US policies. Some things that are potentially terrorist-breeding and considered unjust, may be viewed by the US for politically and ethically sound reasons, as not unjust and in no need for major change (p. 32)
Moreover, there will always remain a core of incorrigibles’ roots of terrorism, and these will include terrorists about whom the US must worry the most. Their viewpoints are simply too extreme to be accommodated (Pillar, 2001, p. 32)
2- Capabilities
Reducing the capabilities of terrorist groups to conduct attacks is at the heart of US counterterrorism programs. However, terrorists can still inflict mass casualties, which might not require much capability.
3- Intentions
Why do terrorists do what they do, matters. Nonetheless, no matter what the terrorists’ intentions are, the US has made its policy that it will make no concessions to terrorists, because not rewarding terrorism will give terrorists less incentive to try using it again (Pillar, 2001, p. 35). Although the US at times made concessions to terrorism, e.g. Iran-Contra affair, the incorrigibility of some hardcore terrorists’ demands is the main limitation of this element of counterterrorism, and therefore, there is no way to influence their intentions over long term (p. 37)
4- Defenses
Defenses against terrorism include security measures, anti-terrorist defenses, and physical defenses. The anti-terrorist defenses constitute a very large proportion f the US fight against terrorism (Pillar, 2001, p. 37). Furthermore, research and development of new antiterrorist technologies continues through the Technical Support Working Group created by the federal government (p. 38)
However, as Pillar argued, the comprehensive protection for everything in the terrorists’ sights would be prohibitively expensive (Pillar, 2001, p. 39). As the Crowe panel acknowledged, “We understand that there will never be enough money to do all that should be done, we will have to live with partial solutions, and in turn, a high level of threat and vulnerability for quite sometimes. Furthermore, terrorists themselves shift their targets depending on the limitations due to security countermeasures (p. 39)
Counterterrorist instruments
In order to ensure that a counterterrorism strategy contains some or all main four elements mentioned above, Paul Pillar in 2001, suggested five various instruments to be implemented. He argued that all instruments needs to be employed and that each element can be pursued with more than one instrument (p. 73)
These instruments of counterterrorism strategy include:
1- Diplomacy
Diplomacy influences all elements of counterterrorism, including roots, intentions, capabilities and defenses. Through diplomacy, the US can seek peace, improve its image, and persuade allies to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and combat anti-Americanism.
Therefore, effective counterterrorist diplomacy must be practiced not only by Foreign Service Officers, but also by immigration officers, FBI agents, CIA officers, and all other branches of government (Pillar, 2001, p. 74)
Counterterrorism diplomacy supports other instruments, including the application of criminal law by negotiating treaties and extraditing terrorist fugitives among states. By encouraging states not to allow terrorist groups to operate within their borders, the time and effort spent by intelligence services can then be limited and directed into other avenues (Pillar, 2001, p. 75). In order for counterterrorist diplomacy to be effective, cooperation from other states is necessary, which can be achieved through bilateral or multilateral negotiations leading to more powerful resolutions. Multilateral resolutions, e.g. UN, G8, or NATO, can provide more latitude to obtain cooperation by countries that are reluctant to bear its responsibilities in the GWOT. The case of Pan Am 103 and the implementation of UN Resolutions forcing Libya through multilateral diplomacy to cooperate in the investigations that led to successfully prosecuting those responsible for the crime (p. 76). Moreover, collective interventions through multilateral diplomacy reinforce international norms against use of terrorism (p. 77)
Among the major achievements of multilateral counterterrorist diplomacy is the rejection by the international community and UN General Assembly of terrorism as tactic against occupation, which was used predominately and condoned during the 1970. The Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, which met from 1974 to 1977, adopted a protocol that diluted the legal distinction between armed conflict and terrorist acts when it defined a combatant as someone who belongs to the “armed forces of a party to the conflict” needs to distinguish himself from the civilian population only “while….engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack (Pillar, 2001, p. 79)
Criminal law
Despite its shortcomings, applying the rule of law in terrorist cases remains a fundamental part in counterterrorism. The US national security will be served better when terrorists get punished for what they have done, which in turn, not only prevent them from conducting further attacks, but also might deter others from committing more acts of terrorism (Pillar, 2001,p. 81) Moreover, applying the rule of law reinforces democratic principles of the US, with freedom and justice their basic tenets.
