Key elements in counterterrorism strategies

Paul Pillar in 2001 argued that terrorism deserves to be condemned and actively opposed by all the world’s nations because it involves conduct that offend universal values involving human life and the suffering of innocents. In this regard, counterterrorism is of a piece with international humanitarian law as it has evolved for more than a century and been codified in The Hague and Geneva conventions on the conduct of warfare and is a similarly apt subject for multilateral diplomacy (Pillar, p. 78)

Following the attacks of 9/11, the US National Security Strategy became multifaceted, and more focused as far as its threat assessment and its articulation of the nature of the “new terrorism” the country faces, compared to pre 9/11. The presence of a comprehensive, integrated and more coordinated national strategy that includes several intelligence, law enforcement and security agencies highlights the main characteristics of counterterrorism (CT) today (Hoffman, 2001; Lieven, 2001, p. 1)

Furthermore, as Pillar explained, there are several elements upon which this new post 9/11 counterterrorism strategy should address, which includes: Roots, capabilities, intentions and defenses (pp. 29-40). According to Pillar, no single approach makes an effective counterterrorism policy, which must have several elements these elements.

1- Roots

Terrorism does not arise randomly (Pillar, 2001, p. 30). Nonetheless, the National Security Strategy for the US lacks a clear understanding of the roots of terrorism’s asymmetric threats (Gray, 2002, p. 5), and consequently, a clear strategy to deal with and address these threats, without which CT today remains ineffective in its ability to prevent future terrorist attack.

A major flaw in the US national counterterrorism strategy is its downplaying of the role of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the perceived US bias towards Israel among Arabs/Muslims public opinion, as well as the US policies in Iraq during the period of economic sanctions ending with the Iraq war as some of the causes of Islamist terrorism (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006, p. 8)

Another flaw in the US national counterterrorism strategy is its mischaracterization of the Al Qaeda (AQ)’s reasons of waging jihad against the “US and the crusaders” as their hatred towards Western civilization, freedom and democracy, which is not what AQ’s literature clearly indicated.

Barry Posen, in 2001/2002, argued that AQ targeted the US mainly for its policies in the Middle East responsible for the killing and suffering of millions of Muslims in countries such as Iraq, the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and imposing upon Muslims a Western culture deeply offensive to traditional Islam (p. 1). Furthermore, the US military presence in Saudi Arabia is considered by bin Laden as a desecration of the Islamic holy land. Posen’s argument seem to correlate more accurately with AQ’s statements and videotapes released in Arabic

Furthermore, the US national counterterrorism strategy emphasized the role of democracy in combating terrorism through the”advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy.” (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,2006, p.8). However, democracy promotion does not seem to be a priority for the current US administration, which eased up pressure exerted by the Bush administration on autocratic regimes to in the Middle East to democratize, in favor of their cooperation the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, Iran, and other areas that serves the interests of the US. Therefore, the lack of consistency in US foreign policies in the Middle East represents a gap in the US counterterrorist strategy

Anatol Lieven in 2001 argued that the US Global War On Terror (GWOT) should be waged in a fashion similar to the Cold War and drawing from its lessons (p. 1). He makes a valid argument that the USG should have basic knowledge of the Arab and Muslim world culture, traditions, value systems, and religious sects, as it conduct its WOT, by incorporating experts in these areas (p. 2). A need to build “culturally sophisticated profiles of asymmetric foes, so that we may stand some chance of understanding what might best discourage them from proceeding”, as Colin Gray argued in 2002 (p.11). Such knowledge and familiarity, according to Lieven, will enable the US to rightfully characterize the “enemy” and avoid alienating the majority of those in the Muslim world who perceive the WOT as a war on Islam (P. 2)


However, as Paul Pillar argued, doing something about the roots involves the management of numerous foreign policy matters that are not primarily the responsibility of people in counterterrorism (p. 30), which remains a challenge in itself. Some of these grievances are expressed directly by terrorists such as political repression, lack of self-determination, the depravity of other rulers (p. 30). Therefore, policy initiatives, peace progress, political reforms and economic reforms should be made part of measures aimed at addressing the roots of terrorism (p. 31). Furthermore, counterterrorism is not the only consideration in determining US policies. Some things that are potentially terrorist-breeding and considered unjust, may be viewed by the US for politically and ethically sound reasons, as not unjust and in no need for major change (p. 32)

Moreover, there will always remain a core of incorrigibles’ roots of terrorism, and these will include terrorists about whom the US must worry the most. Their viewpoints are simply too extreme to be accommodated (Pillar, 2001, p. 32)

2- Capabilities

Reducing the capabilities of terrorist groups to conduct attacks is at the heart of US counterterrorism programs. However, terrorists can still inflict mass casualties, which might not require much capability.

