Overcoming impediments to international cooperation against terrorism

Transnational terrorism waged by Islamist terrorists represents a major challenge to international security, which necessitates an unwitting cooperation by all countries in order to effectively confront this asymmetric and unpredictable form of threat (Gray, 2002, pp. 8-11). The Global war on terrorists is not only a battle of arms and ideas (Posen, 2002, p.1), but also a battle for the hearts and minds, where all elements of international power including intelligence; law enforcement; military; financial, diplomatic and intellectual to defeat the terrorists and isolate their radical ideology that inspired others to join or support them (Probst, 2001, pp. 4-5: Posen, 2002, p.1))

Effective international cooperation in the war against terrorists cannot be achieved without addressing the impediments to such cooperation; among them are the lack of international agreement on the definition of terrorism itself, and placing domestic politics and national interests ahead of those of the international community as a whole. Using examples from ongoing policy efforts describe impediments to international cooperation against terrorism and assess ways in which these impediments can be overcome

Barry Posen in 2001 argued that the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States today is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends (p. 5). Al Qaeda (AQ), formed by Salafi Jihadists and led by Osama Ben Laden (OBL), perpetuated the most horrific terrorist attack in history on September the 11th, in New York and Washington, and is the main transnational Islamist terrorist group that exists today. AQ is seeking to establish pan-Islamic regime, create and exploit a division between the Muslim and non-Muslim world and within the Muslim world itself, and ignite a clash of civilizations, which OBL himself firmly believes

Therefore, the war on Islamist terrorism cannot be won without winning the war of ideas, which require the cooperation between the Muslim world and the West in particular, and among the entire nations in general. Such cooperation will not be achieved without reaching a common ground based on the shared human values and address the impediments that undermine international cooperation in the war on terrorism. Among these impediments are:

1- Absence of international agreement on the definition of terrorism

Islamist terrorism is not monolithic (Posen, 2001, p.5). Most of the ME and the Muslim world doesn't see eye for eye with the West in their classification of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), and in this regard, unlike AQ, HAMAS and Hezbollah are not considered terrorist organizations, but rather resistance movements against Israeli occupation (Bahgat, p. 58). John Waszark in 2004 argued that “the major weapon in the arsenal of the counterterrorist financing regime is the criminalization of material support for terrorist Organizations” (p. 683). Therefore, support to these organizations lie at the heart of disagreement between the West and Muslim world and is a major impediment to the war on Islamist terrorism, where the vast majority of the public, according to opinion polls in the Muslim world, are not willing to alter their financial practices to comply with anti-terrorism written laws (p. 692)

Furthermore, Gawdat Bahgat in 2004 explained how the opposition to US policies in the ME, Israel’s support, “America’s failure to be even-handed” in the Arab-Israeli conflict, invasion of Iraq, and labeling the GWOT as war against Islam, have contributed to rising anti-Americanism in the Muslim world in which terrorists and terrorism breed (p. 58).

Palestinian suffering is a very sensational issue across the Muslim world, and is a weapon that has been used very effectively by terrorists, especially AQ, to rally support and win sympathy for their action and also to feed into anti-Americanism. Therefore, dealing with Palestinian terrorism with its complexities through a separate strategy and within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and not through narrow definitions that no one can agree on, will isolate AQ and give more momentum to the war on terrorism, which will be then defined as the brand of AQ terrorism. Consequently, the parameters for designating FTO need to be revisited, in which a distinction must be made between Islamist terrorist organizations with global agenda that use terrorist as a strategy, such as AQ, and other insurgencies that might of have used terrorism as a tactic during an armed conflict, but no longer do so, such as HAMAS and Hezbollah. Therefore, making such distinction, and engaging HAMAS and Hezbollah, provided that they end their terrorism against Israeli civilians, will pave the way to ending the blockade against Palestinians in Gaza which is galvanizing anti-American and sentiments in the region and aiding terrorists

2- Lack of clear understanding of foreign culture, especially Muslim culture

There is an inherent need by people in any country, religion or culture for prosperity, freedom and justice and aspiring to these values is not exclusive of particular countries or group of countries. In the Muslim world, tradition plays an important role, and most of these traditions stem from religion. Therefore, Anatol Lieven argued in 2001 that the USG should have basic knowledge of the Arab and Muslim world culture, traditions, value systems, and religious sects, as it conduct its GWOT. Such understanding of Muslim culture will help the GWOT on two fronts:

A) Build “culturally sophisticated profiles of asymmetric foes, so that we may stand some chance of understanding what might best discourage them [Islamist terrorists] from proceeding”, as Colin Gray argued in 2002 (p.11). Peter Probst in 2001 argued the greatest threat to national security that the US fails to appreciate remains problems of mindset and perception, which impacts terrorists thinking, operations, strategy, tactics, and planning (p. 4). Probst added that terrorists’ perception is their reality, and we must understand this reality through their lenses not through ours, which is colored by culture, history, personal experience and bureaucracy (p. 4)

B) Such knowledge and familiarity, according to Lieven, will enable the US to rightfully characterize the “enemy” and avoid alienating the majority of those in the Muslim world who perceive the GWOT as a war on Islam (p. 2). Furthermore, as George Perkovich in his fascinating 2005’s article “ Giving justice its due” argued it will enable us to realize how the ME today, contrary to Western thinking, is striving for justice more than freedom, and that should be the emphasis of US policies towards the Muslim world.