However, bringing justice to terrorists through imprisonment or even capital punishment might not be effective deterrence with terrorists who are driven by religious ideology, and whose ultimate goal is to seek death to become martyrs. Furthermore, terrorists might exploit the legal system and use trials in open courts to disseminate propaganda for their cause, seek to justify their violence, and alter public perception regarding the nature of their heinous crimes. Often, the targeted audience in such propaganda would be the sympathizers and potential recruits, who the terrorists are keen on not losing their support.
Pillar, in 2001, warned of potential complacency when applying criminal justice in counterterrorism, which can be manifested through:
1- Confusing criminal justice as an instrument of counterterrorism with counterterrorism itself (p. 81). In other words, because criminal justice is focused on the punishment of terrorists after they commit their crimes, the main goal of counterterrorism should always remain the prevention of terrorists from conducting future operations
2- Prosecuting and successfully convicting terrorists might give a misleading sense of closure on terrorist crimes, that are still open, and terrorists will continue to plan and conduct their operations (Pillar, 2001, p. 82)
Although criminal justice has been playing an increasingly essential role in international counterterrorism efforts, applying criminal justice in terrorism cases remains a national issue, which Pillar argued could be because of various reasons, among them,
1- Difficulty to prosecute foreign terrorists and gather evidence that would stand in court, since most of the investigations require unfettered cooperation by foreign governments and may compromise intelligence sources. The federal government enacted the Classified Information Procedure Act (CIPA) in order to protect sensitive information during trials (Pillar, 2001, p. 85)
2- Lack of cooperation by some foreign governments despite of their commitments to the fight against terrorism. This ambivalence might be stemming from notions of sovereignty and national laws that might prohibit extradition or oppose capital punishment, in addition to political or public pressure on the governments not be perceived as collaborating with the USG, especially in some of the Middle East countries where anti-Americanism is influencing public sentiment. For example, the Khubar Towers and African embassy bombings cases (Pillar, 2001, p. 87)
3- Legal challenges in the application of international law governing extraterritorial prosecution of terrorists. The extraterritorial application for the US criminal law to terrorism relies heavily on cooperation of other states (Pillar, 2001, p. 86)
Therefore, due to the global nature of terrorism, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was proposed as a viable forum to prosecute terrorists, withstanding the various logistical hurdles and objections by major states including the US. Concerns were voiced regarding the mechanisms of handling of sensitive material and possible exploitation of intelligence sources (Pillar, 2001, p. 89).
Transferring suspected terrorists to other countries, such as Israel and several “moderate” Muslim states, for interrogation and possible prosecution, appeared to be an attractive option for USG in order to avoid possible retaliation by terrorist groups, or offending Muslim population (Pillar, 2001, pp. 91-92). However, when news about rendition operations becomes public, as in the case of CIA secret transfer of terrorist suspects to countries accused of poor human rights records and torture, the harm to US interests can be more.
Financial Controls
Contrary to common belief, controlling finances of terrorist groups and individuals plays a modest and secondary role in counterterrorism (pp. 93-94). Freezing terrorists’ monies and financial assets can undermine their ability to operate, that’s why the US has pursued their financial livelihood. Among other challenges facing financial war on terrorism is the fact the most of the financial operations take place outside the US, where, similar to criminal justice, foreign countries’ cooperation in clamping down on terrorists finances have not been limited (p. 95).
Furthermore, terrorist networks have developed multiple channels to move money around the globe outside the formal banking systems, therefore it is difficult to track. Moreover, terrorism is cheap, which makes impossible to eradicate (p. 94). It does not require significant sums of monies to blow up a truck or destroy a building in order to spread fear and make political statement.
Therefore, as Pillar argued, the value of the financial control instrument in counterterrorism will always be more symbolic demonstrating the US seriousness in countering terrorism than the material one of impoverishing terrorist groups (p. 96)
Military Force
Pillar argued that the use of military force in counterterrorism must always be an instrument available for the US to undermine terrorists’ capabilities, although it should be limited to punitive retaliatory situations (p. 99) where a high standard of proof in establishing responsibility for terrorist incident can be maintained (p. 107). He added that the cost of using military force unwisely can be staggering, especially on the diplomatic and international relations fronts, where the US is often perceived as superpower using its military muscle offensively (p. 106).