3- Intentions

Why do terrorists do what they do, matters. Nonetheless, no matter what the terrorists’ intentions are, the US has made its policy that it will make no concessions to terrorists, because not rewarding terrorism will give terrorists less incentive to try using it again (Pillar, 2001, p. 35). Although the US at times made concessions to terrorism, e.g. Iran-Contra affair, the incorrigibility of some hardcore terrorists’ demands is the main limitation of this element of counterterrorism, and therefore, there is no way to influence their intentions over long term (p. 37)

4- Defenses

Defenses against terrorism include security measures, anti-terrorist defenses, and physical defenses. The anti-terrorist defenses constitute a very large proportion f the US fight against terrorism (Pillar, 2001, p. 37). Furthermore, research and development of new antiterrorist technologies continues through the Technical Support Working Group created by the federal government (p. 38)

However, as Pillar argued, the comprehensive protection for everything in the terrorists’ sights would be prohibitively expensive (Pillar, 2001, p. 39). As the Crowe panel acknowledged, “We understand that there will never be enough money to do all that should be done, we will have to live with partial solutions, and in turn, a high level of threat and vulnerability for quite sometimes. Furthermore, terrorists themselves shift their targets depending on the limitations due to security countermeasures (p. 39)
Counterterrorist instruments

In order to ensure that a counterterrorism strategy contains some or all main four elements mentioned above, Paul Pillar in 2001, suggested five various instruments to be implemented. He argued that all instruments needs to be employed and that each element can be pursued with more than one instrument (p. 73)
These instruments of counterterrorism strategy include:

1- Diplomacy

Diplomacy influences all elements of counterterrorism, including roots, intentions, capabilities and defenses. Through diplomacy, the US can seek peace, improve its image, and persuade allies to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and combat anti-Americanism.

Therefore, effective counterterrorist diplomacy must be practiced not only by Foreign Service Officers, but also by immigration officers, FBI agents, CIA officers, and all other branches of government (Pillar, 2001, p. 74)

Counterterrorism diplomacy supports other instruments, including the application of criminal law by negotiating treaties and extraditing terrorist fugitives among states. By encouraging states not to allow terrorist groups to operate within their borders, the time and effort spent by intelligence services can then be limited and directed into other avenues (Pillar, 2001, p. 75). In order for counterterrorist diplomacy to be effective, cooperation from other states is necessary, which can be achieved through bilateral or multilateral negotiations leading to more powerful resolutions. Multilateral resolutions, e.g. UN, G8, or NATO, can provide more latitude to obtain cooperation by countries that are reluctant to bear its responsibilities in the GWOT. The case of Pan Am 103 and the implementation of UN Resolutions forcing Libya through multilateral diplomacy to cooperate in the investigations that led to successfully prosecuting those responsible for the crime (p. 76). Moreover, collective interventions through multilateral diplomacy reinforce international norms against use of terrorism (p. 77)

Among the major achievements of multilateral counterterrorist diplomacy is the rejection by the international community and UN General Assembly of terrorism as tactic against occupation, which was used predominately and condoned during the 1970. The Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, which met from 1974 to 1977, adopted a protocol that diluted the legal distinction between armed conflict and terrorist acts when it defined a combatant as someone who belongs to the “armed forces of a party to the conflict” needs to distinguish himself from the civilian population only “while….engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack (Pillar, 2001, p. 79)
Criminal law

Despite its shortcomings, applying the rule of law in terrorist cases remains a fundamental part in counterterrorism. The US national security will be served better when terrorists get punished for what they have done, which in turn, not only prevent them from conducting further attacks, but also might deter others from committing more acts of terrorism (Pillar, 2001,p. 81) Moreover, applying the rule of law reinforces democratic principles of the US, with freedom and justice their basic tenets.