3- Respect of International Law, human rights and civil liberties

Several analysts criticize the GWOT, especially the US Patriot Act, and the war on Iraq for their encroachment on civil liberties, violating acceptable procedures of International Law, and creating the impression that US relies on brute force and undermines legal norms, which consequently compromise the international cooperation in the war on terrorists (Best, p. 26). Some argued that waging wars of choice on other countries in absence of credible and reliable evidence that they represented an imminent threat US (Record, 2003, p. 43 & p. 18)

The US cannot afford to lose the support of friendly nations in the war on terrorists, where security services of these nations can be important sources of information for US intelligence; they know their neighborhoods and have access that US agencies do not (Deutch & Smith, 2002, p. 65). Therefore, the US must work with the international organizations and avoid unilateral actions that threaten international unity.

However, as the nature of the enemy we face today has changed, and as governments are obliged to respect international law and make an effort to preserve civil liberties, people themselves, particularly in the US, might need to change their perception on what constitute violation of civil liberties and what does not.

Chalk and Rosenau explained how the European public opinion generally accepts government intrusion into citizens' personal life as "necessary evil" (p. 51). However, in the US, the single largest obstacle to domestic intelligence remains cultural, given the history and structure of the US, where "most Americans don’t like to feel that they are being spied upon by their government or neighbors (Burch, 2007, p. 19). Where to draw a line between security needs and civil liberties, is a question that Americans themselves are ought to reconcile and without infusing partisan politics in order to provide our intelligence agencies with the necessary tools to fight this asymmetric form of threat to our national security

4- Conflict with domestic politics

Since domestic politics often shape a country’s foreign policy decisions, governments tend to appease their domestic audience sometimes at the expense of its international standing and credibility. Barry Posen, in 2002, argued how the US has often failed to act out of fear of incurring modest costs; it has applied insufficient pressure on Israel to suppress its settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza. He added that short-term domestic political gains or losses has often dominated decision-making (p 6), which has significantly hurt the US foreign policies, especially in the Middle East, and hence undermine the international cooperation in the fight against terrorists.

Furthermore, domestic partisan politics can also undermine our intelligence and law enforcement capabilities and distract reform efforts. For example, although the US has a solid legal oversight structure, however, the lack of bipartisan approach and the politicization of intelligence reforms represent an obstacle to effectively implement these reform initiatives. Burch in 2007, argued how the CIA was insulated from partisan politics from 1947-1967 because secrecy normally expected by intelligence agency was maintained and congressional knowledge and monitoring of intelligence operations was very limited (p. 3). Therefore, having less legislative and more judicial and/or independent internal oversight might be the best approach to shield national security agencies from partisan politics, as it is happening in Italy, France and other European countries

Moreover, as the 2004’s National Commission Report on terrorists financings have indicated, domestic politics has also played a role in countries like Saudi Arabia, where the balance that the government has tried to strike between the Wahhabi clergy and the more liberal ruling elite, have rendered the Saudis skeptical of US new strategies in the war on terrorism, until the country itself became a victim of a series of terrorist attacks from May of 2003 and November of 2004. Since then, Saudi Arabia viewed AQ as a domestic threat (p. 123) and has dramatically increased its cooperation with the US in the fight against terrorism to an unprecedented level (p. 126), stepped up their crackdown on terrorist financiers, captured or killed many AQ suspects and disrupted several terrorist cells (pp. 124-128)


5- Differences in Intelligence and law enforcement agencies’ structures and philosophy from one country to the other

According to Chalk and Rosenau, 2004’s comparative study of four European countries—UK, France, Canada and Australia—differences exist in the culture and modes of operations between these countries and their counterparts in the US, despite of shared strengths and weaknesses in their operational and organizational structure. These differences might stall cooperation and adds to layers of bureaucracy and create some difficulties coordinating policies and strategies. Furthermore, foreign counterterrorism agencies, which include intelligence and law enforcement, might not have the same guidelines that regulate the balance between national security and civil liberties. Therefore, the quality of information gathered by intelligence, as well as its credibility might be undermined, especially if a country has history of human rights abuses, torture or racial discrimination, or if some countries perceive certain intelligence information politically motivated, which can prevent some countries from acting upon intelligence information gathered by that country