Despite of public domestic support to retaliatory military strikes against terrorist targets, foreign reactions have been mixture of cynicism and criticism of the real US intentions (p. 107). Furthermore, opponents of use of military force argue there has been no concrete evidence to conclude that military strikes have been successful in weakening terrorists’ capabilities and prevent them from conducting future attacks (pp. 102-103)
Furthermore, the use of destructive and indiscriminatory military force in retaliation to terrorist attacks have inflamed public opinion especially in the Muslim world, and have contributed to rising anti-Americanism. Since the US has began utilizing its military forces to in counterterrorism, all countries that have been attacks were Muslim, including Libya in 1986, Iraq in 1993, Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, ending with the invasion of Iraq in 2002 following the attacks of 9/11 (p. 100). Therefore, the US was portrayed by radical Islamists as the new “crusader” seeking to kill Muslims and strike poor Muslim nations (p. 107).
The use of military force as a counterterrorist instrument should be lethal, precise, and based on sound, credible and reliable intelligence in order to destroy terrorists’ capabilities and prevent future attacks with the least amount of collateral damage. This task can be best achieved by the Special Forces, which is the center of the US military’s capabilities to apply armed force to terrorists (p. 98)
Intelligence and Covert Action
Intelligence supports all the other counterterrorist instruments, with specific information as well as strategic assessments (p. 116). Therefore, it’s the most substantial instrument of counterterrorism (p.110). Human and tactical intelligence are the two main arms for information collection about terrorists, followed by meticulous process of information analysis, that should involve and coordinate with all other branches of security (pp. 110-112)
However, inherent problems and limitations with both collection and analysis of intelligence on terrorism undermine the feasibility of tactical warnings of potential terrorist attacks (p. 115). Similar to some of the European countries, some argue that the creation of a stand-alone domestic intelligence services entity is in the US is a necessary tool for CT, in order to address the limitations in intelligence information collection and analysis.
Rosenau and Chalk in 2004 argued that although significant cultural, historical, and political differences exist between the US and other countries examined in their study, and that intelligence institutions cannot and be replicated from one country to the other, there are in these countries measures that can be adopted by the US (p. XV), among them are:
1- Creating a domestic intelligence agency that focuses solely on information gathering, penetrating terrorist cells, but has no law enforcement capabilities (p. 43). However, there is no evidence to suggest that the presence of domestic intelligence agencies have actually been effective in preventing terrorist attacks in these countries, compared to what we have today in the US. The Bombings in London, Bali and Mumbai serve as example of the shortfalls in some of strategies implement by these domestic intelligence agencies in their respective countries
2- Extensive use of intelligence services in local community and reliance on information derived from HUMINT information (p. 35). Australia in particular posses a public outreach programs that emphasizes on increasing public understanding and awareness of its role, and building public trust, that can be helpful for the US (p. 37). In the countries examined in the RAND study, the emphasis on HUMINT and community intelligence/outreach was done through their domestic intelligence agencies, however, in the US in absence of such agency, this strategy can be pursued by FBI Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) spread throughout the country, but under the direct control of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and/or the NCTC not the FBI itself, which is one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission (Burch, 2007, p. 15)
Therefore, creating a domestic intelligence agency seem to be natural, especially that a series of reform initiatives from 1998 to 2001have not been able to reshape the culture within the existing intelligence agencies, especially the FBI, which seem to be resistant to change. A domestic intelligence agency that has the organizational strategic structure to effectively and precisely perform its mission of information gathering relying mainly on HUMINT and local community intelligence; effectively coordinate and share information with law enforcement and other foreign intelligence; governed by the constitutional safeguards to prevent the abuse of its power in surveillance and monitoring of private citizens for political gain, and is subject to independent internal and external oversight, can be the most valuable tool in the fight against terrorism
References
Chalk, P. & Rosenau, W. (2004). Confronting the "Enemy Within”: Security intelligence,
the police, and counterterrorism in four Democracies , RAND, retrieved from
http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG100/*Public Site
Gray, C. (2002). Thinking asymmetrically in times of terror. Parameters: US Army War
College, 32(1), 5. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier Database
Hoffman, B. (2001, March). Combating terrorism: In search of a national Strategy,
RAND. Retrieved from: http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT175/index.html
Lieven, A. (2001, October). Fighting terrorism: Lessons from the Cold War. Policy Brief,
Carnegie Endowment. Retrieved from:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=811
Pillar, P. (2001). Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1st ed. Washington Dc: Brooking
Institution Press
Posen, B. (2001, December). The Struggle against terrorism: Grand strategy and tactics
. International Security, 26 (3)
US National Strategy Against Terrorism. Retrieved from
https://norwich.angellearning.com/AngelUploads/Content/MDY_LOR_2008_12/_assoc/mdy_s6_terror/pdf/nsct2006.pdf
Following the attacks of 9/11, the US National Security Strategy became multifaceted, and more focused as far as its threat assessment and its articulation of the nature of the “new terrorism” the country faces, compared to pre 9/11. The presence of a comprehensive, integrated and more coordinated national strategy that includes several intelligence, law enforcement and security agencies highlights the main characteristics of counterterrorism (CT) today (Hoffman, 2001; Lieven, 2001, p. 1)
Furthermore, as Pillar explained, there are several elements upon which this new post 9/11 counterterrorism strategy should address, which includes: Roots, capabilities, intentions and defenses (pp. 29-40). According to Pillar, no single approach makes an effective counterterrorism policy, which must have several elements these elements.