However, bringing justice to terrorists through imprisonment or even capital punishment might not be effective deterrence with terrorists who are driven by religious ideology, and whose ultimate goal is to seek death to become martyrs. Furthermore, terrorists might exploit the legal system and use trials in open courts to disseminate propaganda for their cause, seek to justify their violence, and alter public perception regarding the nature of their heinous crimes. Often, the targeted audience in such propaganda would be the sympathizers and potential recruits, who the terrorists are keen on not losing their support.

Pillar, in 2001, warned of potential complacency when applying criminal justice in counterterrorism, which can be manifested through:

1- Confusing criminal justice as an instrument of counterterrorism with counterterrorism itself (p. 81). In other words, because criminal justice is focused on the punishment of terrorists after they commit their crimes, the main goal of counterterrorism should always remain the prevention of terrorists from conducting future operations

2- Prosecuting and successfully convicting terrorists might give a misleading sense of closure on terrorist crimes, that are still open, and terrorists will continue to plan and conduct their operations (Pillar, 2001, p. 82)

Although criminal justice has been playing an increasingly essential role in international counterterrorism efforts, applying criminal justice in terrorism cases remains a national issue, which Pillar argued could be because of various reasons, among them,

1- Difficulty to prosecute foreign terrorists and gather evidence that would stand in court, since most of the investigations require unfettered cooperation by foreign governments and may compromise intelligence sources. The federal government enacted the Classified Information Procedure Act (CIPA) in order to protect sensitive information during trials (Pillar, 2001, p. 85)

2- Lack of cooperation by some foreign governments despite of their commitments to the fight against terrorism. This ambivalence might be stemming from notions of sovereignty and national laws that might prohibit extradition or oppose capital punishment, in addition to political or public pressure on the governments not be perceived as collaborating with the USG, especially in some of the Middle East countries where anti-Americanism is influencing public sentiment. For example, the Khubar Towers and African embassy bombings cases (Pillar, 2001, p. 87)

3- Legal challenges in the application of international law governing extraterritorial prosecution of terrorists. The extraterritorial application for the US criminal law to terrorism relies heavily on cooperation of other states (Pillar, 2001, p. 86)

Therefore, due to the global nature of terrorism, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was proposed as a viable forum to prosecute terrorists, withstanding the various logistical hurdles and objections by major states including the US. Concerns were voiced regarding the mechanisms of handling of sensitive material and possible exploitation of intelligence sources (Pillar, 2001, p. 89).

Transferring suspected terrorists to other countries, such as Israel and several “moderate” Muslim states, for interrogation and possible prosecution, appeared to be an attractive option for USG in order to avoid possible retaliation by terrorist groups, or offending Muslim population (Pillar, 2001, pp. 91-92). However, when news about rendition operations becomes public, as in the case of CIA secret transfer of terrorist suspects to countries accused of poor human rights records and torture, the harm to US interests can be more.
Financial Controls

Contrary to common belief, controlling finances of terrorist groups and individuals plays a modest and secondary role in counterterrorism (pp. 93-94). Freezing terrorists’ monies and financial assets can undermine their ability to operate, that’s why the US has pursued their financial livelihood. Among other challenges facing financial war on terrorism is the fact the most of the financial operations take place outside the US, where, similar to criminal justice, foreign countries’ cooperation in clamping down on terrorists finances have not been limited (p. 95).

Furthermore, terrorist networks have developed multiple channels to move money around the globe outside the formal banking systems, therefore it is difficult to track. Moreover, terrorism is cheap, which makes impossible to eradicate (p. 94). It does not require significant sums of monies to blow up a truck or destroy a building in order to spread fear and make political statement.