Among the various reasons cited in 2004’s National Commission’s report on terrorist financing for Saudis’ lack of cooperation with the US their inaction against Islamic charities, such as HIF, suspected of financing terrorists, was the lack of specific and credible intelligence available for the Saudis to move against these organizations

6- Deconflating the threat

Jeffrey Record in 2003 argued that in declaring the “we [US] make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them” (p. 10), the US broadened the scope of its enemies, risked international and popular support, and undermined the resources to fight wars of necessity by lumping in the same basket all terrorist organizations, in addition to rouge states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and failed states, such as Afghanistan, instead of focusing on AQ and Islamist terrorists as the main threat to US (p. 13 & p. 18). Therefore Record argued that while transnational terrorist organizations’ most potent protection is statelessness (p. 16) therefore they are undeterrable, there is no evidence that rouge states, such as North Korea and Iran, are not subject to effective deterrence (p. 17).

7- lack of written anti-terrorism laws in some countries and lack of enforcement

Among the major hurdles in waging an effective global financial war on terrorism is the lack of written anti-terrorism laws in some countries to disrupt the financial networks funneling monies to terrorists, or the lack of enforcement of such laws when they exist.

John Waszak in 2005 argued that “the problem of suppressing terrorist financing is not necessarily one of the laws or law enforcement. Rather, the suppression of terrorist financing is made difficult for [various] non-legal reasons” (p. 707), which include:

1- Sensitivity and restraint: since terrorists rely, among other sources, on money collected from Islamic charities and mandatory zakat paid by Muslim individuals and businesses, it will is logistically difficult to sort out and clamp down on terrorist finances without running into the risk of restricting one of the main pillars Islam—zakat—and offending majority of mainstream Muslims. Therefore, counterterrorist strategists must communicate effectively with Muslim leaders and communities in the US and “be sensitive to peaceful followers of Islam not materially supportive of terrorism or terrorist organizations” (pp. 707-708)

2- Lack of financial intelligence network with the essential resources and tools for law enforcement: The building of such global network requires strong political and economic will by countries which are major international players in the fight against terrorism, such as US, Saudi Arabia and UAE. This will might be lacking in some countries because of several complex political, economic, and cultural reasons that must be addressed by policy makers (pp. 708-709).

Therefore, micromanaging an unfocused financial war on terrorism by going after every individual, charity, business or organization with suspected ties or links to terrorists, can be exhaustive, and will create an atmosphere of phobia that is counterproductive. It will be more effective to focus on identifying and detecting patterns of financial transactions that can predict early phases of terrorists’ operations. This can be achieved by combining financial information with counterterrorist intelligence, coordination between financial institutions, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, outreach to the private sector, and rely on diplomacy to achieve international engagement and ending state sponsorship of terrorism (FATF, pp. 29-35)


Conclusion

The Global war on Islamist terrorists is not only a battle of arms and ideas, but also a battle for the hearts and minds, where all elements of international power including intelligence; law enforcement; military; financial, diplomatic and intellectual to defeat the terrorists and isolate their radical ideology that inspired others to join or support them. Therefore, the war on terrorism cannot be won without winning the war of ideas, which require the cooperation between the Muslim world and the West in particular, and the entire world in general. Such cooperation will not be achieved without reaching a common ground based on the shared human values and addressing the impediments that undermine international cooperation in the war on terrorism.

International cooperation can be achieved by formulating new strategy in the GWOT that does not deal with Islamist terrorism as a monolithic threat. A distinction must be made between Islamist terrorist organizations with global agenda that use terrorist as a strategy, such as AQ, and other insurgencies that used terrorism as a tactic during an armed conflict, but no longer do so, such as HAMAS and Hezbollah. Dealing with Palestinian terrorism with its complexities through a separate strategy and within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and not through narrow definitions that no one can agree on, will isolate AQ and give more momentum to the war on terrorism.

Better understanding and appreciation of the Arab and Muslim world culture, traditions, value systems, and religious sects, will avoid alienating the majority of those in the Muslim world who perceive the GWOT as a war on Islam, and will help shape counterterrorism based on terrorists’ perception, and therefore reduce intelligence gaps and vulnerabilities

Furthermore, broadening the scope of enemies by lumping deterrable rouge states and undeterrable transnational terrorist groups will risk international agreement and unity and compromise cooperation.

As governments are obliged to uphold International Law, respect human rights, and work within international norms, peoples also need to redraw the line between national security and civil liberties, where sacrifice of some the personal freedoms might be necessary in order to meet the challenges of the new transnational terrorist threat posed by non state actors.

Effective international cooperation can also be achieved by improving quality of intelligence and seeking better coordination between law enforcement and intelligence services in different countries. Identifying and detecting patterns of financial transactions that can predict early phases of terrorists’ operations. This can be achieved by combining financial information with counterterrorist intelligence, coordination between financial institutions, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, outreach to the private sector, and rely on diplomacy to achieve international engagement and ending state sponsorship of terrorism


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