1- Roots
Terrorism does not arise randomly (Pillar, 2001, p. 30). Nonetheless, the National Security Strategy for the US lacks a clear understanding of the roots of terrorism’s asymmetric threats (Gray, 2002, p. 5), and consequently, a clear strategy to deal with and address these threats, without which CT today remains ineffective in its ability to prevent future terrorist attack.
A major flaw in the US national counterterrorism strategy is its downplaying of the role of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the perceived US bias towards Israel among Arabs/Muslims public opinion, as well as the US policies in Iraq during the period of economic sanctions ending with the Iraq war as some of the causes of Islamist terrorism (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006, p. 8)
Another flaw in the US national counterterrorism strategy is its mischaracterization of the Al Qaeda (AQ)’s reasons of waging jihad against the “US and the crusaders” as their hatred towards Western civilization, freedom and democracy, which is not what AQ’s literature clearly indicated.
Barry Posen, in 2001/2002, argued that AQ targeted the US mainly for its policies in the Middle East responsible for the killing and suffering of millions of Muslims in countries such as Iraq, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and imposing upon Muslims a Western culture deeply offensive to traditional Islam (p. 1). Furthermore, the US military presence in Saudi Arabia is considered by bin Laden as a desecration of the Islamic holy land. Posen’s argument seem to correlate more accurately with AQ’s statements and videotapes released in Arabic
Furthermore, the US national counterterrorism strategy emphasized the role of democracy in combating terrorism through the”advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy.” (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,2006, p.8). However, democracy promotion does not seem to be a priority for the current US administration, which eased up pressure exerted by the Bush administration on autocratic regimes to in the Middle East to democratize, in favor of their cooperation the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, Iran, and other areas that serves the interests of the US. Therefore, the lack of consistency in US foreign policies in the Middle East represents a gap in the US counterterrorist strategy
Anatol Lieven in 2001 argued that the US Global War On Terror (GWOT) should be waged in a fashion similar to the Cold War and drawing from its lessons (p. 1). He makes a valid argument that the USG should have basic knowledge of the Arab and Muslim world culture, traditions, value systems, and religious sects, as it conduct its WOT, by incorporating experts in these areas (p. 2). A need to build “culturally sophisticated profiles of asymmetric foes, so that we may stand some chance of understanding what might best discourage them from proceeding”, as Colin Gray argued in 2002 (p.11). Such knowledge and familiarity, according to Lieven, will enable the US to rightfully characterize the “enemy” and avoid alienating the majority of those in the Muslim world who perceive the WOT as a war on Islam (P. 2)
However, as Paul Pillar argued, doing something about the roots involves the management of numerous foreign policy matters that are not primarily the responsibility of people in counterterrorism (p. 30), which remains a challenge in itself. Some of these grievances are expressed directly by terrorists such as political repression, lack of self-determination, the depravity of other rulers (p. 30). Therefore, policy initiatives, peace progress, political reforms and economic reforms should be made part of measures aimed at addressing the roots of terrorism (p. 31). Furthermore, counterterrorism is not the only consideration in determining US policies. Some things that are potentially terrorist-breeding and considered unjust, may be viewed by the US for politically and ethically sound reasons, as not unjust and in no need for major change (p. 32)
Moreover, there will always remain a core of incorrigibles’ roots of terrorism, and these will include terrorists about whom the US must worry the most. Their viewpoints are simply too extreme to be accommodated (Pillar, 2001, p. 32)
2- Capabilities
Reducing the capabilities of terrorist groups to conduct attacks is at the heart of US counterterrorism programs. However, terrorists can still inflict mass casualties, which might not require much capability.