Therefore, as Pillar argued, the value of the financial control instrument in counterterrorism will always be more symbolic demonstrating the US seriousness in countering terrorism than the material one of impoverishing terrorist groups (p. 96)
Military Force

Pillar argued that the use of military force in counterterrorism must always be an instrument available for the US to undermine terrorists’ capabilities, although it should be limited to punitive retaliatory situations (p. 99) where a high standard of proof in establishing responsibility for terrorist incident can be maintained (p. 107). He added that the cost of using military force unwisely can be staggering, especially on the diplomatic and international relations fronts, where the US is often perceived as superpower using its military muscle offensively (p. 106).

Despite of public domestic support to retaliatory military strikes against terrorist targets, foreign reactions have been mixture of cynicism and criticism of the real US intentions (p. 107). Furthermore, opponents of use of military force argue there has been no concrete evidence to conclude that military strikes have been successful in weakening terrorists’ capabilities and prevent them from conducting future attacks (pp. 102-103)

Furthermore, the use of destructive and indiscriminatory military force in retaliation to terrorist attacks have inflamed public opinion especially in the Muslim world, and have contributed to rising anti-Americanism. Since the US has began utilizing its military forces to in counterterrorism, all countries that have been attacks were Muslim, including Libya in 1986, Iraq in 1993, Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, ending with the invasion of Iraq in 2002 following the attacks of 9/11 (p. 100). Therefore, the US was portrayed by radical Islamists as the new “crusader” seeking to kill Muslims and strike poor Muslim nations (p. 107).

The use of military force as a counterterrorist instrument should be lethal, precise, and based on sound, credible and reliable intelligence in order to destroy terrorists’ capabilities and prevent future attacks with the least amount of collateral damage. This task can be best achieved by the Special Forces, which is the center of the US military’s capabilities to apply armed force to terrorists (p. 98)
Intelligence and Covert Action

Intelligence supports all the other counterterrorist instruments, with specific information as well as strategic assessments (p. 116). Therefore, it’s the most substantial instrument of counterterrorism (p.110). Human and tactical intelligence are the two main arms for information collection about terrorists, followed by meticulous process of information analysis, that should involve and coordinate with all other branches of security (pp. 110-112)

However, inherent problems and limitations with both collection and analysis of intelligence on terrorism undermine the feasibility of tactical warnings of potential terrorist attacks (p. 115). Similar to some of the European countries, some argue that the creation of a stand-alone domestic intelligence services entity is in the US is a necessary tool for CT, in order to address the limitations in intelligence information collection and analysis.

Rosenau and Chalk in 2004 argued that although significant cultural, historical, and political differences exist between the US and other countries examined in their study, and that intelligence institutions cannot and be replicated from one country to the other, there are in these countries measures that can be adopted by the US (p. XV), among them are:

1- Creating a domestic intelligence agency that focuses solely on information gathering, penetrating terrorist cells, but has no law enforcement capabilities (p. 43). However, there is no evidence to suggest that the presence of domestic intelligence agencies have actually been effective in preventing terrorist attacks in these countries, compared to what we have today in the US. The Bombings in London, Bali and Mumbai serve as example of the shortfalls in some of strategies implement by these domestic intelligence agencies in their respective countries

2- Extensive use of intelligence services in local community and reliance on information derived from HUMINT information (p. 35). Australia in particular posses a public outreach programs that emphasizes on increasing public understanding and awareness of its role, and building public trust, that can be helpful for the US (p. 37). In the countries examined in the RAND study, the emphasis on HUMINT and community intelligence/outreach was done through their domestic intelligence agencies, however, in the US in absence of such agency, this strategy can be pursued by FBI Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) spread throughout the country, but under the direct control of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and/or the NCTC not the FBI itself, which is one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission (Burch, 2007, p. 15)

Therefore, creating a domestic intelligence agency seem to be natural, especially that a series of reform initiatives from 1998 to 2001have not been able to reshape the culture within the existing intelligence agencies, especially the FBI, which seem to be resistant to change. A domestic intelligence agency that has the organizational strategic structure to effectively and precisely perform its mission of information gathering relying mainly on HUMINT and local community intelligence; effectively coordinate and share information with law enforcement and other foreign intelligence; governed by the constitutional safeguards to prevent the abuse of its power in surveillance and monitoring of private citizens for political gain, and is subject to independent internal and external oversight, can be the most valuable tool in the fight against terrorism


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