3- Intentions
Why do terrorists do what they do, matters. Nonetheless, no matter what the terrorists’ intentions are, the US has made its policy that it will make no concessions to terrorists, because not rewarding terrorism will give terrorists less incentive to try using it again (Pillar, 2001, p. 35). Although the US at times made concessions to terrorism, e.g. Iran-Contra affair, the incorrigibility of some hardcore terrorists’ demands is the main limitation of this element of counterterrorism, and therefore, there is no way to influence their intentions over long term (p. 37)
4- Defenses
Defenses against terrorism include security measures, anti-terrorist defenses, and physical defenses. The anti-terrorist defenses constitute a very large proportion f the US fight against terrorism (Pillar, 2001, p. 37). Furthermore, research and development of new antiterrorist technologies continues through the Technical Support Working Group created by the federal government (p. 38)
However, as Pillar argued, the comprehensive protection for everything in the terrorists’ sights would be prohibitively expensive (Pillar, 2001, p. 39). As the Crowe panel acknowledged, “We understand that there will never be enough money to do all that should be done, we will have to live with partial solutions, and in turn, a high level of threat and vulnerability for quite sometimes. Furthermore, terrorists themselves shift their targets depending on the limitations due to security countermeasures (p. 39)
Counterterrorist instruments
In order to ensure that a counterterrorism strategy contains some or all main four elements mentioned above, Paul Pillar in 2001, suggested five various instruments to be implemented. He argued that all instruments needs to be employed and that each element can be pursued with more than one instrument (p. 73)
These instruments of counterterrorism strategy include:
1- Diplomacy
Diplomacy influences all elements of counterterrorism, including roots, intentions, capabilities and defenses. Through diplomacy, the US can seek peace, improve its image, and persuade allies to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and combat anti-Americanism.
Therefore, effective counterterrorist diplomacy must be practiced not only by Foreign Service Officers, but also by immigration officers, FBI agents, CIA officers, and all other branches of government (Pillar, 2001, p. 74)
Counterterrorism diplomacy supports other instruments, including the application of criminal law by negotiating treaties and extraditing terrorist fugitives among states. By encouraging states not to allow terrorist groups to operate within their borders, the time and effort spent by intelligence services can then be limited and directed into other avenues (Pillar, 2001, p. 75). In order for counterterrorist diplomacy to be effective, cooperation from other states is necessary, which can be achieved through bilateral or multilateral negotiations leading to more powerful resolutions. Multilateral resolutions, e.g. UN, G8, or NATO, can provide more latitude to obtain cooperation by countries that are reluctant to bear its responsibilities in the GWOT. The case of Pan Am 103 and the implementation of UN Resolutions forcing Libya through multilateral diplomacy to cooperate in the investigations that led to successfully prosecuting those responsible for the crime (p. 76). Moreover, collective interventions through multilateral diplomacy reinforce international norms against use of terrorism (p. 77)
Among the major achievements of multilateral counterterrorist diplomacy is the rejection by the international community and UN General Assembly of terrorism as tactic against occupation, which was used predominately and condoned during the 1970. The Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, which met from 1974 to 1977, adopted a protocol that diluted the legal distinction between armed conflict and terrorist acts when it defined a combatant as someone who belongs to the “armed forces of a party to the conflict” needs to distinguish himself from the civilian population only “while….engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack (Pillar, 2001, p. 79)
Criminal law
Despite its shortcomings, applying the rule of law in terrorist cases remains a fundamental part in counterterrorism. The US national security will be served better when terrorists get punished for what they have done, which in turn, not only prevent them from conducting further attacks, but also might deter others from committing more acts of terrorism (Pillar, 2001,p. 81) Moreover, applying the rule of law reinforces democratic principles of the US, with freedom and justice their basic tenets.
However, bringing justice to terrorists through imprisonment or even capital punishment might not be effective deterrence with terrorists who are driven by religious ideology, and whose ultimate goal is to seek death to become martyrs. Furthermore, terrorists might exploit the legal system and use trials in open courts to disseminate propaganda for their cause, seek to justify their violence, and alter public perception regarding the nature of their heinous crimes. Often, the targeted audience in such propaganda would be the sympathizers and potential recruits, who the terrorists are keen on not losing their support.
Pillar, in 2001, warned of potential complacency when applying criminal justice in counterterrorism, which can be manifested through:
1- Confusing criminal justice as an instrument of counterterrorism with counterterrorism itself (p. 81). In other words, because criminal justice is focused on the punishment of terrorists after they commit their crimes, the main goal of counterterrorism should always remain the prevention of terrorists from conducting future operations
2- Prosecuting and successfully convicting terrorists might give a misleading sense of closure on terrorist crimes, that are still open, and terrorists will continue to plan and conduct their operations (Pillar, 2001, p. 82)
Although criminal justice has been playing an increasingly essential role in international counterterrorism efforts, applying criminal justice in terrorism cases remains a national issue, which Pillar argued could be because of various reasons, among them,
1- Difficulty to prosecute foreign terrorists and gather evidence that would stand in court, since most of the investigations require unfettered cooperation by foreign governments and may compromise intelligence sources. The federal government enacted the Classified Information Procedure Act (CIPA) in order to protect sensitive information during trials (Pillar, 2001, p. 85)
2- Lack of cooperation by some foreign governments despite of their commitments to the fight against terrorism. This ambivalence might be stemming from notions of sovereignty and national laws that might prohibit extradition or oppose capital punishment, in addition to political or public pressure on the governments not be perceived as collaborating with the USG, especially in some of the Middle East countries where anti-Americanism is influencing public sentiment. For example, the Khubar Towers and African embassy bombings cases (Pillar, 2001, p. 87)
3- Legal challenges in the application of international law governing extraterritorial prosecution of terrorists. The extraterritorial application for the US criminal law to terrorism relies heavily on cooperation of other states (Pillar, 2001, p. 86)
Therefore, due to the global nature of terrorism, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was proposed as a viable forum to prosecute terrorists, withstanding the various logistical hurdles and objections by major states including the US. Concerns were voiced regarding the mechanisms of handling of sensitive material and possible exploitation of intelligence sources (Pillar, 2001, p. 89).
Transferring suspected terrorists to other countries, such as Israel and several “moderate” Muslim states, for interrogation and possible prosecution, appeared to be an attractive option for USG in order to avoid possible retaliation by terrorist groups, or offending Muslim population (Pillar, 2001, pp. 91-92). However, when news about rendition operations becomes public, as in the case of CIA secret transfer of terrorist suspects to countries accused of poor human rights records and torture, the harm to US interests can be more.
Financial Controls
Contrary to common belief, controlling finances of terrorist groups and individuals plays a modest and secondary role in counterterrorism (pp. 93-94). Freezing terrorists’ monies and financial assets can undermine their ability to operate, that’s why the US has pursued their financial livelihood. Among other challenges facing financial war on terrorism is the fact the most of the financial operations take place outside the US, where, similar to criminal justice, foreign countries’ cooperation in clamping down on terrorists finances have not been limited (p. 95).
Furthermore, terrorist networks have developed multiple channels to move money around the globe outside the formal banking systems, therefore it is difficult to track. Moreover, terrorism is cheap, which makes impossible to eradicate (p. 94). It does not require significant sums of monies to blow up a truck or destroy a building in order to spread fear and make political statement.
Therefore, as Pillar argued, the value of the financial control instrument in counterterrorism will always be more symbolic demonstrating the US seriousness in countering terrorism than the material one of impoverishing terrorist groups (p. 96)
Military Force
Pillar argued that the use of military force in counterterrorism must always be an instrument available for the US to undermine terrorists’ capabilities, although it should be limited to punitive retaliatory situations (p. 99) where a high standard of proof in establishing responsibility for terrorist incident can be maintained (p. 107). He added that the cost of using military force unwisely can be staggering, especially on the diplomatic and international relations fronts, where the US is often perceived as superpower using its military muscle offensively (p. 106).
Despite of public domestic support to retaliatory military strikes against terrorist targets, foreign reactions have been mixture of cynicism and criticism of the real US intentions (p. 107). Furthermore, opponents of use of military force argue there has been no concrete evidence to conclude that military strikes have been successful in weakening terrorists’ capabilities and prevent them from conducting future attacks (pp. 102-103)
Furthermore, the use of destructive and indiscriminatory military force in retaliation to terrorist attacks have inflamed public opinion especially in the Muslim world, and have contributed to rising anti-Americanism. Since the US has began utilizing its military forces to in counterterrorism, all countries that have been attacks were Muslim, including Libya in 1986, Iraq in 1993, Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, ending with the invasion of Iraq in 2002 following the attacks of 9/11 (p. 100). Therefore, the US was portrayed by radical Islamists as the new “crusader” seeking to kill Muslims and strike poor Muslim nations (p. 107).
The use of military force as a counterterrorist instrument should be lethal, precise, and based on sound, credible and reliable intelligence in order to destroy terrorists’ capabilities and prevent future attacks with the least amount of collateral damage. This task can be best achieved by the Special Forces, which is the center of the US military’s capabilities to apply armed force to terrorists (p. 98)
Intelligence and Covert Action
Intelligence supports all the other counterterrorist instruments, with specific information as well as strategic assessments (p. 116). Therefore, it’s the most substantial instrument of counterterrorism (p.110). Human and tactical intelligence are the two main arms for information collection about terrorists, followed by meticulous process of information analysis, that should involve and coordinate with all other branches of security (pp. 110-112)
However, inherent problems and limitations with both collection and analysis of intelligence on terrorism undermine the feasibility of tactical warnings of potential terrorist attacks (p. 115). Similar to some of the European countries, some argue that the creation of a stand-alone domestic intelligence services entity is in the US is a necessary tool for CT, in order to address the limitations in intelligence information collection and analysis.
Rosenau and Chalk in 2004 argued that although significant cultural, historical, and political differences exist between the US and other countries examined in their study, and that intelligence institutions cannot and be replicated from one country to the other, there are in these countries measures that can be adopted by the US (p. XV), among them are:
1- Creating a domestic intelligence agency that focuses solely on information gathering, penetrating terrorist cells, but has no law enforcement capabilities (p. 43). However, there is no evidence to suggest that the presence of domestic intelligence agencies have actually been effective in preventing terrorist attacks in these countries, compared to what we have today in the US. The Bombings in London, Bali and Mumbai serve as example of the shortfalls in some of strategies implement by these domestic intelligence agencies in their respective countries
2- Extensive use of intelligence services in local community and reliance on information derived from HUMINT information (p. 35). Australia in particular posses a public outreach programs that emphasizes on increasing public understanding and awareness of its role, and building public trust, that can be helpful for the US (p. 37). In the countries examined in the RAND study, the emphasis on HUMINT and community intelligence/outreach was done through their domestic intelligence agencies, however, in the US in absence of such agency, this strategy can be pursued by FBI Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) spread throughout the country, but under the direct control of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and/or the NCTC not the FBI itself, which is one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission (Burch, 2007, p. 15)
Therefore, creating a domestic intelligence agency seem to be natural, especially that a series of reform initiatives from 1998 to 2001have not been able to reshape the culture within the existing intelligence agencies, especially the FBI, which seem to be resistant to change. A domestic intelligence agency that has the organizational strategic structure to effectively and precisely perform its mission of information gathering relying mainly on HUMINT and local community intelligence; effectively coordinate and share information with law enforcement and other foreign intelligence; governed by the constitutional safeguards to prevent the abuse of its power in surveillance and monitoring of private citizens for political gain, and is subject to independent internal and external oversight, can be the most valuable tool in the fight against terrorism
References
Chalk, P. & Rosenau, W. (2004). Confronting the "Enemy Within”: Security intelligence,
the police, and counterterrorism in four Democracies , RAND, retrieved from
http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG100/*Public Site
Gray, C. (2002). Thinking asymmetrically in times of terror. Parameters: US Army War
College, 32(1), 5. Retrieved from Academic Search Premier Database
Hoffman, B. (2001, March). Combating terrorism: In search of a national Strategy,
RAND. Retrieved from: http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT175/index.html
Lieven, A. (2001, October). Fighting terrorism: Lessons from the Cold War. Policy Brief,
Carnegie Endowment. Retrieved from:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=811
Pillar, P. (2001). Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1st ed. Washington Dc: Brooking
Institution Press
Posen, B. (2001, December). The Struggle against terrorism: Grand strategy and tactics
. International Security, 26 (3)
US National Strategy Against Terrorism. Retrieved from
https://norwich.angellearning.com/AngelUploads/Content/MDY_LOR_2008_12/_assoc/mdy_s6_terror/pdf/nsct2006.pdf
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